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05021948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 241 held on 5 February, 1948


 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 241 held on 5 February, 1948

 

Before going into the substance of the questions under discussion, I should like to offer a suggestion in regard to our procedure. We have heard lengthy statements from the representatives of India and Pakistan, and we are now in the course of a general discussion I suggest that at the conclusion of this general discussion the President again enter into direct conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan to explore the possibility of narrowing the differences and of finding new solutions which would be acceptable to both parties.

 

With regard to the substance of the questions under discussion, when I last spoke in the Security Council on the draft resolutions submitted by the representative of Belgium (documents S/661 and S/662), I was under the erroneous impression that they had been agreed to by the representatives of India and Pakistan. I have learned that this is not the case. However, I do not mean to suggest that today I intend to withdraw my support of the draft resolution, I find that those draft resolutions, while going in the right direction, may

 

not meet the case and, therefore, require further consideration. Some parts might be amplified and other parts modified. The suggestion has been made that an interim regime be set up in Kashmir. If the President should accept my suggestion for the two parties to enter into direct negotiations the suggestion of an interim regime might be explored in detail during these private conversations. I would, however, make a further suggestion in relation

 

to this matter. In view of the constitutional relationship, it might be that the representative of India would find it difficult to make Kashmir accept the suggestion of an interim government. In that case, we shall again find ourselves deadlocked, without any further possibilities as to a solution.

 

An interim regime is, in fact, a government limited as to time. A government today performs a multitude of functions. What we are interested in is that the plebiscite to be conducted in the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be really free. In that case, is it necessary for the Security Council to recommend that an entire new regime should be set up ? Furthermore, the question of the competence of the Security Council might be raised with regard to that suggestion. Therefore, I suggest that the Security Council try to provide electoral machinery under which a free plebiscite would be carried out. Instead of embracing all the functions of the government, we should concentrate on that aspect which concerns us; that is, the plebiscite. I also suggest that a further canvass be made of the parties in the private talks which I hape will be conducted after this general discussion.

 

Another idea occurs to me. Both the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan have stressed the urgency of the situation. They wish their problems solved as soon as possible. Now it is clear that the fighting should be stopped as soon as possible. It seems to me that the Security Council might well recommend to the Government of Pakistan that its legal and moral influence should be thrown in the direction of pacification, and that the tribesmen should be stopped from further fighting.

 

I do not think that sort of recommendation is sufficient by itself from both a factual and a psychological standpoint. I would therefore add the further recommendation that the Security Council appeal to the Government of India to withdraw its troops progressively from Kashmir.

In regard to the question of the restoration of peace, as well as in regard to the conduct of the plebiscite, I suggest that, after the fundamental principles have been determined in the Security Council, we leave large discretionary powers to the Commission of the Security Council on the Jammu and Kashmir question, which will be in touch with the personalities, movements and groups in India and Pakistan, and which might, on the spot, discover a solution-practical, technical procedures in line with the principles decided upon here, which the Security Council, from a distance, cannot produce.