05021952--242 Text of the Resume of the Statement made on 5 February 1952 to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

05021952--242 Text of the Resume of the Statement made on 5 February 1952 to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan

 

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE

 

1. The United Nations Representative has indicated that, in pursuance of his terms of reference under the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March and 10 November 1951, he will endeavour to resolve the outstanding differences concerning the twelve truce proposals contained in his second report to the Security Council. Pakistan is in full agreement with the United Nations Representative that no progress can be made unless in one way or another agreed solutions are found for the following:

 

(i) A definite period of demilitarization;

 

(ii) The scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; and

 

(iii) The day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

 

PERIOD FOR DEMILITARIZATION

 

2. A period of three months should be more than enough for carrying out the demilitarization programme envisaged by the United Nations Representative, particularly as, with the advance of the year, the difficulties in respect of the weather will have been removed. In any case, the demilitarization programme should be completed not later than 15 July 1952.

 

SCOPE OF DEMILITARIZATION

 

3. The demilitarization programme should embrace all armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir without exception, namely, the Pakistan Army and the Azad Kashmir forces on the one hand, and the Indian Army, the State Army and Militia, on the other. (The tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers have already withdrawn). There is no justification whatsoever for the contention that the State Militia is a police force and so not liable to disbandment. The Maharaja's Government has a separate police force, a part of which is armed with rifles. The Militia, on the other hand, is, and has always been, a military formation. It is organized and equipped exactly on the same lines as normal Indian infantry battalions. A considerable number of its commanders are officers taken on loan from the Indian Army. The Militia took part in military operations in 1948, and since then its main role has been protection of lines of communication, guarding of military dumps and installations, bridges, military headquarters etc.

 

4. Throughout the negotiations with the United Nations Commission, the Militia was considered a part of the State armed forces. In the demilitarization proposals submitted by the Pakistan Delegation to the Truce Sub-Committee on 9 March 1949, the strength of the Militia was estimated at 4,000. Since then the force has been increased to over 7,000. Pakistan asked for the early disbandment of this irregular force because its continuance was one of the greatest obstacles. to the return of mutual confidence (third report of UNCIP, S/1430/Rev. 1, annex 10). No objection was raised by the Indian representatives at the meeting. If India made any representation to the Commission afterwards, it was not communicated to Pakistan.

 

5. General McNaughton's demilitarization proposals of 22 December 1949 provided for the disbanding and disarming of the Militia along with the State Army and the Azad Kashmir forces. These proposals were endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution dated 14 March 1950 [S/1461]. Sir Owen Dixon also called for the disarming and disbanding of the Militia as a necessary part of the demilitarization programme. He rejected the Indian Prime Minister's claim that the Militia should be treated as a police force. He insisted that the Militia could be retained only as a part of the armed forces kept in the State by agreement. He pointed out that "it was inconsistent with the fairness or freedom of the plebiscite to have any such exhibition of force as would be involved in the presence of the Militia, more especially as the State Government was so vitally interested in the result of the plebiscite".

 

6. In its negotiations with Mr. Graham also, Pakistan has proceeded on the assumption that the Jammu and Kashmir Militia would be regarded as a part of the State armed forces, and would be liable to disbandment in the same way, and to the same extent, as other local forces, such as the State Army and the Azad Kashmir forces.

 

QUANTUM OF FORCES

 

7. We are in full agreement with the following observation of Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) made at the meeting of the Security Council held on 30 January 1952 [571st meeting, para. 37]:

 

"...in order that the plebiscite shall be demonstrably fair and free from any external pressure, the number of troops on both sides of the cease-fire line should be reduced to the absolute minimum compatible with the need to preserve law and order and internal security."

 

This is also in accord with the principle enunciated by the United Nations Representative in paragraph 7 of the twelve truce proposals.

 

8. India's alleged fears for the security of the State are unfounded, but, assuming for the sake of argument that there is some cause for India's concern, the same considerations also exist in respect of Azad Kashmir. The security of both areas has to be ensured, and neither side should be able to steal a march over the other; but the overriding consideration is that neither India nor Pakistan should be placed in a position to intimidate the population and influence their vote in the plebiscite. As the representative of the Netherlands observed at the meeting of the Security Council held on 30 January 1952, the Security Council cannot "admit the right of either party for reasons of their own security to curtail the full freedom of choice by the people of Jammu and Kashmir." [571st meeting, para. 59].

 

9. We also agree in principle with the suggestion of the United Nations Representative that the number of armed forces to be retained at the end of the demilitarization programme should be based, in proportion, on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949. In order to give effect to this formula, it is now necessary that the ratio of forces existing at the time of the cease-fire should be settled, and that the number of forces which should remain at the end of the demilitarization should be clearly specified in the truce agreement.

 

10. According to the best estimates available to the Pakistan Government, the forces engaged on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949 included approximately 68,000 combatants, while the forces engaged on the Indian side of the cease-fire line included approximately 84,000 combatants, On the basis of these figures, the ratio of forces would be roughly 4:5. The proportion of forces at the end of the demilitarization should be based on the same ratio, particularly in view of the fact that only infantry forces have to be retained on both sides of the cease-fire line.

 

DATE OF INDUCTION INTO OFFICE OF THE

PLEBISCITE ADMINISTRATOR

 

11. Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers, the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian Army have withdrawn.

 

Mr. Graham's proposal that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarization programme represents a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as a part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative.

 

12. It is, however, essential that the powers of the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the "final disposal of forces'' should be clearly defined. It will be recalled that this term occurs both in sub-paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, with reference to India and State armed forces, and the Azad Kashmir forces, respectively. Obviously the term means the same thing in both these clauses. Mr. Lozano told both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan that under these clauses the Commission contemplated large-scale disbandment and disarming of all the forces concerned. This confirms Pakistan's view that the Plebiscite Administrator is competent to determine, in consultation with the United Nations Representative and the authorities concerned, not only the location and disposition of forces which remain in the State on the eve of the plebiscite, but also their strength.

 

INTERPRETATION OF NEW AGREEMENT

 

13. Paragraph 12 of Mr. Graham's proposals enable the United Nations Representative to determine final points of difference relating to technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed demilitarization programme.

 

This is not enough. Sub-paragraph 2(a) of the Security Council's resolution dated 14 March 1950 authorized the United Nations Representative "to interpret the agreement reached by the parties for demilitarization". There should be a similar provision in the truce agreement. The experience of the last three years underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving deadlocks that might arise.