09031949--20 Text of the Statement by the Pakistan delegation at the meeting of the Truce Sub-Committee held at New Delhi on 9 March 1949 (UN Document No. S/AC. 12/TC.1)
09031949--20 Text of the Statement by the Pakistan delegation at the meeting of the Truce Sub-Committee held at New Delhi on 9 March 1949 (UN Document No. S/AC. 12/TC.1)
As a preliminary to giving the Pakistan Government's views as to the basis on which the military clauses of the truce agreement should be formulated, I would like to inform the Sub-Committee of the progress made in respect of ceasefire arrangements.
In accordance with the UNCIP's resolution of 13 August 1948, part I C, the Commander-in-Chief Pakistan met the Commander-in-Chief India at New Delhi on 15 January 1949. At that meeting it was agreed :
(a) That the cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir should be advanced from an informal to a formal basis. (b) That the following action should be taken in order to further the satisfactory implementation of the cease-fire:
(i) The local commanders in the areas of Chota-Kazinag. Richmargali and Marol were authorised to make any slight adjustments in their dispositions on which they might mutually agree in order to avoid minor incidents. If the local commanders did not consider adjustment necessary, or were unable to reach agreement, the present dispositions were to continue.
(ii) The Pakistan Army required the use of the road Mirpur-Jhangar for the maintenance of their troops, and the Indian Army required the use of the road Poonch-Uri for a similar purpose. It was agreed that the local commanders should confer for the purpose of reaching mutual agreement on a satisfactory method of achieving these two objects.
As a result of the above agreement, meetings of local commanders were arranged for 26 and 28 January at Jhanjar and Chakoti respectively. The agreed records of these meetings were sent to the two High Commands for approval. The Commander-in-Chief Pakistan signalled his agreement of the Commander-in-Chief India (vide Pakistan-HQ Signal No. 21134/OPs. Plans, dated 31 January 1949). The approval of the Commander-in-Chief India has not been notified as yet to the Commander-in-Chief Pakistan, and consequently the local commanders' agreements have not been implemented. Another meeting of local commanders was held at Chakothi on 18 February regarding the Gurais front. The agreements. reached at this meeting have also not been implemented.
The cease-fire, apart from minor incidents, has been effectively maintained since the 1st of January, 1949.
Part II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 deals first with Pakistan's obligations and leaves the initiative entirely to Pakistan as to how these obligations should be discharged. It then goes on to set out the obligations devolving on India and states that these are to be discharged in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. It is therefore obvious that Pakistan should start the ball rolling in this joint meeting by stating the basis on which it is proposed to discharge her obligations. Before doing this I would stress that the August resolution makes the Pakistan Government, and not the Azad Kashmir authorities, a party to the truce agreement, and therefore responsible that its terms are properly. observed on the Azad Kashmir side of the line. It is essential that the Pakistan Government must itself be satisfied that, quite apart from the truce terms themselves, the conditions under which those terms are to be implemented are such as to enable the Pakistan Government effectively to discharge. its responsibility for the proper observance of the truce conditions by the Azad Kashmir authorities and forces.
The declared objective of the truce arrangements is to create a military balance between the forces on each side so as to develop a feeling of mutual confidence between those forces themselves and among the displaced persons and refugees-both non-Muslims and Muslims-who will be returning to the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period as a preliminary to the taking of the plebiscite. Before putting forward the basis on which the Pakistan Government proposes to carry out its part of the truce agreement, I would here mention three fundamental necessities. The first is the delimitation of the boundaries between the Indian and the Azad Kashmir-controlled areas; secondly, the immediate lifting of all land mines by the side which sowed them so that the civilian population may move about on lawful occasions without the present risk to life and limb. And thirdly, agreement for the free use of roads throughout both areas for refugee movement, refugee maintenance and for free egress and ingress for all other legitimate purposes. As regards delimitation of boundaries, we would hope that this could be done in general terms during the present series of meetings, and that exact local delimitation could be left to local military commanders on both sides in each of the forward areas to settle with the help of the United Nations observer parties.
To revert to the Pakistan Government's obligations under Part II A of the 13 August resolution, these are firstly to do its best to secure the withdrawal from Azad Kashmir territory of tribesmen and nationals of Pakistan who had entered the territory for the purpose of fighting; to withdraw all its regular forces from Azad Kashmir territory.
The first of these obligations, namely, the withdrawal of the tribesmen, has been carried out already, in advance of the truce agreement, and was completed by February 15th.
The discharge of the second obligation-namely, withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces-is dependent upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for synchronization of this withdrawal with that of the bulk of the Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmir State territory. This is provided for in paragraph 10 of Appendix 1 to the Commis sion's letter of 27 August 1948 to the Pakistan Government [S/1100, annex 26]. These plans for synchronization must be acceptable to the Pakistan Government because they have to convince, in turn, the Azad Kashmir authorities, the tribesmen and the people of Pakistan that the truce conditions are such as to assure in due course a free and impartial plebiscite. In this regard, I would stress that one of the main essentials is that the truce conditions must be such as to give non-Muslim refugees from the Azad Kashmir area full confidence that they can return in safety to that area, and equally give Muslim refugecs from the area controlled by the Indian and State Forces confidence as to their return to the latter areas. The fact that the Muslim refugees number nearly half a million as against some forty thousand non-Muslim refugees underlines the importance of this aspect to Pakistan.
This postulates organized and disciplined forces on both sides, strictly controlled by the authorities ultimately responsible for the proper observance of the truce terms, and capable of maintaining law and order in their respective territories. To produce such forces on the Azad Kashmir side, reorganization and training of the Azad Kashmir forces is essential. It will be recalled that at the meeting of the two Commanders in-Chief on 15 January 1949, they agreed to recommend to their respective Governments that, as soon as the truce agreement was signed, the Azad Kashmir forces should be relieved in the forward areas by Pakistan regular forces and concentrated in the rear areas behind a minimum screen of regular Pakistan troops on the existing cease-fire line. The basis of this recommendation was the feeling that it was better in the early stages at least of the truce period to have regular troops opposite each other in the forward areas. The Commission's Military Adviser was informed of this recommendation at the time.
The Pakistan Government has considered the recommendations of this meeting and it informed the Commission on 8 February at a meeting in Karachi that it considered the following arrangements essential to enable it to discharge effectively its obligations under the resolutions of the Commission :
1. The relief of the Azad Kashmir forces now in the forward areas by Pakistan regular troops.
2. The temporary withdrawal from the forward area and concentration in the rear areas of Azad Kashmir territory, of all Azad Kashmir forces to enable them to be reorganized and trained, under the supervision of G.H.Q. Pakistan, into a disciplined force of infantry units with the necessary administrative and ancillary units.
3. The relief, on completion of this reorganization and training of the Pakistan regular forces in the forward areas by the Azad Kashmir forces.
4. The withdrawal from Azad Kashmir territory of the Pakistan regular forces as soon as this relief has been completed.
5. Overall operational and administrative control of the reorganized Azad Kashmir forces to continue to rest with G.H.Q. Pakistan, this being the most important safeguard the Pakistan Government would have that the Azad Kashmir forces would scrupulously observe the truce agreement.
The Commission has also been informed that it is estimated that a period of some three months would be needed for the reorganization and training of the Azad Kashmir forces, but that, in order not to allow this to delay implementation of the truce agreement, the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces would be started simultaneously with the relief of the Azad Kashmir forces in the forward areas. The Pakistan Government proposes, subject to satisfactory arrangements for synchronization with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces on the other side, to reduce the Pakistan regular troops in Azad Kashmir territory to a screen of eight infantry battalions only in the forward area, and to withdraw the remainder, including all the Pakistan artillery, from Azad Kashmir territory altogether as soon as the relief of the Azad Kashmir forces and their concentration in the rear areas have been completed.
Here I would inform the Sub-Committee that at present the Azad Kashmir forces consist of:
(a) One A.A. battery of eighteen 20 mm. guns; one 25 pounder gun; two 6 pounder A.T. guns; one Azad mountain battery armed with mortars.
(b) Eight infantry brigades, numbers 2 and 7 of which consist of three battalions each, number 8 of six battalions, and the remainder of four battalions each, making a total of thirty-two battalions. The strength of an Azad battalion is 650 all ranks.
(c) Six pioneer battalions employed on roads and only partly armed.
(d) Four animal transport and one camel company. We propose to reorganize this force into a small artillery group containing the artillery units I have mentioned, and
into eight infantry brigades each of three battalions i.e., a total of twenty-four battalions as compared with the present thirty-two units. The remaining personnel will be reorganized into administrative and L. of C. units to produce as far as possible an administratively balanced force. I hope it will be clear to the Sub-Committee from this outline that the reorganized Azad Kashmir forces will be extremely weak in artillery, and completely lacking in air support, in ground reconnaissance units and in armour. It will be really an infantry force dependent on infantry weapons only.
The Pakistan Government intends to place these Azad Kashmir forces under a General Officer Commanding appointed by them on the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, and that this General Officer Commanding be assisted by the requisite number of senior officers selected by G.H.Q. Pakistan in consultation with the General Officer Commanding Azad Kashmir forces. These arrangements are again necessary safeguards to ensure that the Azad Kashmir forces can be relied upon to observe the truce agreement and fulfil their role of maintaining law and order and of instilling confidence in all elements of the civil population of the Azad Kashmir territory during the truce period.
Thus, for the first, say, three months of the truce period, the military forces in Azad Kashmir territory would be eight Pakistan regular battalions, no Pakistan artillery or armour, and the Azad Kashmir forces in process of reorganization. For the remainder of the truce period the military forces in the Azad Kashmir territory would be the Azad Kashmir force of eight brigades of infantry, with practically no artillery, and no armour or other supporting arms.
The Commission has started that it considers itself free to hear the views of the Pakistan Government on the way in which the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces should be synchronized with the withdrawal of Pakistan regular troops, In view of this, and of the fact that, as have stated, the declared objective of the truce agreement is to produce a balanced military situation during the truce, I now propose to give, in outline, the Pakistan Government's views on this point.
According to Part II, section B of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Indian withdrawal should start as soon as the Commission notifies the Indian Government that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn. As I have shown, the Pakistan withdrawal will start and be notified as soon as the belief of the Azad Kashmir forces in the forward areas has started. The Pakistan Government suggests that, by the time. the Pakistan regular forces are reduced to a screen of eight battalions, the Indian regular forces should have been reduced to:
(a) Two infantry brigades each of three battalions in the Valley area, that is, Uri-Tithwal, Gurais.
(b) Two infantry brigades each of three battalions in the Poonch-Naushera sector. (c) One infantry brigade group of three battalions and supporting arms in the Jammu sector.
Other than the normal proportion of artillery and armour with the infantry brigade group in Jammu, all other Indian regular artillery and armour should be withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir State territory by the end of this first phase of the truce period.
This would give a total of fifteen Indian regular infantry battalions plus supporting arms of one brigade group, plus the six Kashmir State Force brigades (which have a proportion of artillery and armour) as against the eight regular Pakistan battalions in the forward areas and the Azad Kashmir forces under reorganization and training in the rear areas. The Commission may well object that this hardly represents a military balance owing to the great numerical preponderance on the Indian side, especially in supporting arms. The Pakistan Government, however, on the advice of its Commander-in-Chief, is prepared to accept this during this stage of the truce agreement as evidence of its belief that the object of both sides is to bring about conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite as soon as possible. The Pakistan Government will, of course, have to persuade its half-million Muslim refugees that they can begin to return with confidence to their homes on the Indian side.
As regards the second stage of the truce period, by the time the reorganized Azad Kashmir forces have taken. over the forward areas from the Pakistan regular screen, and the latter has been withdrawn from Azad Kashmir territory, thus completing the Pakistan Government's obligation to withdraw their regular forces in entirety, the Government suggest that the final dispositions, for the remainder of the truce period, of the Indian and Kashmir State forces should be:
(a) In the Valley and Poonch-Naushera sector: five Kashmir State Force brigades with their proportion of artillery and armour; and
(b) In Jammu Province: one Kashmir State Force brigade with its proportion of artillery and armour, and one Indian infantry brigade group.
Here again in this phase there is considerable difference between the military strengths in the Azad Kashmir area and those in the Indian-controlled area, but for the reasons already given the Pakistan Government is prepared to accept this.
The Sub-Committee will have noted that I have not mentioned the Abdulla militia, which we believe to number about 4,000. The Pakistan Government hopes that early steps will be taken by the Indian Government to bring about the disbandment of this irregular force with the same object as the Pakistan Government had in effecting the withdrawal of the tribesmen during the cease-fire period instead of waiting for the truce agreement-viz., the feeling that the presence of such irregular forces is one of the greatest obstacles to the return of mutual confidence. The Pakistan Government in this hope has not included this militia in giving its views on the basis for synchronization of withdrawals on both sides.
It will be clear, I hope, to the Sub-Committee that the above proposals of the Pakistan Government provide a framework within which, if it is agreed to, the two High Commands. can work out together a detailed and synchronized withdrawal programme. I hope it is clear too that all these proposals refer to the period of the truce only and do not cover the plebiscite stage,
(Signed) W.J. Cawthorn Major-General