Documents

00000000 .79 The Need for a Realistic Decision


00000000 .79 The Need for a Realistic Decision

 

I have dealt at some length and with complete frankness with the basic principles which govern my views on the problem of Kashmir. With equal frankness let me turn now to those who are assembled here for this Convention. Over the years a variety of solutions have been offered by different people with their own interpretations of the right of the people to self-determination. The point I should like to emphasize is that it is high time that a definite and realistic decision was taken now.

 

Time and circumstance move fast in a revolutionary age like the one in which we live. Statesmanship demands quick decisions in keeping with such changes. The question of Kashmir is not an academic one that can be debated indefinitely and in the abstract, while the economic and social needs of her people suffer sad neglect. It is very much a political question, but the choices in politics are always limited by a combination of circumstances which cannot be ignored.

 

There is frequent reference in a discussion of the Kashmir problem to the right of self-determination. That claim rests on an assurance first given on behalf of the Government of India by Lord Mountbatten in his letter to Maharaja Sir Hari Singh in these words: "as soon as law and order have been restored and the soil is cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people''. It is but fair to point out that even now a large part of the State continues to be in alien hands. As a further complication, there was the tragic conflict of 1965, and a recurrence of such conflict cannot be ruled out so long as Pakistan declines to accept a no-war pact.

 

Let me also remind you that the world of 1968 is far removed in outlook and mood from the world of 1947. In these intervening years, new factors have emerged which have radically altered the essential nature of the issues involved in a solution of the problem of Kashmir. The right to self-determination, viewed against such a changed background, needs to be interpreted afresh in keeping with today's needs of the people of Kashmir.

 

There is, of course, a broader implication in the right to self-determination, namely, the inherent right of every person to determine their ways of life and the form and character of their institutions. But this is an extremely complicated matter; and in the context of the modern nation-state, the complications are further compounded. Now, I am not an admirer of the nation-state and in fact regard it as an already outmoded and out-dated concept. But it exists and does seem to arouse the strongest sentiment that moves and unites men today. It cuts across the boundaries of region, race, language, culture and ideology, including the ideology of communism.

 

In the context of the nation-state, it is extremely difficult to define and geographically demarcate "a people". Are the Kashmiris a people? Then, what about the Dogras and the Ladakhis? Where will you draw the line? You can look around the world and see for yourselves how doggedly the existing nation-states, no matter how haphazardly created, fight against any of their 'peoples' wanting to break away or to exercise their right to self-determination. is a hard fact of which due notice must be taken. Whether one likes it or not, the Indian nation-state, also a haphazard creation owing to the tragedy of partition, has its geographical boundaries demarcated. India is no more prepared than Pakistan, or for that matter any other nation-state, I willingly and peacefully to let any part of the country break away on any plea whatever. Let this fact be duly appreciated. No doubt military means can be used to enforce the right to self-determination, but a breakaway part of a nation state is never likely to achieve its end or maintain it for long by such means-unless it is helped by other powerful nation-states for their own selfish ends. However, such a possibility is entirely irrelevant to the discussion here, because I am not aware that there is any one present who is advocating a military or a violent solution.

 

Other factors, too, must be taken into account. The fate of the people of this region-Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh was determined over a hundred years ago, not primarily in their own interests but by the consideration that the State lay wedged in between three empires: Czarist Russia, China and Britain. The old rivals of the last century have no doubt disappeared, but the clash of interests continues in a different garb in today's world and in potentially more menacing terms. Small States, despite the noble aims and principles of the U.N. Charter, continue to become helpless pawns in the game of power-politics of big States.

 

These are unpleasant but inescapable realities; and as your friend and well-wisher I am bound to speak the truth as I see it. This Convention must understand clearly that after the 1965 conflict, no Government of India can accept a solution that places Kashmir outside the Union of India. Or, to put it positively, a solution has to be found within the framework of the Union. This statement should not surprise any of you, because this is not the first time that I am making it publicly. As some of you at least must know, this also happens to be the view of many others in the country who have been trying over the past several years to create public opinion in favour of an agreed settlement in Kashmir.

 

These then are the inevitable limitations imposed by circumstances to which I have referred in my opening remarks. Statesmanship on your side requires that you should adapt your policy and programme to suit the facts of the situation. To ignore them will only mean further tension, resulting, so far as your people are concerned, in frustration, uncertainty and misery.

 

These observations obviously raise a number of questions. Let me deal with some of them. I know that Sheikh Saheb and his colleagues have been emphasising the right of the people to decide their future. I have indicated the considerations which must qualify this right. It may, of course, be argued that (a) the people have the right to decide whether they accept or not such qualifying considerations; and (b) if they do, what kind of a political settlement would they have within those limitations.

 

The main issue that I would place before you today is, how can the people decide these complicated and grave issues without clear and unambiguous advice from their leaders? I feel strongly, and wish to say to you with all the emphasis I can command, that this is the occasion when you owe it to yourselves and to the people to make up your minds and advise them unambiguously on these vital issues. I do not think it will be difficult for the leaders gathered here to go to the people and convince them that the decisions reached here are the best possible solutions in the circumstances and would guarantee them peace, happiness and honour. If this Convention is not to be a mere exercise in political debate but represents an earnest and constructive effort to find a practical way out of the present impasse, I am convinced that this is the wisest course open to it.

 

Another large question that my suggestion raises is, how will Pakistan react to a settlement within the limits pointed out by me? It is often urged that unless Pakistan is at least tacitly reconciled to the situation here, there can be no guarantee of peace and security in the State. This is true. So, let us see what possible Pakistani reaction there could be. Pakistan's public stand had always been that the people of this State should themselves decide their fate. Therefore, if you take a decision here and persuade the people to endorse it, as I have no doubt that you will be able to do, Pakistan will have no valid grievance or cause for complaint. World opinion too would acclaim a settlement acceptable to the people of Kashmir and restrain Pakistan from the pursuit of any policy but that of acceptance or acquiescence. Should that happen, it may prove to be the beginning of a new and happy chapter in the history of India-Pakistan relations.

 

The last question, and the most important, is, what about the possible reaction of the Government of India to the course I am advocating here? While I cannot speak for the Government of India, I have no doubt that your acceptance of this line would clear the ground for a meaningful dialogue between your leaders and the Government of India In that event, even other leaders of the State, who have stayed away from this Convention, may join forces with you. It seems to me that a new day would have truly dawned then.

 

Such questions as the constitutional status of the State within the Indian Union, a guarantee that that status would not be unilaterally altered, etcetera, will remain to be discussed But the proper place for such discussions is not here but at a later stage, with the Government of India's representatives at the Conference table. I am aware that in some quarters there is a view which is opposed to any state being given a special position. But I doubt if such a view can be maintained in the changing circumstances of India. For historical reasons modifications will have to be made in the general pattern. Such modifications do, in fact, exist even today. There is also a developing pressure from the States for a larger measure of autonomy. It would be wrong to consider such trends as being disruptive of national unity. On the other hand, any attempt to impose a rigid uniformity from above is bound to create tensions that may be productive of seeds of disruption. With the situation undergoing a great change as a result of the general elections of 1967, there is an urgent need to review Centre-State relationships from an entirely new angle. In a vast country like ours, national unity can only be fostered in an atmosphere of wise understanding of regional sentiments and interests and of a spirit of mutual tolerance So long as political authority was the monopoly of a single party ruling at the Centre and in virtually all the States, the problem of Centre-State relations did not appear to be major significance The general elections in February 1967 have resulted in a jockeying for power among political groups in a number of States. This is not the place nor the occasion for a detailed discussion of the theme. But it is relevant here to remark that Kashmir is not alone in its efforts to secure maximum autonomy.

 

These, my dear friends, are the "plain words" that I had said at the outset I wanted to speak to you today. Let me once again assure you that they have been spoken from the heart and are intended to help you to arrive at a wise and practical decision. All eyes in the country are turned towards you, and every one expects that your decisions will prove to be a turning point towards a happier future.

 

Since this is the commencement of the Gandhi centenary year, it is appropriate that we should turn our thoughts in homage to the man who led us in the freedom struggle. Partition caused him deep anguish; but when he found that it was inevitable because most of his lieutenants were willing to pay that price for freedom, he continued to live in the hope that the separation would be as between friends and their relationship could be defined in a treaty to ensure a smooth and harmonious transition. Tragically, he did not live long enough after partition to see the fulfilment of such a hope.

 

This Convention, it is my earnest prayer, will so guide its proceedings as to make a renewal of that effort not only possible but also fruitful. There are all over the world today many spots of trouble and explosive danger. If through your decisions the prospectus of peace and goodwill can be brightened in the entire region, described as the subcontinent south of the Himalayas, it will be a big step forward towards the world of Mahatma Gandhi's conception.

 

This is a great opportunity which you yourselves have had the foresight to create, and I pray to God that He may grant you the wisdom and courage that this occasion demands.