19121951 (B) SECOND GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text,19 December 1951)
19121951 (B) SECOND GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL (Original Text,19 December 1951)
(a) Introduction
The purpose of this report is to inform the Security Council of the manner in which the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan has carried out his duties in accordance with the Security council resolution of 10 November 1951 [S/2392], in connexion with its resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1].
1. Terms of reference
1. On 10 November 1951, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which
"The Security Council,
"Having received and noted the report of Mr. Frank Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, aed having heard Mr. Graham's address to the Council on 18 October 1951 [564th meeting].
"Noting with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization which could be carried out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.......
"2 Instructs the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir......
"4. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council on his efforts, together with his views concerning the problems confided to him, not later than six weeks after this resolution comes into effect,"
2. These terms of reference given by the Security Council the United Nations Representative should be considered in connexion with those set forth in operative paragraphs 3 and 5 of the resolution of 30 March 1951 as follows:
"The Security Council...
"3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949..
5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not affected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out."
II. Procedure adopted under the resolution of
10 November 1951
3. The resolution of 10 November 1951 noted with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan [S/2375, annex 2], and instructed the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
4. The proposals for a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir are contained in the letter dated 7 September 1951 addressed to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.
5. The procedure adopted by the United Nations Representative was as follows:
(a) To exhaust the possibilities, if any, in endeavouring to reach an agreement between the parties on the proposals of the United Nations Representative contained in the communication of 7 September 1951 :
(b) If the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the proposals, to obtain their detailed plans of demilitarization under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 in order to establish the points of difference in regard to the interpretation and execution of these resolutions which the United Nations Representative considered must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out.
With regard to the first question, that is, to exhaust the possibilities of reaching an agreement under the proposals of the United Nations Representative contained in the communication of 7 September 1951, the United Nations Representative desires to recall to the Council the points of difference between the Governments of India and Pakistan in regard to the draft agreement submitted to them. These points of difference were reported by the United Nations Representative on 15 October 1951 as follows [S/2375, para. 60] :
"(1) Period of demilitarization
"(a) The Government of India greatly doubts whether during the period of ninety days the firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully would have replaced in Pakistan the spirit and temper of war prevailing at the present time.
"(b) The Government of Pakistan agrees that the phase of demilitarization be completed during a period of ninety days, unless another period is decided upon by representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments.
"(2) Withdrawal of troops
"(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when
"(i) The tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State ;
"(ii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.
"(b) It is the view of the Indian Government that further withdrawals and reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the complete withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces cannot be related to the period of ninety days. Both the period during which these further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and quantum, cannot be determined at present.
"(c) The Government of Pakistan agrees to the withdrawals as proposed in the draft agreement, emphasizing that the term "further withdrawals or reductions mentioned in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) refers to a large-scale reduction and disarmament.
"(3) Forces to remain on either side of the ceasefire line
"(a) The Government of India agrees that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon, there should be a force of 4,000 men, consisting of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or "locals" and not by Pakistan officers.
"(b) The Government of India states that there will remain on its side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division (normal) of four brigades of four battalions each.
"(c) The Government of Pakistan maintains that the same consideration should apply to the status of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line.
"(d) The Government of Pakistan considers that a force of no more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme. However, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached.
"(4) Plebiscite Administrator
"(a) The Government of India considers that the proposals concerning the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator should be omitted from the agreement. According to the Indian Government, they would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.
"(b) The Government of Pakistan emphasizes the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible."
From the outset the United Nations Representative emphasized the desirability of concentrating his efforts on endeavouring to narrow the differences of the parties on the two fundamental points outlined in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) above, namely.
(a) The minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and
(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.To this end the United Nations Representative had several meetings with the parties, one jointly, the others separately, and his efforts covered the period that started on 10 November 1951, and finished, practically speaking, with the drafting of this report.
After having ascertained the present position of the parties, the United Nations Representative presented to them on 7 December 1951 the statement and questionnaires which appear as annex 3 to this report. To the Government of India he also addressed a letter [annex 4] requesting the Government's detailed plans for carrying out the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the two UNCIP resolutions.
On 11 December 1951 the Government of Pakistan handed to the United Nations Representative its answers to the questionnaire [annex 5].
The Government of India presented its answers to the questionnaire and to the letter of the United Nations Representative on 14 December 1951 [annex 6].
During the negotiations it was deemed useful that informal conversations be held at a military level. To this end, the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, at separate meetings with the military advisers of the representative of India and with the representative of Pakistan, discussed relevant military matters in a purely exploratory manner. Although in proposal 9 of the United Nations Representative [S/2375, annex 2] it is contemplated that the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments, assisted by their military advisers, would meet, under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw up a programme of demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of that agreement, during the discussions mentioned above, the phasing of the withdrawals of troops was considered, without prejudice to proposal 9 of the draft agreement. These discussions showed that, although agreement might have been reached on the phasing of some of the withdrawals, the differences between the parties on the quantum to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization were essentially the same differences that had previously impeded agreement. On the other hand, as the demilitarization was contemplated in a single, continuous process and as sub paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 conferred upon the Plebiscite Administrator certain functions with respect to the final disposal of forces, the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator at a certain moment in the period of demilitarization was considered necessary. On this basic point also no agreement could be reached. At the end of his informal discussions the military adviser reported to the United Nations Representative on his exploratory talks and his tentative plan of demilitarization.
III. Points of difference between the two Governments
The points of difference of the two Governments in regard to their interpretation and execution of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 remain on the fundamental issues as they appear in the first report of the United Nations Representative [S/2375, paras. 37-44).
Concerning the points of difference between the Governments on the proposals of the United Nations Representative of 7 September 1951, the conversations held by the United Nations Representative with the parties, as well as the answers he has received to the different questions put to them by him, have convinced him that at this stage of the negotiations the parties could not achieve accord on the draft agreement as a whole, submitted to them by the United Nations Representative on 7 September 1951.
As explained above, the United Nations Representative concentrated his efforts on what in his opinion constituted the two fundamental points of difference between the parties with regard to his proposals for agreement, namely,
(a) The minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and
(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.
MINIMUM OF FORCES
In his statement to the parties of 7 December 1951 [ annex 3 ] the United Nations Representative pointed out that
"...the number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator".
In the questionnaires submitted to the parties, the United Nations Representative had in mind that the Government of India had repeatedly stated that the Government of India was responsible for the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and security could not be, made dependent solely on assurances offered, but must be related to the actual conditions prevailing in the area. The United Nations Representative also took into account the fact that in August 1951 the Government of India, in answering a question submitted by the United Nations Representative, had said:
"The expression 'security of the State' referred to in question 9 is intended to connote the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir against incursion of tribesmen, Pakistan nationals and regular Pakistan forces whether acting separately or in concert".
In its answer to the questionnaire the Government of India said [ annex 6 para. 71:
"It should be noticed that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan are over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September" [ 2375, annex 3]. Furthermore, in paragraph 8 of its answer to the questionnaire, the Government of India said:
"The quantum of troops proposed in paragraph 5 above should be compared with the force of about a dozen battalions of infantry plus artillery, cavalry and other protective forces which were maintained by the State of Jammu and Kashmir before the partition of India, when the borders of the State were secured against any external threat by the presence of large garrisons in British India at all the strategic approaches to the State, and when conditions of comparative peace and security prevailed on the sub-continent and in the neighbouring countries. Not only has the State since suffered two invasions, but on some of its frontiers extremely unsettled conditions still prevail. These factors must inevitably influence the strength of the forces now required for its security. It should also be pointed out that any appreciation affecting the security of the territory and the strength of the forces required to ensure it, must remain the responsibility of the Government of India".
The Government of Pakistan maintains that [annex 5, para. 10]
"...a force of no more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan Government is, however, prepared to agree that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in reached". the way of an agreement being reached.
During the discussions at the military level information received indicated that at some stage of the tentative plane of demilitarization the withdrawals of armed forces would amount to a great proportion compared with those that were there on 1 January 1949. However, the disparity between the number and character of the forces proposed by the parties to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization were so wide that any agreement on the whole plan concerned as a single continuous process could not be reached at this stage.
APPOINTMENT OF THE PLEBISCITE ADMINISTRATOR
The opinions of the Government of India and Pakistan concerning the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator were so irreconcilable that the United Nations Representative could not see the possibility of obtaining an agreement at this stage.
The Indian Government insisted that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-fire line, permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite, and that to appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he could function effectively would be premature. On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan emphasized the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.
IV. Views of the United Nations Representative concerning the problem confided to him
The United Nations Representative has endeavoured in the preceding part of his report to present to the Security Council a summary of his efforts to implement the resolution of the Council of 10 November 1951.
In his first report to the Security Council dated 15 October 1951, the United Nations Representative reported that the two Governments had indicated agreement on four of the twelve proposals for an integrated plan of demilitarization submitted to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951 [S/2375, para, 50].
The four proposals on which agreement had been reached were proposals 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The United Nations Representative can now report agreement on four more proposals, namely, proposals 8, 9, 11 and 12.
The representative of India agreed to accept proposal 12 of the draft agreement on the understanding that the reference made there was not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarization, but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. The United Nations Representative agreed with this interpretation of proposal 12.
Agreement has not been reached on the four most basic proposals of the twelve, namely, proposals 5, 6, 7 and 10. Agreement on these four proposals is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarization envisaged as an integrated whole in the twelve proposals.
The four basic proposals on which agreement between the parties has not been reached are as follows: "5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph
11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process;
"6. Agree that this of demilitarization shall be contemplated during a period of ninety days, unless another period is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9 below;
"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be.
"(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line
"(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State; and
"(iii) Large scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.
(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line "(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will
have been withdrawn;
"(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out, "so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at force of......civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of......
"10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above."
The United Nations Representative has carefully considered the situation on the sub-continent with regard to the relations between India and Pakistan in general and the Kashmir problem in particular [S/2375, chapters II and III). Furthermore, he has paid careful attention to the views put forward by both parties, and he has sought to narrow the differences between the parties on the basis of the twelve proposals of the plan as a whole which was noted with approval by the Security Council in the resolution adopted on 10 November 1951.
Accordingly, and with reference to paragraph 4 of the resolution of the Security Council of 10 November 1951, the
"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State ; and
"(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.
"b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line
"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have withdrawn ;
"(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out,
"so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the ceasefire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949."
(d) Proposal 10 to be maintained as it stands, namely: "Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above."
The United Nations Representative, in accordance with the request of the Security Council that he give his views on the problem confided to him, has presented this analysis of the problem and his views thereon, with the hope that they will help the Council to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the problem of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the more hopeful atmosphere prevailing in the sub-continent.