Kashmiri Bhatta

19091952 . FOURTH GRAHAM REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 19 September 1952)

19091952 . FOURTH GRAHAM REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 19 September 1952)

Introduction

In accordance with his letters of 29 May and 30 July 1952 to the President of the Security Council [S/2649 and S/2727] the United Nations Representative for Indian and Pakistan wishes to inform the Security Council regarding (a) negotiations carried out in agreement with the Governments of India and Pakistan from 29 May to 16 July 1952 in New York, and (b) the Conference held at ministerial level from 26 August to 10 September 1952 in Geneva.

This report should be read in connexion with the first, second and third reports of the United Nations Representative. This report is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the negotiations that were held in New York in United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 16 July 1952. Part II deals with the Conference held in Geneva in the European Office of the United Nations, from 26 August to 10 September 1952,

Part III

sets forth certain conclusions. The United Nations Representative has been assisted during the negotiations and the Conference by the following staff:

Mr. Miguel A. Marin, Principal Secretary;

General Jacob L. Devers, Military Adviser ;

Mr. Elmore Jackson, Political Affairs Officer, Personal

Assistant to Dr. Graham ; Colonel Joy Dow, Commissioner Aide to the Military

Adviser;

Miss Louise Crawford, Secretary;

Miss Odette Goldmuntz, Secretary;

Miss Barbara Henne, Secretary.

In addition Mr. David Blickenstaff of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General was assigned to assist the mission during the Conference in Geneva.

NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK FROM

29 MAY TO 16 JULY 1952

These negotiations were participated in on the part of India by:

Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, Minister, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations ;

Mr. B. Rajan, Adviser ;

Brig Gen. Banerji, Military Adviser

Mr. P.K. Bannerjee. Adviser;

and on the part of Pakistan by:

Professor Ahmed S. Bokhari, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations ;

Mr. M. Ayub, Adviser ;

Lt. Col. Mohammed Iqbal Khan, Military Adviser.

On 29 May 1952 a joint meeting took place under the chairmanship of the United Nations Representative in which he made a statement outlining the procedure he intended to follow (annex 1).

The following points of that statement may be underlined:

(a) The negotiations would proceed under the terms of reference as laid down by the Security Council in the resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1] in connexion with the resolution of 10 November 1951 [S/2392) as well as the debates in the Security Council on the matter.

(b) The negotiations should continue without prejudice to any action that the Security Council might take on the United Nations Representative's third report. He would inform the President of the Security Council of the resumption of negotiations and he would report on the Council. their outcome to the Security

The representatives of India and Pakistan on behalf of their Governments agreed to the procedure outlined by the United Nations Representative, with the reservation on the part of the representative of India that he could not agree that the negotiation should proceed under the terms of the resolution of the Security Council of 30 March 1951, which the Government of India had not been able to accept. Both ; representatives expressed their earnest desire to promote a peaceful settlement of the dispute by negotiation.

The United Nations Representative then invited the representatives of the two Governments to state their position in the light of his third report and suggested that thereafter he would proceed in accordance with the fourth recommendation set forth in that report [S/2611, para. 51]:

"That the United Nations Representative's negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be continued with view to:

"(a) Resolving the main differences on the twelve. proposals, with a special reference to the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; and

"(b) The general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949". The United Nations Representative added that he would, at all times, welcome suggestions from either Government directed towards this end and the solution of the dispute.

During the negotiations, consideration was given to certain terms of military significance used in the twelve proposals and the UNCIP resolutions, about which there had been a

difference in interpretation.

The Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, General Jacob L. Devers, met jointly and separately with the Military Advisers the representatives of India and Pakistan. The following definitions were agreed as representing the points of view of the respective Governments :

1. On the meaning of word "bulk" ;

(a) It does not have a precise military meaning, and

(b) As used in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the twelve proposals and in section B, paragraph 1 of part II of the 13 August resolution, it is interpreted, on the Indian part as referring to the majority of, and on the Pakistan part as referring to most of, the Indian forces.

2. On the meaning of the term "State armed forces":

The term "State armed forces'' referred to in sub paragraph 4 (a) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, as well as En sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the twelve truce proposals is interpreted by India as referring solely to what was, at the time of the acceptance of the 5 January 1949 resolution, the Maharaja's State armed forces. The Government of India states that forces have now been integrated with the India Army for purposes of operational control, but not in regard to internal administrative matters. In the view of the Government of India the term "State armed forces' cannot be interpreted to include the Jammu and Kashmir Militia either today, or at the time of the acceptance of the 5 January 1949 resolution. The phrase "State armed forces'' is interpreted by the Government of Pakistan as referring to the Kashmir State Forces and the Jammu and Kashmir Militia. The Government of Pakistan understands that the Kashmir State Forces and the Jammu and Kashmir Militia are now under the operational control of the Indian Army.

3. On the number of forces on 1 January 1949:

Based on ration returns, the number of combatant forces on 1 January 1949, when the cease-fire took effect, was as follows:

(a) On the Indian side, according to India, 130,000 troops, and

(b) On the Pakistan side, according to Pakistan, 81,000 troops.

No agreement was reached on these respective estimates. During this period, meetings took place Jointly and separately at the representative and advisory level. The course of the negotiations brought the United Nations Representative to the conclusion that the appropriate step was for him to introduce for consideration, in a meeting at ministerial level a new draft of his twelve proposals in which some of the pra graphs were revised in the light of the recent discussions.

To this effect, the United Nations Representative held a joint meeting on 16 July 1952 with the representative of India and Pakistan in which he made a statement [annex 2] and introduced the proposals [annex 3] that he would submit formally at the conference referred to in the statement.

In paragraph 8 of his statement the United Nations. Representative suggested that it would be more useful if his revised proposals were discussed between the representatives of the two countries at ministerial level in such a way that "not only these proposals may be considered, but, if necessary, also the general implementation of the two resolutions together with any suggestions the parties may wish to make". Paragraph 10 suggested the procedure that he would follow. The agenda of the meeting of the conference would be "Implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949".

The Government of India and Pakistan communicated to the United Nations Representative their acceptance of the suggestion for such a conference. Thereafter, Geneva was selected as the place.

CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FROM 26 AUGUST TO

10 SEPTEMBER 1952

The Conference took place in the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva from 26 August to 10 September 1952.

The delegations of India and Pakistan were composed as follows:

ON KASHMIR PROBLEM

India:

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Leader, Minister for Defence, Leader of the Upper House ;

Mr. D. P. Dhar, Adviser, Deputy Minister, Government of Jammu and Kashmir ;

Major General K. S. Thimayya, Military Adviser ;

Mr. V. Shankar, Adviser, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence;

Mr. B. Sharma, Adviser, Principal ; Information Officer

Pakistan:

Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Leader, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. M. Ayub, Secretary-General;

Major General K. M. Sheikh, Senior Military Brigadier Altaf Quadir, Adviser ;

Lt. Colonel M. Iqbal Khan, Adviser.

REVISED PROPOSALS OF 16 JULY AND 2 SEPTEMBER 1952

The Conference may be divided into two different stages. The first stage began with the opening statement by the United Nations Representative [annex 4] and the subsequent discussion of the revised proposals [annex 3]. Paragraph 7 of these proposals suggested brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and an Indian army force of 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. The United Nations Representative suggested that an effort be made to reach agreement within these brackets, on the number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. Joint meetings and separate conversations took place at the representative and advisory level.

As a result of these meetings and conversations, in a joint meeting on 2 September the United Nations Representative submitted a new draft of his proposals [annex 7] suggesting in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) a minimum force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and of 18,000 on the Indian side. The United Nations Representative made it clear that in this draft, as in the draft of 16 July 1952, these figures did not include the Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and the State militia on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

In addition to suggesting definite minimum figures, this draft, in a provisional clause attempted to accommodate the concern expressed during the conversations that the agreement should not come into effect until the programme (schedule of demilitarization had been agreed upon in a subsequent meeting between representatives of India and Pakistan and approved by the two Governments).

On 3 September it appeared that no agreement could be secured on the basis of the figures proposed, either within the brackets suggested for discussion in the 16 July 1952 proposals, or on definite numbers as in the 2 September 1952 proposals.

The position of the two Governments on the main issues as stated by their representatives was set forth in memoranda submitted to the United Nations Representative [annexes 5 and 6] and can be summarized as follows:

(A) Character and quantum of forces to remain on each side of the cease fire line

The character and quantum of forces should be considered in connexion with sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) and paragraph 11 of the revised proposals submitted by the United Nations Representative to the Governments of India and Pakistan on 16 July and 2 September 1952.

Position of India (annex 5]:

(a) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) The Government of India maintains that it is constitutionally responsible for the defence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which includes aid to the civil power;

(ii) According to sub-paragraph 4 (a) of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India must have the minimum que forces required to assist the local authorities, i.e., the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, in the maintenance of law and order. India considers that UNCIP itself interpreted this to include adequate defence. Under subparagraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the disposal of Indian and State armed forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line has to be with due regard to security, which, according to the Government of India, has a wider significance than law and order.

(iii) Having regard to these commitments of internal and external security, the responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which for some length are common with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India considers that a minimum force of 28,000 is required.

(iv) However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlement, it is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000 but it is impossible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000. The Government of India will under no circumstances be prepared to include the militia in these calculations. The militia is a special armed police force which is under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the period of emergency, under the operational control of the Indian Army.

(b) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) The Government of India maintains that the administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of Part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1949, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force.

(ii) The Government of India considers that a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side, considering the pre-aggression strength of forces policing this area. However, it would be

prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the Northern Areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate.

(iii) Having regard to the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Government of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable re-adjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this force. (iv) The civil armed force should be neutral. and local officers.

Position of Pakistan [annex 6]:

(i) The Government of Pakistan maintains that security on each side of the cease-fire line has to be ensured. and neither side should be able to steal a march against the other, but the overriding consideration is that neither India nor Pakistan should be placed in a position to intimidate the population and influence their vote in the plebiscite. India cannot be the sole judge of the steps needed to ensure the security of the State. During the plebiscite stage, the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in accordance with the 5 January 1949 UNCIP resolution, have the right to determine, in consultation with the authorities concerned, the final disposal of all the forces remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, "such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite".

(ii) The Government of Pakistan considers that after the processes outlined in clause 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952 (annex 3] have been carried out, there should remain on each side of the cease-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of the cease-fire line. The character of the forces must be the same on both sides of the cease-fire line.

(iii) In regard to the figures established by the United Nations Representative in clause 7 of his proposals of 2 September 1952 [annex 7], the Government of Pakistan considers that it leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before partition, they add, the Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative-8,000 as against 33,500. The ratio of the forces proposed is also unfair to Pakistan considering the ratio on the date of the cease-fire.

(iv) Subject to these observations, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the proposals of 2 September 1952 of the United Nations Representative.

(B) Final disposal of forces

Connected with the character and quantum of forces is the question of the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set out in sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

Position of India [annex 5]:

The Government of India contends that the term "final disposal" in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 means only disposition. Moreover, once it I accepted in principle that the demilitarization contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single continuous process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State is possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the matter of the reduction or withdrawal of forces at the plebiscite stage (according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949) is brought into the demilitarization stage, the process of demilitarization must be deemed to have exhausted itself and the United Nations. Representatives and the Plebiscite Administrator can, in the plebiscite stage, deal only with the question of disposition.

Position of Pakistan [annex 6]:

The Government of Pakistan maintains that the term "final disposal" covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as well as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it is contended that "final disposal" means only the location or stationing of the forces then there is by the same token no provision in the UNCIP resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces.

Position of India (annex 5]:

The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function only after (i) the process of demilitarization is completed and the United Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided that it is completed according to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrators would, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization is fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition.

Position of Pakistan [annex 6]:

Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian army have withdrawn. The proposal of the United Nations Representative that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarization programme represents in the opinion of the Government of Pakistan a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative.

DRAFT PROPOSALS OF 4 SEPTEMBER 1952

The second stage of the Conference began on 4 September 1952. The United Nations Representative was faced with the objections of the two Governments to essential parts of his proposals as revised on 16 July and 2 September. As he had stated before, these objections derived mainly from the different conceptions that the Government of India and Pakistan had of their status in the State of Jammu and Kashmir [S/2375, paras. 33-35] as well as the different interpretations that they give to the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. As it was not possible under the circumstances to secure agreement on the minimum forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, the United Nations Representative thought it might be possible for the two Governments to agree on some principles based on the requirements of each side of the cease fire line. These principles could then serve as the criteria for fixing the quantum of forces in the conference of civil and military representatives contemplated in the provisional clause of the revised proposals of 2 September. The United Nations Representative accordingly submitted a new draft proposal [annex 8] in a joint meeting on 4 September 1952. Paragraph 7 of these proposals reads as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

"(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease fire line:

"(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State ;

"(iii) Large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;

"(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

"(i) The bulk of the Indian force in the State will

have been withdrawn; "(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out: so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the

State and the freedom of the plebiscite".

The responses of the representatives of India and Pakistan were as follows:

Position of India [annex 5];

The Government of India considers that the principles enumerated in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) of the proposals of 4 September 1952 were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for the evolution of a suitable definition of functions of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line, they contained the terms of a settlement." The Government of India maintains that it cannot accept any equation of its responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree to anything more than a local character to the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. Constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. India maintains that this is the only position consistent with the assurance given by the Commission and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India.

Position of Pakistan [annex 6]:

The Government of Pakistan fully agreed with the United Nation Representative that every effort should be made at the Geneva Conference itself to agree on the number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme. Failing this, Conference should at least agree on the guiding principles for determining the number and character of forces. The Pakistan delegation felt that the words ``with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite" used in subparagraph 7 (a) (iii) and the phrase "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the draft proposals should be deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the recurrence in the Military Sub-Committee of the political controversies which had held up progress in the main Conference itself. If this proposals had been accepted, Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction of forces under paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the January 1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the disposition of all remaining forces by the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the respective authorities, and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

Subject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 September 1952.

The revised proposals of 4 September were agreed upon by the representatives of India and Pakistan to the following extent:

(i) Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, (a) (ii), 7 (b) (i), 8, 9, 10, 12, and the provisional clause; with the redrafting of paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 as follows:

"5. Agree that the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single continuous process;

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the date on which the programme of demilitarization referred to in paragraph 7 below is approved by the Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period is decided upon by the two Governments;

"9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarization mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line."

(ii) Concerning paragraph 12 the representative of India accepted it with the understanding that the differences referred to the United Nations Representative should be only on technical details referring to the actual implementation of the agreed programme.

(iii) In regard to sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) the remaining difference in position of the representatives has been stated in paragraph 25.

(iv) Paragraph 11 of the proposals was deleted, to be substituted with another one to be agreed upon by the two representative, connected with the definite wording of paragraph 7 and with the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator in accordance with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

III

CONCLUSIONS

In his third report, submitted on 22 April 1952, the United Nations Representative recommended [S/2611, para. 51] that the negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be continued with a view to: T

"(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals, with a special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

"(b) The general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and January 1949."

The agenda of the Geneva Conference was the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The meetings began with the examination of the revised [annex 3] draft proposals of 16 July 1952 and continued with discussion of the subsequent redrafts.

After two weeks of discussion it was evident that agreement could not be reached at this Conference on any of the revised drafts presented for consideration. The positions of the two Governments on the main issues were such that the contemplated examination [annex 2, para. 8] of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolution by resolution and paragraph by paragraph, did not appear to be a useful further line of approach. The possibility envisaged by the United Nations Representative, in his statement of 16 July 1952 [annex 2, para. 8], discussion of any further suggestions that the representatives of the two Governments might wish to make did not arise during the Conference and no alternative suggestions were made.

The United Nations Representative on his part, has limited himself to carrying out his mediatory functions under the terms of reference given him by the Security Council.

The Security Council is familiar with the dispute between India and Pakistan on the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It has been before the Security Council since January 1948. The present positions of the two Governments are derived from their differing conception of their status in the State [S/2375. pasas. 23-36). This more than anything else is the origin of their different interpretations with regard to their commitments.

These conceptions have been stated repeatedly by both Governments during the discussions in the Security Council and during the negotiations with the UNCIP, with General A. G. L. Mc Naughton and with Sir Owen Dixon.

Growing out of the basic difference in the interpretation of the two Governments regarding their status and commitments under the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the UNCIP, is their difference over the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.

Demilitarization, as a condition for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, is but one of the important steps necessary in the preparation for the plebiscite.

The heart of the integrated programme for demilitarization and the plebiscite, is the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. This was made a central part of the twelve proposals, original and revised.

The preparations for, and the holding of, the plebiscite follow upon the induction into office follows upon the solution of the crucial problem of the character and number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. For the solution of this problem the United Nations Representative, after submitting brackets of figures within which discussion might proceed, later suggested to the parties in the Geneva Conference definite figures. Then, alternatively, he suggested criteria for establishing definite figures on the basis of the functions and requirements on each side of the cease-fire line.

The present United Nations Representative has been instructed to secure an agreement on a plan of demilitarization under the two resolutions, and, in case of no agreement, to report the remaining differences thereon to the Council. He has made three reports to the Council which have narrowed the problem down to what appears to be the prerequisite for an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, namely, agreement on the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.

The United Nations Representative holds the view that for reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either :

(a) To establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization : or

(b) To declare that the forces to remain on each of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in Provisional Clause of the revised proposals. the

Documents

19091952 . FOURTH GRAHAM REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 19 September 1952)