10091952--259 Memorandum transmitted to the United Nations Representative on 11 September 1952 by the representative of India, giving a resume of India s views concerning issues discussed at the Geneva Conference from 26 August to 10 September 1952
10091952--259 Memorandum transmitted to the United Nations Representative on 11 September 1952 by the representative of India, giving a resume of India s views concerning issues discussed at the Geneva Conference from 26 August to 10 September 1952
1. Character and quantum of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line
(1) The position of the Government of India as regards its own forces is as follows:
(a) According to paragraph 4 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India must have the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities, i.e., the Jammu and Kashmir Government, on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in the maintenance of law and order; this term, according to the Commission, includes adequate defence.
(b) Under subparagraph 4(a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the disposal of India and State armed forces on our side has to be with due regard to security, which in its connotation has a wider significance than law and order.
(c) The Government of India is constitutionally responsible for the defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which includes aid to the civil power.
(d) Having regard to these commitments of internal and external security, the responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free to locate its forces as its likes within its own borders, which for some length are common with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India considers that a minimum force of 28,000 is required.
(e) However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlement, it is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000, but it is impossible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000.
(f) The Government of India will in no circumstances be prepared to include the Militia in these calculations. The Militia is a special armed police force which is under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the period of emergency, under the operational control of the Indian Army.
(II) The position of the Government of India as regards forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line is as follows:
(a) The Azad Kashmir forces and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts have been newly raised or greatly augmented during the period of Pakistan's aggression. This has been done in violation of the Commission's assurance that Pakistan would not be allowed to consolidate its position to the disadvantage of the State. They are administratively or/and operationally under the control and direction of the Pakistan High Command. For these reasons they are indistinguishable from the Pakistan regular troops and must be disbanded and disarmed. This is necessary not only to honour the assurances given but also to restore peaceful and normal conditions in, and to facilitate the return of the refugees to this area.
(b) The administration of this area would under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities, under the same resolution, only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only. of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entered only with a civil armed force.
(c) The Government of India considers that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side considering the pre-aggression strength of similar forces policing this area. However, they would be prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the northern areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate.
(d) Having regard to the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Government of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable readjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this force.
(e) The civil armed force should be under neutral and local officers.
2. Induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator
The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function only after (1) the process of demilitarization is completed and the United Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided that it is completed according to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization is fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition.
3. The functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces so set forth in sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.
The Government of India contends that both under the two United Nations resolutions read together and according to the understandings with the Commission, the term "final disposal" in sub-paragraph 4 (a) means only disposition. This is evident from the fact that the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 speaks of minimum forces required to assist the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, which the Commission itself has interpreted to include adequate defence. The Government of India considers that it can never be contemplated that as a result of any subsequent reduction forces should be reduced to below the minimum. The Commission has never used the term "reduction" or "withdrawal" of Indian forces with reference to sub-paragraph 4 (a); it has, on the other hand, always insisted that sub paragraph 4 (b) contemplated disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces and other armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. This distinction was made by the Commission with reference to a difficulty of its own creation by giving an assurance to the Pakistan Government, without the knowledge of the Government of India, that it did not contemplate the disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces at the stage of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution. Moreover, once it is accepted in principle that demilitarization contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single continuous process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State is possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore if the element of reduction or withdrawal of forces at the plebiscite stage, according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, is brought on to the demilitarization stage, the process of demilitarization must be deemed to have exhausted itself and the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator can at that stage deal only with the question of disposition.
4. Principles for the determination of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line
The Government of India considers the principles. enumerated in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) of Mr. Graham's proposals of 4 September 1952, were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for the evolution of a suitable definition of functions of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line they contained the germs of a settlement but despite several efforts to evolve a suitable draft in terms of the language used in the Commission's resolutions no understanding could be reached with the Pakistan Government. Since the evolution of such principles is basic to the question of the character and quantum of forces, the Government of India would point out that while the Commission's resolutions acknowledge its responsibility in this respect in specific broad terms, the use of the term "local authorities'', the provision for the surveillance of the United Nations Commission, and the fact that these local authorities have to carry on the mere administration of this area leave no doubt whatsoever that their law and order responsibilities are of a purely local character. The Government of India cannot accept any equation of its responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree to anything more than a local character to the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. It would observe that constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. This is the only position consistent with the assurance given and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition of the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India.