30051949--149 Text of the Letter dated 30 May 1949 from the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan Mr. M.A. Gurmani to the Chairman of the Commission, in reply to the Commission truce terms of 28 April 1949 (UN Document No. S/AC. 12/209)
30051949--149 Text of the Letter dated 30 May 1949 from the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan Mr. M.A. Gurmani to the Chairman of the Commission, in reply to the Commission truce terms of 28 April 1949 (UN Document No. S/AC. 12/209)
I have the honour to refer to His Excellency, Minister Lozano's letter dated 28 April 1949 (annex 23), enclosing the Commission's truce terms. Before expressing their views on the Commission's truce terms, the Pakistan Government desires to make a few preliminary observations.
First, it is common ground that the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which have been accepted by the Governments of both India and Pakistan constitute an agreed solution of the Kashmir question by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, and that no addition to, or modification of, these resolutions can be made without the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan and the Commission. It follows that the provisions of the truce agreement should be confined to the implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948.
Secondly, the Pakistan Government have always been, and still is, determined to implement in full all their commitments under the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. They trust that the Government of India would also implement in full all the commitments accepted by them under these resolutions.
Thirdly, as the Commission is aware, the Pakistan Government does not consider themselves bound by any clarifications which may have been given by the Commission to the Government of India, but which were not put to and accepted by the Pakistan Government.
The Pakistan Government has given their most careful consideration to the Commission's truce terms, and their reactions to them are set out in the succeeding paragraphs.
Cease-fire line (paragraphs 1 A, B and C)
The Pakistan Government accept the cease-fire line drawn on the map annexed to the Commission's truce terms, and agree that the line between Chakothi and Tithwal, and from Chorwan to the north of Dress should be similarly demarcated by the Military Adviser to the Commission on the basis of the factual positions occupied by the forces on both sides on 1 January 1949. They also agree that the Military Adviser to the Commission may decide upon local adjustments of the cease-fire line in cases where no agreement is reached between the local Commanders. It was explained in the Commission's letter dated 16 April 1949 (annex 19) that "the Military Adviser will base his determinations upon military and factual considerations, other considerations being beyond his competence". Further, it is understood that the adjustments, being local, would be of a minor character.
The Pakistan Government has already submitted relevant data to the Military Adviser to the Commission in regard to the undemarcated sectors of the cease-fire line, and they would be glad to furnish any further information that may be required.
The demarcation of the cease-fire line is provided for in part 1 of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 and should not be held up because of any delay in arriving at an agreement with regard to truce arrangements under part II of the resolution. The Pakistan Government understands that the Commission is fully alive to the urgency of this question, and that the demarcation of the cease-fire line will be completed as soon as possible.
Northern area (paragraph I D)
The Pakistan Government understand:
(i) That the territory referred to in paragraph ID of the truce terms is the area of the State north of the cease-fire line, with the exception of Gilgit Sub division and Gilgit Agency;
(ii) That the contingency in which the defence of this area might become necessary is hypothetical and highly remote;
(iii) That such a contingency could arise only in the case of aggression by a foreign power, an incursion by tribesmen from the North-west Frontier of Pakistan, and that the provisions of this paragraph would not be invoked for the maintenance of law and order or for dealing with a situation of internal unrest;
(iv) That any report from the Government of India on the subject would be verified independently by the Commission's own observers before the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator arrived at the conclusion necessary; that the defence of the area 18
(v) That if the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator conclude that the defence of the area is necessary, it is open to them to take any action that they consider appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case, that a request to Government of India for posting their troops at specified points is only one of the possible courses of action and that they are not precluded from seeking the advice of the Pakistan Government and the assistance of Pakistan forces should circumstances in their view warrant such a course;
(vi) That the Commission does not intend in actual practice to take any action under this paragraph without consultation with the Plebiscite Administrator; and
(vii) That, even if the posting of Indian garrisons at specified points is decided upon, the administration of the area will not be handed over to the Government of India, or to the Maharaja's Government, and that civil or military officials of either of these Governments would in no circumstances be introduced it lored into this area for the purpose of administration les or control.
The views of the Pakistan Government with regard to this proposal have been stated at great length in their letters dated 23 and 26 April and 6 May 1949, and are summarized below:
(a) The proposal to allow in certain contingencies the posting of Indian garrisons at specified points in this area is not in accord with clause B. 2 of part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, which permits the retention of Indian troops only within the lines in existence at the moment of the cease-fire.
(b) The proposal also conflicts with the assurance given by the Commission on 31 August 1948 that neither the Government of India nor the Maharaja's Government will be permitted to send any military or civil officials to the evacuated territory. In its letter of 3 September 1948 to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan [S/1100, paragraph 90] the Commission explained that the term "evacuated territory" used in paragraph A. 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 "refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command". The area north of the cease-fire line has been as much under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command as the area west of the cease-fire line.
The assurance that no civil or military official of the Government of India or of the Maharaja's Government would be sent to the evacuated territory was conveyed to all the people in the "evacuated territory", whether north or west of the cease-fire line, and was an important factor inducing the people of these territories to stop fighting.
(c) The proposal appears to be unnecessary in view of the following considerations :
Even hypothetically, the threat envisaged might arise either from tribesmen or from a foreign Power. The first contingency should be ruled out in view of the assurance given by the Pakistan Government that they would deal effectively within their incursions. own borders with any possibility of tribal As regards the second contingency, it has been explained to the Commission that on account of the very difficult terrain, and the fact that the mountain passes remain snow-bound for most of the two main trade routes leading into this area from Central Asia could be used for military operations of any magnitude.
Of these two trade routes, much the more important one (Kashgar-Hunza-Gilgit) passes through Gilgit Agency and Gilgit Sub-division, which are to remain under the control of Pakistan. A threat to this route would therefore have to be dealt with in any case by Pakistan. The second and minor trade route (Yarkand-Leh-Kargil), which has to cross the Karakoram Pass (18,240 feet high), traverses territory which is already under Indian control. Any threat to this route could therefore be dealt with effectively by India without the necessity of posting India troops in the "northern area".
The local authorities responsible for the administration and security of this area should be capable of meeting any minor threat with the help of their local forces, which have successfully withstood the repeated assaults of the Indian Army. A major threat due to aggression by a foreign Power would be a threat to the security of the entire Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and to the peace of the world, and thus be a matter for the Security Council to consider and to take appropriate measures against. The Commission would agree that no authority other than the Security Council is competent to sanction measures to deal with such a situation.
(d) In view of its stronger strategic position and better lines of communication, and the fact that the population of this area is wholly Muslim, Pakistan is more vitally interested in, and is in a much better position than India to safeguard the security of this area. The Muslim population of this area is so opposed to the imposition of Indian rule that the men tion of a proposal to post Indian garrisons in certain contingencies is likely to create serious unrest among them. The actual posting of Indian garrisons in any part of this territory would have still more disastrous effects on the peace and tranquillity of the area and, far from ensuring security against foreign attack, it would result in a war of resistance, thus creating conditions facilitating foreign intervention.
In view of the considerations summarized above, the Pakistan Government submit that the proposal contained in paragraph ID of the truce terms is not in accord with the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, is unnecessary and, far from ensuring peace and tranquillity in this area, is likely to create conditions of unrest and insecurity.
Withdrawal of troops (paragraphs II A, B and C)
The withdrawal of troops is the central feature of part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, which calls for the following action :
(i) Withdrawal of tribesmen.
(ii) Withdrawal of such Pakistan nationals as have entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of fighting.
(iii) Withdrawal of Pakistan troops and the bulk of Indian troops in accordance with a synchronized programme.
The Pakistan Government have armed out successfully the difficult and delicate operation of insuring the withdrawal of the tribesmen in advance of the truce agreement, although this obligation arises only after the signing of the truce agreement, No better proof could be afforded of the sincere desire of the Pakistan Government to take all steps possible to promote peace and tranquillity in the State and to pave the way, as rapidly as possible, for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. The second obligation mentioned in paragraph 8 (ii) above is also in the process of implementation.
It is understood that the Commission's Military Adviser has called for reports from his observers with regard to the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and that on the basis of this investigation the Commission will be in a position, after the signing of the truce agreement, to notify the Government of India of the discharge of these obligations by Pakistan. The Commission would then be able to fix a date for the beginning of the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops, and another for that of the bulk of the Indian forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The only important matter left to be dealt with in the truce agreement is the withdrawal of Pakistan troops and of the bulk of Indian troops in accordance with a synchronized programme. In its letter of 27 August 1948. [S/1100, annex 27], the Commission stated that "synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission". This meant that the Commission would arrange with the Pakistan High Command the synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments, and also do the same thing with the Indian High Command. Such a procedure is the only practical way of insuring that the withdrawals of Indian and Pakistan forces proceed in corresponding stages, without advantage to either side at any time during the truce period and without temptation to either side to violate the truce, either by restarting hostilities or by halting or slowing down the withdrawal.
Under the Commission's truce proposals the Pakistan Government has to withdraw all their forces within seven weeks in accordance with the schedule which has been laid down in paragraph II A. 1 of the truce terms, and communicated to the Government of India. The Pakistan Government, on the other hand, has not been shown the schedule of withdrawal of the Indian forces and have thus been placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis India, which has full information of the withdrawal programme of both the forces. The only positive information given to the Pakistan Government is that the time allowed for the withdrawal of Indian forces is longer than the seven weeks laid down for the complete withdrawal of Pakistan forces. They are not even sure that the schedule of withdrawal of the Indian forces submitted by the Commission for the agreement of the Government of India is firm and not subject to alterations. The Pakistan representatives have been made to understand that there will be no change in the composition of the "bulk" of the Indian forces as given in the schedule already submitted to the Government of India, nor in the time allowed for the withdrawal of the "bulk", but that there might be some alterations in the stages of withdrawal, although such changes, if any, would be minor and limited by the Commission's assurance given in the letter under reply that the schedules of withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and of the bulk of the Indian forces will be faithful to the Commission's resolution. of 13 August 1948 and represent a coordination of timing which in the view of the Commission will constitute a synchronized action.
The truce terms relating to the withdrawal of the Pakistan and Indian forces do not appear to the Pakistan Government to fulfil the undertaking given by the Commission that it would arrange with the Pakistan High Command a synchronization of the withdrawal of the two armed forces. In consequence, the Pakistan Government have no information as to the strength and composition of the bulk of the Indian forces to be withdrawn, nor of the time during which these forces will withdraw from the State. They also have no information regarding the stages of withdrawal of the Indian forces corresponding to the stages of the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces, or of the position on the Indian side at the end of seven weeks, when Pakistan forces will have completely withdrawn from the State. They have also no information as to the strength, composition or location of the Indian forces allowed under paragraph B 2 of part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order, and have thus been deprived of the opportunity to place their views before the Commission on the subject; vide the Commission's letter of 3 September 1948 to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
The Pakistan Government have not even been told the reasons for which, in spite of repeated requests, they have been denied information on these vital points without which they cannot, in reason, be expected to take a decision. The only fact known to them, namely, that the time allowed for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces is longer than the time allowed for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, appears to them to nullify the provision for a synchronized withdrawal promised by the Commission and to create a disequilibrium of forces after the period of seven weeks allowed for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army.
Disposal of the Indian and State forces and of Azad Kashmir forces (paragraph III B and C)
The Pakistan Government understand that the discussions envisaged in paragraphs III B and C are with a view to initiating implementation of points 4 (a) and (b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, under which decisions regarding the final disposal of Indian and State forces on the one hand and of Azad Kashmir forces on the other are to be taken by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator. It is understood that it is the Commission's intention to associate the Plebiscite Administrator with these discussions from the outset even though he may not have been formally appointed to office by then. Further it is understood that the Plebiscite Administrator would reach the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent at a very early date, and that his formal appointment would be made as soon as possible.
Paragraph III C of the truce terms provides that if decisions are reached in the consultations envisaged in paragraph III B of the Commission's truce proposals, the schedule of withdrawal of the Pakistan Army may be extended to three months in order to facilitate the implementation of decisions relating to point 4(b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. It is understood that the Pakistan Army would be expected during this extended time only to reorganize the Azad Kashmir forces so as to facilitate the implementation of decisions relating to point 4(b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, and not actually to implement those decisions within that period of time. In other words, the actual implementation of the decisions will start only after parts I and 11 of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been fully implemented.
In the view of the Pakistan Government it is essential that the Plebiscite Administrator be associated with the discussions under paragraphs III B and C of the Commission's truce terms, since such discussions relate to the provisions of paragraph 4(a) and (b) of Commission's resolution of 5 Jan. 1949. The decisions reached in these discussions will have a vital bearing on the freedom of the plebiscite, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the Plebiscite Administrator should participate in these discussions. The Pakistan Government strongly urges that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed at as early a date as possible.
General provisions (paragraphs III F and G)
It is understood that the Commission is fully alive to the importance of taking concrete steps, such as the release of political prisoners and the abrogation of emergency laws, to implement the declaration under part III of the truce terms. The Pakistan Government trusts that the Commission will do everything possible for the restoration of human and political liberty in the State in actual practice. Unless the public declaration envisaged in paragraph III F were followed immediately by concrete action, the psychological effect on the people of the State would be of a highly undesirable character.
The Pakistan Government are unable to appreciate how the introduction of paragraph III G in the Commission's truce terms could be regarded as an implementation of part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 which makes no mention at all of the subject matter of this paragraph. It is suggested that this paragraph, which unnecessarily introduces a highly controversial matter, should be omitted from the truce terms.
Conclusion
The Pakistan Government are sincerely desirous of advancing to the plebiscite stage as early as possible, and to this end they wish to assure the Commission of their whole hearted cooperation in the tasks developing upon the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator. In pursuance of this policy they are anxious that the truce agreement leading to the withdrawal of the armed forces should be concluded at as early a date as possible. Since this is an essential preliminary to the holding of a plebiscite they have, as the Commission is aware, carried out an important part of their obligations in effecting the withdrawal of tribesmen and of almost all Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. They are also ready to withdraw all Pakistan troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the terms of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 as elucidated to the Pakistan Government. The Commission will, no doubt, appreciate that without knowing the schedule of withdrawal of the Indian forces, on the basis of which the synchronized withdrawal of the two armed forces could be arranged, the Pakistan Government are not in a position to take a decision on the Commission's truce terms, the central feature of which is the withdrawal programme of the two armed forces. They trust that they may soon be put in a position in which they can take such a decision.
The submissions made in this letter, in particular that relating to the early appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, have been made with a desire to facilitate the task of the Commission. The Pakistan Government trusts that these submissions will meet with the approval of the Commission.
(Signed) M.A. Gurmani