27031953 . FIFTH GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 27 MARCH 1953)
27031953 . FIFTH GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 27 MARCH 1953)
Introduction
In previous reports and statements to the Security Council, the United Nations Representative has reviewed the background, the content and the steps in the acceptance of the twelve proposals for a plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, first submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951.
This report should be read in connexion with the first LS/2375/Rev. 1] second [S/2448], third [S/2611] and fourth [S/2783] reports of the United Nations Representative.
We shall in this report not review again the twelve proposals as a whole but shall concentrate on proposal seven. Differences over proposal seven continue on two issues (1) the number and (2) the character of the forces to be left on the two sides of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. In his efforts to assist the two Governments to reach an agreement the United Nations Representative has made six suggestions for the negotiation of the parties, including the latest exploratory suggestions made in Geneva. In reviewing these suggestions and the present situation the report will be in five parts.
Part I will review the suggestions regarding proposal seven; part II will point out the values of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office at an early fixed time: part III refers to assurances and elucidations regarding the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions; Part IV will summarize the negotiations since the meeting of the Security Council on 23 December 1952 [611th meeting]; and part V will emphasize the importance to the people of the State, the two nations, and the world of an agreement on the Kashmir dispute.
A. THE SUGGESTIONS ON PROPOSAL SEVEN REGARDING THE NUMBER AND CHARACTER OF FORCES
Early in his consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent in July and August 1951, the United Nations Representative found (1) that the Government of India maintained that there should remain in the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan army a civil force; and (2) that the Government of Pakistan maintained that after withdrawals and reductions there should, in general, be a military balance on the respective sides. In an effort to discover whether there were circumstances under which one or the other of these positions could become the basis of an agreement, the United Nations Representative made certain suggestions to the two Governments as a basis for their negotiation.
The first proposals were made on 7 September 1951.
Proposal seven read as follows:
Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:
"(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line :
"(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn ;
"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and
"(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the
Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.
"(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:
"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn :
"(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in (b) (i) above will have been carried out; "so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of......civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of......"
In response to this proposal, the Prime Minister of India, on 11 September 1951, stated inter alia :
"......the Government of India will retain on its side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each, at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of that period. Thus much more than the bulk of Indian forces in the State' will have been withdrawn, and I with to emphasize that the forces left behind will be wholly adequate to resist any large-scale aggression. Effective measures to prevent such aggression will, it is presumed, be taken by Pakistan."
The Prime Minister of India in the same letter further stated:
"As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000 organized, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in item C of the memorandum transmitted to Mr. Lozano under cover of letter No. 248-PASG 49 dated 13 April 1949, by their
Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Prime Minister of Pakistan on 12 September 1951 stated, inter alia, that his Government
......considers that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragraph 7. These figures are based on a careful consideration of all relevant factors such as area, terrain, size and distribution of population on the two sides of the cease-fire line.
"The Pakistan Government is, however, of the view that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strengthor description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached." In his statement to the Security Council on 17 January 1952 [570th meeting), the United Nations Representative summarized the positions of the two Governments as follows: "
.....it should be noted that, as a result of these informal exploratory discussions at military level, India agreed to with draw an additional 7,000 of its armed forces. This would bring the Indian and State armed forces down to 21,000 (exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000) which with the other reductions already made it seems would make a total reduction of over 75 per cent of the number of India and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.
"The representative of Pakistan indicated that any proportionate reduction, however, heavy, would be matched on the Pakistan-Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line as an interdependent part of a continuous process in the proposed programme of demilitarization.
The official replies of India and Pakistan to the basic questions asked by the United Nations representative made formal the wide differences between the two Governments on the most basic questions.
"With the additional reduction of 7,000 armed forces, India held the position that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be on the Indian side of the line 21,000 Indian and State armed forces, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000 and there should be on the other side of the line a civil armed force of 2,000 and an unarmed civil force of 2,000, half of whom were not to be followers of Azad Kashmir, as specified above.
"Pakistan maintained that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be approximately 4,000 armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, but for the sake of agreement would accept a slight disparity in favour of India.
"The wide difference in the number of armed forces proposed by the two Governments to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization made it clear that no agreement could be reached on proposal 7 at this time."
In his second report the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the parties that proposal seven should be revised to provide that at the end of the demilitarization period:
......there will remain on each side of the ceasefire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion. on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949" [S/2448, para. 32].
Following this proposal a wide difference in the positions of the two Governments on proposal seven still persisted regarding the number and character of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization.
In view of the continuing differences between the two Governments, the United Nations Representative believed it might be useful if he made suggestions on numbers for the consideration of the parties in their negotiations.
In July 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the two Governments that they attempt to agree on figures within the brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan Army, and Indian Army forces of 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side. These figures did not include either the 3,530 Gilgit and Northern Scouts in the evacuated territory or the 6,000 State Militia on the Indian side.
In the Geneva conference in September 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested the definite figures of 6,000 and 18,000 for the respective sides, exclusive of the Scouts and the State Militia. This suggestion was followed by the suggestion that criteria be established by which definite figures might be agreed upon at a military conference to be held after the signing of a truce agreement.
No agreement having been reached between Governments at the Geneva Conference or during the meetings of the Security Council held in October, November and 1952, the United Nations Representative, in the conference held in Geneva in February 1953, referred to in part IV below, suggested that the Governments consider for discussion the proposal mentioned therein. the two
While during the negotiations on paragraph seven there has been some narrowing of the gap between the positions. of the two Governments on the question of the number and character of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, a substantial difference in position still remains.
B. THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE,
AS A MEDIATOR, HAS MADE A SERIES OF SUGGESTIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BASIS CAN BE FOUND FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE CHARACTER AND NUMBER OF FORCES
The United Nation Representative makes no preferential brief for the lower figures of 3,000 to 12,000 or the higher figures of 6,000 to 21,000. As a mediator whose responsibility has been to keep striving for an agreement he has hoped that a basis for the negotiation of an agreement might be found. He hoped, for example, that the figures 6,000 and 18,000 with the accompanying provisions would be found adequate for fulfilling the respective functions: in the evacuated territory, of preserving law order and the cease-fire line from violations; and on the Indian side of the line, of preserving law and order and the cease-fire line from violations, including meeting the needs in relation to defence.
In the belief that there will be no deliberate and responsible violation of the cease-fire line from either side, it is nevertheless important that there be alertness on both sides of the line against the possibility of attempted violation by any possible irresponsible elements. It appears obvious that India under the two resolutions has some larger responsibilities on her side of the cease-fire Line than the local authorities have in the evacuated territory on the other side of the cease-fire line.
Without recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State, it also appears obvious, by the nature of the cease-fire line and the temporary exercise of the necessary and useful functions of the local authorities, that (with the withdrawal of the tribes men and of Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and with the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and authority and the large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces) there should be in the evacuated territory effective local authorities and effective armed forces. In the "Azad Kashmir '' territory these armed forces would be organized out of the remainder of the Azad Kashmir forces without armour or artillery, and thereafter would be commanded by local officers under the local authorities, under the surveillance of the United Nations.
Proposal seven takes on much added significance because agreement on it would prepare the way for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office at a definite time as provided in proposal ten of the twelve proposals.
II
The importance of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office
It is timely that, with all our necessary concern over the issue of the number and character of the forces, we reorient this concern in the framework of the larger meaning of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator provided for in proposal ten.
Proposal ten has been accepted by Pakistan. India's acceptance of proposal ten is conditioned as set forth in annex V, paragraph 2, of the fourth report of the United Nations
Representative [S/2683]. The difference over definite numbers, important as it is, looms less larger than the difference between induction and not inducting the Plebiscite Administrator into office. The transformation in the situation which comes from the simple fact of his induction into office is most important for the great objective of the self-determination of the State under the agreements between the two Governments. The cooperation of the appropriate authorities and agencies in the State, and the specified responsibilities of the Plebiscite Administrator all contribute to this objective. Facilitation of demilitarization gets much of its importance from the fact that it is a preliminary step in the facilitation of the plebiscite. Facilitation of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator becomes an expression of the will to have a plebiscite.
The large values which would result from the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator may be recalled by reviewing the provisions of the 5 January 1949 resolution.
In connexion with the importance of the number of armed forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization and the importance of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, we should bear in mind the importance of the later consideration of where the armed forces would be at the time of the preparation and holding of the plebiscite.
Without anticipating the specified consultations of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with the appropriate authorities and without prejudice to the meaning of the words "final disposal", proposal eleven of the twelve proposals provides :
"11. Agree that the completion of the programme of demilitarization referred to in the provisional clause below will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution" [Annex II to this report].