12101962 Pakistan s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir
Pakistan s White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir
When reports of clashes between China and India in the Ladakh region were first received in October-November 1959. President Ayub Khan expressed concern at China's military advance. A strong representation to him from Mr. Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan's delegation to the General Assembly, persuaded him to change this line, at least in public.
On 12 October 1962, Prime Minister Nehru announced that he had ordered the Indian Army to clear the Chinese forces out of the disputed territory in the north. The Indian offensive provoked a decisive counter-attack from China all along the China-India border on 20 October. The result was a general retreat of the Indian Army. While large-scale fighting was in progress, Prime Minister Nehru addressed a letter to President Ayub Khan on 26 October which concluded with an appeal for Pakistan's "sympathy and support".
This was followed on 28 October by a letter from President Kennedy informing President Ayub Khan that the United States would render military assistance to India. The main assumption in the letter was that President Ayub Khan would share the alarm which the United States as a leader of the free world must take at any aggressive expansion of Communist power.
Accordingly it asked him to make a move of the greatest importance which only he could make. This was to signal to the Indians in a quiet but effective way that the concern, however unjustified, that had led them to maintain the greater part of their military power on their borders with Pakistan should be put aside in the present crisis. President Kennedy thought that perhaps an effective way would be a private message from President Ayub Khan to Mr. Nehru to count on Pakistan's taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India.
This was accompanied by similar suggestions from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said a message of 25 October to President Ayub Khan which said that China's "act of aggression" must be a cause of considerable concern to President Ayub Khan. In line with the thought that President Ayub Khan had put forward at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting earlier that year (10-19 September 1962) Prime Minister MacMillan hoped
"this external threat to the whole subcontinent" might indirectly have the effect of bringing Pakistan and India-closer together. In the British. view, it was indeed fortunate that at that crucial time Pakistan could count on President Ayub Khan's leadership.,
During the height of this crisis, President Ayub Khan continued a tour of Gilgit-far from the center of activity in the capital. As far as written correspondence goes, he sent replies to President Kennedy on 5 November and to Prime Minister MacMillan on 16 November, to question their reading of the situation which, he asserted, had developed as a consequence of India's "bending over backwards to appease Communism'' and her policy of intimidating and threatening Pakistan and abusing the West. But there are indications that he did not withhold the assurance the Western powers had sought. This is clear from the following narrative of development during those crucial days.
On 27 October, the US Ambassador in Delhi Mr. J.K. Gabraith, was provided with information that the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Mohammad Ali of Bogra, had told Mr. Duncan Sandys, the U.K. Secretary for Commonwealth relations, that Pakistan "would not make India's pain more difficult and "that India was in no danger of attack from Pakistan ''. On 28 October, the Pakistan Foreign Office instructed the ambassador in Washington that "our policy is to keep strictly out of the Sino-Indian conflict and also Cuban affairs' ' and we "do not want to be drawn into any public statements or assurances of any kind".
The Americans made no secret of the fact that they were in no position to compel India to make territorial concessions. On 27 November, the Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi, after meeting the military members of the Harriman Mission, had informed the Government that the United States felt that "at the present moment, it was not appropriate for Nehru to make territorial concessions to Pakistan in Kashmir" as "by doing so, when he was already greatly shaken and weakened, he would be committing political suicide". The Americans counselled that "Pakistan must, therefore, wait and not turn on pressure at the wrong moment".
The issue that was involved in the triangular situation with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in October-November 1962 needs to be clearly understood. A territory to which Pakistan has potentially a rightful claim, and in which it certainly had a stake, by the terms of natural justice as well those of the settlement of 1947 and the international agreement embodied in UNCIP resolutions of 13 August, 1948 and 6 January 1949, had become a scene of conflict because the power in illegal occupation of the bulk of this territory, India, chose to resist by force the claim of a third party, China, to an area which had never been demarcated by international agreement.
Pakistan had, therefore, a valid reason, indeed the obligation, to intervene in order to ensure that its own interests in Jammu and Kashmir were not jeopardised by the armed conflict between China and the occupying power, India.
Since also Pakistan had no ground, either in international law or in the national interest, to endorse even tacitly India's opposition to China's claim, such intervention would not have ranged it against China. Nor would it mean any perfidy. It was not a question of stabbing India in the back. Nor was it a matter of opportunism towards an ignoble end. Had India not committed a breach of its agreements with Pakistan with regard to Jammu and Kashmir? Had India not also conducted a relentless political campaign against Pakistan's alliance with the United States? Had India not-as President Ayub Khan put it also "abused the West?" What, therefore, justified Pakistan's neutrality in the China-India conflict? If, in such a situation, Pakistan would have asserted its independence and conveyed to the United States that it would act according to its own judgement of the situation and that it regarded the American evaluation as erroneous because this evaluation was made not from Pakistan's or Kashmir's vantage point but from Washington's and was also based on the fallacy of an elemental opposition between American and Chinese interests, Pakistan would not have betrayed its alliance with the United States. It must be recalled in this context that there did not at that time exist the disparity in military strength between Pakistan and India which was to handicap Pakistan in later years.
Against the background of Pakistan's inaction, the diplomatic intervention of the United States and Britain, through Mr Duncan Sandys, UK Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and Mr Averell Harriman, United States Under Secretary of State, to persuade India to make a renewed effort with Pakistan to resolve the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters, had but meagre prospects of success. It is only fair to acknowledge that these intermediaries, particularly Mr Sandys, made considerable exertions to make the talks achieve a result. A US Senator, Mr Mansfield, who also happened to be in Delhi, had used forceful language when advocating to Mr Nehru the urgency of a Kashmir settlement. Mr Harriman was reported to have said to Mr Nehru bluntly that he "did not care what proposal or procedure Mr Nehru put to Pakistan for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute as long as Pakistan got what she should have got at the time of partition". But such good intentions could not change the objective situation created by Pakistan's declared position that she would remain scrupulously neutral in the India-China conflict. On 21 November, President Ayub Khan had addressed a secret session of the National Assembly, it I was known that he had argued against any intervention in Jammu and Kashmir and had dwelt on the primacy in Pakis' tan's interests, of the Tarbela Dam project which he did not wish to be endangered. In the circumstances, the sincerity and earnestness of the American and British intermediaries could not offset the lack of any inducement for the talks to be productive.
A joint statement was issued on behalf of the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India on 20 November 1962. Only the next day, however, Mr Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament that "anything that involved an upset of the present arrangement would be very harmful to the people of Kashmir as well as to the future relations of India and Pakistan". This threatened a breakdown of the bilateral talks even before they had begun and caused Mr. Sandys to immediately visit Delhi and make a strong protest to Mr. Nehru. After the conference, Mr Sandys said that the Indian Prime Minister did not intend to limit the scope of the discussions or to exclude consideration of any solution of the problem. As a result of this urging, Mr. Nehru himself gave the assurance on 1 December that "there has never been any question of pre-conditions or of any restrictions" on the projected talks. Two days later, Mr. Nehru clarified that by his later statement, what he had meant was that each side could freely express its opinion.
Eventually, six rounds of ministerial talks were held between India and Pakistan between 27 December 1962 and 16 May 1963.
Throughout these talks there was considerable pressure exerted by the United States on the Government of Pakistan to make concessions lest the talks break down. In addition to this external pressure on Pakistan there was another obstructive element in the talks: the Indian delegation had very little authority to negotiate.
The Indian position at the end of the talks, and throughout, was exactly what it had been long before the outbreak of any hostilities between India and China. In December 1961, the Prime Minister of India had indicated that he envisaged a settlement in Kashmir by making some minor adjustments in the cease-fire line. He had thus completely dismissed both Pakistan's claims and the force and validity of the international agreement between India and Pakistan, as recorded in their joint acceptance of UN decisions. Now, though India went through the motions of holding talks with Pakistan, it did not make the slightest departure from that position.
At one stage, the Indian delegation suggested that the partition line in the state could be drawn on the basis of "give and take". Out of some 80,000 square miles of territory in Jammu and Kashmir they said the Chinese had seized 12,000 to 14,000 square miles and by the line proposed by India, Pakistan would be conferred possession of more than 34,000 square miles (which India did not possess) and thus India would retain less than half of the entire area concerned (and thus keep what it had). The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, suggested that a talk about the settlement of Kashmir in these terms was like "dividing a birthday cake" and that such an approach was not acceptable to either the Government or the people of Pakistan. "I do not believe", he said, "in a mathematical approach to a human problem: so many square miles for us and so many square miles for you. The aspirations of a people. are involved here".
These India-Pakistan talks were preceded or accompanied by international developments which in effect strengthened India and thus weakened whatever chance existed for a settlement. The United Kingdom sent its consignment of military supplies to India on 29 October 1962, and the United States on 3 November. That this was done without prior consultation with Pakistan, contrary to the assurance given by President Kennedy to President Ayub Khan in Washington in July 1961, evoked protests from Pakistan. But these were of no avail.
The upshot of these developments was patently antithetical to the assumptions which President Ayub Khan and his followers had maintained over the years and from which followed their reiterated offer of a joint defence with India. Even the United State, the prime opponent, of China at that time, did not fancy the proposition of bringing and pressure on India in order to enlist Pakistan's subjectively assessed military pro was, along with India's, in a common anti-Communist front.
With this illusion destroyed, the Pakistan Government was forced to take up the line which had been suggested in November 1959 by Mr Bhutto, as leader of the Pakistan delegation, towards a rethinking of Pakistan's policy towards China especially as it related to the boundary between China and the territory of Jammu and Kashmir not under Indian control. Under the impetus given by the India-China conflict, the ex-changes and negotiations for a boundary agreement which had been initiated on 28 March 1961 led to the issuance of a joint Pakistan-China communique on 26 December 1962 registering the fact of a complete agreement in principle. This was followed by the signing of the agreement on 2 March 1963.
This boundary agreement between Pakistan and China initiated a chapter of friendly relations between the two countries which proved to be of immense strength to Pakistan. It was a new element which would potentially work towards ensuring the self-determination of Jammu and Kashmir. That Pakistan, under the leadership of Mr Ayub Khan, failed to realise this potential is clear from the events of 1965.
The White Paper recalls the upsurge in Indian held Kashmir in December 1963 following the disappearance of a holy relic at Hazratbal, occupation of three posts in Kargil by Indian forces in May 1964, civil disobedience movement in Srinagar and other towns in occupied Kashmir, reoccupation of the Kargil posts in August 1965, Indian leader's statement threatening war, frequent aggressions across the cease-fire line by Indian troops, intensification of repression on Kashmiris.
While all these tragic happenings were taking place and India was developing its determined offensive, Pakistan refused to make a prompt, deterrent response. President Ayub Khan, who combined in himself both political and military authority, remained aloof, again prolonging a tour of the northern areas (as in 1962), way from the scene of strife. The fear of escalation, which gripped his mind, inexorably led to escalation itself.
On 12 May 1965, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto had addressed President Ayub Khan a letter in which he had made the following points:
"India is at present in no position to risk a general war of unlimited duration for the annihilation of Pakistan. Moreover, from what I have been able to gather from authoritative sources, there is for the present at least, the relative superiority of the military forces of Pakistan in terms of quality and equipment.... This does not mean that there cannot be a general war of limited duration. The morale of our nameless soldier on the front line is high. He has a poignant choice to react now if India chooses to retaliate. This is our hour of decision and may God guide us on the right path."
This assessment had gone unheeded. After some initial probes, India naturally felt emboldened by the lack of resistance on Pakistan's part. Tardily, the Government decided upon an operation in the Chamb sector of Kashmir on 1 September despite the military advantage India had gained through the elements of surprise and careful planning. The Azad Kashmir Forces aided by the Pakistan Army met with instantaneous success. But the forces which were initially committed were too inadequate to capture the strategic objective of Akhnur. There was no proper articulation of command and grouping of forces. This necessitated reinforcements and a change of command in the process of bringing in the Seventh Division after the crossing of the Tawi, vital time was lost. which enabled the Indians to recover from the initial shock and to bring in reinforcements on their side. Eventually, India. invaded Pakistan when its troops crossed the international frontier towards Lahore and Sialkot on 6 September. Two days earlier, the Indian Air Force in strength had twice violated Pakistan's airspace,
On 6 September, the US Ambassador met President Ayub Khan and, in effect, equated the use of force in a disputed territory with that across international frontiers. On no less than three occasions during that meeting the Ambassador told the President, "India has you by the throat". On 8 September, the US State Department announced an embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan. This affected Pakistan and not India because it was Pakistan which was primarily dependent on the supply of American military equipment. When the same day, Pakistan protested this "grossly unequal treatment" and reminded the United States of its assurances of assistance against aggression given to Pakistan from time to time, the United States reply was that "it did not wish to apportion relative blame in the present case" and did not hold that "aggression was the responsibility of one party alone". On 9 September, the US Ambassador met the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, and handed over to him an aide memoire containing the announcement of US embargo on military aid to both Pakistan and India. He explained that the American decision was "not in any sense a punitive action" but "meant only to lend support" to the Secretary-General's peace mission. The Foreign Minister responded, "We are fighting the battle for Pakistan's survival. We had not expected that while we are fighting for our lives and existence, you would do this to us". To the Ambassador's explanation that the action would help the Secretary-General's efforts the Foreign Minister rejoined: "If even action were taken to frustrate the Secretary-General's efforts, it is this which you have just communicated. Please take serious consideration of this matter. Please do not equate us with India. Please inform your Government that this is not the way to respond to an ally when aggression has been committed against that ally. What your action amounts to is that Pakistan is cornered, deserted and ditched. Please communicate these views immediately to the Secretary of State."
The Foreign Minister added: "If you agree to sell arms to us, we'll sell and barter our commodities, our gold and whatever we have." When the Ambassador said that he had no brief from Washington on the attitude of the United States. relating to events after 6 September, the Foreign Minister pointed to the aide memoire and said "this does not show that you have no brief. and if history cannot begin for you on 6 September, it will not end for us today on 9 September." The Foreign Minister continued, "What do you expect us to tell our people, our soldiers? That we now go back to where we started, and that all the sacrifices made and the blood that has been shed was of no account?... Your decision which you have communicated to me has increased our resolve not to accept the Secretary-General's terms." A day later the United States Ambassador brought the proposal that "on humanitarian grounds' ' Pakistan should agree to exclude East Pakistan from the theatre of war. The Foreign Minister, Mr Bhutto responded that war against any part of Pakistan was aggression on the whole of Pakistan and that, if Pakistan were to accept the US proposal, it would mean agreeing to a division of our country into two separate states. At around the same time (9 September), the US Secretary of State in a public statement, while commending the role of the Soviet Union in supporting the call for a cease-fire and Secretary-General U Thant's peace mission, expressed concern at China's warning to India. On 10 September, Pakistan formally invoked the US assurances of assistance against aggression. The reply of the United States Government stated: "In accordance with our assurances to Pakistan, the United States is urgently to meet this common danger by fully supporting immediate United Nations action to end the hostilities. The appeal of the United Nations Security Council must be honoured."
This evoked the observation from the Foreign Minister Mr. Bhutto, that "if the United States could only act through the Security Council then there was no need for alliances' '. The US Ambassador in Karachi reacted to the proposal for a complete withdrawal of the troops of both India and Pakistan from Jammu and Kashmir by expressing the view that India would agree to it. Mr Bhutto replied that no progress could be made if India's attitude became "a determining and decisive factor". On the same day a U.S. Presidential assistant warned a Pakistan Embassy official in Washington of President Lyndon Johnson's annoyance with Pakistan and stated that the United States would make it "crystal clear that Pakistan could not expect U.S. assistance in case of a conflict with India ''. The American official added the observation that a double defeat for the Indian armed forces, coming after the debacle with China in 1962 would be intolerable for India. Finally, he suggested that confidence between the United States and Pakistan could be restored only by a meeting of the two Presidents at the earliest opportunity as they were "good friends' '. On 12 September, an official Pakistan spokesman stated his Government's intention to appeal to all countries, including China, for material assistance. On 13 September, Secretary of State Rusk said in a public statement that the US regarded plebiscite as part of an overall settlement. However, in a conversation with the Pakistan Ambassador the same day, he said that the question of Indian aggression could not be divorced from that of infiltration. Despite all these discouraging portents, President Ayub Khan in a public statement in acted the United States to "play a constructive role". This elicited no substantial response.
It was in this situation of India being permitted by a conjunction of forces to continue her armed attack on Pakistan and resist a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir question that, on 16 September, China addressed a Note to India.
This lent an element of urgency to the settlement of the conflict which could have persuaded the great powers to alter their diplomacy. How President Ayub Khan helped to neutralise this element is one of the most fateful episodes of the Kashmir dispute.
In the second week of the war of September 1965, Pakistan was valiantly fighting for its own survival and for Kashmir's release from alien subjugation. Alone among the great powers, China was extending resolute support to its struggle. But despite his public expression of patriotic fervour President Ayub Khan assumed a posture which was anything but that of the leader of a nation at war. He did not leave it to guess that he was tired of the whole business and had no regard either for the object for which Pakistan's soldiers were laying down their lives or the value and significance of China's support. Among number of indications he gave of this attitude, one of the first was apparent from a statement made by him on 15 September. This was reported in the New York Times of 16 September. The following excerpts of this despatch by the Rawalpindi correspondent of the newspaper, Jacques Nevard, are quite clear.
"Marshal Ayub's call for the United States to take "a giant hand" in bringing peace came when he asked comment on State Dean remarks that was using the conflict fish troubled
"When asked what his reaction would be President Johnson total Pakistan that the United States would stand for this war, Marshal Ayub, said: "Well think they would have to tell both 'cease-fire', and then after that "let's have little arrangement that these unfortunate things don't happen.
Pakistan would understand it".
"The Pakistan President, was asked he was now pinning his hopes for peace on intervention by the big powers rather than on a military victory. "I am pinning my hopes a cease-fire really good common sense", he replied.
"He cleared his throat and said: "I am putting my hopes on good sense-mutual self-interest". "While we are fighting this battle, let me make quite clear: its going to do India no good-it's going to do Pakistan no good".15 or list
A report by the same correspondent, published on September, stated:
"The President told newsmen that Pakistan was ready to accept a cease-fire even if it did not include guaranteed plebiscite in Kashmir". 300
The evaluation of these statements by the concerned foreign
observers, as published in the same despatches, was as follows:
"His (President Ayub Khan's) call for the United States to play a very definite role in this part of the world by using its influence to halt the Indian-Pakistani conflict appeared to put him in open opposition to a major foreign policy objective of Communist China....
"Western diplomats here seem delighted with the apparent change".
"Pakistani leaders said today they were ready to fight if it were necessary, but it was clear that they were looking for any honourable way out. Their appeals to the United States were seen here as opening a door for the restoration of good relations with the United States-a virtual slap at China".
On 19 September, Under-Secretary of State Ball told the Minister of the Pakistan Embassy in Washington that "if it could be cleared up that Chinese alignment was not at Pakistan's bidding" things could be sorted out by President Ayub Khan and Lyndon Johnson meeting at an early date. Otherwise, the American reaction would be severe. The US Presidential Assistant, who was present at the meeting interjected that the United States would not take any stand with regard to the long-term solution of the problem until Pakistan made its position clear on the Chinese question. The same day, the British High Commissioner in Pakistan met President Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi.
The following are the relevant excerpts from the record of this meeting:
"The High Commissioner referred to the Chinese ultimatum to India and its implications with regard to the present conflict, as mentioned in the British Prime Minister's message to the President. He asked whether Pakistan was in any way involved in the Chinese ultimatum to India. The President replied in the negative. He said Pakistan did not even know what the Chinese-Indian differences over Sikkim were. He said he only hoped to God that nothing would happen. The President said that Pakistan had no control over Chinese actions. There was no collaboration between the two countries in relation to the present conflict. If there had been any, the Chinese would come to Pakistan's assistance much earlier.
"The High Commissioner said that it would be very helpful, indeed it would have a dramatic effect, if the President could tell the Chinese publicly not to interfere in the present India-Pakistan conflict. The President said that he could perhaps talk to the Chinese about it privately, but he could certainly not give a threat to China in this regard.
"The High Commissioner said that a public statement, as mentioned by him, could have a dramatic effect in the United Kingdom because Pakistan's position in relation to China's ultimatum to India was not clear. The President said that he had made it clear both publicly and privately that there was no collaboration between Pakistan and China against India. He said he would say so again publicly if an occasion arose.
"The High Commissioner again referred to the Chinese attitude in the present conflict. He said if the Chinese plunged into the conflict, 'the game would then be played by others, including the nuclear powers'. However, he added, there was still time to steer back to a peaceful course, but if the Chinese made a move against India, it would be too late. "The nuclear powers would take over".
"The High Commissioner went on to say Pakistan had shown to the world in a 'remarkable way' that it was prepared to sacrifice not only its political position and material gains but even its 'national existence' for the sake of Kashmir. He said Pakistan had made the point and never again would the world regard Kashmir as a dead issue... However, the advantage would be lost by a drastic move, which might well enlarge the conflict in such a way that there would be no Kashmir to fight for nor Pakistan, nor for that matter the United kingdom or any other country.
"The President said that Pakistan had always wanted to live in peace with India. It was India which never allowed. Pakistan to rest in peace. He said Pakistan was prepared to accept a meaningful cease-fire, such as would contain the seeds for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. All that Pakistan wanted was "some sort of a settlement, sometime". He recognized that the settlement could not take place soon".
The British High Commissioner again called on President
Ayub Khan on 21 September. The record of the meeting says: "The High Commissioner referred to this meeting with the President on 19 September, and said that the reply to the
President's message had been received from Prime Minister Wilson. He said that the Prime Minister had expressed the view that if India accepted the cease-fire and Pakistan did not, and at the same time China attacked India, Pakistan would find itself in an impossible moral position". The West would feel convinced that there was secret collaboration between Pakistan and China.
"The High Commissioner said, we feel that dangerous possibilities can be averted by an agreement to cease-fire. Pakistan has everything to gain. Kashmir is now before the world. We and others are now determined to settle it (Kashmir dispute). The President asked, 'is that a firm promise'. The High Commissioner replied, 'yes, Sir'. He added that once a cease-fire was established, the United Kingdom would do all to promote a Kashmir settlement. "This is the pledged word of the British Government which I am asked to convey with all the emphasis at my command... 'Referring to the Chinese question, the President said that Pakistan had always exercised restraint on China at the diplomatic level. He said Pakistan had already told the Chinese to keep out of the present conflict. As regards. that Pakistan should make a public statement of this nature, the President said that Pakistan was not prepared to do so for the sake of the Hindus, nor was Pakistan in a position to extend such a threat to a great power like China. The High Commissioner asked if the Pakistan Government had already told the Chinese to keep out of the present conflict and, if so, could he confirm this to his Prime Minister. The President replied in the affirmative.... The President said that he wished to God that the Americans would realise how their policies were forcing countries into the hands of China.... The President thanked the High Commissioner and told him that he would give serious consideration to his Prime Minister's suggestions".
The direct sequel to this concerted diplomatic offensive by the great powers which had secured from President Ayub Khan an agreement to forestall any possible Chinese intervention even though it might have been a benefit to the cause of the people of Kashmir and strengthened Pakistan's position-was the cease-fire 23 September. Pakistan accepted the after the President had himself departed from the position that the cease-fire must be accompanied by provision for self-executing arrangement for permanent settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. All it obtained was a "promise" that Kashmir would not be regarded as "a dead issue".
This statement, however, requires qualification-the Chinese ultimatum to India of 16 September was extended by three days. That was not without effect is shown by the Security Council Resolution of 20 September. This resolution reflected an awareness of the potentialities of the enlargement of the conflict and some recognition of the need for a permanent settlement. The fixing of the date for the cease-fire (23 September) as well as the date of the passage of the resolution were correlated with possible Chinese movies. In contrast to the resolution of 6 September, which called only for a cease fire and withdrawals, and thus was entirely in accord with India's objective of perpetuating the status quo, the resolution of 20 September said in preambular paragraph "that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters" and, in an operative paragraph, "decided to consider" as soon as the cease-fire and withdrawals had taken place, "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict". That this element was organic to the resolution of 20 September was borne out when the subsequent resolution of 5 November 1966 reaffirmed it "in all its parts".
The diplomatic situation which emerged at the end of the September 1965 War-insofar as it related to the Kashmir dispute-bears analysis. It contained both a positive and a negative element. The negative element was that, by not only denying "collusion" or "collaboration" with China, as if such"-collaboration" were barred by international law or morality, but also by undertaking to preclude any action by China which might have exerted a salutary pressure on India, Pakistan surrendered the advantage which it could have utilised for setting in motion a process leading to an equitable settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The positive element was that China's declared policy as well as Pakistan's successful military resistance (despite lack of planning management at the higher command level) had not been unavailing. If not in a position of strength, Pakistan was not in a position of weakness either. It was in a position from which it could have made efforts towards the fulfilment of the decision contained in the Security Council resolution of 20 September to consider steps towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
President Ayub Khan's diploma inhibited even such efforts. Soon after the hostilities, another rebellion broke cut in Indian-Occupied Kashmir and India resorted to even severe repression than before. Violations of the cease-fire were frequent. But President Ayub Khan focused his attention entirely on eliminating any possibility of a resumption of fighting. A political stalemate ensued. As has been mentioned earlier, the United States Government, during the hostilities, had suggested a meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and President Ayub Khan. Public opinion in Pakistan was opposed to President Ayub Khan's meeting with President Johnson unless it promised an advance towards a solution of the Kashmir problem. However, President Ayub Khan, in his consultations, kept making anxious inquiries whether it would be possible to mend the fences between Pakistan and the United States. He showed readiness to make concessions and to change the policies that irritated the Johnson Administration. Accordingly, he decided to visit the United States, and to confer with Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London en route. Prime Minister Wilson was also scheduled to visit Washington around the same time. Since President Ayub Khan's visit proved of great consequence for the Kashmir dispute, the climate which pervaded it needs to be recalled.
President Ayub Khan arrived in New York on 12 December and addressed the United Nations General Assembly the next day. The American press regarded the speech as conciliatory and in complete contrast to his Foreign Ministers (Mr Bhutto's) statements. The same day when reading a factual newspaper report (in the New York Times) about his conversations with Prime Minister Wilson which referred to the different appreciations of Pakistan and the United Kingdom on China's position in Asia and the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict, he instructed his Foreign Minister to issue a contradiction. The next day he went to Washington and was received by President Johnson. All the important conversations were conducted exclusively between the two leaders. The first meeting between them took place on 14 December in the morning and lasted nearly two hours. After it, when the two leaders joined their delegations, President Johnson paid rich compliments to President Ayub Khan and remarked that Pakistan US relations stood on a firm basis despite temporary strains. On his part, President Ayub Khan said that he had explained to President Johnson the peculiar geographical position of Pakistan, surrounded by three mighty powers. In the evening, Mr Geoige Ball, Acting Secretary of State, met the President in company with the respective delegations. At this meeting, he spoke solemnly of the growing American involvement in Victram and said, "this question plays a significant role in affecting our attitude towards China, and shapes our equations with others", He then said that it was important for the United States to know if Pakistan had entered into any special secret agreement with China. President Ayub Khan shock his head. and said emphatically "No". Upon Mr. Ball's saying that it was important for the US and Pakistan to have a clear understanding on the matter, President Ayub Khan replied, "you have that understanding," neither the Chinese not the Indians, he said, could bear to bring any military pressure on each other.
Later in the conversation, Mr. Ball referred to the proposed Tashkent meeting and indicated the full support of the United States for the Soviet initiative, President Ayub Khan said that Pakistan had accepted the offer but that in his opinion, the United States alone could play a decisive role in bringing about a settlement. Mr. Ball said that the United States would not wish to compete with the Soviet Union or come in the way of the Tashkent talks. He added that the United States
did not want the "Nobel peace prize", but that the would consider "picking up the pieces' the Tashkent talks failed. Before the next meeting, Mr. Goldberg, the US permanent Representative at the UN, remarkety during a conversation in the White House that he had indications both from India and Pakistan (but more clearly from Pakistan) that they were anxious for a compromise and that the President of Pakistan had shown greater inclination for a solution other than plebiscite. This disclosure, he added was very important.
The Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, told Mr. Goldberg later that he should not be under the impression that Pakistan had abandoned the plebiscite principle. Later the same evening, President Ayub Khan dwelt on the desirability of a Kashmir settlement and indicated his willingness to consider a regional plebiscite or even arbitration. President Johnson said that there was a very strong feeling regarding China in the United States-a fact that Pakistan must keep in view.
He then stated that, though the United States wanted a Kashmir settlement, its influence on India was limited and implied that it would not use aid as a lever, Pakistan, he added, had an impression that the United States could exercise a great deal of influence on India regarding Kashmir. "Get it out of your system", he said and repeated later, "get it out of your heads''. The visit concluded with an exchange of warm compliments between the two Presidents. US officials close to President Johnson evaluated President Ayub Khan's visit in enthusiastic terms. Shortly after, President Johnson conveyed a message to President Ayub Khan containing the offer of resumption of economic aid on five important projects and the offer to send American medical personnel to the rural areas of Pakistan.
The meeting between President Johnson and President Ayub Khan caused satisfaction to India. A new Delhi despatch detelined 16 December and published in the New York Times reported:
"Indian officials expressed cautious satisfaction today with the outcome of the Johnson-Ayub talks. "It seems that Ayub has not been able to take Johnson for a ride to use one of your American phrases", said one high ranking Indian official."
In the course of the visit, President Ayub Khan informed his delegation that President Johnson had assured him that the United States was not operating against his person or his regime. This coupled with President Johnson's ready acceptance of the explanation of Pakistan's policy towards China, which was identical with the one given on numerous occasions before and rejected by the United States, would lead to the inference that President Ayub Khan pleaded that he be given time and opportunity to change his policy towards China and to reach an accommodation with India over Kashmir along lines more acceptable to India.
At the time that tension had grown in Jammu and Kashmir, Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR addressed messages to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India on 20 August 1965. Compared to Soviet official pronouncements in earlier years, the message to the President of Pakistan did not bear a partisan tone in relation to the Kashmir dispute. "We would not like to comment on the statements' ', it said, made by Pakistani and Indian sides on the situation. arising in Kashmir. It advocated a peaceful solution of outstanding problems between the two countries, reconciliation and good-neighbour relations. On 4 September, Mr. Kosygın sent nearly identical letters to the two heads of Governments expressing the concern of the Soviet Government over military conflict in the Kashmir area "directly adjacent to the border of the Soviet Union ''. After suggesting reciprocal withdrawal of troops to positions behind the cease-fire line the letters said:
"Acting in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and the Bandung Principles, the parties should enter into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the differences that have arisen between them. As for the Soviet Union, both sides could count on its willing co-operation or, to use the accepted expression, on its good offices in this matter. We are ready for this if both sides consider it useful." This message was followed by another on 19 September which contained the proposal:
"To hold on our territory a meeting in which you, Mr. President and the Prime Minister of India would take part to establish a direct contact in order to achieve agreement on the re-establishment of peace between Pakistan and India. If desired by both sides, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR could also take part in this meeting. Such a meeting could be held in Tashkent, for instance or, any other city in the Soviet Union. One thing is important to meet and start negotiations. It is important that the guns become silent and the blood of the fraternal peoples cease to flow."
In his reply on 20 September, President Ayub Khan repeated his earlier welcome of the Soviet initiative but suggested that for the meeting proposed by Premier Kosygin "the ground would have to be prepared in advance". He suggested that this ground could be prepared with the help of the Soviet good offices in the Security Council: President Ayub Khan expressed regret that the Soviet delegation in the Security Council was "working actively for diluting the original draft resolution in favour of India ''. On 12 November, the Soviet
Embassy in Karachi issued a statement which said:
"Attempts are made at times to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other. Such opinions are far from reality".
On 25 November, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr Bhutto met Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR in Moscow. At these meetings, the Soviet leaders told him that Prime Minister Shastri had accepted Soviet good offices and was ready to meet President Ayub Khan at Tashkent. They did not wish to specify what matters should be on the agenda, as these could be settled at the summit meeting itself. The aim was "a major political detente" which could lead to a "chain of events". In a public statement after the meetings, Mr Bhutto indicated Pakistan's acceptance of the Soviet proposal and said:
"If we are to move into a new environment, what happened would depend on Soviet diplomacy. We hope the Soviet Union, as a great power, will be impartial".
On 8 December, the following announcement was made simultaneously from Moscow, Karachi and Delhi:
"President of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan and Prime: Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri have agreed to the suggestion of the Soviet Government to meet in Tashkent on the 4th of January 1966. In accordance with the wishes of both the sides, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR, Mr A.N. Kosygin, will take part in the meeting when it is necessary".
The wording of this announcement avoided any reference to the object of the meeting. On 6 December, the President of Pakistan had suggested that the announcement should state that "the object of the meeting is to discuss ways and means. of resolving India-Pakistan differences, with a view to establishing good relations between the two countries." This as well as different formulations suggested by others were all excluded. In retrospect, this seems to have set the tone of the projected Tashkent conference. It was to be a conference where specific issues, apart from the naturally pressing ones of the physical. consequences of the September hostilities, might be the subject. of prolonged discussion, but not of agreement.
The Tashkent conference lasted from 3 to 10 January 1966. Though at the beginning the Pakistan delegation placed its emphasis on the necessity of a Kashmir settlement and on establishing a procedure for it, India advanced all its familiar. arguments for putting the cart before the horse. Let us first establish trust, then settlement will follow, they asserted, ignoring that, without a settlement or at least a credible intention of evolving it, trust would easily evaporate. At a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, Mr. Bhutto suggested a way out of this impasse. He said that Pakistan was prepared to discuss a formal agreement on the non-use of force provided a self-executing mechanism was agreed upon for the solution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the same way as was done in the case of the Rann of Kutch. If this was not acceptable, Pakistan would be willing for an informal agreement on non-aggression provided India agreed informally to work towards an honourable and equitable settlement. Mr. Gromyko, however, felt that India would not equate the two situations. He also remarked that it Jammu and Kashmir issue was linked to a no-war pact there was bound to be a deadlock.
At the first meeting the next day exclusively between President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, the latter opened the conversation by stating in Urdu, "I am afraid it will displease you to hear this but we cannot give up Kashmir." President Ayub Khan in response, pointed out the misery and suffering caused to the peoples of both countries by the lack of a just and honourable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
The gulf between the two sides was further revealed at at meeting of the two Foreign Ministers to discuss the agenda of the conference. Mr. Bhutto was constrained to say that Pakistan had not come to Tashkent in order to sign a surrender. This was followed by Mr. Gromyko asserted to the Pakistan Foreign Minister that the alternative to a no-war pact, which plea should logically come from the weaker country to the stronger one, was nothing-no treaty, no agreement, no diplomatic relations, no progress. To this Mr. Bhutto responded by emphasising that Pakistan had no unilateral interest in withdrawal of troops and that the Pakistan delegation could not be expected to agree to a no-war declaration, to withdraw its troops and then to back and tell the people that Kashmir had been buried for good.
However, when President Ayub Khan met Prime Minister Kosygin on the 6th, the latter again stressed that without a declaration to refrain from the use of force, all problems would hang in suspense. The time had come for adjusting the frontiers of the two countries to their mutual satisfaction. He added that a renewal of war between the two countries would involve third parties who would come into the conflict for their own ends. Mr. Kosygin further said that the two countries simply could not go away from Tashkent with nothing achieved. When the discussion turned to India evacuating the three passes it held across the cease-fire line, the Foreign Minister interjected and said that the more serious problem than that of the passes was the unparalleled repression of Indian-occupied Kashmir. At another stage in the discussion, President Ayub Khan said that as a soldier, he appreciated India's need to keep open communications to the troops facing the Chinese in Ladakh and that ways and means could be found of allowing them these communications through the valley or alternative by-passes could be developed. However, Prime Minister Kosygin developed the suggestion that the Kashmir situation would be improved by giving the people of Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line "some sort of self-Government'' and the feeling that they were not some sort of "temporary resident." Pakistan, he added, should compete with India to see which of them developed more quickly and more efficiently the part of Kashmir under its control. Finally, Premier Kosygin stressed that the two sides could not leave Tashkent without a settlement and observed:
"No one else can solve these problems for you. You have to find a solution yourself."
When, at the next meeting, it appeared that there was no agreement on the merits of the Kashmir dispute, President. Ayub Khan suggested that rather than discuss the Kashmir question further, he would leave it in suspense for the present because he could not "sell" the proposal mooted during the conversations-"this is definite." In other words, President Ayub Khan would be prepared to discuss troop withdrawals and diplomatic relations and leave Kashmir aside during the talks. To this, Mr. Kosygin agreed. When Prime Minister Kosygin pointed out the futility of discussing machineries for settlement, the Foreign Minister. Mr. Bhutto cited a number of treaties including the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter to prove that a machinery for settlement of disputes was a concomitant of historic agreements to banish war. Prime Minister Kosygin observed in reply that President Ayub Khan had agreed to leave the Kashmir question in suspense, and if the question was suspended there would be no need for machinery, President Ayub Khan clarified that his agreement to leave the dispute in suspense was only for the purpose of the current negotiations in Tashkent the problem would remain and Pakistan would continue to seek a solution in other forums. The Foreign Minister added that there could be no renunciation by Pakistan of its claims or abandonment of the people of Kashmir. Mr. Kosygin said that was precisely how he himself understood the position; he did not expect Pakistan to renounce its claim.
At this stage, India proposed a complete treaty of friendship between the two countries which made no reference to the Jammu and Kashmir question and merely contained the following provision relating to such issues:
"Both Government agree that the differences and disputes between them shall be resolved by peaceful means. To this end, they agree to nominate representatives who will endeavour to reach agreements and report to their respective heads of Government."
Under president Ayub Khan's leadership, the thinking prevailed at official level that the Tashkent Declaration would. be followed up by direct talks between Pakistan and India in which Pakistan could use the leverage which resulted from the great powers apprehension of a of conflict over Kashmir, India's own fear of the war, her urgent need to restore her communications with Assam and Tripura through East Pakistan and her anxiety to regain the very substantial Indian property seized by Pakistan during the war. The anticipations were not borne out by subsequent developments. The two Foreign Ministers met in Rawalpindi on 1 and 2 March 1966. At the conclusion of their meetings, they made the following declaration:
"The two sides proposed for discussion and settlement subjects to which they attached high priority in the interest of peaceful and good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. The Pakistan side pointed out the special importance of reaching a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Both sides agreed that all disputes between India and Pakistan should be we resolved to promote and strengthen peace between the two countries."
However, immediately on his return to New Delhi, India's Minister for External Affairs who had led the Indian delegation reiterated the Indian position that Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir was not negotiable. During her visit to the USA the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi also made statements to the same effect.
Towards the end of the Tashkent conference, President Ayub Khan had appealed to the Soviet leaders to work for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute when, after the reciprocal withdrawals of troops by India and Pakistan, the question would be referred again to the Security Council. To the public opinion of Pakistan, he had attempted to justify the Tashkent Declaration in the context of the Security Council Resolution of 20 September which had decided to consider' as soon as the withdrawals had taken place 'what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict' and had, 'in the meantime' called on the two governments to utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter to this end. By signing the Tashkent Declaration, the argument ran, Pakistan had surrendered no initiative but simply fulfilled the conditions precedent for the Security Council's reconsideration of steps towards a settlement of the political problem. The argument was, of course, made incredible by the very tenor of the declaration. and its focus on the promotion of friendly relations regardless of a settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir question. The plain political fact also was that the Tashkent Declaration had defused the Kashmir issue exactly as India had wanted it to be defused. Nevertheless, by action and not by unpersuasive interpretation, the argument could have been sustained if Pakistan had gone back to the Security Council without further loss of time and urged the Council to implement its own decision to consider a Kashmir settlement. The US Representative at the United Nations had said that the resolution was the Bible of the Security Council. Once withdrawals had taken place at the end of February and ministerial meetings between India and Pakistan had produced a deadlock, the Pakistan Government had solid ground to invoke the Security Council's commitment. But President Ayub Khan's Government decided not to do so.
This was a clear demonstration that the argument it was advancing as justification of the Tashkent Declaration was artificial and did not reflect its real intent in signing the declaration.
On 14 April 1966, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bhutto, made a final determined attempt to move the Government to the course of action which was logical if the Tashkent Declaration. were not in effect to become an instrument for the erosion of the Security Council's commitment and of the relegation of the Kashmir issue indefinitely to the background. The record of the meeting states:
"The Foreign Minister said that we should go to the Security Council and that if we did not do so, we would be committing laches. It would also mean that the threat to peace had been removed and that alternative channels were open for a solution of the Kashmir dispute. If the parties concerned. did not show any interest it would mean admission that the Security Council was no longer seized with the problem."
On 21 May, a proposal among these lines was submitted to the cabinet. Though the proposal was approved on 8 June 1966, replacement of Mr. Bhutto by a new Foreign Minister soon afterwards caused a change in calculations. The issue was not referred to the Security Council. To President Ayub Khan and his advisers, considerations of elections in India in 1967 and in the United States in 1968 appeared to be weighty reasons for letting the Security Council's Resolut of 20 September, 1965 fall into oblivion. The Tashkent Declaration was thus allowed to take the life out of the Kashmir issue, at least untill another constellation of events and circumstances would serve to revitalise it.
The developments between June 1966 and 1971 are of no major significance in the history of the Kashmir dispute except that they reveal that the regimes then in authority in Pakistan disinterested themselves in the issue. A significant example out of many is the message conveyed to Chairman Kosygin by President Yahya Khan on the fourth anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration. The message made no mention of the Kashmir Question. Nor did the message which he sent to the Prime Minister of India on that occasion.