22041952. THIRD GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 22 April 1952)
22041952. THIRD GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text, 22 April 1952)
Introduction
This report is to inform the Security Council of the manner in which the United Nations Representative has discharged his responsibilities under the resolutions of the Security Council of 30 March and 10 November 1951 [S/2017/ Rev. 1 and S/2392] in connexion with the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 31 January 1952 [572nd meeting, paras. 28-32).
The report is divided into three parts: part I deals with the progress made on the twelve proposals [S/2375/Rev. 1, annex 2] for an agreement on demilitarization; part II sets forth the views of the United Nations Representative on the general problem and his conclusions; part III contains his recommendations. The report is supplementary to the first and second reports of the United Nations Representative.
Part I
TWELVE PROPOSALS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARIZATION
A. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE
At the 572nd meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1952 the President said:
(a) "...he [Mr. Graham) should continue his negotiations in pursuance of his terms of reference under the resolutions of 30 March and 10 November 1951, in order to remove the remaining difficulties which he [Mr. Graham] has described."
(b) "Although we cannot strictly limit the negotiations which, to have every chance of success. must be flexible, I feel I can say that the Council definitely expects to receive a report within two months, that is by 31 March".
These terms of reference given to the United Nations Representative should be considered in connexion with those instructions set forth in the resolution of 30 March 1951 as follows:
"The Security Council
"3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;
"5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report. to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not affected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out;" and with the resolution of the Security Council of 10 November 1951 as follows:
"The Security Council,
"Having received and noted the report of Mr. Frank Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, and having heard Mr. Graham's address to the Council on 18 October 1951 [564th meeting]:
"Noting with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization which could be carried out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan,
"2. Instructs the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
"4. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council on his efforts, together with his views. concerning the problems confided to him, not later than six weeks after this resolution comes into effect".
B. PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE
The United Nations Representative in his statement to the Security Council on 31 January 1952 [572nd meeting, paras, 36 40] indicated that he wished to enter into consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan and the representative of the Government of India, then in Paris, on the procedure for carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to him.
To this end, discussions were held in Paris early in February with the representatives of the two Governments.
The United Nations Representative and his staff left New York on 26 February 1952, arriving in New Delhi on 29 February. He and his staff left the subcontinent on 25 March to report to the Security Council.
The United Nations Representative and his staff were as follows:
Mr. Frank P. Graham. United NationsR Representative;
Mr. Miguel A. Marin, Principal Secretary, (Department of Security Council Affairs);
General Jacob L, Devers, Military Adviser. Mr. J. F. Engers, Political Officer (Department of Security Council Affairs);
Colonel Joy Dow, Liaison Officer ;
Mr. Elmore Jackson, Personal Assistant to the United Nations Representative;
Miss Louise A. Crawford, Secretary (Administrative and Financial Services);
Miss Mary Robertson, Secretary (Department of Public Information).
In order to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in removing the remaining difficulties described in his second report [S/2448, paras. 30-32], the United Nations Representative continued, during this four-week period, his previous procedure of separate negotiations with the parties.
The possibility was also envisaged of having representatives of the two Governments, at a level to be decided, meet together with the United Nations Representative, but after careful consideration it was concluded that the meeting was not advisable until sufficient preliminary agreement had been reached as to ensure positive results from such a joint conference.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN QUESTIONS
(1) Progress under the twelve proposals
In his first report [S/2375/Rev. 1, paras. 49-50] the United Nations Representative informed the Security Council of the agreement of the Government of India and Pakistan on the first four paragraphs of the twelve proposals, which read as follows:
"The Governments of India and Pakistan:
"1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
"2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organizations radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
"3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949;
"4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices.
of the United Nations". In the second report [S/2448, paras. 27-28] the agreement of the two Governments on four more of the proposals was reported, namely,
"8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above;
"9. Agree that representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Government, assisted by their military advisers, will meet, under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw up a programme of demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above;
"11. Agree that the completion of the programme of demilitarization referred to in paragraph 9 above will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution:
"12 Agree that differences regarding the programme of demilitarization contemplated in paragraph 9 above will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, to the United Nations Representative, whose decision shall be final.
In the second report the United Nations Representative informed the Security Council that the four basic paragraphs on which agreement between the parties had not been reached were paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the twelve proposals [S/2448, pras. 29-30]. The United Nations Representative, as a basis for an approach to the chief remaining difficulties, revised and completed paragraphs 6 and 7 of the proposals and redrafted them in the way they appear in his second report [S/2448, para. 32). Therefore, the four basic proposals on which agreement between the parties had not been reached at moment of the submission of the second report on 19 December 1951 were as follows:
"5.Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single: continuous process;
"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed on 15 July 1952, unless another date is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9 ;
"7.Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:
"(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease fire line:
"(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not. normally resident who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State; and
"(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place. "(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:
"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;
"(ii) Further withdrawals or reduction, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out, so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949;
"10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;"
(2) Clarifications
In his proposals of 7 September 1951, revised and redrafted as indicated above (para. 13), the United Nations Representative stated [S/2375/Rev.1, paras. 51-53]:
(a) That the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single, continuous process (paragraph 5 of the proposals).
The United Nations Representative said in his first report [S/2375/Rev.1, para. 56] that agreement that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in single continuous process, implied, in his opinion, the implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, together with subparagraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution as a whole, and would lead to the following consequences :
(i) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops would be withdrawn as provided in section A, paragraphs 1 and 2 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1943, and the Azaa Kashmir forces would be disbanded and disarmed as provided in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.
(ii) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line, the bulk of the Indian forces would be withdrawn as provided in section B, paragraph 1 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces would take place as provided in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.
(iii) The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed to office at some stage during the period of demilitarization, inasmuch as the resolution of 5 January 1949 conferred upon him certain responsibilities with respect to the implementation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of that resolution.
(b) That the process of demilitarization "should be completed on 15 July 1952, unless another date was decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9" (redrafted paragraph 6 of the proposals).
The date 15 July 1952 was based on the premise that the weather would permit easier withdrawals of the troops on the Indian side of the cease-fire line at the end of the spring and the beginning of the summer.
(c) That, as provided in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the proposals, "further withdrawals or reductions, as the case might be, of the Indian and State armed forces... will have been carried out."
The United Nations Representative had been requested to give his understanding of the term "State armed forces". In the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 no mention is made of "State armed forces". The term appears in sub paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.
The United Nations Representative believes that the term "State armed forces" is one which must be given careful consideration in preparation for the carrying out by the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator of their responsibilities under sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949.
(d) That on the date (15 July 1952) referred to in paragraph 6 of the proposals there would remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces, based in proportion to the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949.
After this suggestion was made, the United Nations Representative found such a wide difference of position still remaining between the two Governments on the issue of the quantum of forces that, without prejudice to further negotiations on this question, and as a practical matter, another approach to this problem should be explored.
(e) That the completion of the programme of demilitarization would be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.
The United Nations Representative has been requested to give his understanding of the expression "final disposal" of forces. Sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution confer upon the Plebiscite Administrator certain responsibilities with respect to their implementation It would therefore be premature for the United Nations Representative. without consulting the Plebiscite Administrator and without having further discussions with the two Governments, to give an opinion on this matter.
During the negotiations a reference was made to the powers of the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the "final disposal" of forces referred to in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949. This is a matter that enters into the general question of the powers that the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir and it has already been a subject of discussion between the UNCIP and the Governments of India and Pakistan. The United Nations Representative does not deem it appropriate at this moment to enter into discussions on the subject.
In general, the United Nations Representative would like to remind the Security Council that in his first report [S/2375/Rev. 1, para, 54] he emphasized that the practical details of a programme of demilitarization could best be taken up in a meeting, held under the auspices of the United Nations, between representatives of the two Governments assisted by their military advisers, once agreement had been reached on the broad principles.
D. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN MARCH 1952
(1) On the remaining differences concerning the twelve proposals
In his statements to the Security Council on 17 and 31 January 1952 [570th and 572nd meetings], the United Nations Representatives emphasized that in order to obtain demilitarization, an agreed solution should be found for the following:
(a) A definite period for demilitarization;
(b) The scope of demilitarization;
(c) The quantum of forces that would remain at the end. of the period of demilitarization; and (d) The date for the formal induction into office of the
Plebiscite Administrator. Following the meeting of the Security Council of 31 January 1952, the United Nations Representative, in discharging the duties conferred upon him by the Security Council, had in mind two purposes :
(a) To assist the parties in removing the remaining described difficulties in an effort to reach an agreement on the twelve proposals, and
(b) Without prejudice to the above, to obtain, if possible, further withdrawals from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on both sides of the cease-fire line.
Concerning the four basic proposals on which agreement between the parties had not been reached, the United Nations Representative, in his conversations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in New Delhi and Karachi in March 1952, ascertained the then present points of view of the two Governments, and gives his understanding of their position as follows:
Position of India
Forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line :
(a) The Government of India maintains its position concerning the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, i.e. :
On the Indian side: 21,000 regular Indian Army forces, plus 6,000 State Militia:
On the Pakistan side: A force of 4,000 men consisting of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir.
(b) The Government of India also stated that, should the situation be favourable, it would be ready, at the end of the period of demilitarization, to enter into consultations with the Plebiscite Administrator and with the United Nations Representative to consider a further reduction of forces on the Indian side.
Period and scope of demilitarization and induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator:
(c) of the three other principal points of difference emerging from the second report of the United Nations Representative, the Government of India considers that two, namely, a definite period for demilitarization and the date for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, can be settled without difficulty, provided agreement is reached on the scope of demilitarization and the quantum of forces that would remain at the end of the period of demilitarization.
Position of Pakistan
Period of demilitarization:
(a) Pakistan agrees that the demilitarization programme envisaged by the United Nations Representative should be completed not later than 15 July 1952. Scope of demilitarization:
(b) Pakistan insists that the demilitarization programme That should embrace all the armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir without exception, namely, the Pakistan Army, the Azad Kashmir forces, the Indian Army, the State Army and the State Militia. (The tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers are stated to have already withdrawn from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line.)
Quantum of forces :
(c) Pakistan agrees that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should remain on each side of the cease-fire line "the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion to the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January, 1949".
Induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator:
(d) Pakistan agrees that the Plebiscite Administrator should be inducted into office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in (a) above.
(2) On the withdrawal of troops
Concerning withdrawals of troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations Representative is able to report the following:
(a) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:
The Government of India has agreed to withdraw unconditionally and without prejudice to the negotiations. concerning proposals for demilitarization submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan, one division with supporting arms, from its side of the cease-fire line in the State. of Jammu and Kashmir, which it estimates to be a force of approximately 18,000 men..
(b) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:
The Government of Pakistan contends that the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir were greatly augmented in the summer of 1951, and that even after the withdrawal of one Indian Army division, the strength of the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir would be far in excess of the Pakistan forces in the State.
(3) On related matters
The Security Council will recall that the United Nations Representative said in his first report [S/2375/Rev. 1, paras. 17-20] that the period spent by the Mission on the sub continent in July-September 1951 was a period characterized by the existence of a great tension between the two Governments. He also referred, among other things, to the fact that on 30 June 1951 the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed a communication to the President of the Security Council [S/2225] transmitting a communication from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of India alleging a series of violations by Pakistan of the cease fire line. Also, on 15 July 1951, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, addressed a communication to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General [S/2245 and Corr. I bringing to the notice of the Security Council "that heavy concentrations of Indian Army forces are taking place in East Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. This constitutes a great threat to the security of Pakistan and to international peace". With regard to the present possibility of India and Pakistan making withdrawals of troops from their common frontiers near the borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir the United Nations Representative can now report to the Security Council that:
(a) The Government of India has recently issued orders for withdrawals to distances varying from 70 to 450 miles of those military formations of the Indian Army, which last summer had, at certain points, been moved on Indian territory to within 30 miles of the western Indo-Pakistan border. These withdrawals are in the process of being carried out.
(b) The Government of Pakistan indicated that most of the forces "which it had been compelled" to move to the Indo-Pakistan border during the summer of 1951 had been withdrawn to their "peace-time stations".
Part II
VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE ON THE GENERAL PROBLEM
A. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE UNDER THE 30 MARCH 1951 RESOLUTION
The United Nations Representative derives his terms of reference from the resolution of the Security Council of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev.1] in which the Security Council,
"3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Government of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission of India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949," Of this quoted part of the resolution the words "to effect the demilitarization ... on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1940" should be especially noted.
These two UNCIP resolutions are interdependent. The main purposes of the two resolutions, considered as a whole, were, (a) The cease-fire and preservation of peace; (b) The plebiscite, the question of demilitarization (truce agreement) being on procedure.
20 The main obstacles which the UNCIP and the previous and present United Nations Representatives found in the path of demilitarization centered in the scope of military withdrawals, the synchronization of such withdrawals, and the question of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces.
The United Nations Representative chose the approach embodied in the twelve proposals in order to effect demilitarization in a single, continuous process, and therefore to solve indirectly one of the main obstacles, namely, the synchronization of the withdrawals and the implementation of the principles of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE RESOLUTIONS
Before entering into the details concerning the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, it may perhaps be of assistance to recall the time and circumstances in which the resolutions were adopted.
At the time the resolution of 13 August 1948 was proposed to the Government of India and Pakistan, hostilities were taking place in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The 5 January 1949 resolution, for all practical purposes, was accepted at the end of December 1948. As a consequence, the cease-fire orders were issued which brought the suspension of hostilities, on 1 January 1949.
(1) UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948
(a) Part I
Part I deals with the cease-fire. The primary objective of the UNCIP during the first stage of its activities was to obtain a suspension of hostilities. The cease-fire was agreed upon between the two parties and made effective on 1 January 1949 and, as a completion of this part of the resolution, a cease-fire line was agreed upon between the two Governments under the auspices of the UNCIP in the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. The line was demarcated subsequently on the ground.
Therefore, part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 can be considered implemented.
(b) Part II
Part 11 of the 13 August 1948 resolution, entitled "Truce agreement", outlined the way in which the demilitarization of the State should be carried out. This reads as follows:
"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both governments accept the following principles as a basis for formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.
"A
"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from State of Jammu Council may find it useful to consider part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, in which the basic principles of demilitarization are laid down, in the light of the circumstances as they existed at the end of March 1952.
On the Pakistan side:
Concerning section A. paragraph 1 of II ("Truce agreement"), the present number of armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line is estimated to be less than 50 per cent of the number of armed forces existing on 1 January 1949.
Concerning section A, paragraph 2 of part II, the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting are reported by the Government of Pakistan to have been withdrawn from the State.
On the Indian side:
Concerning section B, paragraph 2 of part II, the present number of armed forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line is estimated to be less than 50 per cent of the number of armed forces existing on 1 January 1949.
From the above it appears that since the resolution of 13 August 1948 was agreed upon, and since the suspension of hostilities came into effect on 1 January 1949, there has been a considerable reduction in the forces on each side of the cease-fire line.
Therefore part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has, to a considerable extent, already been implemented.
(c) Part Itl
Concerning part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, procedure for its implementation has been elaborated in the resolution of 5 January 1949.
(2) UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 The UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 set up the principles for a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. By inference, this resolution contemplates two main stages in connexion with the plebiscite :
(a) the period for the preparation of the plebiscite and
(b) the plebiscite itself.
The first stage requires a preliminary step in which a study should be made of the conditions on each side of the cease-fire line and of the requirements for holding a free and impartial plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Throughout this report and throughout all the negotiations as set forth in the first and second reports of the United Nations Representative, it has been evident that many of the questions dealing with the demilitarization of the State. are closely related to problems affecting the preparation of the plebiscite and with the responsibilities of the Plebiscite Administrator. Among these responsibilities is the final disposal of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
In short, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has now reached a stage in which further consideration will affect the prerequisites for a plebiscite and therefore are inter-related with the responsibilities which the Plebiscite Administrator will one day be called upon to exercise.
It is the firm conviction of the United Nations Representative that besides the question of the final quantum of forces, there are other factors which have a bearing on demilitarization, which need now to be taken into consideration. The United Nations Representative is not at the present time in a position to give a considered statement on all these factors. He feels, however, that with further explorations into the relationships between the last stage of demilitarization and the first stage of preparation for the plebiscite he would perhaps be able to place the question of demilitarization in a perspective which would favour its solution.
Further reductions of troops on each side of the cease fire line are directly related to the preparation of the plebiscite. The United Nations Representative, in addition to having the advice of the civilian and military members of his staff, deems it necessary that the Plebiscite Administrator designate be associated with him in studies and consideration of common problems.
C. CONCLUSIONS
(1) Progress has been made on the twelve proposals
Progress has been made in the acceptance of an increasing number of the twelve proposals for agreement on demilitarization. On 15 October 1951 in his first report, the United Nations Representative reported to the Security Council that the two Governments had accepted four of the twelve proposals. On 19 December 1951, in his second report, he reported to the Security Council that four more of the twelve proposals, or a total of eight, had been accepted by both Governments.
He can now report acceptance, by Pakistan, of the remaining four proposals, with certain qualifications regarding the character of forces to be demilitarized. India maintains that if agreement can be reached on the issues of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, the other two remaining differences (i.e., the period of demilitarization and the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) can be solved without difficulty.
The chief remaining obstacle is the difference over the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.
(2) Progress has been made in demilitarization
(a) Substantial withdrawals of forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir have been made from time to time by both India and Pakistan since the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.
(b) In response to discussions about further withdrawals of military forces from the State, the Government of India has, in addition, decided to withdraw unconditionally one division, with supporting armour. It estimates this to total 18,000 men.
(c) With such withdrawals, it appears that the Governments of India and Pakistan will have both withdrawn over 50 per cent of their forces from the State.
(d) The Government of India has decided to withdraw to distances varying from 70 to 450 miles from the western Indo-Pakistan border, the forces which were moved up near that border last summer.
(e) The withdrawals referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) above are now in process of execution.
(f) The Government of Pakistan has indicated that most of its forces that were moved to the western Indo Pakistan border during the past summer have been withdrawn to their peace-time stations.
(3) Interdependence of the two resolutions
Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution have been connected by the Governments of India and Pakistan and are interdependent on questions of demilitarization. Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and the resolution of 5 January 1949, as a whole, are inter-dependent on requirements relating to the preparation of a plebiscite.
(4) Concerning further procedures
The United Nations Representative should have in mind the considerations set forth in this report. In the future, the United Nations Representative, in addition to the assistance to be provided by his civilian and military advisers, intends to take note of the view of the Plebiscite Administrator-designate on those problems which have a bearing on their common responsibilities. This consultation should be without prejudice to the question of the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator-designate, which should be a result of the further negotiations.
(5) Urgent need of a settlement
The need is urgent for the settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This dispute has been before the Security Council for over four years. More than three years ago the two Governments accepted the 13 August 1948 and the 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. A settlement is important not only for the sake of approximately 4 million people in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but also for the sake of over 400 million people in India and Pakistan, whose peaceful progress is of vital importance for the peoples of the world.
Part III
RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingly, the United Nations Representative recommends :
(1) That, taking notice of the progress made in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through withdrawals of forces from both sides of the cease-fire line, the Governments of India and Pakistan refrain from taking any action which would augment the present military potential of the forces in the State.
(2) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, taking into account their agreements under the UNCIP resolutions and their acceptances under the twelve proposals, should :
(a) Continue their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and to follow faithfully their agreement to instruct their official spokesmen and to urge all their citizens not to make statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir (twelve proposals, paragraphs 1 and 2).
(b) Observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949 (twelve proposals, paragraph 3).
(3) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, as a means of further implementing the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, should undertake by 15 July 1952 further to reduce the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(4) That the United Nations Representative's negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be continued with a view to :
(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals, with special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and (b) The general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.