28011948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noel Baker (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 236 held on 28 January, 1948

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noel Baker (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 236 held on 28 January, 1948

The point which arose in discussion between the representatives of India and of Pakistan was which question should be discussed first which of the various issues which energy in the documents now laid before us? Should it be the plebiscite, or should it be what the representative of India regards as overwhelmingly the most important matter before us, namely, stopping the fighting in Kashmir. If the question is put like that, I do not know that I have any very fixed or dogmatic views. It is clear to me that now that we have had time to look at the documents and I hope we shall go on tomorrow morning having studied them more fully-the Security Council ought to discuss the substance of the problem on the basis of these documents, and of the statements already made by the parties and any further statements they may care to make.

On the order of the points, there may be various views. My own, as I say, is not at all dogmatic. It is that I incline to agree with the suggestion made by the President that we should discuss the plebiscite first. Why? Not at all because I am against the view expressed by the representative of India that stopping the fighting is our most urgent task. I agree with him very fully. I have said so already, and I have quoted his own words. As we sit at this table and exchange legal and other technical observations, we must remember constantly that there are vast masses of women and children suffering as refugees, and men dying at the battle. The representative of India said this afternoon that the situation is deteriorating from day to day. We are, then, confronted with the question of how to stop the fighting. What will stop it, and in what way should it be stopped?

I do not believe for a moment that the Indian delegation or the Indian Government desire to stop this fighting by a military victory if it can be stopped by any other means. They do not want to crush those who are up in arms against their troops at this moment if they can be brought to an agreement in another way. They want them to stop fighting, as we all do, because they are convinced that it is not necessary for them to go on fighting; in other words, because the Kashmiris can secure peace, safety for their families, and a free choice as to the future of their country without any more fighting. Everyone must agree that no matter what measures are taken, by way of refusing supplies, and so on, the process of stopping the fighting by a military victory may be long and bloody, This is not a new point between the representative of India and myself. I have said it to him a number of times. He is familiar with my views. Stopping the fighting by the sword has rarely proved, in history, to be a satisfactory way. It would not be very good preparation for a plebiscite. It is utterly out of accord with the philosophy and the thinking of the two Governments which have been wise enough to bring this dispute here to us today.

What these two Governments want, and what we all want, is that the moral power and authority of the Security Council be brought to bear on the situation so that there can be a conviction on all sides that justice is to prevail, and that violence need not go on. Moreover, our object is not only to stop the fighting, but to keep it stopped. We have to arrive at a settlement which will prevent a new outbreak.

The fundamental difference of view between the two parties is on the question: To which Dominion shall the people of Kashmir accede? But they both hold the view that question is to be settled by the free expression of the people of Kashmir I say in parenthesis that if that is done, the divergence of view-sometimes it might seem to outsiders to be bitterness-which this question of the future of Kashmir is now causing between parties, may easily disappear.

After the last war, there was a dispute between two Governments in Europe concerning a frontier laid down in the Paris Conference. It was not a large area that was in dispute ; it was a high and mountainous country like Kashmir, less rich and less beautiful than Kashmir, but very beautiful by European standards. The Governments came, I would not say near to war, but to a point of great tension They submitted the dispute to an international tribunal. An answer was returned. The parties agreed, and, within a year, they had made of that territory an international park dedicated to lasting agreement between the countries. In addition, they signed a treaty of all-in compulsory arbitration. I hope that this question, when solved by the Security Council, as I believe it will be, will lead to that kind of result. I further hope that the solution will make Kashmir not a dividing factor but a link between the parties, and that the people of Kashmir will benefit from the free and friendly cooperation of both Governments.

The cause which is now in dispute here, the cause of the fighting Kashmir, is question: which the two. shall In my conception infinitely the best to stop the fighting to assure those who are engaged in it a settlement will be arrived under which their rights will be assured. as the in our first talk after his arrival, in profound conviction, a settlement arrived quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as to the fighting, right up to the conduct of the plebiscite the end, is all one problem. 'Only when the combatants know what the future for will they agree to stop.

If have carried the members of the Security Council and, as hope, the representative of India, with me thus far, I might suggest that it would be wise to start with what all of us agree is a vital part of the settlement, upon which agreement has been reached; namely, the plebiscite. If the representative of India found at any moment that his views were being prejudiced or that his case was not being justly treated, then, of course, we could turn to another point to which he could divert our attention, or he would be able to correct us in any way. However, we are on firm ground if we discuss the three points on which, as the President reported, the parties are agreed; first, that three shall be a plebiscite to settle the question as to whether Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan; secondly, that this plebiscite must be held under condition which will guarantee its fairness and impartiality; and thirdly, that the plebiscite must be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

The formula which the President originally prepared has been improved by the amendments which he reported on this afternoon by the omission of the word "referendum", and by defining the object of the plebiscite as the choice of accession to India or to Pakistan. Therefore, I think that real progress has been made.

As the President stated, a further question arises as to what should follow from the use of the words "the auspices of the United Nations". As I understand it, that is the point under debate. I have views on that point. I do not express them at this moment because I am speaking on the procedural aspects.

I hope I have succeeded in making the Security Council and the parties concerned think that it would not be inconvenient to start with the plebiscite. Of course, this would not exclude anything else which the representative of India may think relevant to the points which come up. We should not thereby be putting off the question of stopping the fighting. Perhaps we might be accelerating it because the plebiscite is part of that process. It is the part on which we have reached agreement all around the table. If we can create confidence in the plebiscite, then perhaps all that the Indian representative desires may quickly follow.