22041960 Statement of Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon on the question of withdrawal of Kashmir ease from the U.N.O. in the Lok Sabha on April 22, 1960.
22041960 Statement of Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon on the question of withdrawal of Kashmir ease from the U.N.O. in the Lok Sabha on April 22, 1960.
This resolution coming within the private Members' time might perhaps-I only said, perhaps-give an impression that it is somewhat out of relationship with the immensity of this problem. We may not however forget that this debate, however few we are here, has a vast audience, an audience just across our frontiers, an audience in the world, and particularly amongst the Great Powers.
Shri Tariq has moved this Resolution which has given us an opportunity of reminding ourselves of this problem. It will live with us unless and until Pakistan vacates its aggression on Kashmir territory, because what is involved here is really the sovereignty of this land. This is the fundamental issue.
The Resolution before us asks us to withdraw our complaint or rather our reference-we did not, actually make it as a complaint to the Security Council. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I say with great respect that the criticism that is made of the Mover's approach to this, for availing ourselves of this remedy is bad, but, if I may say, so, the reasons given for it are worse. The reasons why we cannot withdraw this from the Security Council are not merely technical ones. If they are technical ones, we would overcome them. The reasons go to the basis of our foreign policy, of our approach to international affairs and, what is more, to our security.
Now, there are certain fundamental things in connection with Kashmir. This debate has roamed far and wide. Therefore, it becomes necessary, since matters have been raised, to refer to some of them in brief.
First of all, this reference was made to the Security Council at a time when conditions as far as were known were not the conditions that came to be known afterwards. We submitted the complaint to the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations-Pacific Settlement of Disputes-because at that time we were not aware of the fact that Pakistani Armies had intervened. At least we were not officially aware. At that time many Pakistani nationals were there and they were aided and abetted by Pakistan; but it had not become a warlike action by a constituted State.
Secondly, at that time our one desire was to limit the spreading of conflict. Reference has been made and I think it is only right to refer to it-allegation has been made to the sinister role of Lord Mountbatten in this affair. Apart from being a reflection on Lord Mountbatten, it is rather a reflection on this country. We were a self-governing Dominion at that time and it was incumbent on the Governor General as the Head of the State to act according to the advice of his Ministers. So, if we place the responsibility on Lord Mountbatten, we are really blaming our Government and our Prime Minister. But, in fact, what is alleged is not the case at all. Lord Mountbatten's role in this, as Head of the State, was to accept accession. But, in the subsequent letter that went out there was some reference to the ascertainment of the opinion of the people to which I shall refer later.
Therefore, the main position in regard to this was this: we went there at a time when we did not know as much as we did later. And, our lack of knowledge was not due so much to our lack of care as to the fact of deliberate concealment on the other side. And, so, when Pakistan made its reply-some 15 days later to the United Nations they answered our application with several points-I think it was 14 of something of that kind. But only one of them referred to Kashmir the others were references to Junagadh, Hyderabad and genocide and the two nation theory and all kinds of things which had nothing to do with this matter. The long reply did not refer to the Kashmir State except a two line paragraph or so in which they denied aggression. The others are irrelevant. Our complaint was, therefore, in fact, met by denial which, afterwards, was proved by U.N. Observers to be wrong. Therefore, there has been no legitimate or proved fact in support of the denial.
Reference has been made to the fact that aggression has not been found by the United Nations. This is to throw away. the support we have got from the findings of the UN Commission itself when Sir Owen Dixon stated that on such a date when the Pakistani forces crossed the frontier they committed a breach of international law. That might be a roundabout way of saving it. But it was a finding that aggression had been committed.
In this matter we have to stand from various factors. Ours being a modern nation, an old country, being a modern nation, having came into independence after the emergence of the United Nations and the Charter, the commitments in relation to the Charter are part of our Constitution. Therefore, we are bound as much by the municipal law of this country as by the international obligations which have been sanctified or accepted by our municipal law. We cannot get away from the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations.
Secondly, it is not our interest to get away from it. The solution now proposed, if it were accepted, would be something like saying, if you have got a bad headache, cut off your head. That would be no remedy. So, to displace the United Nations and to lend our support even if we are badly hurt would be to disown and disengage ourselves from all the obligations, moral and otherwise, we have entered into. It would accentuate or rather would take us away from the forces that operate in this world towards world peace and co-operation and human development. What is more, it would belie every profession and every declaration that we have
made before that body in this regard. It is quite true that aggression has not been vacated in Kashmir. It is also true that even the United Nations in its resolutions-it is sometimes forgotten-has found in favour of our sovereignty of that region, because every resolution speaks about the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir- Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India-and because there are no States in this country, whether it be the Maharashtra that has to appear or Gujarat that has to appear next week or Kerala in which there is trouble often or Bengal or Punjab, there are no States with international boundaries, with frontiers. The frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir are on the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the foot of the Himalayas. That has been sanctified by the declaration of the U. N. where it speaks of the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government which is indeed the Government that is like any other Government, part of our constitutional arrangements. It is so by international law; it has been accepted by Pakistan, by ourselves and the British Government at the time of Pakistan. It is international law.
Secondly, it is the will of the people themselves declared in their constituent assembly and afterwards by two different elections from which latter only those people who were held away by duress were prevented from participation. Even if they had voted against it would still leave a large electoral majority in favour of the declared will. Therefore the plebiscite has been gone through. We come to this question raised by Shri Sadhan Gupta. He said that we made a mistake in making a commitment about the plebiscite. We are inclined to accept the versions other people have about us; we are even likely sometimes to accept such terms. Two or three years ago, it was common in our country to speak about Kashmir and India as if they were two separate countries. We have got out of it. Similarly, when we speak about the plebiscite and so on, we are accepting the version of people who do not agree with us. We made no commitment in regard to the plebiscite without any conditions. True, we have referred to it. The only resolutions of the U.N. by which we are bound are the resolution of the 13th August, 1948, 5th January, 1949 and the 17th January or whatever it is. These are the only resolutions to which India has agreed. Every delegate, myself or any representative of the Government-every delegate had been instructed and has said it before the Security Council that we are not bound by any resolution which we have not accepted. We may in good faith try to carry out what the Security Council decides; we cannot prevent the Security Council passing resolutions anything more than we can prevent the SEATO powers declaring India to be under their protect-royalty were to return to some particular country whose name I shall not mention and were to say, "Macmillan was my ancestor and the whole continent of America is part of my country", we could not stop him doing it. You may send him to some place for mental cure. If the Security Council were to pass any resolution or the SEATO powers were to say that any country below the 32nd parallel is under its protection, we cannot stop them. We can only refuse to accept them. There was thus no question of any resolution being accepted.
It takes me to a point of the plebiscite. There is the Plebiscite Front" and what not. What has been their view at the U.N.? We accepted it as a working basis some years. ago. Some years ago, there was a resolution which was divided into three parts; it is what may be called a concertina resolution. One part is tied up with the other. The second part becomes operative only when the first part is performed; so also, about the third part. Our contention has been and I am. glad to say that it is now regarded as at least not controversial that the first part has not been performed. That first part was that the Pakistani elements in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir must withdraw Their contention was that they were not there; and it was said that all the forces that there were at that time, except such people as were required for local police work in the so-called Azad Government, should withdraw. At that time when the Resolution was passed, the Northern areas were not under the Azad Government and in fact the Pakistani delegate himself admitted that he had no control over it. Therefore, the whole area which is now so significant to us, much more than is realized by our countrymen,-Baltistan, Gilgit, the whole area of Chitral, the frontiers with China, Soviet Union and so on, that is, those areas-was never part of Azad Kashmir; those areas were and are within the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.
So when this resolution was passed the Pakistan Government had agreed to withdraw all these forces. Not only did they not withdraw these forces, they accentuated and added to them. Therefore, the first part has not been performed, and unless the first part is performed the second part is not irrigated. That has been our argument. I hope we have successfully established that the first part has not been performed and, therefore, we cannot look at the second part because it is necessary to have the first part performed.
Supposing, for argument, sake, the first part has been performed, then comes performance of the second part which, maybe on account of our weakness, maybe because we are preoccupied, maybe because we never had experience in these matters, has been easily "translated", by those who ought to know better, as meaning demilitarization. We have never at any time, whether in Sri Gopalaswami Ayyangar's time or anybody's time, agreed to the demilitarization of Kashmir. No sovereign nation will agree to demilitarization of its own territory. And, on behalf of the Government of India, I would say we are accused of passion in this matter; as the Prime Minister rightly said, it is not my passion, I only reflected the passion of the country in this matter-we would not agree to any tribunal however great, we would go down as a people rather than agree at any time to demilitarization.
So there is no question of demilitarization in this matter. There is another point in this first part. Apart from the withdrawal of these troops, it was said in the first part that it was incumbent on the other side not to create conditions which would create turbulence between us. So, when they carried on all this campaign with all their heart and when speeches were made that they would invade us the jehad, they created that kind of conditions and they have broken the first part.
So unless Pakistan behaves like a civilized nation and not carry on a war of nerves a psychological war against us, continually pricking our frontiers and everywhere, as she has been doing, unless the first part is fulfilled-the first part was not fulfilled and I make no reservation in this matter; the first part in regard to the resolution of 13th August remains imful filled and, what is more, it remains violated-the second part does not come into operation.
But even if the first part has been performed, the second part would require taking away, first of all, of the forces, the 32 battalions of the so-called Azad Army, Pakistan's regular army that have come in possibly after the conclusion of the ceasefire, after the drafting of these agreements. It is only when they have been removed that other matters would come in..
Then, what is it that in the second part we have committed ourselves to? We said we would withdraw ourselves at certain points. I am sure I am not endangering the security of the country when I tell you that even today on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir, the number of Indian Armed Forces is at a level lower than permitted by the cease-fire agreement. That is the pacific approach that this country has made to this problem.
Supposing it was the case, even the second part has been performed, what do we say in the third part? We never said anything about a plebiscite in the third part. We simply said that we would discuss with the Pakistan Government certain methods, this, that and the other, and out of those methods were put on a kind of architectural plan in the 5th January resolution. It was not an offer of plebiscite. In fact, there are various documents, which you can obtain from the Ministry of External Affairs, where the United Nations itself has said that plebiscite is only one method of ascertaining the opinion. So the plebiscite which has by repetition become almost a
gospel, was not a commitment on our part. If it was a commitment, it required the satisfaction of three or four stages of conditions, which have not only been not fulfilled but have been violated by the action of a reverse kind.
So when we went to the UN., we agreed to this resolution in order to restrict the area of war, in order that the specific purpose of the United Nations may be promoted.
The second point we have to remember is this, that we have not taken a "Dispute" to the United Nations. There is no dispute, so far as we are concerned, about Kashmir. There is no more a dispute about Kashmir than there is a dispute about U.P. What is before the Security Council, under the terms of the Charter, is a "Situation" which is very different from a "Dispute". And what is more, the Security Council has not got the powers under the Charter to adjudicate in a legal dispute. That could become the function of the World Court if we agree to its jurisdiction. But no legal issues can be resolved at the Security Council under the terms of the Charter. Therefore, it is a dispute, it must be either a boundary dispute or a legal dispute. If it is a boundary dispute, it would have to be settled under the terms of a specific settlement where there must be agreement on both sides. Therefore, we have referred to no dispute. We have referred to a situation-I have forgotten the relevant clause of the Charter-which was inimical to the peace of the world, which was deteriorating the relations between two countries and which might lead to this, that and the other.
The third fact to be remembered is this. Perhaps the House would not feel very much moved by it, but they are familiar with this phenomenon as well as other individuals at the United Nations. In all these years, we have been maligned up and down the world on many charges. We have been charged, with genocide; we have been charged, for example, with ill treatment of the minorities-who are the majorities in Kashmir and what is more, we have been told that the Muslim populations of India-I hope the Muslim population, if they recognize themselves as a separate identity, will take this into account we have been charged with holding the Muslim population of India as a hostage in regard to Kashmir-a large hostage indeed, of 60 million. So, that is the third factor that we should bear in mind.
The fourth is that it is quite true the resentment of this House and of this country as a whole in regard to the Security Council is understandable, that the Council is composed of 11 nations, most of the nations whose constitutions are founded in the ideas of truth and liberty, who have not thrown their weight on the side of resisting aggression.
Even as late as last year, the Secretary-General, when called upon in another connection to state the juridical position about the changes of sovereignty, said that no act of war could be permitted by the United Nations to change what is called the status hurts. That is to say, the State of Jammu and Kashmir is part of this country under the international law, under the terms of the Constitution in 1935 which was implemented at the time of partition, and what is more by the fact that the United Nations themselves have recognised in their resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir-When the question of Jammu and Kashmir was raised-that Jammu and Kashmir Government had no international status except inasmuch as they could be either related to us or to Pakistan-of course, it related to us. Therefore, this position having been recognised, there could be no question whatsoever of our surrendering any part of this territory, and that is why our position has been on the one hand consistent with the background of our country and the necessities of the world and on the other with the practical considerations of the situation.
We have told the Security Council that 40,000 to 42,000 sq miles of our territory remain under external occupation. There is yet another thing that is not fully realised; they have been annexed by Pakistan, I believe, that clause 1 sub clause (2) of their constitution legally from their point of view, and from our point of view illegally. They have been annexed by Pakistan. We have not recognised and we will not recognise the fact that we have ceased to be sovereign over those territories. What is more, under our present Constitution, with the recent decision of the Supreme Court, no Government in this country except by an amendment of our Constitution, can alter the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir, because they are part of our sovereign territory, and there can be no change of our national boundaries except by an amendment of our Constitution. So, it has been made very clear. Therefore, the excitement on the part of Shri Tariq about Mangla dam is natural, but, in my humble submission, unnecessary, because, no Government in this country-not that it wants to do so, but even if it wants to-can alter the boundaries; it is not possible. except by a change in our Constitution.
Then, reference has been made to the fact that we are not taking enough care about it: what have we done to take our country back? Questions have also been asked with regard to the present position. First of all, I would like to say that the present position is that on our sovereign territory, are two administrations one is the civil administration of India functioning and the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, indeed as any other State, and the other is the de facto administration which is inimical to the exercise of our sovereignty, the socalled Azad Government and certain principality governments presumably in these mountain States. This is the de facto position; and these are held apart not so much by physical forces as by voluntary agreement on our side. It should not be forgotten that India was the party which initiated these cease-fire negotiations. And that we negotiated at a time when, as someone has stated, there was the prospect of armed victory. Rightly or wrongly, and I believe rightly, we took the view that victory by armed forces alone is not enough and it is necessary to proceed to a settlement. On either side of the cease-fire line are observers of the United Nations and it would not be proper for me to know what I feel about the performance of the operations in so many cases. They are composed of many nations, and I regret to say that many of them belong to military alliances,
whose business it is to report on cease-fire violations. These violations are complained of by the Parties and, if you look at them, they will look like a score-board! That is to say, the aim appears to be-I speak subject to correction, because there is the risk of criticism, but this looks like a score-board -to even up. Actually, we made some hundreds of complaints -I forget the number now, I think it was 1,028-against Pakistan and they have made 870 complaints against us. But the score is always slightly tilted against us over the years. It looks like that. We will leave that alone.
This cease fire line is not held by any armed forces but is held by observers and by a law that, in fact, operates against us, because we observe international law and very scrupulously, that is, within five miles of that line no armed forces can operate, with the result that when a raid is committed, we can not do anything about it, because our uniformed men are precluded from going there which will violate that line. That is the position regarding the case-fire line. Of course, I do not want to whine about the position and we are carrying on as best as we can.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the worst part of it is that during. for the last three years considerable acts of sabotage have taken place inside our territory and when I say territory I mean our administered territory, a very unfortunate word.
In a part of our administered territory, these acts of sabotage have happened. This was originally initiated by an ex General called Akbhar Khan, but it so happens that we have an Institute of Armament studies. Arms research and what not, and there is no doubt whatsoever that the materials for these sets, the Personnel for this, the money for it, according to the investigations, have proved to come from Pakistan. It is an act of underground war or guerilla war against us. We might take the evidence of what cannot be called an authority inclined in our favour, the News Chronicle of London. It says:
"An unofficial cloak and dagger movement has been launched inside Indian Kashmir by fire-eating General Akbar Khan, a veteran of the 1948-49 Kashmir war days, to counteract the internal distress and bolster up his own position. Thus, this tacit encouragement of subversive movements of General Akbar Khan suggests he intends to have Kashmir by fair means or by foul."
Then he goes on in various places to talk about taking these places by forces by force, if need be. Our policy is based on friendship with our neighbours, whoever they might be, but equally it is based on resistance to aggression.
Now much has been said about our preparedness in this matter. We cannot shut up our minds, and indeed we did not, and we told the Security Council that on the other side of the Indo-Pakistan international frontier, not the cease-fire line but upon the other side of the Indo-Pakistan international line is not only the country of Pakistan but a member of a great military alliance. That is to say, it is like our war machinery in British days. This country's power at that time was not what was collected here but what was here and the British war office put together. Similarly, Pakistan stands in a greater military alliance and in view of the various conditions, I do not want to go into greater detail about it. It is said or thought that the change of Government in Pakistan has brought about or is bringing about some results. I hope it will. I think we may not forget these things, because we have to keep our power somewhat dry, even if we trust our neighbours.
This is what the General said when he was commanding an army, and he was not a pensioner. He said:
"I hope to have an army which is highly skilled and it is on that that the future of Pakistan will depend...... The American commitment was to give the Pakistan army the means to create certain units that would balance certain divisions. This programme has now been geared up. It is moving splendidly. It is a limited programme."
It was "limited" two years ago and it is still "limited". Then he goes on to say this is a press report:
"General Ayub said that this was, for the first time, that the exercises envisaging the use of tactical atomic weapons were being staged in Pakistan. Hitherto, the Pakistan Army's studies have been confined to studies of atomic warfare in the tactical field. To put our observations to a practical test, this exercise is being staged." The conclusions and the technique of fighting in nuclear battle-fields would be evolved from this exercise. The exercise is being staged keeping in view the terrain in West Pakistan plains..."
This is the important part of it.
"The exercise is being staged keeping in view the terrain in West Pakistan plains where riverine obstacles..."
I said:
"There are no rivers on the other side in the way of obstacles."
That is, the whole idea is that all these things are in order to resist the Soviet Union but the riverine obstacles are on our side.
I said:
"I do not have a copy of a map to circulate but you know where riverine obstacles are."
The report goes on the say:
"The battle has been developing during the past two months. Now, the climax is about to reach."
This has been the position since two years ago. It is not my purpose to heat up any difficulties or to come in the way of any conciliatory processes that go on. Going back to this question of explosions inside, during the last three years there have been 229 cases of explosion in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, on the whole working out at an average of 90 a year, that is to say, one in every four days. When I say explosions, at present they are not what may be called merely country made explosives of any kind but they have war materials in them.
Also, in the same period there have been infiltrations into our territory, first starting at just over a hundred going up to 211 in 1958, 152 in 1959 and 25 in the few months of this year, that is, the first two months of this year. Infiltrations mean not people who come because they are hungry. The infiltrators are international criminals who are penetrating our frontiers and who have been either arrested or rounded up and so on. But as circumstances obtain, we do not deal with all these people every time. They can be pushed back. They are pushed back.. But these are the fellows who really try to do harm. So there is an act of incipient aggression against us going on all the time. This should be borne in mind and it should not lapse into the background of our thinking when we are talking of the territorial integrity of our land.
Now that takes us to the last of our positions. The Government cannot accept the Resolution as it stands for the reasons I have stated and not because some technical positions cannot be found if we want to. There are technical difficulties, but they can probably be overcome. It may even be that the Security Council is tired of it. But suppose that you withdraw. it from the Security Council, there is nothing to prevent the whole issue from going before the General Assembly. At the present moment it does not go before the General Assembly where it is possible to garner votes even more because it is tied up in the Security Council. Two organisations of the United Nations cannot debate the same question at the same time. Therefore it does not go in the way the more assumes. But if we were to withdraw this question from the Security Council, because we want to, certain consequences follow. We would have proclaimed to the world that now the Charter is no longer worth adhering to. That will be a grave decision to take.
Therefore it is not only Kashmir that is involved. It is the basis of our foreign policy, it is the basis of the world organisation and our whole approach to peace and world co-operation that are involved. Therefore whatever risks we may have in this matter-and there are no risks just because the question is in the Security Council-the only eventually is that it is possible for Pakistan to bring it up now and then and have a debate. But there are no military risks just because the matter is in the Security Council. On the last occasion when this was brought up before the Council of Pakistan the risk was of foreign intrusion under the guise of importing the United Nations Emergency Force". It was sought to be proposed in the interests of Pakistan by some of the western powers that a United Nations Emergency Force should go into the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The Government's reply at that time in no uncertain terms and in externally categorical ones was that we would not allow in any circumstances, foreign soldiers to tread on our soil, that is to say, we would not permit the bringing in-not only not permit we would resist and push them out we would physically not permit anyone entering the territory where our administrative writ ran. If the idea was to bring them on the other side we may not be able to prevent it except by an act of war. But we would regard that as a further violation of our sovereignty and with international support. Therefore, in 1958 I think it was, the Government of India very stoutly resisted the proposal for the sending of a United Nations Emergency Force for this purpose, which would have meant the sending of troops of certain countries acting as international soldiers-for what purpose, one does not know -because that would have been violation of our territory, and the Security Council was prevented from such action.
There is at the present moment no actual physical danger to us, but there is this question remaining unresolved in the Council. From a moral and legal point of view there is much to be gained. Therefore, the Government cannot agree at all to this resolution. Speaking for myself, it would be very wrong for me to say that it should not have been brought, because there are various parliamentary methods of raising issues. This is perhaps one of them. we should have this question in our minds, partly because of It is important that the Indian army on the soil of Kashmir, and much more so on account of the economic and democratic development that has gone on in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
There is comparative quietude, and the solution of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir will rest on the industrial and economic development of our land and the maintenance of our unity. That way, the political and social equilibrium will so shift that there will be no option for the people on the other side except to join their brethren on this side of the Ceasefire line.
Thus it would be better for us, it would be part of our policy that we do not attempt to do that by the violation of an agreement we have reached. We have told the Security Council that under international law every agreement that we have entered into, we shall carry out. But we shall not accept an agreement because somebody says we have accepted it. Secondly, we have also confirmed, we have pointed out that there are certain principles and doctrines of international law which have to be observed for example what is called in dubious mitius. that is to say, if a treaty is entered into by two sides and has to be interpreted, it has to be always interpreted liberally in favour of the person who carries the greater burdens in the implementing of it.
Therefore, in regard to all these matters a different view has to be taken. But it very much depends upon the determination of this country. We may not forget that not long ago it is now getting on to thirteen years-this country, this part of India was invaded, invaded first by irregulars numbering about a quarter million, and for a few days a single battalion of the Indian army was responsible for checking the tide of invasion. And on the soil of Kashmir lie buried some of the best officers and men of our fighting forces. We owe a debt of gratitude to them, and, what is more, we owe-a debt of obligation to see that there shall be no residing on our part, no back-sliding on our part in this matter.
Kashmir is a live issue with us, because it is part of our sovereign territory, not because it is a piece of land; it is part of our kinship, it is a sector of our people. What is more, the economic development of that territory, the development of its resources, and apparatus of international conflict into the Asian Continent, is very much dependent upon our ability to maintain our hegemony over this strategic area.