15081947 Opening speech by Mr. Mohamad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the All Parties Conference on Kashmir, 1955
Speeches and Interviews
15081947 Opening speech by Mr. Mohamad Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan, at the All Parties Conference on Kashmir, 1955
We have in this hall today a unique gathering. There are assembled here leaders drawn from all important political parties and schools of thought. It is for the first time in the history of Pakistan that an assembly so representative of public opinion has met to consider the Kashmir question and assist the Government in finding a solution to this national problem. I am most grateful to all of you for having responded to my invitation.
We have met to consider a momentous issue. It is an issue the solution of which is vital to the preservation of peace and stability in this region. It is an issue which holds the key to friendly and cooperative relations between Pakistan and India. Above all it is a human issue. It concerns the destiny of 4 million people in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and their right to self-determination. Indeed, the fate not only of the four million inhabitants of Kashmir but that of many more millions in this region hangs on it.
The Kashmir dispute has remained unresolved for 8 years. The remarkable part of it is that, given goodwill, its solution should have presented no difficulty whatever. The issue, in fact, is extremely simple. Both India and Pakistan are solemnly pledged that the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan must be settled through a free and impartial plebiscite. All that remains to be done is to hold this plebiscite. It has not been held so long because India would not allow it to be held.
In fact, the Kashmir dispute need never have arisen. Had certain agreements which formed the very basis of the Partition of this sub-continent been honoured by India, or had India been consistent even in her own conduct on this issue of accession of Indian States, there would have been no dispute regarding Kashmir. Let us recall some of the indisputable facts of Partition.
When Partition was agreed upon, the British Government declared that British paramountcy in regard to Indian States would lapse on the day the subcontinent became independent. The States would then be free to accede either to India or Pakistan as they wished. The Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, however, advised the rulers that, in deciding the question of accession, they must pay due regard to the communal composition of their populations, the wishes of their peoples and the geographic location of their States. He told them: "You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour, any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible "
It was thus universally assumed that, following the basis of Partition, States with a Muslim majority population contiguous to Pakistan would accede to Pakistan. In the case of Kashmir, accordingly, the position was crystal clear. Here, although the ruler was a Hindu, 77% of the population was Muslim. The territory is contiguous to Pakistan. Political, economic, strategic and other considerations all made accession to Pakistan the natural course.
The Government of India and the Indian National Congress were in full agreement with the advice that Lord Mount batten had given to Indian rulers on the subject of accession. Indian States acceded to India or Pakistan in accordance generally with that advice. A dispute on the question of accession arose only in regard to three States, namely, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad.
The Nawab of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan, although the State had a majority of Hindu population. The Government of India protested in the strongest terms. Their view was that on the lapse of British paramountcy, sovereign rights in an Indian State reverted to its people. A Muslim ruler could not speak for his non-Muslim population. In their telegram dated 22nd September, 1947, the Government of India considered the acceptance of Junagadh's accession by Pakistan as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory. They characterised it as "a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by expanding the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of the principles on which Partition was agreed upon and effected." Subsequently, the Indian army invaded Junagadh and the State was occupied by India by force.
In the matter of Hyderabad, the conduct of the Government of India was also inspired by similar considerations. The Nizam did not wish to accede either to India or Pakistan. He wanted instead to enter into special treaty relations with the Government of India in order to preserve a measure of independence for his State. That a Mgslim ruler of a Hindu majority State should refuse to accede to India, even though he was prepared to let his people decide this question by means of a plebiscite, was intolerable in the eyes of the Indian Government. In September 1948, Indian Army marched into Hyderabad and forcibly annexed the Nizam's territory.
The Indian stand thus was that a State with a majority of Hindu population must accede to India, even if its Muslim ruler does not want to do so. This, according to the Government of India, was the very basis of Partition. It followed there from that a State with a majority of Muslim population must accede to Pakistan, even though its Hindu ruler may decide otherwise.
When it came to Kashmir, however, the Indian claim that accession of Indian States must follow the Partition pattern, irrespective of the wishes of their respective Rulers, was conveniently ignored. Here was a case of a Hindu ruler offering to accede to India, inspite of the fact that 77% of the State's population was Muslim.
The offer of accession was, moreover, invalid. It was made during the currency of a standstill agreement which the Maharaja had signed with Pakistan on the 15th August, 1947. It was, further, against the known wishes of the majority of the population Soon after Partition, the Maharaja's forces and the terrorist Hindu gangs he had imported from India set out to exterminate and overawe the Muslim population. The indomitable warriors of Poonch drew their sword in defence of freedom. They were poorly armed. Nevertheless, the Maharaja's forces were broken and scattered and an Azad Kashmir Government: was set up to administer liberated territory. At the same time the brave people of the Northern territories threw off the Maharaja's yoke. The Maharaja himself fled the Capital and found sanctuary in Jammu, where the accession drama was enacted. His writ had ceased to be supreme in the major part of the State through an instrument of accession.
None of these facts, however, deterred the Government of India from accepting the Maharaja's offer of accession. On the strength of an accession document, signed surreptitiously by the Maharaja with the Government of India, Indian forces. were flown into Kashmir to fight and subjugate the Muslim population. Since then India has remained in forcible occupation of a large part of the State.
This is how the Kashmir dispute arose. Had India honoured the basis on which Indian States were to accede to Pakistan or India and had Indian conduct with regard to Kashmir been consistent with her own conduct in respect of Junagadh and Hyderabad, no such dispute would have arisen. While accepting the Maharaja's offer of accession, however, the Indian Government stated that this accession was to be conditional. In their reply to the Maharaja on the 27th October 1947, they categorically said that as soon as law and order was restored in the State, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
Ever since then, for these last 8 years, this "reference to the people" has remained a mirage. Law and order was established in the State several years ago. But that Indian undertaking. Subsequently reinforced by an International Agreement, that the people of Kashmir shall be allowed to decide the question of accession by means of a plebiscite remains unfulfilled.
On the 1st November 1947, the Quaid i-Azam suggested that the Indian forces and the tribesmen should withdraw from the State at once and then the Governor-General of Pakistan and India should arrange for a plebiscite under their joint supervision. These proposals were not accepted by India.
Eventually, the Government of India took this dispute to the United Nations. While the Security Council was endeavouring to bring about a settlement, the Government of India, disregarding the undertaking they had given to the Security Council to do nothing that may aggravate the situation, launched a major offensive in the State in April 1948. The Indian intention obviously was to crush the forces of liberation and resistance within the State and to occupy the entire State by force. They thus wanted to present the world with a fait accompli, as they had done in the case of Junagadh and as they subsequently did in the case of Hyderabad.
As the Indian offensive mounted, over 500,000 Muslims were driven out of the State to seek refuge in Pakistan Pakis tan's security was seriously threatened by the advancing Indian forces. In May 1948, the Government of Pakistan was therefore compelled to move a limited number of troops into the State in order to hold certain defensive positions.
The heroism and valour shown by Azad Kashmir forces and the tribesmen and others from Pakistan who had gone to the succour of their brethren in Kashmir was superb. Although heavily outnumbered and inadequately armed, they valiantly fought the enemy's forces and gave a magnificent account of themselves. Had is not been for their resistance to the com bined onlaught of the Indian and State forces, a much grimmer calamity would have befallen the helpless Muslim population of the State.
After hearing both Indian and Pakistani representatives, the Security Council came to the conclusion that the only just, peaceful and democratic solution of this dispute was to deter mine the accession of the State in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people. The Council appointed a Commission which was able eventually to bring about an agreement between Pakistan and India on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This International Agreement is embodied in two of the Commission's resolutions dated 13th August 1948, and 5th January 1949.
Pursuant to this Agreement, fighting in the State stopped on 1st January, 1949.
The Agreement provides for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops simultaneously with the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces from the State. Thereafter, a plebiscite Administrator is to be appointed to conduct a plebiscite to decide the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. He is to have full powers, including the power of disposal of the remaining Indian and State armed forces, so that the people may vote freely without fear or coercion.
By March 1949, Admiral Nimitz was designated Plebiscite Administrator, with the agreement of both India and Pakistan. Three months later, in July, the ceasefire line was demarcated in Kashmir.
Thereafter a deadlock ensued. The Plebiscite Administrator can hold the plebiscite only after Indian and Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State in accordance with the provisions of the International Agreement. Up-to-date, owing to Indian intransigence, it has not been possible to make any progress with the withdrawal of troops from the State.
After January 1949, the Security Council and its representatives made numerous attempts to secure Indian agreement to the reduction of her troops in the State. All proposals for their reduction to a figure that would ensure the freedom of the plebiscite were rejected by India.
In July, 1950, Sir Owen Dixon, the U.N. Representative, even tried to seek an alternative solution to this problem. After consulting the Indian Prime Minister, he put forward a proposal that the plebiscite should be confined only to the Kashmir valley and some adjacent territories, and the remainder of the State territory may be partitioned between India and Pakistan. This proposal was repudiated by the Indian Prime Minister even while the Government of Pakistan was considering it. Sir Owen Dixon eventually came to the conclusion that India had no intention whatsoever of allowing a free expression of the will of the people in any part of the State under her control.
Subsequently, Dr. Graham, another Security Council mediator, made a number of attempts to secure Indian agreement on demilitarization. These too failed.
In 1953, on a suggestion from the Indian Prime Minister, my predecessor took up direct negotiations with him to settle this dispute. In a communique the two Prime Ministers issued from Delhi in August 1953, they reaffirmed that Kashmir should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as ascertained by means of a free and impartial plebiscite in the entire State. It was also agreed that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954 to organize and hold the plebiscite. Prior to that date, Expert Committees of Indian and Pakistan officials were to meet and advise the Prime Minister. Ministers on the settlement of such issues as demilitarization, which had thus far held up progress towards the plebiscite.
This agreement was, however, accompanied by some entirely new demands by the Indian Prime Minister. He demanded that a new Plebiscite Administrator drawn from a small "neutral" country should be selected in place of Admiral Nimitz. He insisted that although a plebiscite was to be held in the entire State, this plebiscite by itself was not to decide the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan. The question of accession, according to him, was to be decided after the result of the plebiscite had been examined in the light of geographic, economic and other considerations with a view to preventing migrations from or disturbances within the State. In other words, even after the plebiscite had been held there was to be no assurance that a settlement of this dispute would be reached. Finally, the Indian Prime Minister insisted that the Kashmir refugees now in Pakistan should not be allowed to vote in the plebiscite. He contended that to permit them to vote would create a number of complications. All these demands were contrary to previous agreements between India and Pakistan.
While these issues were still under discussion, an entirely extraneous subject was imported into these negotiations by the Indian Prime Minister. In December 1953, he informed my predecessor that reports that Pakistan was going to obtain military assistance from the United States had completely altered the context of Kashmir negotiations. In particular, he added, the grant of military aid to Pakistan would affect the question of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, implying that India would now want to keep larger forces in the State than previously.
Obviously this issue of military aid can have no bearing whatever on the size of forces that India may maintain in Kashmir during the plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan have agreed that the plebiscite must be free. Therefore all fore. must be withdrawn from the State or so located that they are unable to interfere with the freedom of plebiscite. The question of military aid is totally irrelevant to this issue. It cannot be used as an excuse to deny to the people of Kashmir their right to determine the question of accession in complete freedom from fear or pressure of Indian forces stationed in the State.
These facts were explained to the Indian Prime Minister. Subsequent negotiations between the Prime Minister of India and my predecessor, however, failed to resolve these issues. They met again in May this year, in yet another attempt to solve this dispute. The Indian viewpoint was, however, so divergent from that of Pakistan that these talks also bore no fruit.
We are thus faced with this position. Although it was agreed between India, Pakistan and the Security Council, seven years ago, that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State as freely expressed through a plebiscite, no plebiscite has yet been held. India maintains a vast army in the State. Every proposal for a reduction in the size of this army so that the people's vote may be free has so far been rejected by India. She has thus barred the holding of a plebiscite.
The Indian Prime Minister and other Indian spokesmen have at times attempted to blame Pakistan for this unconscionable delay in the holding of the plebiscite. Addressing a press conference at Srinagar on July 9th this year, Pandit Pant, the Indian Home Minister, stated that Pakistan had failed to agree to any reasonable conditions for the last seven or eight years in regard to a plebiscite in Kashmir. Let us examine this statement a little closely.
What has held up the plebiscite is lack of agreement on reduction of forces in the State. Even a cursory appraisal of the facts will show who is responsible for it.
(1) In March 1949, the United Nations Commission convened a joint committee of the Indian and Pakistan representatives at which it was agreed that both India and Pakistan would submit their plans for the withdrawal of forces to this Committee. Pakistan did so: India first asked for more time and later refused to honour this agreement.
(2) After many months of effort, the U.N. The Commission came to the conclusion that India was not prepared to withdraw the bulk of her forces from Kashmir and was seeking to cover this refusal by misinterpreting the Commission's resolutions on this subject. The Commission, therefore, proposed that the differences arising from the interpretation of the two resolutions (which constitute the international agreement on Kashmir) should be submitted to arbitration by Admiral Nimitz, the Plebiscite Administrator.. This proposal was endorsed by a personal appeal from President Truman of the U.S.A. and Mr. Attlee, the then British Prime Minister, in August 1949. Pakistan accepted this proposal: India rejected it.
(3) In December 1949, the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, acting as the Council's mediator in this dispute, formulated certain proposals for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan accepted these proposals: India rejected them.
(4) The Security Council then appointed Sir Owen Dixon and authorised him in March 1950 to bring about the demilitarization of the State within 5 months. He formulated his demilitarization proposals in July 1950 and discussed them with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted those proposals: India rejected them.
(5) In January 1951, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers learnt their good offices to settle this dispute. They considered the removal or disbandment of all troops of both India and Pakistan in Kashmir essential to securing the freedom of the plebiscite vote and suggested any one of the following to provide for the security of the State:
(i) A Commonwealth force to be provided by Australia New Zealand, or
(ii) A joint force of India and Pakistan; or
(iii) A force to be locally raised in the State by the
Plebiscite Administrator. Each of these proposals was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India.
(6) In March 1951, Ambassador Muniz of Brazil suggested that in order to resolve the deadlock both India and Pakistan agree to arbitration on all points of difference arising from the interpretation of the two United Nations commis sion's resolutions of 13th August 1948 and 5th January 1949. which provide for the plebiscite. Pakistan accepted this proposal: India rejected it.
(7) In March 1951, the Security Council in a resolution. made a similar proposal. Pakistan accepted the resolution : India again rejected it.
(8) Subsequently between March 1951 and December 1952 Dr. Graham, the U.N Representative, put forward a number of proposals on the subject of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, each one of which was accepted. by Pakistan, but rejected by India.
(9) Finally, in December 1952 in a resolution, the Security Council urged the Governments of India and Pakistan that they agree that Pakistan armed forces in the State should be reduced to between 3,000 and 6,000 and Indian forces to be between 12,000 and 18,000. The Government of Pakistan. accepted this resolution: the Government of India rejected it.
It was this stage that the Indian Prime Minister and my predecessor started direct negotiations with a view to settling this dispute. At one time, it seemed that the question of demilitarization of the State might be resolved by the Pakistan and Indian Experts Committees. Just then the Indian Prime Minister barred further negotiations, on the plea that Pakistan's decision to obtain military aid from the U.S. had entirely changed the context of Kashmir negotiations.
In the light of the foregoing, Indian spokesmen's charge that Pakistan was preventing the holding of a plebiscite is clearly unjust and untrue. On the other hand, it is clear beyond doubt that the responsibility for preventing the plebiscite from being held is wholly that of India.
The Indian Prime Minister and other Indian spokesmen have of late also been saying that any solution of the Kashmir dispute must take into account the developments that have taken place during the last 7 years. In particular they have stated that under the Indian Constitution no decision concerning the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir could be taken by the Government of India without the consent of the Government of that State. The other development according to them is that the State's "Constituent Assembly" has voted for accession to India.
These so-called developments are nothing but action taken. unilaterally by India herself. They cannot alter the basic fact that India is bound under an International Agreement to decide the question of the accession of Kashmir through a free plebiscite. Nor can they possibly take away from the people of Kashmir their right to self-determination. It must be remembered that there are three parties to this agreement: Pakistan, the Security Council and India. Any unilateral action taken by India or by any subordinate body set up under Indian authority cannot in the least alter the commitments. India has freely made under an International Agreement in regard to Kashmir.
So far as the accession to India by the so-called "Constituent Assembly of the State'' is concerned, it is wholly devoid of any moral basis or legal effect.
When the idea of convening this Assembly was first mooted, the Indian representative categorically assured the Security Council that it was not meant "to come in the way" of Security Council and that while "the Assembly'' might "express an opinion" on the question of accession, "it can take no decision on it" It is quite obvious, therefore, that it was never intended that any decisions by this Assembly on the question of accession would in any way affect India's commitment that this question shall be decided only by means of a free and impartial plebiscite in the State. Let us, nevertheless, look at the character of this Assembly.
To start with, it obviously does not represent a large part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, namely, the substantial State territory which is not under Indian occupation. But let that pass. What is the nature of this so-called constitution-making body?
It was to consist of 75 members, representing Indian -occupied Kashmir. The elections were to be held while Indian troops were still in full control of the State. Under these circumstances there was no question of any freedom of voter. And, in fact, there was no vote. All sections of the Kashmir population boycotted the elections. As a result, no election at all took place. All the 75 members, nominated at India's behest, were declared "elected" unopposed, The world knows the character of regimes under which such unanimity in elections becomes possible. To call such an Assembly representative of the people of Kashmir would be a mockery of democracy. To claim that it was competent to decide the fate of the State, would be fantastic.
However, even with an Assembly which consisted wholly. of men nominated by India's agents, things did not proceed entirely according to plan. As time passed and Indian designs. With regard to the future of the State becoming clearer, Sheikh Abdullah, the State's Prime Minister, began to get progressively disillusioned. He started condemning attempts to force the State to accede wholly to India. In a public speech he described Indian arguments in favour of full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as "unrealistic childish and savouring of lunacy". This was in April 1952. By August 1953 the gulf between his and the Indian point of view on the question of accession had become so wide that it had become dangerous from the Indian standpoint to let him stay at large. The Indian press began vigorously to attack Sheikh Abdullah and openly to suggest that he needed rest. Accordingly, on the 9th August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah, whom India had held up to the world as the true spokesman of the people of Kashmir, was denounced, dismissed and clapped in jail. In his place, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was installed "Prime Minister" with the help of the Indian Army of Occupation. In due course, Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed fulfilled his part of the bargain. The so-called Constituent Assembly was persuaded to agree to "accede" to India. This is the true nature of the alleged "accession" decision which this Assembly rubber stamped at India's dictation.
The Indian Prime Minister has repeatedly affirmed that India stands by her international commitments. If that is so it is indeed extraordinary that Indian agreement on the basic question of the reduction of Indian troops in Kashmir so that a plebiscite may be held should prove so elusive. One is compelled to agree with Sir Owen Dixon that India has no intention to allow a free plebiscite in any part of the State under her control. Her object is rather to continue to hold the state down by force in an effort to consolidate her strangle-hold on Kashmir.
Nor do developments which have been taking place inside Indian-occupied Kashmir, with the obvious complicity of India, help to reinforce faith in Indian professions that India means to abide by her international commitments in regard to Kashmir. Civil liberties Mohammed Abdullah was arrested and jailed because he are bagan to show signs of refusing to toe the Indian line on the dead. Sheikh question of the plebiscite. He has been in jail for over 2 years without any trial. Many of his compatriots have also been similarly incarcerated. Today a reign of terror prevails in Kashmir. Whoever dares openly to ask for a plebiscite to decide the question of accession is accused of "treason" and imprisoned. A number of prominent Kashmir leaders have recently been arrested on this ground. Among them are Mirza Afzal Beg, a one-time Minister in the Abdullah Government, whose main crime seems to be that he was organising the plebiscite. Front in Kashmir, Mr. Ghulam Mohiyuddin Karra, President of the all-Jammu and Kashmir Political Conference, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, President, Democratic Union, Pir Maqbool Shah Gilani, Mr. Muhammad Hussain Gilani, Mr. Ghulam Muhammed Butt and many other Kashmir leaders and workers.
The Government of India is mistaken if they think that by such measures they would succeed in suppressing the demand for a plebiscite or scotching the movement for liberation from the Indian yoke. Let them draw a lesson from the independence struggle of the people of India and Pakistan. Such movements can never be put down by repressive measures. On the contrary, the greater the repression the greater and more. wide-spread the popular bitterness, and the stronger such movements become. I am confident that the day is not far off when Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed himself will be discarded by his Indian bosses.
Indian-occupied Kashmir today is virtually an armed camp. There are some 90,000 Indian soldiers in the State. In other words, there is an Indian soldier for every 32 persons in Indian occupied territory. If we leave women and children out of account, it would seem that India has one soldier for every 12 adult males in Kashmir. There is, besides, the State Militia and a vast army of that notorious oppressive instrument that goes by the name of the Peace Brigade to hold the population down. Nevertheless, a strong resistance movement, which must command the admiration of the world, continues to thrive in the State. Of late, this movement has been gaining rapidly in strength and the recent wholesale arrests are an indication that the Bakhshi Government is seized with panic. You cannot indefinitely hold down a whole population by means of bayonets and Indian bayonets are no exception. Indian action in respect of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir is part of the same pattern. It is based solely on the familiar imperialist rule-Might is Right.
The Indian Prime Minister has often attacked colonialism in the strongest terms. He is also a signatory to the Bandung Resolution which condemns colonialism in all its manifestations. And yet, what the world witnesses in Kashmir today is clearly a manifestation of colonialism. India has sedulously preached to the world the principle of self-determination but scrupulously refrained from practicing it herself.
Our hearts go out to the people of Kashmir who today live in that prison-house in terror and travail. They have faced their trials with great courage and endurance. I have no doubt that they will eventually succeed in achieving their objective, however oppressive the measures that their rulers may adopt.
What crime have they committed that the engines of oppression should be employed against them? What is it that they want ? They want merely that they be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination; to decide their own fate. They only ask that India abide by her international commitments and let them decide the question of accession by means of a fair and impartial plebiscite. In asking India to fulfil her commitments, surely they have committed no offence, such as would merit wholesale arrests and indefinite imprisonment without trial for their leaders.
And what do we in Pakistan want? Merely this that the people of Kashmir should be allowed freely to exercise their choice in respect of accession. Both India and Pakistan are committed to this course. commitment be fulfilled. So is the Security Council. Let that
The Kashmir dispute has remained unresolved for eight years. As I have said, had India honoured the agreements reached at the time of Partition, this dispute would never have arisen. In any event, given goodwill and a genuine desire to settle this dispute, its solution should present no serious difficulty whatever. It is unfortunate that a dispute of this character should have been allowed for so long to embitter relations between India and Pakistan and become a serious potential threat to world peace.
We have shown the utmost patience in handling this dispute. For eight years we have persevered in the search for a peaceful settlement. We have not succeeded. Every effort to break the deadlock by impartial mediators has been defeated by Indian intransigence. We are prepared to explore and exhaust all other possibilities of a peaceful settlement. I must, however, warn that as time passes and this dispute remains unresolved frustration and bitterness will grow among the people of Kashmir and the people of Pakistan. It is of the utmost importance that this dispute is resolved before this frustration and bitterness have so seized the minds of the people that they turn to desperate measures.
We wish to live in honourable friendship with the people of India. They are our neighbours. The cause of peace and the prosperity of the peoples of this sub-continent can be best served if India and Pakistan co-operate in the solution of their common problems. In order that they may do so, the causes that now poison their relations must be eliminated. Of these, the Kashmir dispute is the most important. It behoves India and Pakistan and all countries interested in the promotion of peace and welfare of this region to see that a just settlement of this dispute is reached without further delay.
This dispute presents a great moral issue before the world. This issue is: Should the inhabitants of Kashmir enjoy the right to self-determination which is their birth-right? Should they be permitted to decide the question of accession of their State in a free plebiscite ? India herself is pledged to let them do so. We too are similarly pledged. That pledge has to be honoured.
Finally, let me give this assurance to the people of Kashmir. In their struggle for self-determination, the people of Pakistan are fully behind them. We shall strive to the utmost to secure that right for them. However long and arduous the struggle may be we shall not fail them. Everything we hold dear-our faith, our honour, our lives are dedicated to the fulfilment of this pledge..