11091952--265 Memorandum transmitted to the United Nations Representative on 11 September 1952 by the representative of Pakistan, giving a resume of Pakistan s views concerning issues discussed at the Geneva Conference from 26 August to 10 September 1952

11091952--265 Memorandum transmitted to the United Nations Representative on 11 September 1952 by the representative of Pakistan, giving a resume of Pakistan s views concerning issues discussed at the Geneva Conference from 26 August to 10 September 1952

 

Introductory

 

The Government of Pakistan accepted the proposal of the United Nations Representative to participate in a meeting at ministerial level at Geneva ``for the purpose of arriving at agreement with regard to implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 within the limits of those resolutions." Since the two agreed UNCIP resolutions together constitute the international agreement with regard to Kashmir, they are the touch-stone by which all proposals for the implementation of these resolutions are judged. Pakistan has been ready at all times to accept all proposals which are in accord with the letter or the spirit of these resolutions.

 

Problem of demilitarization

 

The Conference has been mainly concerned with the problem of demilitarization. The UNCIP resolutions envisaged demilitarization in two stages. During the first stage, the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers, and the Pakistan troops were to be withdrawn, on the one hand, and the bulk of the Indian forces, on the other. The Plebiscite Administrator was then. to be inducted into office, and was made responsible for determining the final disposal of all the remaining forces in consultation with the United Nations Representative and the authorities concerned.

 

The United Nations Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952 [annex 3], also envisaged demilitarization in two stages. The first stage provided for implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and part of sub-paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. In the second stage, the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator were to determine the final disposal of the remaining forces,

 

Pakistan has been equally ready to carry out the demilitarization programme as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions and as contemplated in the United Nations Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952. It would appear that the Government of India was prepared to accept neither.

 

Security of the State

 

3. The main reason given for India's refusal to proceed with demilitarization on the lines laid down in the UNCIP resolutions or as suggested by the United Nations Representative, has been India's alleged fears for the security of the State. It might be pointed out that the agreed UNCIP resolutions make adequate provisions for the security of the State at all stages. India's alleged fears for the security of the State are unfounded, but assuming for the sake of argument that there is some cause for India's concern, the same considerations also exist in respect of Azad Kashmir. The security of both areas has to be ensured, and neither side should be able to steal a march against the other, but the overriding consideration is that neither India nor Pakistan should be placed in a position to intimidate the population and influence their vote in the plebiscite.

 

India cannot be the sole judge of the steps needed to ensure the security of the State. According to paragraph 2 of section B of part II of the UNCIP resolution 13 August 1948, India may maintain during the truce stage "within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission (now United Nations Representative) are considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order". Thereafter, during the plebiscite stage, the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator have the right to determine, in consultation with the authorities concerned, the final disposal of all the forces remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, "such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" (vide paragraph 4 of the UNCIP resolution dated 5 January 1949).

 

The proceedings of the Geneva Conference show that the basic differences with regard to the problem of demilitarization have been with respect to:

 

(i) The number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period; and

 

(ii) The functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces under subparagraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.

 

Number and character of forces to be retained at the end of demilitarization

 

Pakistan considers that after the processes outlined in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's truce proposals of 16 July 1952 have been carried out, there should remain on each side of the cease-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of the cease-fire line.

 

The UNCIP resolutions contemplated the retention of some armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line for the purposes specified above. The character of the forces must, obviously, be the same on both sides of the cease-fire line.

 

Final disposal of forces

 

The term "final disposal of forces" was used by the UNCIP both in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of its resolution of 5 January 1949 with respect to Indian and State armed forces, and in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the same resolution in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces. It could only mean the same thing in both cases. The Vice-Chairman of the Commission informed the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 that the object of paragraph 4 of the Commission's draft proposals on 11 December 1948 (which subsequently became the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949) was "to ensure a large scale reduction and disarmament, the exact scope of which will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the authorities concerned" (see appendix to annex 5 to UNCIP's second report, document S/1196). The term "final disposal" therefore covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as well as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it is contended that "final disposal" means only the location or stationing of forces, then there is, by the same token, no provision in the UNCIP resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces either.

 

Induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator

 

Second in importance only to the question of demilitarization is the date by which the Plebiscite Administrator will be inducted into office Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian Army have withdrawn. The United Nations Representative's proposal that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarization programme represents a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as a part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative.

 

United Nations surveillance over "local authorities"

 

Paragraph 3 of section A of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that "pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission".

 

In its letter dated 3 September 1948, the Commission defined the "evacuated territory" to mean "those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command". (UNCIP's first report, document S/1100, paragraph 90.) As a result of the demarcation of the cease-fire line all territories. situated on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be regarded as "evacuated territory".

 

The United Nations Commission told the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that by the term "local authorities" it meant the Azad Kashmir Government, though the Commission could not accord de jure recognition to a revolutionary. authority such as the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission also gave the assurance that no official of the Government of India, or of the Maharaja's Government, would be permitted to enter the evacuated territory. (Vide UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held on 31 August 1948.)

 

As regards the term "surveillance," the UNCIP said that it meant neither supervision nor control. The Chairman of the Commission explained that "all the Commission had wanted was to find a definition for something which would release the Commission from taking too heavy responsibilities on its shoulders. The word "surveillance" was chosen as the mildest expression for something which would not imply spontaneous control or interference with the local authorities unless the truce is violated." (Vide UNCIP's summary record of the meeting held on 2 September 1948.) The Commission also agreed that its surveillance would not extend to Gilgit.

 

The Pakistan delegation took note of the United Nations Representative's statement on 2 September 1952 that he understood the term "local authorities" to mean "the persons there who exercise effective authority" and that as regards "surveillance" over the local authorities the United Nations Representatives would seek to exercise it through the appointment of civil and military observers.

 

United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 16 July, 2 September and 4 September 1952

 

Pakistan's views on the main issues discussed at the Geneva Conference have been summarized in the preceding paragraphs. The following additional comments are offered concerning the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 16 July, 2 September and 4 September 1952.

 

(i) Proposals of 16 July 1952 [annex 3]

 

There is no warrant in the UNCIP resolutions for the appointment of "neutral" officers in command of the reduced Azad Kashmir Forces. This proposal is also inherently unworkable. There is no shortage of suitable local officers to command the reduced Azad Kashmir Forces.

 

Paragraph 12 of the truce proposals enables the United Nations Representative to determine final points of difference relating to technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed demilitarization programme. This is not enough. Sub-paragraph 2(a) of the Security Council's resolution of 14 March 1950 [S/1461] authorized the United Nations Representative to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization. There should be a similar provision in the truce agreement. The experience of the last four years underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving deadlocks that might arise.

 

Subject to the preceding observations, Pakistan was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952 as explained and clarified in Mr. Graham's statement of that date [annex 2].

 

(ii) Proposals of 2 September 1952 [annex 7]

 

Pakistan considers that the United Nations Representative's proposal that at the end of the demilitarization programme contemplated in paragraph 7 of the proposals, there should remain an armed force of 18,000 (exclusive of 6,000 Militia) on the Indian side, and an armed force of 6,000 (exclusive of 3,500 Scouts) on the Pakistan side leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before partition, the Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative (8,000 as against 33,500).

 

The ratio of forces proposed is also unfair to Pakistan, considering that the ratio on the date of the cease-fire was 5:4 in India's favour according to the Government of Pakistan, and 7:5 according to General Jacob Devers, the Military Adviser to the United Nations Representative.

 

Subject to the above observations, the Pakistan delegation. was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's truce proposals of 2 September.

 

(iii) Proposals of 4 September [annex 8]

 

Pakistan fully agreed with the United Nations Representative that every effort should be made at the Conference itself to agree on the number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme. Failing this, the Conference should at least agree on the guiding principles for determining the number and character of forces.

 

The Pakistan delegation felt that the words "with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub-paragraph. 7 (a) (i) and the phrase "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the draft proposals should be deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the recurrence in the Military Sub-Committee of the political controversies which had held up progress in the main Conference itself. If this proposal had been accepted, Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction of forces under sub-paragraphs

4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the disposition of all remaining forces by the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the respective authorities, and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

 

Subject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 September 1952.