11121951--214 Text of the Letter dated 11 December 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan.
11121951--214 Text of the Letter dated 11 December 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan.
We have read with great interest the statement on the current negotiations to resolve the Kashmir dispute which you gave to us at our meeting on 7 December 1951. We have also received from your secretariat a memorandum giving India's answers to some of the questions which had been raised by us with regard to certain paragraphs of the Indian Prime Minister's letter dated 11 September 1951 (appendix II), and another memorandum containing some observations by you and a questionnaire with regard to the problem of demilitarization and the formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.
The statement which was given to us on 7 December sets out, if I may say so, clearly and concisely the main fact of the case and the issues which have to be resolved in order to bring about agreement on a demilitarization programme preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. In its resolution dated 30 March 1951, the Security Council asked the United Nations Representative "to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949". These resolutions taken together constitute the international agreement with regard to Kashmir and are the yardstick by which all proposals for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute must be measured. No departure from the basic provisions of these resolutions can be made without the agreement of both India and Pakistan. So also, the attitude of the two parties with regard to any proposals which may have been put forward to resolve the deadlock must be judged by the extent to which they are prepared to carry out the international commitments which they accepted in the two UNCIP resolutions.
It is necessary to emphasise that the two UNCIP resolutions have to be taken together, and not in isolation. It was only when both the resolutions were accepted by India and Pakistan during Christmas week in 1948 that an agreement emerged, and cease-fire orders were issued by both Governments to take effect from I January 1949.
We entirely agree with your observation that "if the two Governments reach an agreement (1) on the number of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization, and (2) on fixing a definite time for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office for the assumption of his responsibilities for the final disposal by him of the remaining forces' ' it should be possible to reach agreement on all the twelve proposals set out in your letter dated 7 September 1951.
We also agree that "the number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator". It has always been recognized by the Security Council that a free and impartial plebiscite is not possible in the presence of substantial. numbers of troops of either party. In the words of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, "the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties' ' [532nd meeting].
As a result of agreement on some of the proposals contained in your letter of 7 September 1951, there has been an improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations and some reduction in the tension which existed between the two countries at the time of your visit to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. The people of both countries have been looking forward to agreement being reached on a programme of demilitarization and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. We entirely agree with your remark that "it would be unfortunate if a failure to follow through and reach an agreement resulted in a reversal of the present development of a more peaceful atmosphere. On the other hand, if these hopes are confirmed and strengthened by a definite agreement between the two Governments, the atmosphere will be further improved and other disputes vital to the welfare of the people can be cooperatively settled to the high advantage of both nations and the world".
You will recall that in the meeting which you had with the representatives of India and Pakistan on 15 November 1951, you enquired whether both parties were in a position to let you know their comments, as well as their detailed points of view on the answer of the other Government to your communication of 7 September 1951. We were prepared to offer our comments, but Sir Benegal N. Rau asked for an adjournment and suggested that it would be better for you to have separate meetings with the representatives of India and ourselves.
At our meeting with you on 16 November, we offered to clarify any point arising out of our Prime Minister's letter of 12 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 4]. I pointed out that, as desired by you, our Prime Minister had given his comments on each separate paragraph of your proposals of 7 September 1951, as well as Pakistan's detailed plans for carrying out the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the two UNCIP resolutions.
He had stated that Pakistan was equally ready to carry out a programme of demilitarization in two stages, as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions, and a demilitarization programme in one single continuous process, as proposed by you. We stand by that assurance.
I also explained that our late Prime Minister had accepted, unconditionally, ten out of the twelve proposals made in your letter of 7 September, and that while also accepting the remaining two proposals embodied in paragraphs 7 and 10 of your letter, he had made certain observations which were fully in accord with the UNCIP resolutions and the clarifications given by the Commission to the Government of Pakistan.
The only addition suggested by us was "that a provision should be made in the agreement that any differences regarding the interpretation of the agreement should be referred to the United Nations Representative, whose decision should be final. The experience of the last two and a half years. underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving deadlocks that might arise".
At the meeting held on 16 November, I was also asked to offer our comments on India's reply to your proposals of 7 September. I made some provisional observations, but submitted that before offering more detailed comments, we would wish to obtain some clarifications of the Indian Prime Minister's letter dated 11 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 3]. In compliance with your wishes, a memorandum was given to Mr. Schmidt on 16 November 1951, with regard to the points on which clarifications were necessary. A copy of that memorandum is attached for ready reference (appendix I),
From a perusal of the memoranda received from you on 7 December (annex 3] and 8 December (appendix II), it is evident that some of the questions suggested by us have not been answered, and in respect of some of other questions, the Indian reply is vague and incomplete.
On the basis of all the information made available to us to date, we have the following comments on the Indian Prime Minister's letter dated 11 September 1951:
Paragraphs 1 and 2: No comments.
Paragraph 3: The Prime Minister of India claims "that India has not committed aggression against Pakistan or made war on that country and has no intention of doing so". We welcome this assurance, but are constrained to observe that over 90 per cent of the Indian Army, including all its armour, has during the last six months been concentrated either in Jammu and Kashmir or along the borders of Pakistan. The aggressive dispositions of India's armed forces are a standing threat to Pakistan's security and to peace in the sub-continent.
Paragraph 4: According to paragraph 1 of the UNCI resolution of 5 January 1949, "The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite". It is, therefore, not correct for the Indian Prime Minister to say that the plebiscite is to determine the question of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India",
India claims to be "anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible", but has done all it could to delay the plebiscite and to prejudice the result of the plebiscite by permitting the convening of the so-called Constituent Assembly in Indian occupied Kashmir in total disregard of India's international obligations and the appeals of the Security Council.
Paragraph 5: In view of the solemn international commitments accepted by Pakistan, there is no danger of any "large-scale infiltration of hostile elements" into Jammu and Kashmir, and India's alleged apprehensions on this account are unfounded. We cannot help feeling that these and other considerations are repeatedly put forward simply to justify India's refusal to withdraw its forces from the State.
Pakistan has always been anxious for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. But it is natural for its people. should be exasperated at India's persistent refusal to honour its commitments. It is incorrect to describe this feeling of dissatisfaction as "the spirit and temper of war", or to use this as an excuse for not giving effect to the plan of demilitarization envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions.
It is significant that while India desires Pakistan to carry out its part of the programme of demilitarization proposed by you within ninety days, India is reluctant to accept any similar firm commitment for itself. In the latest. clarifications furnished by India, mention is made of certain "physical and administrative difficulties" which India might have in carrying out the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces within the prescribed period, but no indication has been given of the period within which India is prepared to carry out this operation.
There is also no assurance that the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces would be synchronised with the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army as was promised by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in its letter dated 27 August 1948 to the Government of Pakistan.
Paragraph 6: India has refused to make any commitment as to the period within which it would carry out the further withdrawals or reductions of the Indian Army and State armed forces mentioned in sub-paragraph 7(b) (ii) of your proposals of 7 September 1951. India wishes to remain free to determine what forces are needed for the security of Indian-occupied Kashmir and when any further reductions should take place. The assurance that the Government of India would "consider this problem with the United Nations Representative from time to time and...give effect to the measures that may be agreed upon between them to make further withdrawals or reductions'' is of no value because the final decision would rest with the Government of India and not with the United Nations Representative. Pakistan, on the other hand, is required to accept firm commitments for complete demilitarization on its side of the cease-fire line.
The obligations which India and Pakistan accepted under the UNCIP resolutions have been clearly summarized in paragraph 56 of your report to the Security Council [S/2375] You pointed out that "agreement that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single continuous process implied, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, the implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution together with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, as a whole". In other words, the demilitarization programme should embrace all the fighting elements in the State, namely, tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers, the Pakistan Army and the Azad Kashmir forces, on the one hand, and the Indian Army and the State Army and militia, on the other. India's demand that the demilitarization agreement should omit the further withdrawals and reductions of the Indian and State armed forces proposed in sub-paragraph 7(b) (ii) of your letter of 7 September 1951, is clearly contrary to the UNCIP resolutions. Pakistan obviously cannot agree to the one-sided demilitarization desired by India. Both parties must accept clearly defined and firm commitments, and essential conditions such as the extent of demilitarization and the stages by which it should be effected, cannot be left to the discretion of either party.
Pakistan also cannot agree that India should be the sole judge of what forces are required to safeguard the security of the State. According to part II, section B, paragraph 2 of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, India may maintain during the truce stage "within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission"- now the United Nations Representative-"are considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order". (It should be remembered that this force would be in addition to the State Army and militia.) Thereafter, during the plebiscite stage, the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator have the right to determine, in consultation with the authorities concerned, the final disposal of all the forces remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, "such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" (wide sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution dated 5 January 1949).
Paragraph 7: The Government of India has demanded that the Azad Kashmir forces should be totally disbanded. and disarmed, and that, for the purpose of maintaining law and order, a police force should be raised consisting of 2,000 armed and 2,000 unarmed men. This force "should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir, and the other. half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or locals and not by Pakistan officers" (vide Government of India's letter dated 13 April 1949 to Mr. Lozano, Vice Chairman of UNCIP). In the latest clarifications received from India it is stated that recruitment of this police force should be made under the supervision of United Nations authorities, who, in determining that a person is not a follower of Azad Kashmir, will be assisted by India's representatives.
There is no warrant in the agreed resolutions of UNCIP for this fantastic proposal. As explained in paragraph 11 of our memorandum dated 22 July 1951 (vide appendix to annex A to your report to the Security Council dated 15 October 1951), the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 did not contemplate the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir Forces. Sub-paragraph 4(b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 provided that the final disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces will be determined by the Commission (now the United Nations Representative) and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities. This operation was linked with the final disposal of the balance of the Indian Army (after the withdrawal of the bulk during the truce stage) and the State armed forces (namely, the State) Army and militia). (Vide sub-paragraph 4(a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.)
In his memorandum dated 25 December 1948, clarifying the UNCIP proposals of 11 December 1948 (which subsequently become the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949) Mr. A. Lozano explained to the Government of Pakistan that the object of paragraph 4 of the proposals was "to ensure a large-scale reduction and disarmament, the exact scope of which will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the authorities concerned" (vide the memorandum attached to annex 5 of the second interim report of UNCIP, to the Security Council, document S/1196). Similarly, the Indian Prime Minister was informed by Mr. Lozano, on 21 December 1948, that it was the Commission's intention that there should be large-scale disarming of these forces (vide aide-memoire 1 attached to annex 4 to the second interim report of UNCIP to the Security Council).
It would thus be seen that the assurance given by the Commission to both Governments was that there would be large-scale reduction and disbandment of the forces in the State after part II of the UNCIP resolution dated 13 August 1948 had been implemented. The United Nations Commission never contemplated total disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces of their replacement by a police force.
In any case, the Government of India has concern at all with the recruitment and composition of the forces that will remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. UNCIP categorically assured the Pakistan Government that the defence of territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan troops would be the responsibility of the "local authorities" (i e. the Azad Kashmir Government), that "no Indian soldier would tread on the evacuee territory", and that no officer of the Government of India or the Maharaja's Government would be permitted to interfere with the administration of Azad Kashmir (vide UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held on 31 August 1948).
There is a further absurdity in the Indian proposals. It has not been explained as to who would be in administrative control of the proposed police force, and to which Government or administration "persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir" would owe allegiance. If the police force is to be controlled partly by the Azad Kashmir Government and partly by the Government of India or the Maharaja's Government, the police force would not only be militarily useless, but, on account of its divided loyalties, it would almost certainly give rise to internal strife and disorders in Azad Kashmir.
For the reasons summarized above, the proposal was made. in paragraph 7 of the Indian Prime Minister's letter is totally unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan would, however, be prepared to accept such a proposal if the Government of India were also to agree that all the armed forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line should be withdrawn or disbanded, and that for the maintenance of law and order the United Nations Representative, assisted by the representatives of India and Pakistan, should recruit a police force of 4,000 to 5,000 men, half armed and half unarmed, half of whom should be followers of Sheikh Abdulla, and the other half persons who are not followers of Sheikh Abdulla.
Paragraph 8: In the memoranda received from you it has been explained that India wishes to retain at the end of the period of demilitarization before the arrival of the Plebiscite Administrator 28,000 troops and 6,000 militia, but other important details have not been furnished. In order to get a clear picture of the quantity and quality of armed forces India wishes to retain on its side of the cease-fire line, the Government of Pakistan would wish to know whether the 28,000 troops consist of the Indian Army as well as the State Army, and if so, in what proportion. How many of these troops are combatants and how many non-combatants? Does this force also have armour and artillery? If so, how much? What is the normal armament and equipment of the State Militia? Until these questions are clearly answered, Pakistan cannot deter mine the force which it would need on its side of the cease-fire line to ensure the security of Azad Kashmir and to prevent a breach of the cease-fire agreement.
It might be pointed out that a "normal" infantry division of the Indian Army consists of three brigades of three or four battalions each. In asking for an infantry division of four brigades of four battalions each, plus a line of communication area headquarters, India is in fact asking for the retention of approximately two "normal" infantry divisions of the Indian Army. Since India had little more than three infantry divisions in Jammu and Kashmir at the time of the cease-fire, it is difficult to accept the Indian Prime Minister's claim that he has agreed to the withdrawal of "much more than the bulk of Indian forces in the State".
The Indian Prime Minister has asked that Pakistan should take effective measures to prevent any aggression against the State of Jammu and Kashmir after the proposed demilitarization programme. Pakistan is prepared to do so. What then is the justification for keeping such large forces in Indian-occupied Kashmir? You will recall that before August 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir found that three battalions of his State forces were more than enough for the maintenance of internal security and law and order in the area on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. An almost equivalent force was kept by the Maharaja in the area on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. This was one of the considerations which the Government of Pakistan had in view in suggesting that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in your proposals of 7 September 1951.
Paragraph 9: According to the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be formally appointed to office as soon as the Commission (now the United Nations Representative) is satisfied that parts I and II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 have been implemented (i.e., the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers, the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian Army have been withdrawn) and that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State. The proposal in paragraph 10 of your letter of 7 September 1951 that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period proposed by you represented an important concession to India. The fact that India is not satisfied even with this concession, and desires that no provision should be made in proposed demilitarization agreement for the formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator shows that India is seeking to resile from its commitments under the UNCIP resolutions. As you have rightly pointed out, the Plebiscite Administrator has to determine the final disposal of the forces in Jammu and Kashmir under sub-paragraphs 4(a) & (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949. The formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator is, therefore, an essential part of any agreement for demilitarization in a single continuous process,
The Indian Prime Minister has argued that the proposal for the formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator "would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters". This is a fallacious argument. Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator is responsible for necessary conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite. As a matter of fact, under paragraph 10 of that resolution, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be associated in the discussions which the United Nations Commission (now the United Nations Representative) is to have with India and Pakistan to work out the details of the arrangements necessary for a free and impartial plebiscite.
Paragraph 10: In the latest clarifications received through you, it has been stated that India agrees to paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12 of your proposals of 7 September 1951. We take note of this statement.
Paragraph 11 of your proposals provided that the programme of demilitarization proposed by you would be "without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution". It has always been understood by the Government of Pakistan that the term "final disposal" of forces includes power to determine the ultimate strength, location and disposition of all forces in Jammu and Kashmir prior to the holding of the plebiscite.
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the Prime Minister of India's letter dated 11 September 1951, one cannot escape the conclusion that, while seeming to agree in principle, India has not accepted any of the basic provisions of your proposals of 7 September. India has not agreed to the scope of the demilitarization proposed by you, or to the period within which the demilitarization should be carried out, or to the formal appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator not later than the final day of the proposed demilitarization programme, It is a matter of great regret that, notwithstanding the genuine expression of sympathy by the leaders of India in connexion with the tragedy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, and the friendly tone of some of the recent utterances of the Indian Prime Minister, there has been no change at all in India's attitude towards the Kashmir dispute since you received Mr. Nehru's letter of 11 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 3].
The Pakistan delegation has carefully studied your memorandum of 7 December 1951 [annex 3] containing some general observations on the problem of demilitarization and asking certain questions of the Pakistan Government. We venture to submit that paragraph 4 of the memorandum is an inadequate summary of Pakistan's views on the question of demilitarization. We consider that:
(i) The assurances contained in the first three proposals made in your letter of 7 September 1951 rule out the possibility of resumption of fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, and that there is no danger to the security of the State.
(ii) Only a very small portion of the armed forces now located in Jammu and Kashmir, are needed for assisting the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order. Moreover, having regard to the agreed objective of a free and impartial plebiscite, the forces on both sides of the cease-fire line should be reduced to the absolute minimum. The greater the reduction effected at this stage, the easier it would be for the Plebiscite Administrator to deter mine the final disposal of the remaining forces. If, on the other hand, there is complete demilitarization on one side, and substantial forces are left on the other, it would become almost impossible for the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out his duties.
(iii) If it is intended that the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be of the status of civil armed forces, the forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line should also be of the same status.
(iv) Having regard to all the above considerations, a force of not more than four infantry battalions. (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan Government is, however, prepared to agree that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached.
With regard to the four questions put to the Pakistan delegation, our brief answers are as follows:
Question: "What is the minimum number of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line that the Government of Pakistan is ready to accept on the final day of the period of the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir?"
Answer: Four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) on each side of the cease-fire line. In case, however, India insists on retaining one division of four brigades, of four battalions each, consisting of 28,000 troops, presumably with the normal complement of armour and artillery of an Indian Army division, plus 6,000 militia, the Pakistan Government would consider it necessary Azad Kashmir forces consisting of 25,000 troops plus 3,500 retain the Gilgit and Baltistan Scouts. These forces are much weaker than the forces which India wishes to retain, both in number and in armament.
Question: "Would the Government be prepared to accept that United Nations Military observers be stationed in the necessary numbers where it would be deemed appropriate by the United Nations and the Governments of India and Pakistan?"
Answer: Yes. It might be pointed out that under paragraph 2 of section B of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the United Nations Representative is competent to station United Nations observers wherever he deems necessary.
Question: "Would the Government of Pakistan be ready to accept forces to be provided by the United Nations in order to safeguard the security of and to maintain law and order in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir as long as the United Nations, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, deems necessary?"
Answer: Yes. It is assumed that United Nations troops would be posted on both sides of the cease-fire line, and that the object of this proposal is to facilitate the withdrawal of all the forces of India and Pakistan, and the disbandment of all local forces, namely, the State Army and militia and the Azad Kashmir forces.
Question: "Would the Government of Pakistan agree that the Plebiscite Administrator be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization?"
Answer: Yes. The Pakistan Government wishes to emphasize the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as early as possible. The UNCIP resolutions contemplate his appointment in the middle of the programme of demilitarization. It is hoped that he would be appointed to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.
(Signed) Zafrulla Khan
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan
APPENDIX I
Memorandum submitted on 16 November 1951 to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan from the Pakistan delegation concerning the letter dated 11 September 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative from the Prime Minister of India
Prime Minister of India's letter dated 11 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 3].
Points requiring clarification
Paragraph 5: (a) Is it correct that India is willing to carry out the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces within the period of ninety days mentioned in paragraph 6 of Mr. Graham's proposals [S/2375, annex 2]?
(b) Is it agreed that the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces in the State should be synchronised with the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from Jammu and Kashmir?
Paragraph 6: When would India be prepared to carry out the further withdrawals or reductions mentioned in sub paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the United Nations Representative's proposals, and how much time would be required for these operations?
Paragraph 7: India has proposed that the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line "should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir''. How is it proposed to recruit "persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir'', and to which Government or administration will they owe allegiance?
Paragraph 8: (a) What is the strength, armament and equipment of one line of communications area headquarters, and one infantry division of sixteen battalions, which India wishes to retain?
(b) Do the above mentioned forces include the State Army and militia? If not, what is the strength, armament and equipment of the State Army and State militia, which India desires to retain? When would India be prepared to agree to large-scale reduction and disarmament of the State Army and militia?
Paragraph 9. When will India cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office?
Paragraph 10: Can this be taken to mean that India agrees to all the remaining proposals contained in the United Nations Representative's letter of 7 September 1951 (i.e., paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12)?
APPENDIX II
Memorandum from the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan received by the delegation of Pakistan on 8 December 1951
The following are India's answers to the questions which have been raised with reference to certain paragraphs of the letter of the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of India, dated September 11, 1951 [S/2375, annex 3]:
Question concerning paragraph 5: Is it correct that India is willing to carry out the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces within the period of ninety days mentioned in paragraph 6 of
Mr. Graham's proposals?
Answer: It is not our intention to delay withdrawal of the bulk of our forces beyond the period of ninety days mentioned in paragraph 6 of Mr. Graham's proposals, provided Pakistan completes, within the same period, processes (i), (ii) and (iii) described in sub-paragraph 7 (a) of the proposals. Our reservation on this point was governed by two considerations: (1) doubts as to whether Pakistan will be able to carry out all the processes referred to within this period; (2) physical and administrative difficulties of our doing our share under subparagraph 7 (b) (i). Some of our troops are occupying remote posts difficult to approach and exit particularly in winter.
Question concerning paragraph 6: When would India be prepared to carry out the further withdrawals or reductions mentioned in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the United Nations Representative's proposals, and how much time would be required for these operations?
Answer: As explained by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai in formally to Mr. Marin in the course of his conversations with him on September 11, 1951, much of what we should have done under subparagraph 7 (b) (ii) of the proposals we have agreed to do under subparagraph 7 (b) (i) in order to convince Mr. Graham and the Security Council of the genuineness. of our desire to go as far as possible in the direction of reducing our forces in the State to the minimum compatible with its security. It is impossible for us to suggest any time limit within which further withdrawals or reductions will be practicable. We can only repeat the assurance given in our letter of 11 September 1951, that "it is (our) policy to reduce (our) forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard its security," and that "the greater the measure that the State enjoys from threats of incursion or aggression, the smaller will be this minimum."
Question concerning paragraph 7: India has proposed that the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line "should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir." How is it proposed to recruit "persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir''?
Answer: Recruitment of both categories of persons will be made under the supervision of United Nations authorities. who, in determining that a person is not a follower of Azad Kashmir, will be assisted by our representatives. Every applicant for recruitment, whether now resident in the Azad Kashmir area or a refugee on our side of the cease-fire line, must of course belong to that area.
Question concerning paragraph 9: When will India cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office?
Answer: The position has been explained fully in the paragraph itself. We still think that it would be premature to fix now the date of appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator. Once a programme of demilitarization has been agreed upon this matter can be settled.
Question concerning paragraph 10: Can this be taken to mean that India agrees to all the remaining proposals contained in the United Nations Representative's letter of 7 September 1951 (i.e., paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12)?
Answer: We understand that the reference in the paragraph. 12 of Mr. Graham's letter is not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarization, but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. On this understanding the answer to the question is in the affirmative.