26041949--65 Text of the Letter dated 26 April 1949 from the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan Mr. Gurmani addressed the Chairman of the Commission, regarding the northern areas (UN Document No. S/AC.12/190)
26041949--65 Text of the Letter dated 26 April 1949 from the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan Mr. Gurmani addressed the Chairman of the Commission, regarding the northern areas (UN Document No. S/AC.12/190)
In continuation of Mr. Ayub's letter of 23rd April, 1949, to Ambassador Colban forwarding a note [see appendix] regarding the areas north of the cease fire line, it might be of assistance to the Commission if I were to recapitulate why we regard the proposal to post Indian troops in the area north of the cease-fire line in any contingency as a clear contravention of part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948.
In the first place, the area north of the cease-fire line is "evacuated territory" precisely in the same way as the area west of the cease-fire line. In their letter of 3rd September, 1948, to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan [S/1100, paragraph. 95], the Commission explained that the term "evacuated territory" used in paragraph A. 3 of part II of the resolution of 13th August, 1948 "refers to those territories... which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command." The area north of the cease-fire line was as much under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command as the area west of the ceas line.
The Commission also gave us an undertaking on 31st. August, 1948, that neither the Government of India nor the Maharaja's Government would be permitted to send any
military or civil officials to the evacuated territory. The posting of Indian garrisons in any part of the area north of the cease fire line would be a violation of this undertaking.
Secondly, under paragraph B. 2 of part II of the Com mission's resolution of 13th August, 1948, such Indian forces as are allowed to stay after the withdrawal of the "bulk" of the Indian forces are to be posted "within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire". This applies as much to the area north of the cease-fire line as to the rest of the evacuated territory.
During the discussions preceding the acceptance of the resolution of 5th January, 1949 by the Governments of India and Pakistan, the Government of India had, again and again, stressed their interest in the security of the State. Nevertheless, the Commission did not recognize their right to post Indian troops beyond the cease-fire line. The undertaking given by the Pakistan Government to deal effectively with any possibility of a tribal raid within their own borders applies as much. to the areas north of the cease-fire line as to areas west of the cease-fire line.
I would, therefore, submit that the proposal to post Indian garrisons in areas north of the cease-fire line in any contingency is as much a violation of part II of the Commis sion's resolution as a similar proposal in respect of areas west of the cease-fire line would be.
(Signed) M. A. Gurmani
APPENDIX
Paper presented by the Government of Pakistan on the area north of the cease-fire line excluding Gilgit Agency and Gilgit Sub-Division.
1, DEFINITION
The area comprises the Astore, Skardu and part of Kargil Tehsils, and Gurais Sub-Tehsil.
This deals with:
2. SCOPE
(a) The geography, communications and economic conditions of the area;
(b) A brief history of the fighting in this area;
(c) The system of civil administration; and
(d) Defence against external aggression.
3. GEOGRAPHY
The whole area is extremely mountainous with the high Karakoram range averaging 18,000 feet in the north, and range of hills, enclosing the Kashmir Valley on the north and north-east, to the south. The whole area forms the basin of the river Indus. To the north the passes are 15,500 to 19,000 feet high, and to the south and south-east 12,000 to 16,000 feet. These passes remain blocked for roughly five to seven months in the year due to snow. The routes along the river Indus are the only ones which remain open throughout the year.
The population is concentrated in the river valleys.
4. COMMUNICATIONS-LAND ROUTES
The land routes fall into three categories:
(a) Trade routes leading from Central Asia. These are:
(i) Kashgar (Sinkiang Province), Mintaka Pass (15,450 feet), Hunza, Gilgit, Chilas. (ii) Another route from Russian Turkestan and the
Wakhan Province of Afghanistan joins route (1) just south of the Mintaka Pass and crosses the Kilik Pass (15,400 feet). (iii) Yarkand, Karakoram Pass (18,240 feet), Chang La (18,370 feet), Leh. This route skirts this area to the south and south-east, and falls directly into Indian-held territory.
These routes cross very high passes, and are used by traders for only four or five months in the year during which the passes remain open. Only pack animals can be used on these routes. The railheads for normal trade in case of all these routes are located in Pakistan.
(b) Those connecting the area with Kashmir Valley: Astore, Burzil-Kamri Pass (13,500 feet), Gurais, Tragbal (11,500 feet), Srinagar, 150 miles.
Srinagar-Gurais, approximately 70 miles, now jeepable,
(Note: Leh, which is held by Indian forces, is connected with the Kashmir Valley through Kargil, Dras, Zoji La (11,500 feet), Sonamarg, Srinagar, 220 miles. The whole of this route is in Indian hands, Leh is also connected with India through the following route: Leh, Upshi, Taglang La (17,479 feet), BaraLacha La (16,200 feet), Manali, Kulu (Kangra Valley, East Punjab), approximately 300 miles. This route is extremely long and difficult, crosses high passes and remains open only for about four months in the year, and is seldom, if ever, used by traders. India found it extremely difficult to use this route even for reinforcing Leh during the fighting in 1948.)
(c) Those connecting the area with Pakistan:
(i) Skardu-Rondu-Gilgit-Bunji-Chilas-Babusar (13,000 feet), Balakot-Havelian (railhead in Hazara District North West Frontier Province), approximately 272 miles. Also from Chilas down the Indus river to Hazara District and Swat State. There is no high pass along the Indus route. The route Gilgit-Bunji-Chilas-Babusar-Balakot is jeepable. Efforts are being made to make the route Gilgit (Bunji) Skardu also jeep-able within a short period. There is no pass between Skardu Gilgit-Chilas along this route. Before the war the Chilas Babusar Balakot-Havelian route was the main and cheapest trade route, and was used by traders in preference to the longer and more costly routes through the Kashmir Valley to Rawalpindi railhead.
(ii) Skardu-Gilgit-Shandur Pass (12,210 feet)-Chitral Dargai (railhead in Mardan District, North West Frontier Province) is open all year round for pack animals.
5. AIR COMMUNICATIONS
There exist; a good all-weather Dakota strip at Gilgit; a good all-weather Dakota strip at Skardu; a Dakota strip at Chilas.
Rawalpindi to Gilgit is approximately 1 hour 30 minutes.
Rawalpindi to Skardu is approximately 2 hours. Aircraft have to follow the Indus Valley and cross no passes. Flying is possible all year round, except in inclement weather.
Between Kashmir Valley and the north, high passes have to be crossed and flying is not safe in the winter, when the passes are often covered by fog and clouds. No flying has ever been attempted between East Punjab and the Leh area.
6. THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE AREA
The area is self-sufficient in foodgrains, and woollen clothes which are worn are locally manufactured. The main imports into the area are salt, tea, sugar and kerosene oil. Salt comes from the Khewra mines in Pakistan, as only rock salt is consumed. The other imports also come from Pakistan via the Babusar and Chitral routes.
In addition to necessities of life, other goods such as fine cloth, soap, cigarettes, etc., have begun to move in fair quantities since the construction of Dakota strips at Gilgit and Skardu, and the making of the Balakot-Gilgit road into a jeepable one.
This area is in no way dependent upon the Kashmir Valley, which produces none of the supplies it needs. The fact that it has been cut off from the Kashmir Valley for the last 18 months has produced no adverse effects upon the economic life of the area.
7. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REVOLT AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS
In October 1947, there were the following forces in the area and the adjoining territories:
(a) Gilgit Agency and Sub-Division, approximately 500 Gilgit Scouts offered by Jammu and Kashmir State officers, and two British officers in State employ..
(b) Gilgit Wazarat and Baltistan :
Gilgit Wazarat-One battalion, less one company (State forces, 50 per cent Muslim, 50 per cent non-Muslim);
Skardn (Baltistan)-One company (State force, 25 percent Muslim, 75 per cent non-Muslim);
Leh-One company, less one platoon (State forces, all non-Muslims).
On 28th October 1947, the Gilgit Scouts, assisted by the Muslim element of the State army, staged a successful blood less coup d'etat, and the military Governor and the non Muslim elements of the State Army and Civil Administration were disarmed and arrested. The treasury, and large quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment, clothing and supplies were
captured.
An emergency administration was set up which took over effective control of the entire Gilgit Agency and Sub Division, Gilgit Wazarat and Rondu Sub-Tehsil of Baltistan. The local authorities announced the desire of the people to accede to Pakistan in a series of telegrams to the Pakistan Government.
In view of the international importance. the area, and the danger of foreign intervention in disturbed conditions, the Pakistan Government sent a Political Agent in the middle of November 1947 to provisionally take over the administration in order to restore law and to stabilize conditions.
The Muslim element of the State Army (approximately 400 strong) started raising more volunteers for the Azad Army, and equipped them with weapons they had seized from the non-Muslim elements. This Azad Army set up its head quarters in Astore (Gil-it Wazarat), and towards the middle of January 1948, sent out a strong column to Baltistan.
On 10th February 1948 the column reached Skardu, where it was joined by the Muslim elements of the garrison with their arms, and by hundreds of local Baltistani volunteers. The non-Muslim elements of the garrison, along with the non Muslim civil population of Skardu, withdrew into the fort, where they were besieged.
All the local Rajas of Baltistan (who are all Muslims) denounced the Maharaja's rule and pledged their allegiance to Azad Kashmir. Civil administration was set up in the area up to but excluding Kargil. Volunteers were recruited and organized into battalions.
Towards the end of February 1948 a column of the Maharaja's State forces sent by the Indian Army to relieve the besieged garrison of Skardu was almost completely wiped out north of Kargil, and its supplies and equipment captured.
Early in April 1948, an Azad column from Astore (one battalion) moved south and occupied Gurais and the Kishanganga Valley, and captured Travel Pass. A civil administration was set up in the whole area and local militia was raised.
About the end of April a much stronger relief column, approximately two battalions of State forces, with some Indian army troops under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Singh (Indian Army), left Kargil in a determined attempt to relieve Skardu. This column was completely routed, losing approximately half in killed and nearly all the rest taken prisoner. All their arms, ammunition and equipment were captured. After the victory the Azad forces pushed through to capture Kargil on 11 May, Dras on 27 May and Zoji Pass early in June, and advanced to within 30 miles of Leh. This force was composed mainly of locals. The trained nucleus for tactical direction and leadership was provided by the ex-servicemen of the area and the Muslim element of the State Army who had revolted earlier.
In June 1948, a contingent of about 400 volunteers from Chitral State arrived in Skardu and were entrusted with its siege. The local forces thus released were able to extend their
operations to the Ladakh Tehsil till the middle of July. Leh was virtually besieged On 12th August 1948 the Skardu garrison, having run out of supplies and ammunition, capitulated.
After repeated attempts supported by artillery and air force, one Indian brigade succeeded in recapturing Travel Pass and Gurais in June 1948, but was firmly held and could not make any further advance beyond this point in any direction.
In the Zoji Pass area repeated attacks by four Indians. battalions, supported heavily by artillery, armour and air during the period June-November 1948 were beaten back with very high casualties. In November-December 1948, however, after a 14-day continuous air and artillery bombardment, and led personally by Major-General Thimmaya, they succeeded in breaking through the Azad positions, and this only after the forces had completely run out of ammunition. The Indian Army captured Dras and Kargil early in December 1948 and achieved a link up with Leh. The Azad forces re-established a defence line north of Kargil and west of the line Zoji-Kargil. This line held firm until the cease-fire and is still held. A small Azad force east of the road Zoji-Kargil Leh remained in control of the entire Ranskar-Suru areas to the south of Leh up to the day of cease-fire. This force is still occupying the above area.
No Pakistan regular troops have at any stage been employed in any of these operations. The only Pakistan force in this area is one company of infantry stationed at Gilgit since October 1948.
Ever since May 1948, when Pakistan troops entered Kashmir and overall tactical control was taken over by G.H.Q. Pakistan, the Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts, a Pakistan Army Officer, has been exercising overall tactical and administrative control of Gilgit Scouts, Baltistan Scouts and the local militias,
8. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Before the overthrow of the Maharaja's administration in October 1947., civil administration of Gilgit Wazarat was in charge of a "Revenue Assistant'' with headquarters at Astore, and in the Baltistan-Ladakh area there was a Wazir-i-Wazarat with winter headquarters at Skardu and summer headquarters at Leh. The above officials were helped by a small number of police, Public Works Department, Forests and Revenue officials.
Since the overthrow of the Maharaj's administration in October 1947, the civil administration of this area has been run by an Assistant Political Agent, assisted by two Tehsildars for Skardu and Kargil Tehsils, and three Naib-Tehsildars for the Deosai, Kargil-Marol, and the Skardu-Roundu areas. After the capture of Skardu fort on 12th August 1948, the headquarters of the Assistant Political Agent were located at Skardu. The Gilgit Wazarat has been administered by another Assistant Political Agent with his headquarters at Astore, assisted by one Tehsildar and two Naib-Tehsildars for Astore and Gurais areas.
The above officials are helped by the requisite number of police, Police Works and Revenue officials. Revenue is properly collected and credited to the local treasury. The civil administration is running much more efficiently than in the days of Dogra rule, and the people are content.
The Political Agent, Gilgit, keeps a general eye on the civil administration.
9. DEFENCE
Any danger of a tribal incursion into this area can be ruled out as such an incursion could only take place through territory held by Pakistan. The Pakistan Government has already given an assurance to deal effectively with any such incursions within their own borders even if this should necessitate the use of their armed forces.
The only possibility of external aggression is from the north. A threat from the north can develop along two main routes:
(i) Kashmir-Hunza-Gilgit;
(ii) Sinkiang-Leh-Kargil-Zoji La.
The latter one is entirely under Indian Army control and need not be considered in this paper.
If any threat develops along the former route, it would necessarily have to be met by Pakistan with the active assistance of the local population. The natural hardihood and superb fighting qualities of the locals of this area, accustomed to living in the cold and at high altitudes, have proved beyond any doubt the superiority of the locals of this area to the men from the plains of India when it comes to fighting in these high altitudes. The heavy Indian losses in this region, and the failure of their numerically superior and better equipped troops supported by artillery and air, to make headway against much smaller and poorly equipped local forces, is a testimony to the latter's fighting qualities and adaptation to the terrain.
The Muslim population of this area is approximately 200,000. It can easily produce a force of at least 30,000 men. This force, without much help from the Pakistan Army, could hold even a major attack launched south during the few summer months when the high passes remain open. The willing assistance of the local population against foreign aggression would be available to Pakistan but not to India.
In addition to the above, this route is flanked by the Black Mountain areas, Swat and Chitral States, etc., who owe their allegiance to Pakistan, and would provide a large number of good fighting men to fight any aggression against Pakistan territory.
It might be argued that an aggressor power could drop thousands of parachutists and maintain them by air supply. This is feasible, although extremely hazardous in view of the danger of a too fast descent in rarefied air. But a parachute landing can only be successful if a land link-up with them can be quickly achieved, or they get the assistance of the local population. This would be practically impossible against Pakistan, but might be achieved against India if Indian control is forcibly imposed upon the population.
Indian forces will depend on a single unmetalled and very precarious road, hundreds of miles long, from India for maintenance. On the other hand, Pakistan could rely upon a considerable force of locals, who are the world's finest fighters in the geographical and climatic conditions that prevail in these parts.
The above appreciation is based on the hypothetical assumption of an aggression from the north. In point of fact, owing to the political conditions now obtaining in Central Asia, no such threat is likely to materialize in the near future, and even if it did, there is less likelihood of the predominant ly Muslim people of Sinkiang launching an attack on territory controlled by Pakistan than if India were in control. In any case, any act of foreign aggression would be a matter for the Security Council to consider and to take appropriate measures to deal with it. It could not at any time be regarded as the sole, or even primary, concern of India, as Pakistan is even more directly interested in the security of this area. Another aspect which deserves consideration is that the population of this area is wholly Muslim and is so opposed to the imposition. of Indian rule that even a mention of a proposal to post Indian garrisons in a future contingency would create intense unrest. The actual posting of Indian garrisons would have still more disastrous effects on the peace and tranquillity of the area, as it would give rise to a war of resistance against the Indian forces.
10. CONCLUSIONS
(a) Geographically, the country in spite of its vastness, is in reality mainly the Indus River basin and the few tributaries of the Indus River which flow into Pakistan, and provide the only route which is open throughout the year both for land traffic and air communication. All the routes leading in and out of the area into India are far longer, more difficult and blocked for a longer period of the year than those leading into territory controlled by Pakistan.
(b) Ever since the overthrow of the Dogra regime, the territory has been firmly under Azad control and has been properly administered. In fact, the administration has been better than ever in the past. This is proved by the successful resistance of the local population against the superior forces ranged against them by India.
There is no basis in fact for India's claim that the Maharaja's administration in the area remained undisturbed except by "roving bands". After the overthrow of the Maharaja's regime in October 1948, the Maharaja never recovered his hold over any part of this territory.
The holding up beyond Gurais and ZojiLa of the advance of an Indian force of over two brigades supported by armour, artillery and air for eight months, the inflicting of very heavy losses in killed, wounded and nearly 600 prisoners, the eight-months siege of and capitulation of Skardu, the isolation of Leh for nine months, all prove that it was not "roving bands" but an organized and determined force of local men who fought the Indian forces and kept them at bay.
(c) Economically the country is more or less self-sufficient, only a few necessities of life having to be imported. These come almost entirely from Pakistan over the routes already mentioned.
(d) There is no real danger of any tribal incursion as any such incursion would be dealt with by Pakistan. As regards the hypothetical possibility of foreign aggression from the north. Pakistan is in a much better position to deal with it than India because it enjoys the support of the local population who are the best fighters under the conditions obtained in this region. The posting of Indian garrisons far from ensuring security against foreign attack, would result in an unending civil war, and would thus create conditions in which foreign intervention might be sought and become effective.