07121951--205 Text of the Statement of 7 December 1951 of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan and questionnaires addressed to the Governments of India and Pakistan
07121951--205 Text of the Statement of 7 December 1951 of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan and questionnaires addressed to the Governments of India and Pakistan
The hope for an agreement in the Kashmir dispute is based on explicit commitments of a no-war declaration, a policy against war propaganda, reaffirmation of the cease-fire agreement, and actual demilitarization as an inter-dependent and continuous process carried out in stages on both sides of the cease-fire line as part of the preparation for the long promised free and impartial plebiscite. Consequently there is the present opportunity to work out an agreement for the fulfilment of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 to which both parties agreed.
The UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 comprises a preamble and three parts.
Part I dealt with the cease-fire, which was agreed by India and Pakistan and made effective on 1 January 1949. As a completion of this part of the resolution a cease-fire line was agreed upon by the two Governments under the auspices. of the UNCIP in the Karachi agreement of 27 July 1949. The line was demarcated thereafter on the ground.
Part II, entitled "Truce agreement", outlined the way in which the demilitarization of the State should be carried out.
Part III is a reaffirmation of the will of the Governments of India and Pakistan that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.
The UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 dealt with the question of the plebiscite. For the purpose of this statement. It should be remembered that sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution deal with some aspects of demilitarization in which the Plebiscite Administrator would take some action.
To the United Nations Representative under his terms of reference has been given the responsibility of working out with the parties an agreement for demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of the two resolutions, which provided for demilitarization as follows:
13 AUGUST 1948 RESOLUTION: TRUCE AGREEMENT
"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both Governments accept the following principles as basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission:
A
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
B
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A. 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agree to begin. to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease fire those forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed."
5 JANUARY 1949 RESOLUTION
"4. (a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
(b) As regards the territory referred to in A.3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."
The timing of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces had since 1949 become a chief stumbling block. In order to meet this problem, the United Nations Representative proposed that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces be accomplished by connecting sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution with part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution.
As pointed out in the United Nations Representative's report of 15 October 1951 [S/2375, para. $6], the resolution of 5 January 1949 conferred upon the Plebiscite Administrator certain functions with respect to the implementation of sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of that resolution. For that reason the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator was made a part of the twelve proposals,
It is obvious that the demilitarization would not be one sudden, complete undertaking, whether the explicit provision of the two resolutions regarding stages in demilitarization followed, or whether there were agreed stages in a continuous process, as now proposed. To this end, proposal 9 of the draft agreement of 7 September 1951 was submitted for the purpose of having the military experts, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan and under the auspices of the United Nations, work out the stages in this continuous process of demilitarization.
To surmount the obstacle regarding war psychosis, the United Nations Representative made proposals contained in the first three of the twelve proposals.
The Security Council has asked us to continue on the basis of the twelve proposals. Tentative agreement has already been reached on a majority of those twelve proposals. If the two Governments reach an agreement (1) on the number of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization, and (2) on fixing a definite time for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office for the assumption of his responsibilities for the final disposal by him of the remaining forces, we believe that an agreement can be reached on all the twelve proposals. We have, therefore, with the cooperation of the representatives of the two Governments confined our discussions to those two propositions.
The number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator. In order to meet the contention about the security of the State, the United Nations Representative has made a number of proposals for assurances by both Governments against resort to war and war propaganda and for the prevention of invasion and infiltrations into the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
In grappling further with the problem of the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite, we have made other proposals in addition to the three submitted in our twelve proposals in the letter of 7 September 1951 addressed to the Prime Ministers. We have the conviction that these proposals would make actual demilitarization possible and also provide for the security of the State and the creation of a peaceful atmosphere conducive to the holding of a plebiscite.
The very agreement signed by two countries of high international standing, Members of the United Nations and of the Commonwealth of Nations, and approved in the forum of nations, would be itself one of the most effective guarantees of the keeping of the peaceful assurances thus given and ratified before the world.
It would be unfortunate if a failure to follow through and reach an agreement resulted in a reversal of the present. development of a more peaceful atmosphere. On the other hand, if these hopes are confirmed and strengthened by a definite agreement between the two Governments, the atmosphere will be further improved and other disputes vital to the welfare of the people can be cooperatively settled to the high advantage of both nations and the world.
It is our faith that the leaders of the two peoples will now seize the opportunity of their destiny.
Accordingly, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan would like to make the following statement:
1. He has been instructed by the Security Council to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. By letter of 7 September 1951 the United Nations Representative submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan proposals for an agreement. The Security Council noted: "...with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization which could be carried out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, but forwarded by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan".
3. The two main differences between India and Pakistan concerning that programme are related:
(a) To the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; and
(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.
4. The figure given by the Indian Government as the minimum to be left on its side of the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization before the arrival of the Plebiscite Administrator is 28,000 troops, plus 6,000 militia.
Would it not be possible for the Government of India to accept a considerable reduction in the figure in order to make possible the demilitarization of the State and to obtain the proposed agreement?
5. The Representative of India has stated that effective guarantees should be given for further reduction of these forces.
(a) Would it be an adequate guarantee for the Government of India if an agreement is signed on the basis of the twelve proposals contained in the communication of 7 September 19517
(b) If not, would it be adequate if, in addition, United Nations Military observers were stationed in the necessary numbers where it would be deemed appropriate by the United Nations and the Governments of India and Pakistan?
(c) If not, is the Indian Government ready to accept forces to be provided by the United Nations in order to safeguard the security. of and to maintain law and order in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir as long as the United Nations, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, deems necessary?
(d) If not, what other suggestions is the Indian Government prepared to make in order to obtain demilitarization under the resolutions of the Security Council and the agreed resolutions of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949?
6. Would the Government of India agree to cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period?
Accordingly, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan would like to make the following statement:
1. He has been instructed by the Security Council to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. By letter of 7 September 1951 the United Nations Representative submitted to the Government of India and Pakistan proposals for an agreement. The Security Council noted: "...with approval the basis for a programme of de
militarization which could be carried out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan".
3 The two main differences between India and Pakistan concerning that programme are related: (a) To the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; and
(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.
4. Concerning the minimum number of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization, the Government of Pakistan maintains that the same consideration should apply to the status of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line.
On the other hand the Government of India has given. the following figures as the minimum to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization before the arrival of the Plebiscite Administrator:
(a) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line: 28,000 troops plus 6,000 militia; and
(b) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: 4,000 men recruited and organized as mentioned in the report of the United Nations Representative of 15 October 1951 [S/2375, para. 60(3)].
What is the minimum number of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line that the Government of Pakistan is ready to accept on the final day of the period of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir?
Would the Government of Pakistan be ready to accept that United Nations military observers be stationed in the necessary numbers where it would be deemed appropriate by the United Nations and the Governments of India and Pakistan?
Would the Government of Pakistan be ready to accept forces to be provided by the United Nations in order to safeguard the security of and to maintain law and order in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir as long as the United Nations, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, deems necessary?
Would the Government of Pakistan agree that the Plebiscite Administrator be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization?