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29031960 . Letter dated 29 March 1960 from the representative of Pakistan Aly Khan to the President of the Security Council


 Letter dated 29 March 1960 from the representative of Pakistan Aly Khan to the President of the Security Council

 

1. Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 29 October, 1959, from the Permanent Representative of India to the President of the Security Council [S/4234].

 

2. The Permanent Representative of India has said nothing further on the specific issue of the execution of the Mangla Dam Project in Azad Kashmir which is the subject matter of this correspondence. He has, however, raised issues which have already been resolved by the decisions of the Security Council. My Government would have preferred to ignore this letter. Since, however, portions have been lifted from the text of the proceedings of the Security Council and those of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and an attempt has been made so to juxtapose them as to lead to inferences, which are alien to the intention of the documents concerned, it is necessary to put the record right.

 

3. The quotations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter of the Permanent Representative of India are incomplete. The following portion of paragraph 128 of the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1100] has been quoted:

 

"According to the Security Council's resolution of 17 January, the Government of Pakistan was requested to inform the Security Council immediately of any material change in the situation. In a letter addressed to the Security Council, the Pakistan Government agreed to comply with this request. The Government of Pakistan had, however, not informed the Security Council about the presence of Pakistani troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

4. The portion immediately succeeding this passage which explains the position of the Government of Pakistan regarding the entry of the regular forces of Pakistan into Kashmir has been omitted. This portion reads:

 

"Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan explained that, since the Commission had been charged to deal with the problems related to the India-Pakistan question, his Government thought that the information should instead be given to the Commission, but he had been unable to do this previously because of the delay in its arrival on the sub-continent."

 

5. The position of Pakistan on this issue has also been clearly stated in paragraph 64 of the same report. This paragraph reads (italics ours):

 

"Pakistan had not informed the Security Council of the presence of its troops in Kashmir because, by the time they had been sent into the State, the question had been entrusted to the Commission, whose early departure for the sub continent was expected. The matter had been put before us. the Commission immediately after its arrival in Karachi. In the view of the Foreign Minister, the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir did not raise the question of international obligations since Pakistan had never accepted any with regard to non-interference in Kashmir."

 

6. Similarly, in paragraph 3 of the letter, reference has been made to annex 8 to the third report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1430] in support of the contention that "there is no exclusive or final character about the plebiscite proposal." Here again, passages have been separated from the remarks of the Chairman of the Commission. The full text of the relevant passage (which is point 1 of the aide memoire handed by the Chairman of the Commission and Dr. Lozano to the Government of India on 25 February 1949) reads as follows (italics ours):

 

"The Government of Pakistan raised the point regarding lack of cooperation in the holding of the plebiscite in connection with Mr. Lozano's statement to the Prime Minister of India on 20 December 1948, when the question of a solution other than by a plebiscite was brought up by the latter during the discussion of the Commission's proposals of 11 December [S/1196, annex 3]. The Prime Minister was concerned that the acceptance of specific proposals relating to a plebiscite should close all doors to alternative solutions of the dispute. Mr. Lozano explained that the proposals did not supersede part III of the resolution of 13. August, but it was an elaboration of it. They did, however, take priority over the consideration of alternative methods and every effort had to be made towards putting these proposals into effect. It was in this connexion that Mr. Lozano expressed the view that if the Plebiscite Administrator should find a plebiscite impossible for technical or practical reasons', he or the Commission would then recommend to the Security Council a solution different from that of a plebiscite and acceptable to the Governments of India. and Pakistan [S/1196, annex 4]. It was not intended at that stage to define what might constitute a 'technical or practical reason' for not holding a plebiscite.

 

"It is true that a lack of cooperation from either side could create obstacles which, in fact, might make the organisation and the holding of a plebiscite extremely difficult, if not impossible. However, the Commission feels that the principles embodied in the resolution of 5 January are not only. binding on both Governments, but are based on and call for their fullest cooperation. Therefore, the Commission does not envisage a situation in which either side will withhold its cooperation. It would seem that lack of cooperation, should it occur, would be considered not a 'practical reason' but a breach of commitments formally undertaken by the Governments of India and Pakistan. In this event, the Plebiscite Administrator would presumably then report to the Security Council, through the Commission, not that the holding of the plebiscite was impossible for practical or technical reasons but rather that the lack of cooperation of either of the parties had rendered it impracticable." This text in no way lends support to the contention raised. in paragraph 3 of the letter of the Permanent Representative of

 

India on the question of plebiscite. 7. As regards the allegation made by the Government of India that Pakistan has failed to implement part I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, the Council will recall that Ambassador Gunner Jarring of Sweden, acting on behalf of the Security Council, proposed to the Government of India that this precise question should be investigated impartially through a method which would be more "a determination of facts" than an act of arbitration. India's rejection of this. proposal and Pakistan's acceptance of it demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Government of India knows that their allegation lacks any factual basis whatsoever.

 

8. request that this communication may kindly be circulated as a Security Council document and brought to the notice of the members of the Security Council.

 

(Signed) ALY KHAN Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

(Source: UN Document no. S/4292).