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चैत्र कृष्ण पक्ष, शुक्रवार, चर्तुथी

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21021957 .....3 Mr. Gunnar Jarring Report 1957


21021957 .....3 Mr. Gunnar Jarring Report 1957

 

 

On 21 February 1957, at its 774th meeting, the Security Council adopted a resolution [S/3793] by which it requested its President for the month of February 1957, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which, in his opinion, were likely to contribute towards the settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. He was further requested to visit the subcontinent for this purpose and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957.

 

In pursuance of this resolution I proceeded to the sub continent. I arrived in Karachi on 14 March 1957.

 

Discussions were held with the Government of Pakistan from 15 to 20 March, and again between 2 and 5 April; with the Government of India between 24 and 28 March and again between 6 and 9 April. Before departing from the sub continent another conversation with the Government of Pakistan took place on 10 April. I departed from Karachi on 11 April.

 

The principal participants in these discussions were Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Mr. M. S.A. Baig, Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Din Mohammed, Adviser on Kashmir Affairs. The Government of India was represented by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Minister without Portfolio, Shri NR. Pillai, Secretary-General of the Ministry for External

 

Affairs, and Shri M. J. Desai Commonwealth Secretary. In accordance with the first operative part of the Council's resolution, conversations were held exclusively with the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan. It is a pleasure for me to report that the cooperation of the two Governments, envisaged in the second operative part of the Security Council resolution, has been complete in all respects. Our conversations took place in an atmosphere of complete frankness and cordiality.

 

In pursuance of the third operative paragraph of the resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations placed at my disposal the services of Mr. T. F. Engers of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, and Miss H. Platz of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. I also wish to acknowledge valuable information received from the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.

 

II

 

During the last debate in the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan had stated that his country recognized, "no international obligations with regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, except those it has voluntarily accepted... in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949". [761st meeting, para. 115.] For his part the representative of India declared that these two resolutions were the only ones which bound his Government. [763rd meeting, para. 77.]

 

In view of these declarations I felt it appropriate to explore what was impeding the full implementation of these resolutions. My efforts were, therefore, from the beginning directed towards the finding of a solution for the problems that had arisen in connexion with these two resolutions.

 

The resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196 para 15] envisages the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. On exploring this question of a plebiscite I was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite.

 

I therefore felt it incumbent on me to devise ways and means by which these difficulties could be met or at least be substantially mitigated.

 

Consequently, I made a number of suggestions to this end to both Governments which, for different reasons, however, did not prove to be mutually acceptable.

 

During our conversations the Government of India laid particular emphasis on the fact that, in its view, two factors stood in the way of the implementation of the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The first of these was that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75]. and in particular paragraphs B and E, had, in the Indian view, not been implemented by the Government of Pakistan. For that reason, it was, in the Indian Government's submission, premature to discuss the implementation of parts II and III of that resolution, or of the resolution of 5 January 1949. The second of these impediments, which concerned rather part II of the first resolution, was that the Government of India, which had brought the case before the Security Council on 1 January 1948, felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question of what, in the Indian view, was aggression committed by Pakistan on India. In the Indian Government's view, it was incumbent on the Council to express itself on this question and equally incumbent on Pakistan "to vacate the aggression". It was argued that prior to the fulfilment of these requirements on the part of the Security Council and on the part of Pakistan the commitments of India under the resolution of 13 August 1948 could not reach the operative stage.

 

I explained to the Government of India that the Security Council had properly taken cognizance of the original Indian complaint, and that it was not for me to express myself on the question whether its resolutions on the matter had been adequate or not. I pointed out that regardless of the merits of the present position taken by the Government of India, it could not be overlooked that India had accepted the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan.

 

The Government of Pakistan for part, in conversations with me maintained that it had implemented part I of the first resolution in good faith and in full, and that the time had come to proceed to the implementation of part II.

 

Under the circumstances I decided that it might be appropriate to approach first the question of the implementation of part I of the first resolution as I had been given to understand that this was the primary impediment to the implementation of the resolutions. It was my impression that in the presentation of its views substantial weight was given by the Government of India to the absence of "an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations" as envisaged in paragraph E of that part of the first resolution. Another point which was repeatedly stressed by the Government of India, that the military status quo envisaged in paragraph B of the same part did, in its view, not obtain

 

owing to the policies pursued by the Government of Pakistan. In order to break the deadlock concerning part I, I inquired of the two Governments if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part I had been implemented or not to arbitration. In substance my suggestion to the two Governments did not envisage simple arbitration, but the arbitrator or arbitrators would also be empowered, in case they found that the implementation had been incomplete, to indicate to the parties which measures should be taken to arrive at a full implementation. It was also envisaged that in the latter case after a given time-limit the arbitrator or arbitrators would determine whether the given indications had been followed and implementation did obtain.

 

Being aware of the earlier negative attitude of the Government of India on the question of arbitration with relation to the Kashmir problem as a whole, I made it a point to explain to it that I was not suggesting anything of that nature, and that what I was proposing, while termed arbitration, in all likelihood would be more in the nature of a determination of certain facts which, in the Indian view, were incontrovertible. In addition, the procedure suggested might lead to an improvement in India-Pakistan relations in general, a development which I assumed could not be unwelcome to either of the two countries.

 

While the Government of Pakistan, after a certain hesitation, fell in with my suggestion in principle, the Government of India, however, did not feel that arbitration, outlined by me, would be appropriate. It explained that, while it was not against the principle of arbitration as a method of conciliation and had indeed, agreed to this procedure to arrive at a solution of certain other problems outstanding between India and Pakistan, it felt that the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration because such procedure would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory. It was, furthermore, apprehensive that arbitration even on an isolated part of the resolutions might be interpreted as indicating that Pakistan had a locus standi in the question.

 

III

In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as I have during the period just ended, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connexion with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia.

 

The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change.

 

IV

While I feel unable to report to the Council any concrete proposals which in my opinion, at this time are likely to contribute towards a settlement of the dispute, as I was requested to do under the terms of reference of the Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 [S/3793], my examination of the situation as it obtains at present would indicate that despite the present deadlock, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem In this connexion the Council may wish to take note of expressions of sincere willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in the finding of a peaceful solution, which I received from both Governments.

 

(Source; U N Document No. S/3821).