13081963 Statement of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nahru on India Pakistan talks on Kashmir in Lok Sabha, 13 August 1963.
13081963 Statement of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nahru on India Pakistan talks on Kashmir in Lok Sabha, 13 August 1963.
On the 7th of May last I made a statement in this House in which I referred to the joint talks on Kashmir and other related matters between India and Pakistan which had then still not concluded.
These talks originated from a joint statement which Pakistan and I issued on November 29, 1962, announcing our agreement to make a renewed effort to resolve the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable the two countries to live side by side in peace and friendship. On the 30th November I made a statement in the House in regard to this joint statement and referred to the discussions which I had with Mr. Duncan Sandys, Minister for Commonwealth Relations of the U.K. and Mr. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States,
In pursuance of the joint statement our delegation led by Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of Railways, participated in six rounds of talks. In all these six talks, spread over nearly five
months, Pakistan showed no readiness to discuss anything apart from Kashmir.
As I have stated on many occasions previously, it has always been, and continues to be, India's policy to seek friendly and cooperative relations with Pakistan. The lack of such friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries would not only be unfortunate but would do violence to the long standing ties of geography, history and culture between the two countries. We are convinced that the only proper course for the two countries to adopt is to develop cooperative and friendly relations and live as good neighbours. In the larger interest of the two countries, we have been anxious to bring about a settlement of all Indo-Pakistan differences, including Kashmir, on a rational and realistic basis./It was in this spirit that we agreed to have joint talks but, as the House is aware, in spite of every effort made by Sardar Swaran Singh to arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement, these talks ended in failure.
From the very beginning, the Pakistan Government took various steps which came in the way of a settlement. On the eve of the first round of talks in Rawalpindi, Pakistan announced its so-called "agreement in principle" with China on Kashmir's border with Xinjiang. The timing of this statement was apparently intended to provoke India to refuse to start the talks the next morning. We felt that this was a bad augury for the future. for the talks. Nevertheless, because of our earnest desire to arrive at some settlement, we decided to continue with the talks.
During the first plenary meeting, the Pakistan representative expressed his disinclination to discuss any of the Indo Pakistan differences other than the Kashmir question which, he insisted, must be settled first. Sardar Swaran Singh in his opening speech listed various subjects which were required to be discussed. But Mr. Bhutto insisted on confining himself to Kashmir only. Even on Kashmir, because of Pakistan's insistence, considerable time was spent in friendly but futile discussions on the old idea of plebiscite which, chiefly because of Pakistan's own acts of obstruction and non-implementation of the U.N. Commission's resolutions, had already proved to be impracticable, particularly in the light of irreversibly changed conditions in the last fifteen years.
This was followed by the signing of the Sino Pakistan agreement under which Pakistan gave away as much as about two thousand square miles of our territory to China. The fact that this was done in the course of our talks indicated how little importance Pakistan attached to our talks It was extraordinary that while these talks were taking place, Pakistan was busy handing over a large part of our territory to China which had invaded our country. The object apparently was to present us with a fait accompli in one part of our territory of Jammu and Kashmir while keeping her hands free to negotiate for the remaining part of the State. We might have been justified in not proceeding with the talks at this stage. Nevertheless, we proceed with them after recording our strong protest.
The Rawalpindi talks, despite Pakistan's preliminary agreement with China, had ended with the leaders of the two delegations issuing an appeal for moderation in mutual criticism; the joint appeal had hardly been made by the leaders of the two. delegations in December when Pakistan launched an unprecedented campaign of vilification against India not only in Pakistan, but also in the capitals of Europe through their responsible officers. Thus it appeared clearly from the beginning that Pakistan was interested not so much in a settlement of outstanding differences or even of the Kashmir problem, but only in making political capital out of the situation created by Chinese aggression against India.
When the Pakistan delegation shifted from a futile discussion of plebiscite to the consideration of a possible political settlement, they began to put forward astonishing proposals Pakistan claimed the catchment areas and the water-sheds of the three Western, rivers, the Chenab the Jhelum and the Indus, in Jammu and Kashmir on the ground that there rivers had been allotted to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty. Our dele Gation pointed out that the Indus Waters Treaty protected Pakistan's interests fully and gave her no ground to claim any territory in Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the use and development of waters. If every lower riparian claimed the territory of the upper riparian on the pretext of its water requirements, the maps of many countries in the world would have to be drastically revised. By that argument, the lower riparian might even claim Tibet because the Indus and the Brahmaputra start in Tibet. No less absurd was another of Pakistan's claims to Jammu and Kashmir, namely, that they must have the State to protect their Grand Trunk Road and their railway line, the security of which, our delegation was told, was essential to ensure, what Pakistan called, its "defence in depth". Finally, Pakistan claimed Kashmir on the basis of its Muslim majority. This was a vicious communal approach repugnant to the entire spirit animating our national struggle for independence, and contrary to our Constitution and to our whole attitude to the problem of relationship between the State and the individual.
Pakistan's objective was obviously not a rational and realistic solution to the problem. They were just out to claim the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, leaving to India, as it happened, in a forgotten moment of generosity, an insignificant area in the extreme south, roughly coinciding with the district of Kathua. Even more astonishing was the offer, obviously induced by their awareness of India's need for the defence of Ladakh against China, that Pakistan would be willing to agree to an interim arrangement in the Valley for a period of six months or a year, to enable India to deal with the Chinese. All that this could mean was that India might continue to commit its men and resources for the defence of Ladakh against the Chinese threat, but that once its effort and sacrifices had liberated Ladakh, India should abandon the State in favour of Pakistan. Another proposal was the so-called internationalisation of the Valley, again for a period of six months followed by some method of ascertaining the wishes of the people. This was the old and discarded idea of a plebiscite, without Pakistan having to implement the conditions laid down in the UNCIP Resolutions.
Faced with this deadlock, when a breakdown to the talks seemed inevitable on the last day, our delegation again offered a No-War agreement, together with a practical and immediate disengagement of troops, thus hoping to reassure our neighbour that our efforts to strengthen our defence against the Chinese aggression constituted no threat to Pakistan. A No-War agreement, we said, could include a specific undertaking that the two countries should continue to seek peaceful solutions to the problem, because we did not want the problem frozen. Such an agreement could be registered with the United Nations to give it an international backing. Pakistan rejected this offer. Their delegation also refused to agree to remit the matter to the two Governments for a review and for considering other appropriate steps towards a peaceful settlement. Thus, Pakistan achieved what it had aimed at from the very beginning, that is, a non settlement and a deadlock on every-thing that should have been covered by the phrase "Kashmir and other related matters' '. This is where the Ministerial level talks with Pakistan ended.
In the early part of May, Mr. Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, and Mr. Duncan Sandys paid a visit to Delhi. In the course of discussions, the question of Kashmir came up again. We assured them of our earnest desire to have a settlement provided this was fair and equitable. As an earnest of this desire of ours, we said that we would be prepared to have the good offices of a mutually accepted personality, even though previously we had declined a similar proposal. Pakistan, however, continued to make quite impossible demands. In the first week of June, the President of Pakistan said at Sargodha that no useful purpose would be served by the adoption of such a procedure. Other Pakistan spokesmen have been suggesting impossible terms of reference. They wanted a time-limit, suspension of arms supply to India during this period, etc.
We used to be told by many friends, even by leaders in Pakistan, that a settlement of the Kashmir issue was essential in the interest of joint defence of the two countries. At one time, Pakistan made a grievance of the fact that while she was offering joint defence to us, we were not willing to accept it. That the proposal of joint defence was no more than a propaganda stunt, has now been made perfectly clear by the statements of Pakistan leaders. They have publicly declared that even if the Kashmir issue was settled amicably, Pakistan will not go either to the defence of India against China or change her friendly relations with Peking. On July 12th last, Mr. Bhutto is reported to have said in the Pakistan National Assembly that an "attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan'', but "involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia". He also said that if India were to turn her guns against Pakistan, the latter would not be alone in that conflict. He was obviously referring to China. The fact that India has no intention whatsoever of threatening the security of Pakistan or of turning any guns towards her, was ignored and the repeated offers of a No-War pact were forgotten. Pakistan today has only one object, and that is to malign India and to damage us in every way. They do not want to see us strong enough to stand up to China. They would like us to remain weak and helpless against the Chinese threat. They do not like to be told that the arms aid to India has nothing to do with Kashmir.
We have made it clear that while we are, and shall continue to be, anxious as ever on a settlement of our problems with Pakistan, based on rational and realistic considerations, there is no question of our considering any proposals for international sing or division of the Valley, or joint control of Kashmir, and the like. If and when a settlement is arrived at, it must obviously be a peaceful one, not affecting the stability and progress already achieved, and must strengthen the friendship between the peoples of India and Pakistan. Without this, no settlement has any meaning.
During the talks, India not only exercised great patience. and restraint, but also offered generous concessions, though in vain, in the hope of winning Pakistan's friendship and opening a new chapter of fruitful cooperation between the two countries. While we continue to cherish this hope there is little possibility of a settlement so long as Pakistan persists in its irrational animus against India. The concessions which we offered to Pakistan are no longer open, and they must be treated as withdrawn. We do not wish our generosity and sincere desire for friendly relations with our neighbour to be treated by its Government as a jumping off ground for further claims. While the break in the talks is a matter of deep regret, we have to accept the facts, and we must wait for a more opportune moment for a settlement of all our differences with Pakistan.