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चैत्र कृष्ण पक्ष, गुरूवार, तृतीया, संकट निवारण चर्तुथी

Documents

11091951--189 Text of the Letter dated 11 September 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan Mr. Graham from the Prime Minister of India Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the proposals for an agreement


11091951--189 Text of the Letter dated 11 September 1951 addressed to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan Mr. Graham from the Prime Minister of India Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the proposals for an agreement

 

I have the honour to reply to your letter of 7 September 1951, which you handed to me personally that day.

 

As you are aware, we were glad to meet you and your associates as we are eager to find a way to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. We made it clear to you, however, at the very outset of our discussions, which were informal, that, for the reasons explained by our permanent representative to the Security Council, Sir Benegal N. Rau, we have found ourselves unable to accept the Council's resolution dated 30 March 1951, and that our discussions were without prejudice to this stand of the Government of India. The views that my Government is submitting now on your proposals are similarly without prejudice to that stand.

 

We are in complete agreement with paragraph 1 of your proposals; it represents a policy that we ourselves have been urging upon the Government of Pakistan for a long time. We would also add that India has not committed aggression against Pakistan or made war on that country and has no intention of doing so.

 

As regards paragraph 4, the Government of India not only reaffirms its acceptance of the principle that the question of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic. method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices. of the United Nations, but is anxious about the conditions. necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible. It is with this object, and this object alone, in view that it has examined your proposals,

 

It is clear to the Government of India that the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir from invasion or large cale infiltration of hostile element will not be effectively ensured until the spirit and temper of war that now prevail on the other side of the cease-fire line and in Pakistan have been demonstrably replaced by a firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully. Nor will it be possible to make any headway with arrangements for holding a plebiscite until this condition is satisfied. The Government of India greatly doubts whether this will be practicable within the period of ninety days mentioned in paragraph 6 of the proposals or such other period as may be agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9. The Government of India is willing to carry out the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces in the State by the end of this period, provided the operations described in sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals are progressively completed by the end of that period.

 

In the opinion of the Government of India, sub paragraph 7 (b) (ii) should be omitted. It feels that the further withdrawals or reductions referred to in this part of the proposals cannot be related to the period to be fixed in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9; these can be realized only progressively thereafter as the fear of incursions into the State or renewal of aggression diminishes, and completed when the fear completely disappears. Both the period during which these further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and quantum cannot be determined realistically at present. I would point out that the withdrawal of its forces. which the Government of India is prepared to make under subparagraph 7 (b) (i) of the proposals, and which is specified in paragraph 8 of this letter, will be considerably in excess of "the bulk of the Indian forces''. It would leave in the State the very minimum force necessary to prevent infiltration. Any further reduction could only take place at some risk. The Government of India will be glad, however, to consider this problem with the United Nations Representative from time to time and to give effect to the measures that may be agreed upon between them to make further withdrawals or reductions. It wishes me to give you the assurance that it is its policy to reduce its forces in the State to the minimum necessary to

safeguard its security; the greater the measure of security that the State enjoys from threats of incursion or aggression, the smaller will be this minimum.

 

As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000 organized, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in item C of the memorandum transmitted to Mr. Lozano under cover of letter No. 248-PASG/49 dated 13 April 1949, by their Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs.

 

In pursuance of what has been stated in paragraph 6 of this letter, the Government of India will retain on its side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each, at the end of the period agreed upon. in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of that period. Thus much more than the "bulk of Indian forces in the State '' will have been withdrawn, and I wish to emphasize that the forces left behind will be wholly inadequate to resist any large-scale aggression. Effective measures to prevent such aggression will, it is presumed, be taken by Pakistan.

 

About paragraph 10 of the proposals, the Government of India agrees that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-fire line, permit a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite. To appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he can function effectively would be premature. The Government of India would therefore prefer such a proposal to be omitted from the present

document; it would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.

 

The Government of India has no other comments or suggestions to make on the proposals.

 

(Signed) Jawaharlal Nehru

Prime Minister

and Minister of External Affairs

of India