18051949--154 Text of the Letter dated 18 May 1949 from the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Mr. G.S. Bajpai to the Chairman of the Com mission truce terms of 28 April 1949 (UN Document No. SIAC. 12/207)
18051949--154 Text of the Letter dated 18 May 1949 from the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Mr. G.S. Bajpai to the Chairman of the Com mission truce terms of 28 April 1949 (UN Document No. SIAC. 12/207)
I have the honour to refer to Mr. Pai's letter, dated the 2nd May 1949, in which it was stated that the Government of India would give the proposals that accompanied your letter of the 28th April 1949 (annex 22) their most urgent and serious consideration, but that, because of the absence of the Honourable the Prime Minister, Government's reply might be delayed by a few days. The Commission's proposals have now been fully examined by the Honourable Prime Minister and his colleagues in the light of your conversation with him, with Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and with me, and the Government of India's reply is as follows:
Disbanding and disarming of the so-called "Azad Kashmir'' forces-In my letter No. 253-PASG/49, dated the 17th April, I explained that, since the disbanding and disarming of these forces had been repeatedly challenged, the Government of India would have preferred this matter to be dealt with in the truce agreement itself. They desired, however, to meet the Commission's views as far as possible. They had, therefore, expressed the wish that the assurance regarding the disbanding and disarming of these forces contained in the aide-memoire of the conversation of 22nd December 1948 between the Prime Minister of India on the one hand and Ambassador Colban and Your Excellency on the other. [S/1196, annex 4], should be made clear beyond any doubt. This is still their position. But neither in the Commission's latest proposals nor in your covering letter is this assurance. given, much less placed beyond all doubt. On the other hand, Your Excellency has stated categorically that the Commission cannot at this stage deal with the question of disbanding and disarming the "Azad Kashmir'' forces.
In my letter of the 17th April (annex 20), it had also been suggested that "Discussions to implement this assurance should begin as soon as possible and decisions should be taken not later than the completion of the withdrawal of Pakistan troops (seven weeks) mentioned in A of Commission's proposals communicated to the Government of India on the 15th April. Regarding this suggestion, all that is indicated in Your Excellency's letter under reply is an early study of the matter for which the Commission would enter into consultations... with the local authorities regarding the disposal of the armed forces in the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan. troops, with a view to initiating implementation of point 4 (a) and (b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949" (annex 21).
In paragraph III (C) of the latest proposals, reference is made to what the Commission proposes to do if decisions are reached within the period of seven weeks. Nothing is said, however, as to what is to happen if no decisions are reached within this period; presumably the arrangements for the plebiscite will be proceeded with even if the 32 "Azad Kashmir" battalions remain intact after the withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan troops, an eventuality which could not be reconciled with the agreed objective that the plebiscite should be free and impartial.
Both from the standpoint of the security the State, which the Commission has agreed is the responsibility of the Government of India, and the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, which is an agreed objective, the Government of India are convinced that the disbanding and disarming of "Azad Kashmir" forces should not be left in a state of uncertainty or be, hereafter, the subject of challenge and dispute as it has been on the part of those who speak for Pakistan. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance.
(1) That the agreement of the Government of Pakistan should be obtained now to the disbanding and disarming. of these 32 battalions. The Commission has already agreed to large-scale disbanding and disarming and has informed the Government of Pakistan that this is its objective. It should not therefore be difficult, if Pakistan has accepted this objective, to obtain its agreement.
(2) That the discussions regarding the procedure and phasing of the disbandment and disarming should commence. immediately after the truce is signed. Decisions on a programme designed to achieve this objective should be taken as soon as possible.
(3) That the phasing of the withdrawal of Indian troops be not divorced from, and should depend on, the progress made with the actual disbanding and disarming of the "Azad Kashmir" forces.
Treatment of the sparsely populated and mountainous areas in the north-The position of the Government of India with regard to the sparsely populated and mountainous regions in the north was explained to the Commission in the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Korbel on this subject dated the 20th August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 80]. To quote the relevant sentence, the Government of India expressed their desire that "after Pakistan troops... have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us". In paragraph 8 of my letter, dated the 17th April, it was pointed out that although Pakistan forces, both regular and irregular, may be withdrawn from this area, a large number of men armed by Pakistan would remain and would constitute a threat and a menace to the security of the Valley of Kashmir and to the trade with Central Asia of the Jammu and Kashmir State. The persistence with which infiltration is being carried out in this region by forces under the control of Pakistan is convincing proof of the reality of this menace. (Reports of specific incidents have been furnished regularly to the Commission's military adviser and to the military observers but the Government of India is not aware that any action has been taken to check these violations of the "cease-fire".) That, under the Commission proposals, Pakistan forces, both regular and irregular, would be withdrawn from this part of the State cannot by itself eliminate the danger of the "locals'' who have been armed by Pakistan menacing internal security among law-abiding citizens of the area and indulging in raids into the valley and in armed interference with the State's trade with Central Asia. Individual or even small groups of observers posted by the Commission would find it extremely difficult to detect and could not prevent such incursions. The expanse of the area will render this impossible. The Government of India, therefore, maintains that the principle that Indian troops should garrison important strategic points should be accepted. The points to be so occupied can be the subject of discussion with the Commission. The question of the administration of this area might be left over for the time being.
As regards the other proposals, the Government of India feel that, in view of what has been said in the preceding paragraphs which deal with the major issues, comment at this stage is unnecessary.
Your Excellency's letter of the 28th April urges "unreserved acceptance" by the Government of India of the terms forwarded with that letter. The Government of India have found themselves unable to accede to this request. They reached this conclusion with a full sense of their responsibility. Twice, namely in August and in December 1948, they have given proof, to the Commission and to the United Nations, of their desire to reach a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute, by accepting the Commission's resolution of the 13th August 1948, and the proposals, dated 11th December 1948 [S/1196, annex 3], which were subsequently embodied by the Commission in its resolution of the 5th January 1949. If they find themselves unable now to accept the Commission's latest proposals as they stand, it is through no lessening of their desire for a peaceful solution of the dispute, but because they have come to the conclusion that these proposals do not make adequate provisions for the security of the State-security which, as they have repeatedly made clear to the Commission, they regard as a paramount and ineluctable responsibility. It is now for the Commission to decide whether they will revise their proposals in the light of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this letter.
(Signed) G.S. Bajpai Secretary-General