12091951--192 Text of the Letter dated 12 September 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan Mr. Graham from the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan regarding the proposals for an agreement
12091951--192 Text of the Letter dated 12 September 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan Mr. Graham from the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan regarding the proposals for an agreement
I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 7 September 1951, asking for the comments and suggestions of the Pakistan Government with regard to proposals for carrying out the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the two agreed UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
The UNCIP resolutions envisage demilitarization in two stages. The first stage provides for the withdrawal of tribes. men and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian forces (vide part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948). At the end of this stage the forces remaining in the State on the two sides of the cease-fire line will be (1) the Azad Kashmir forces and (2) the remainder of the Indian forces after the withdrawal of the bulk, and the State armed forces, i.e, the State Army and State Militia. After the first stage of demilitarization has been completed, the Plebiscite Administrator will be formally appointed to office, and together with the United Nations Representative, will determine the final disposal of the forces remaining in the State, namely, the Azad Kashmir forces, on the one hand, and the remainder of the Indian forces and the State armed forces, on the other, vide paragraph 4 of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.
The proposals set out in your letter provide that the demilitarization of the State contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions, instead of being effected in two stages, should be carried out in a single continuous process, and that the Plebiscite Administrator should be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period. The completion of the programme of demilitarization referred to above will, however, be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of such forces as may remain at the end of this programme,
Since the demilitarization contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions would be equally achieved by the proposals in your letter, the Government of Pakistan is in general agreement with them.
The comments and suggestions of the Pakistan Government in respect of each paragraph of the above mentioned proposals are given below:
Paragraph 1-Agreed.
Paragraph 2-Agreed.
Paragraph 3-Agreed.
Paragraph 4-Agreed.
Paragraph 5-Agreed.
Paragraph 6-Agreed.
Paragraph 7-Agreed subject to the following comments:
(i) It is presumed that the term "further withdrawals or reductions" mentioned in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) refers to the "large-scale reduction and disarmament" envisaged by the UNCIP under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, (vide aide memoire given by Mr. A. Lozano to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 5]).
(ii) After the large-scale reduction and disbandment of forces on both sides of the cease-Fireline line contemplated by UNCIP under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 has taken place there will necessarily be left some Azad Kashmir forces on one side and some armed forces on the other. If it is intended that these forces should be of the status of civil armed forces, the same considerations will apply on both sides of the cease-fire line.
(iii) Having regard to the objects stated in paragraph 8
of the proposals and the paramount importance of ensuring the freedom of the plebiscite, the forces left in the State at the end of the demilitarization period should be as small as possible. The Pakistan Government considers that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the administrative units) should remain on each side of necessary the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragraph 7. These figures are based on a careful consideration of all relevant factors such as area, terrain, size and distribution of population on the two sides of the cease-fire line.
The Pakistan Government is, however, of the view that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached.
Paragraph 8-Agreed.
Paragraph 9-Agreed.
Paragraph 10-Agreed. The Pakistan wishes to emphasize the importance of appointing Government the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as early as possible. The UNCIP resolutions contemplate his appointment in the middle of the programme of demilitarization. It is hoped that he would be appointed to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.
Paragraph 11-Agreed.
Paragraph 12-Agreed.
It will be recalled that in their informal talks with you, Pakistan representatives urged that a provision should be made in the agreement that any differences regarding the interpretation of the agreement should be referred to the United Nations Representative whose decision should be final. The experience of the last two and one half years underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving deadlocks that might arise. The Pakistan Government is of the view that any future agreement should contain a clause to this effect.
The foregoing observations give the comments and the suggestions of the Pakistan Government on the proposals. contained in your letter. As regards the detailed plans of the Pakistan Government for carrying out the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, reference is invited to the memorandum which was given to you on 22 July 1951. The memorandum is reproduced as an appendix to this letter. It is necessary to point out that the memorandum was drawn up on the basis of two distinct stages of demilitarization as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions. The Pakistan Government is equally ready to carry out the programme of demilitarization in a single continuous process. A detailed programme of demilitarization can only be drawn up after an agreement is reached as to the quantum of forces which will remain at the end of the demilitarization period. Paragraph 9 of the proposals in your letter lays down the appropriate procedure for drawing up such a detailed programme.
The Pakistan Government has always been willing and anxious to carry out in full the obligations undertaken by it under the agreed UNCIP resolutions. I trust that your informal discussions with Pakistan representatives and the terms of this reply will have convinced you of Pakistan's earnest desire to cooperate in the fullest degree in the vital task entrusted to you by the Security Council.
The principles of the United Nations Charter and the maintenance of international peace alike demand that conditions be created in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as speedily as possible for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices so that the people of the State can freely exercise their right of self-determination and decide the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan.
(Signed) Liaquat Ali Khan
Prime Minister of Pakistan
APPENDIX
Memorandum of Pakistan, dated 22 July 1951 on demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949
1. On 1 January 1949, when the cease-fire came into effect, the armed forces engaged in the State of Jammu and Kashmir were constituted as follows:
On the Pakistan side there were :
(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting;
(ii) Regular troops of the Pakistan Army; and
(iii) The Azad Kashmir forces.
On the Indian side of the cease-fire line, the forces engaged consisted of
(i) Regular Indian armed forces;
(ii) State armed forces, which include the State Army and the State Militia.
2. The UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 envisage demilitarization in two stages. The first stage provides for the withdrawal of the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers, the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian forces, vide part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. The second stage covers the final disposal of all the remaining forces, namely, the Azad Kashmir forces, on the one hand, and the balance of the Indian forces (after the withdrawal of "the bulk") and the State armed forces, on the other (vide paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949).
3. The Chairman of the Commission explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan on 31 August 1948, that "the Commission had taken great pains to assure a military balance on both sides, and the element of balance had been continually at the back of the Commission's mind while drafting the resolution" (UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held in Karachi on 31 August 1948).
4. Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 provides for the formulation of a truce agreement on the basis of the following principles:
(i) Pakistan will use its best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers.
(ii) The Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from Jammu and Kashmir.
(iii) When the Government of India is notified that tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers have withdrawn, and that Pakistan forces are being withdrawn, India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed with the Commission.
(iv) In agreement with the Commission, India will maintain, within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire line, only such forces as are considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
5. Although the obligation to persuade the tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers to withdraw would arise only after the signing of the truce agreement, Pakistan, as a proof of its good intentions and with a view to expediting the plebiscite, has discharged this obligation without waiting for the conclusion of the truce agreement. The only action still to be taken under part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is, therefore, to arrange the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and of the bulk of the Indian forces.
6. Part II, section B, paragraph 2 of the 13 August 1948 resolution states that the Government of India will maintain "within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order". This provision clearly shows that during the truce stage India is to retain its forces only on its side of the cease-fire line. At the meeting held on 31 August 1948, the Chairman of the Commission stated that the defence of the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan troops would be the responsibility of the "local authorities" (i.c., the Azad Kashmir Government), and that "no Indian soldier would tread on the evacuated territory" (UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held on 31 August 1948). The cease-fire line having been determined with the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan, the Indian claim to station garrisons in the areas north of the cease-fire is not tenable.
7. It is equally clear that under part II, section B, paragraph 2, of the 13 August 1948 resolution India can retain only the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. Sir Benegal N. Rau told the Security Council on 1 March, 1951 [533rd meeting] that only "a small portion of the Indian forces was to remain in the State to ensure its security. In its letter dated 3 September 1948 [S/1100, para. 90], the Commission stated that it considered itself "free to hear the views of the Government Pakistan'' on the strength of the Indian forces to be retained under part II, section B, paragraph 2, of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It is the responsibility of the United Nations Representative to determine the strength of the Indian forces required to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order under part II, section B, paragraph 2, of the 13 August 1948 resolution after hearing India and Pakistan. The rest of the Indian forces constitute "the bulk" and have to be withdrawn during the truce stage.
8. In paragraph 10 of the appendix to its letter dated 27 August 1948 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan [S/1100, annex 27], the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan assured the Government of Pakistan that "synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission".
9. The following procedure should, in the view of the Pakistan Government, be followed for implementing the first stage of the demilitarization programme:
(i) After considering the views of India and Pakistan, the United Nations Representative should determine the strength of the Indian forces required to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line under part II, section B, paragraph 2, of the resolution of 13 August 1948. The United Nations Representative should take into account the fact that, Pakistan having given a firm guarantee against any incursion by tribesmen, there is no threat to the security of the State and that, having regard to the character of the population concerned, only very small force is required for maintaining law and order. The strength of the Indian forces to be retained in the State during the truce stage should not exceed three infantry battalions, with the minimum number of administrative units attached. It may be pointed out that this force will be in addition to the State armed forces.
(1) The Indian forces in excess of three infantry battalions and attached administrative units would constitute "the bulk" and should be withdrawn.
(iii) The United Nations Representative should determine the period within which the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian forces should be completed. A period of three months should be ample for this operation. (iv) As a first step, Pakistan should withdraw one infantry battalion by a specified date.
(v) A week later, a synchronized withdrawal of the remaining Pakistan troops and of the bulk of the Indian forces as defined above should commence and be completed within the prescribed period.
(vi) The Military Adviser to the United Nations Representative should be charged with the task of drawing up detailed plans for the withdrawal of the forces mentioned in
(v) above in consultation with. G.H.Q. (Pakistan) and G.H.Q. (India).
(vii) The United Nations military observers should ensure that the withdrawal of the forces on both sides proceeds according to the detailed plan.
10. At the end of the first stage of demilitarization, the position would be that the tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers, the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian forces would have been withdrawn and peaceful conditions have been restored in the State. The Plebiscite Administrator would then assume charge and the second stage of demilitarization would then come into operation. The Plebiscite Administrator and the United Nations Representative would determine the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces and State armed forces, on the one hand, and of the Azad Kashmir forces, on the other. This phase of demilitarization has to be carried out in consultation with India in respect of the forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, and in consultation with the "local authorities" (i.e., the Azad Kashmir Government) in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces, vide paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949.
11. There is no justification for the Indian contention that the reduction and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces should be undertaken during the first stage of demilitarization, or that this should be linked with the programme of the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces. The language of the UNCIP resolutions is too clear to permit any such contention to be raised.
At the Commission's meeting with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 31 August 1948, its Chairman "asked the Foreign Minister to take note of the fact that even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad forces would still muster thirty-five battalions of armed people who were not asked to disarm or withdraw" (UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held on 31 August 1948).
In sub-paragraph 2 (c) of its letter dated 19 September 1948, the Commission assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that its resolution of 13 August 1948 did not "contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces" [S/1100, para. 108].
This position was made equally clear by the Commission to the Government of India before the latter accepted the resolution of 13 August 1948 The Chairman of the Commission told the Prime Minister of India on 17 August 1948 that, according to the provisions of the resolution of 13 August 1948, "limited Government of India forces would remain, and that, on the other side, only the Azad people would remain in their present positions" [S/1100, annex 12].
Up to 18 February 1949, the correct position with regard to the Azad Kashmir forces continued to be accepted by the Government of India. In paragraph 3 of his letter dated 18 February 1949 to the Commission, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai admitted that "the disarming of Azad Kashmir forces is really a matter of chronology. First, there must be a cease fire, and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir forces. So far as the non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out" [S/1430/Rev. 1, annex 7]. It was only in March 1949 that the Government of India began to shift its ground and to suggest that the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces should be effected during the truce stage.
12. The term "final disposal" in paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 covers withdrawal, disbandment, disarming and location of forces. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan was informed on 25 December 1949 that it was the intention of the Commission under this clause to "ensure a large-scale reduction and disarmament" of the forces concerned [S/1196, annex 5].
In determining the "final disposal" of forces, it is necessary to pay regard to the view repeatedly expressed by members of the Security Council that, to quote the words of Sir Gladwyn Jebb [532nd meeting), "the best guarantee of a fair expressio of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties",
13. The Pakistan Government considers that the second stage of demilitarization envisaged in paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 should be effected as follows: (i) The remaining Indian forces (i.c., three infantry battalions with their administrative units) should be withdrawn from the State.
(ii) The State armed forces (namely, the State Army and State Militia) should be reduced to three infantry battalions with the minimum number of administrative units attached. This force should be placed under the control of the Plebiscite Administrator.
(iii) Similarly, the Azad Kashmir forces should be reduced to three infantry battalions with the minimum number of administrative units attached, and placed under the control of the Plebiscite Administrator.
(iv) The Military Adviser to the United Nations Representative should work out a detailed plan for the withdrawal of the remaining Indian forces and the coordinated reduction and disbandment of the State armed forces on the one hand, and the Azad Kashmir forces, on the other.
(v) The United Nations Military Observers should supervise the implementation of the plan mentioned in
(iv) above.
(vi) The location and disposition of all forces remaining in the State during the plebiscite should be as determined by the Plebiscite Administrator.
14. Pakistan reiterates its readiness to cooperate fully in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the UNCIP's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.