15101951 (A) FIRST GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL [Original Text, 15 OCTOBER 1951]

15101951 (A) FIRST GRAHAM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL [Original Text, 15 OCTOBER 1951]

 

(a) Introduction

 

This report is to inform the Security Council of the way in which the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan has carried out the instructions given to him by the Security Council in its resolution of 30 March 1951. Before entering into the substance of the report, he wishes to express his appreciation to the Governments of India and Pakistan for their hospitality, countries and co-operation, as well as to the Secretariat of the United Nations for its collaboration.

 

On 30 March 1951 the Security Council [539th meeting] adopted a resolution on the joint proposal of the United Kingdom and the United States of America which provided for the appointment of a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan [annex 1]. The mandate of the Security Council to the United Nations Representative is set forth in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the resolution of 30 March 1951, as follows:

 

"The Security Council......

 

"3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949…

 

"5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not affected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out."

 

The position of the two Governments with regard to the resolution of 30 March 1951 had been stated before the Security Council by their representatives. On 29 March 1951, at the 538th meeting of the Council,

 

the representative of India stated: "21....My Government has no objection to a new United Nations representative visiting India and Pakistan, if the Security Council so desires, to make a fresh attempt to assist, by suggestion, advice and mediation, in determining how proposals regarding demilitarization under the resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be implemented with due regard to the assurances given to my Government in connexion therewith. This of course, is subject to my Government's views regarding arbitration explained." which I have already

 

On 2 April 1951, at the 540th meeting of the Council, the representative of Pakistan stated:

 

"16......I have been instructed by my Government to submit to the Council its acceptance of the resolution. The Government of Pakistan has accepted the resolution and is determined to afford the fullest cooperation to the United Nations representative who may be appointed by the Security Council, and later, in case of differences arising which cannot be resolved by agreement between the parties, to the arbitrator or arbitrators that may be appointed under paragraph 6 of the resolution.

 

The present United Nations Representative was appointed by the Security Council on 30 April 1951 [543rd meeting]. He was released by the United State Department of Labor as Defense Manpower Administrator on 17 June 1951. He left New York for India and Pakistan on 27 June 1951, arriving on the sub-continent on 30 June 1951.

 

In accordance with paragraph 9 of the resolution of 30 March 1951, the following staff was provided to the United Nations Representative by the Secretary General, and administrative and secretarial assistance was provided as required by the United Nations staff assigned to the Military Observer Group:

 

Mr. Petrus J. Schmidt, Principal Secretary. General Jacob J. Devers, Military Adviser.

Mr. Miguel A. Marin, Political and Legal Adviser.

Mr. David Blickenstaff, Political Officer. Mr. Philippe d'Esterno, Political Officer, (Acting Information Officer).

Mr. Edward Lawson, Social Affairs Officer. Mr. Wiliam B. Aycock, Personal Assistant to the United Nations Representative.

 

Colonel Joy Dow, Commissioned Aide to General Devers. Miss Audrey Owen, Administrative Assistant. Miss Mary Robertson, Secretary.

 

Miss Louise A. Crawford, Secretary pro tempore.

 

Sergeant Richard Hainey, Enlisted Aide to General Devers. Mr. Robert N. Kenney, appointed Information Officer,

 

returned to Headquarters on 12 July 1951 because of illness. On 12 September 1951 the United Nations Representative left the sub-continent for Geneva for the purpose of preparing his report to the Security Council.

 

(b) Terms of reference of the United Nations Representative

 

The debate in the Security Council leading up to the adoption of the resolution of 30 March 1951 indicates that it was the intention of the Council that the United Nations Representative should deal only with the question of the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. According to the terms of the resolution he was:

 

(a) To consult with the Governments of India and Pakistan.

(b) To effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, or to obtain the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization.

(c) To submit his report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the subcontinent.

(d) To report to the Council, in case he has not achieved either of the objectives set forth in sub-paragraph (b) above, "those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out."

 

The United Nations Representative was therefore not concerned with the existing arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire, the responsibility for which the Council had in paragraph 7 of its resolution of 30 March 1951, placed upon the Military Observer Group.

 

His responsibility was limited to obtaining agreement on the steps by which demilitarization might be effected and to assisting the parties in the implementation of the agreement, or to reporting to the Council the points of difference between the two parties in accordance with paragraph 5 of the 30 March 1951 resolution. With regard to this responsibility, the Security Council had laid down in its resolution that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be affected by the United Nations Representative, or the plan of demilitarization to be agreed by the parties, was to be based on the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The parts of the texts of these two resolutions which relate to demilitarization. follow:

 

UNCIP RESOLUTION OF 13 AUGUST 1948

Part II

Truce agreement

 

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.

 

A

 

As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.

 

The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident there in who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

 

Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

 

B

 

When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nations referred to in part II, A (3) hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

 

Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease fire those forces of its army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.

 

The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

 

C

 

Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiquc containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

 

UNCIP RESOLUTION OF 5 JANUARY 1949

 

(a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the securing of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite :

 

(b) As regards the territory referred to in A (3) of part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.

 

(c) Political situation and method of approach

 

A. POLITICAL SITUATION PREVAILING ON THE SUB-CONTINENT

 

The situation encountered by the United Nations Representative on the sub-continent was a complex one and, though containing certain encouraging elements, was largely detrimental to the successful fulfilment of his mission.

 

In the State of Jammu and Kashmir itself the United Nations organization for the supervision, by means of the Military Observer Group, of the ceasefire line, was working effectively and, despite incidents, was continuing its successful assistance to the two Governments in their will to fulfil their commitments under the cease-fire arrangements.

 

During the two and a half years that had elapsed since the coming into effect of the cease-fire, some decrease in forces on both sides of the cease-fire line had taken place and, to some extent, certain provisions of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 had, for practical purposes, been implemented.

 

The United Nations Representative found on the sub continent a general desire that the Kashmir problem be settled as soon as possible. It was generally recognized that delay in the solution of the problem exercised a detrimental effect upon Indo-Pakistan relations as a whole, and that agreement on this problem would greatly facilitate the efforts of the two Governments to resolve other outstanding issues not directly related to the Kashmir question.

 

The eleven-week period spent by the mission on the sub-continent was, however, largely characterized by the existence of great tension between the two Governments.

 

On 30 June 1951 the permanent representative of India addressed a communication to the President of the Security Council [S/2225] transmitting a communication from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of India alleging a series of violations by Pakistan of the cease-fire line which had occurred during the preceding fortnight. The communication referred to "the fanatical warmongering propaganda that is daily growing in Pakistan" and to the suspicion that these events were "part of a planned programme calculated to lead, if unchecked, to the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries".

 

On 15 July 1951 the permanent representative of Pakistan addressed a communication to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General [S/2245/S/2245/Corr. 1] bringing to the notice of the Security Council "that heavy concentrations of Indian armed forces are taking place in East Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir ....." and stating that this constitutes a grave threat to the security of Pakistan and to international peace". The communication quoted the text of a telegram of the same date addressed to the Prime Minister of India from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in which the latter stated that "the main reason for the existing state of tension between India and Pakistan is the persistent refusal by the Government of India to settle the dispute between the two countries by peaceful means''. During the period 15 July to 11 August 1951 there ensured an exchange of ten telegrams between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, an exchange which was fully reported in the Press of the two countries. The issues raised in this correspondence were the centre of public debate and comment and to large extent dominated the political scene on the sub-continent throughout the mission's stay in the area.

 

The question of convening a Constituent Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a further disturbing element. in the relations between the two countries. On 14 December 1950 the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council [S/1942] in which, inter alia, the Security Council was requested "to call upon India to refrain from proceeding with the proposal for Constituent Assembly".

 

The Security Council, in its resolution of 30 March 1951, affirmed "that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance above principles".

 

On 29 March 1951, at the 538th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of India made the following :

 

"5......Some members of the Council appear to fear that in the process the Kashmir Constituent Assembly might express opinion on the Constituent Assembly cannot be physically prevented from expressing its opinion on this question chooses. But this opinion will bind my or about a possibility of obtaining agreement in broad terms and thus preparing the way for a subsequent meeting for the preparation of a programme of demilitarization. The United Nations Representative decided to follow this latter procedure.

 

As a result of his conversions with the parties, which continued until the final stages of the mission's stay on the sub-continent, a formal letter, dated 7 September 1951 (annex 2), was dispatched by the United Nations Representative to the Prime Ministers of both Governments, containing the text of a draft agreement and inviting their comments on each separate paragraph and their suggestions, as well as their detailed plans for carrying out the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the UNCIP resolutions of 13

 

August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan replied to the letter of 7 September on 11 and 12 September, respectively (annexes 3 and 4).

 

The replies of the two Prime Ministers indicated to the United Nations Representative that on certain essential parts of his proposals, agreement could not be reached under the circumstances then prevailing on the sub-continent.

 

(d) Analysis of the main problems

 

A. BACKGROUND OF THE QUESTION

 

The question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been before the Security Council since January 1948. The Council is already familiar with its origin and development and with the positions of the Governments of India and Pakistan, which were fully set forth during meetings of the Security Council, in the three reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, in the report of General A.G.L.

 

McNaughton and in the report of Sir Owen Dixon. It may be of assistance to the Council, nevertheless, to outline in this report the substance of the differing conceptions of India and Pakistan of their status regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir, inasmuch as they are the origins of the differing interpretations of the two Governments with regard to their commitments.

 

These conceptions have been stated repeatedly by both Governments during the discussions of the question in the Security Council and during the negotiations with UNCIP and with Sir Owen Dixon.

 

In its third interim report [S/1430/Rev. 1] UNCIP summarized the positions of India and Pakistan in the following way :

 

"200. The Indian position

 

"(a) India considers itself to be in legal possession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of the instrument of accession of October 1947, signed by the Maharaja of the State and accepted by the then Governor-General of India. From this basis premise, that is, the legality of its presence in the State and its control over it, there flow logically certain corollary attitudes. The assistance which Pakistan rendered to tribesmen who made incursions into the State constituted therefore a hostile act; the entry of elements of the Pakistan regular army into the State was an invasion of Indian territory. India has its armies in Kashmir as a matter of right, and controls the defence, communications, and external affairs of State as a consequence of the act of accession while Pakistan has no locus standi (in Kashmir).

 

"(b) From the fact of accession flows India's claim to be responsible for the security of the State; hence the problem of demilitarization must take into account the importance of leaving in the State sufficient Indian and State forces to safeguard the State's security. A plebiscite in the State would be for the purpose of confirming the accession which is, in all

 

respects, already complete. "(c) India's claim regarding the northern areas of the State is also based on its fundamental argument. Its refusal to discuss with the Pakistan Government, or even to allow it to know the details of withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, is not only in line with that part of the resolution which provides for the prior withdrawal of Pakistan troops, but follows on dia's insistence that Pakistan is illegally in Kashmir and has no rights in the matter. India's position on the question of the Azad forces is not only bound up with India's preoccupation regarding the security of the State, but involves the principle that forces which are in revolt against the government of the State must be disbanded and disarmed. The cardinal feature of India's position is its contention that it is in Kashmir by right, and that Pakistan cannot aspire to equal footing with India in the contest. The Government of India, in its letter of 21 November to the Commission, reiterated its position and commented upon the arguments of Pakistan'' [S/1430/Rev. 1, annex 43].

 

"201. The Pakistan position

 

"(a) Pakistan bases its case on the contention that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India is illegal, and denies that there is any basis whatsoever for India's contention that the legality of this accession is in fact and law beyond question. This stand was first stated in the Pakistan complaint before the Security Council in January 1948, and has been to the Commission as recently as on 1 October 1949 in a letter from the Minister of Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan [S/1430

 

Rev. 1, annex 42]. Pakistan's main arguments for its case are the following:

 

"(1) The State of Jammu and Kashmir had executed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on 15 August 1947, which debarred the State from entering into any kind of negotiation or agreement with any other country.

 

"(2) The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir had no authority left to execute an instrument of accession on 26 October 1947, because his people had successfully revolted, had overthrown his Government, and had compelled him to flee from the capital.

 

"(3) The act of accession was brought about by violence and fraud and as such it was invalid ab initio.

 

"(4) The Maharaja's offer of accession was accepted by the Governor-General of India on the condition that as soon as law and order had been restored, the question of the accession of the State would be decided "by a reference to the people". The Indian Constitution Act does not recognize a conditional accession. The action of the Maharaja and of the Government of India has, therefore, no validity in law'.

 

"(b) Pakistan states further that the Azad movement was indigenous and spontaneous, the consequence of repression and misrule by the Maharaja's Government. The tribal incursions were likewise spontaneous and were the result of the reports of atrocities and cruelties perpetrated on the Muslim peoples of Kashmir and the East Punjab. The entry of Pakistan forces into Kashmir was necessary in order to protect its own territory from invasion by Indian forces, to stem the movement of large numbers of refugees driven before the Indian Army into Pakistan, and to prevent the Government of India from presenting the world with a fait accompli by taking possession of the entire State by force. Pakistan, quoting clause 1 of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, to the effect that the purpose of the plebiscite was to determine whether Kashmir should accede to India or to Pakistan, rejects the Indian view that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of India, a view which, Pakistan says, begs the very question which is in dispute It is Pakistan's opinion that its action in lending assistance to the people of Kashmir is far less open to criticism than was India's intervention at the request of an autocratic ruler. Pakistan has, from the first presentation of its case before the Security Council, contested the whole of the Indian thesis. It considers itself as having equal status with the Government of India and being entitled, as a party to the dispute, to equal rights and considerations.

 

"(c) The claim of Pakistan to equal status with India has had a direct influence on its position regarding the problems posed by the implementation of the truce : in Pakistan's view the truce should establish a balance of forces between the two parties, and Pakistan asks, therefore, to be apprised of the plans of the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces. before signing a truce agreement. It is Pakistan's opinion that any disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, which are local forces, should be balanced by a similar disposition of the State forces or at least by a further reduction of the remaining Indian forces after withdrawal of the bulk. As regards the northern area question, Pakistan, apart from other arguments based on factual considerations and on the letter of the 13 August resolution, denies the claim of India to the right to assume in those territories the defense of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a result of the established relations between India and the State". As a corollary to the above-mentioned positions of the two Governments came their interpretations of the principles for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. These differing interpretations became the obstacles which in the past have prevented the implementation of the two UNCIP resolutions.

 

B. POSITIONS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMILITARIZATION

 

The Principles of the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir are set forth in part II (truce agreement) of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and in sub paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

 

UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, part II (truce agreement)

 

The text of section A of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1951 is as follows:

 

"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State".

 

(a) Pakistan has been consistent in its contention that the withdrawal of its forces should be synchronized with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces on the other side of the cease-fire line; that is, they should take place simultaneously and be arranged in such a manner as to obtain a balance between the

 

remaining forces. (b) India has maintained that the Pakistan troops should withdraw unconditionally from the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and that the timing

and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between UNCIP (or the United Nations Representative) and the Government of India.

 

Section A continues.

 

"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting."

 

Pakistan has reiterated that this condition has already been fulfilled.

 

Section A continues :

 

"3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission."

 

Section B provides :

 

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission "

 

(a) The Government of India has not been prepared to withdraw the bulk of its forces the State of Jammu and Kashmir unless agreement be reached for a large-scale disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces.

 

(b) The Government of Pakistan, for its part, has contended that the withdrawal of its troops should be synchronized with the withdrawal of the Indian troops and that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces was a matter to be dealt with when sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 were implemented.

(c) The Government of India has maintained that the question of the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a question between the Government of India and UNCIP (or the United Nations Representative).

(d) The Government of Pakistan has maintained that UNCIP (or the United Nations Representative), after bearing India and Pakistan, should determine the strength of the Indian forces to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. For Pakistan the remainder of the Indian forces constituted the "bulk" and should be withdrawn during the truce stage.

 

Section B also provides :

 

"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

 

The Government of Pakistan has contended that the Indian claim to station garrisons in the northern areas (on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line), when the territory had been evacuated by the Pakistan troops, was not tenable [S/1430| Rev. 1, pp. 53 ff.).

 

UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949

 

The text of paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 is as follows:

 

"(a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

 

(a) The Indian Government has maintained that the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces should be determined by UNCIP (or the United Nations Representative) and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the Government of India, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

 

(b) The Government of India considered that the expression "security of the State" was intended to connote the security of Jammu and Kashmir against incursion by tribesmen, Pakistan nationals, and regular Pakis forces, whether acting separately or in concert.

 

(c) The Pakistan Government considered that there should be a balance between the Indian forces and the State armed forces referred to in sub-paragraph 4 (a), on the one hand, and the Azad Kashmir forces referred to in sub-paragraph 4 (b), on the other.

 

Paragraph 4 continues :

 

"(b) As regards the territory referred to in A (3) of part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."

 

(a) The Government of India has maintained that the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces referred to in section B, paragraph 1, part II; of the 13 August 1948 resolution was conditioned on a large-scale disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces.

 

(b) The Government of Pakistan has contended that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces was a matter to be dealt with when sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution were implemented.

 

C. PROPOSALS FOR A DRAFT AGREEMENT

 

The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to explain the reasons which led the United Nations Representative to make the proposals set forth in the draft agreement for a plan of demilitarization to the Governments of India and Pakistan; to comment on the replies of both Governments to those proposals; and finally, to establish the points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation add execution of UNCIP's agreed resolutions of 13 and 5 August 1958.

 

January 1949. In view of the circumstances in which the negotiations were carried out, as explained in the last part of chapter II, the United Nations Representative presented to both Governments by letter of 7 September 1951 proposals for a possible agreement (annex 2).

 

In order to assist in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the adoption of a plan of demilitarization, and to narrow the differences between the parties with regard to such a plan, the United Nations Representative presented the proposals contained in the draft agreement as specified below.

 

The official repies of the two Prime Ministers (annexes 3 and 4) expressed not only the desire of their respective Governments to settle peacefully their differences regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but also their willingness to take definite steps to relieve the cumulative tensions between the two peoples. Furthermore, with regard to the differences in the interpretations by the two Governments of their obligation for the implementation of demilitarization under part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution the two replies confirmed the hope of the United Nations Representative that the possibility of arriving at a basis for an agreement is not excluded.

 

Proposals 1 to 4 setting forth general principles of the draft agreement.

 

Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the proposed agreement deal with general principles. Their objectives were as follows:

(a) To meet a threat of recourse to war, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan.

 

"1. Reaffirmed their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

(b) To meet the problem of detrimental propaganda, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan.

 

"2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesman and will urge all its citizens, organizations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

(c) To meet alleged violations of the cease fire, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan.

 

"3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949,"

 

(d) To meet the situation created by the convocation of a Constituent Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan.

 

"4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations."

 

The replies of both Governments indicated that they were favourable to these first four clauses of proposed agreement. Moreover, the Prime Minister of India, in paragraph 4 of his reply of 11 September 1951 (annex 3), said.

 

"4. As regards paragraph 4, the Government of India not only reaffirms its acceptance of the principle that the question of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, but is anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible. It is with this object, and this object alone in view, that it has examined your proposals.

 

" Proposal 5 setting forth the general principle for the programme of demilitarization.

 

One of the main problems encountered by UNCIP and by Sir Owen Dixon was the question of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces. This question arises in connexion with sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

 

The United Nations Representative was faced with the same problem from the very beginning of his negotiations, when the Government of India informed him that it could not regard the implementation of section B, paragraph 1, of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, and of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of UNCIP's resolution of 5 January 1949 as independent of each other. Both were linked up with what was. for the Government of India, a vital question-the security of Jammu and Kashmir against external aggression.

 

To meet this, the United Nations Representative considered with both Governments the possibility that demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir be effected in a single continuous process. In this connexon, attention is drawn to paragraph 250 of UNCIP's third interim report [S/1430/Rev. 1] which states:

 

"250. The conclusion to be drawn from the experience of the Commission during the past year, and from the attitudes of the two Governments as regards the withdrawal problem, is clear: developments in the State during the past year necessitate a modification in the original plan of demilitarization. Such a modification must treat the problem of demilitarization as a whole, eliminating all distinction and comprising all questions concerning the final disposal of all armed forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

As to the practical details of a programme of demilitarization, the United Nations Representative considered that these could best be taken up in a meeting, held under the auspices of the United Nations between representatives of the two Governments assisted by their military advisers, once agree ment had been reached on the broad principles. This agreement would, moreover, have the effect of decreasing the tension between the two countries and would assist in creating an atmosphere favourable to the success of such a meeting.

 

Paragraph 5 of the proposed agreement was drawn up as follows.

 

"The Governments of India and Pakistan....... 5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below, demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single, continuous process,"

 

Agreement that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single, continuous process implied, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, the implementation of Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, together with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, as a whole, and would lead to the following consequences :

 

(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, the tribes men and Pakistan troops would be withdrawn as provided in section A, paragraphs 1 and 2 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, and the Azad Kashmir forces would be disbanded and disarmed as provided in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

 

(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line, the bulk of the Indian forces would be withdrawn as provided in section B, paragraph 1 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and further withdrawals or reductions, as the case might be, of the Indian and State armed forces would take place as provided in sub paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949.

 

(c) The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed to office at some stage during the period of demilitarization, inasmuch as the resolution of 5 January 1949 conferred upon him certain functions with respect to the implementation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of that resolution.

 

The position of the two Governments on this proposal may be expressed as follows:

 

(a) Position of India

 

The Government of India agreed that demilitarization should be effected in a single continuous process in so for as it combines the demilitarization envisaged in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution with part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, but not to the extent of including the substantial part of sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. India was therefore willing to withdraw the bulk of the Indian forces plus some of the remainder (after the bulk) so as to leave on the Indian side of the cease-fire line one line communication area head-quarters and one infantry division. (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions cach, provided such a plan called for complete demilitarization on the Pakistan. side of the cease-fire line, except for a civil armed force of 4,000 persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force, according to the Government of India, should be commanded by United Nations officers or "locals' ' and not by Pakistan officers.

 

(b) Position of Pakistan

 

The Government of Pakistan agreed that demilitarization. should be effected in a single continuous process subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the proposals of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. The demilitarization envisaged in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution should be combined with the provisions of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution. Pakistan was therefore willing to accept large scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces in a plan for the imple- mentation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, provided such a plan calls for withdrawals of the balance of the Indian forces (after the bulk) and a reduction of the State armed forces and State Militia.

 

Proposals 6 to 12 setting forth the principles for a plan of demilitarization

 

The principles for a plan of demilitarization were set forth in paragraphs 6 to 12 of the proposed agreement, as follows:

 

"The Governments of India and Pakistan...

 

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of ninety days, unless another period is decided upon by representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9 below;

 

"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be ;

 

"(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line :

"(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn.

"(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State and

"(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the

Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

"(b) On the Indian side of the cease fire line :

"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn.

"(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out,

 

"so that at the end of the period to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of......civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of... [It was requested in the communication that the blank spaces be filled in by each Government].

 

"8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above ::

 

"9. Agree that representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments, assisted by their military advisers, will meet, under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw. up a programme of demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above. "10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above.

 

"11. Agree that the completion of the programme of demilitarization referred to in paragraph 9 above will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.

 

"12. Agree that any differences regarding the programme of demilitarization contemplated in paragraph 9 above will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, to the United Nations Representative, whose decision shall be final."

 

The positions of the two Governments with regard to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the proposed agreement can be summarized as follow:

 

(a) Position of India

 

(i) The Government of India was willing to carry out the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces in the State by the end of the period contemplated in paragraph 6 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals were progressively completed by the end of that period.

 

(ii) The Government of India was of the opinion that sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the proposals should be omitted, and that the period during which the further withdrawals or reductions contemplated in this sub paragraph were to be made and their phasing and quantum could not be determined realistically at that time.

 

(iii) The Government of India gave assurances that it was its policy to reduce its forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard its security; the greater the measure of security the State enjoyed from threats of incursions or aggression, the smaller would be this minimum.

 

(iv) As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in the terms of paragraphs 6 and 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000, organized, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in item C of the memo randum transmitted to UNZIP under cover of a letter dated 13 April 1949 by the Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs of India; that is, the forces (of 4,000) should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or "locals' ' and not by Pakistan officers.

 

(v) The Government of India, provided that the operations described in sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of the period agreed upon, would retain on their side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each. According to the Indian Government, much more than the "bulk" of Indian forces in the State would thus have been withdrawn and the forces left behind would be wholly inadequate in case of large-scale aggression.

 

(vi) The Government of India presumed that effective measures would be taken by Pakistan to prevent such aggression.

 

(vii) Regarding paragraphs 10 and 11 of the proposals, the Government of India stated that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions on both sides of the cease-fire line permit a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite. In the opinion of the Indian Government, to appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he could function effectively would be premature. The Government of India would prefer such a proposal to be omitted from the agreement; it would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.

 

(b) Position of Pakistan

 

(i) It was presumed by the Government of Pakistan that the term "further withdrawal or reductions", mentioned in sub-paragraph 7(b) (ii), referred to the "large-scale reduction and disarmament" envisaged by UNCIP under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949. In this connexion reference was made to the aide memoire given by Mr. A. Lozano to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 5].

 

(ii) According to the Government of Pakistan, after the large-scale reduction and disbanding of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line contemplated by UNCIP under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January left some Azad Kashmir forces on one side and some armed forces on the other. If it was the intention that these forces should be of the status of civil armed forces, the same consideration would apply on both sides of the cease-fire line.

 

(iii) The Government of Pakistan felt that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragraph 7. The Pakistan Government, however, expressed the view that some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached, so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line were of the order indicated above.

 

(iv) Regarding the Plebiscite Administrator, the Pakistan Government emphasized the importance of appointing him formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.

 

(v) Finally, the Government of Pakistan suggested that a provision should be made in the agreement that any differences regarding its interpretation should be referred to the United Nations Representative, whose decision should be final.

 

Points of difference on proposals 6 to 12

 

The replies of the Governments of India and Pakistan to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the proposed [draft agreement, as they have been summarized in the above paragraphs, indicate, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, that the points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of demilitarization on the basis of the draft agreement, can be established as follows:

 

(1) Period of demilitarization

 

(a) The Government of India greatly doubts whether during the period of ninety days the firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully would have replaced in Pakistan the spirit and temper of war prevailing at the present time.

 

(b) The Government of Pakistan agrees that the phase of demilitarization be completed during a period of ninety days, unless another period is decided upon by representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments.

 

(2) Withdrawal of troops

 

(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when :

(i) The tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State ;

(ii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place. (b) It is the view of the Indian Government that further withdrawals and reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the complete withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces cannot be related to the period of ninety days. Both the period during which these further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and quantum, cannot be determined at present.

 

(c) The Government of Pakistan agrees to the withdrawals as proposed in the draft agreement, emphasizing that the term further withdrawals or reductions" mentioned in sub-paragraph 7(b) (ii) refers to a large-scale reduction and disarmament. (3) Forces to remain on either side of the cease fire line

 

(a) The Government of India agrees that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon, there should be a force of 4,000 men, consisting of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or "locals" and not by Pakistan officers.

 

(b) The Government of India states that there will remain on its side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division (normal) of four brigades of four battalions each.

 

(c) The Government of Pakistan maintains that the same consideration should apply to the status of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line.

 

(d) The Government of Pakistan considers that a force of no more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization program. However, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached.

 

(4) Plebiscite Administrator

 

(a) The Government of India considers that the proposals concerning the appointment or the plebiscite Administrator should be omitted from the agreement. According to the Indian Government, they would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.

 

(b) The Government of Pakistan emphasizes the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.

 

(e) Conclusions

 

The United Nations Representative has endeavoured in the preceding chapters to report to the Security Council on the results of his efforts made in discharging the duties entrusted to him by the Security Council in its resolution of 30 March 1951.

 

Due to the situation prevailing on the sub-continent, as explained in chapters II and III, it was not possible to effect demilitarization during the time available to the United Nations Representative under his terms of reference.

 

The United Nations Representative has set forth in chapter III the main differences between the two Governments, not only in regard to their interpretation and execution of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 concerning demilitarization, but also in regard to points of difference between the parties concerning the proposals made by him for an agreement on a plan for demilitarization. The United Nations Representative considers that, by doing so, he has carried out the instructions contained in paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951.

 

It is with satisfaction and hope that the United Nations Representative emphasize that fact that the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, in their replies to his proposals for an agreement, expressed their willingness to :

 

(a) Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

(b) Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir.

(c) Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949.

(d) Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspice of the United Nations.

 

Considering the results of the informal consultations held by the United Nations Representative with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the written replies received from the two Governments to his letter of 7 September 1951, and considering further the points of difference formulated at the end of chapter III of this report, the United Nations Representative has come to the conclusion that, although he does not underestimate the difficulties, the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement the two Governments is not excluded.

 

Finally, the United Nations Representative should like. to emphasize the importance of the task of the United Nations Military Observer Group on the sub-continent in supervising the cease-fire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

(f) Recommendations

 

Accordingly, the United Nations Representative recommends to the Security Council:

 

(1) That the Security Council call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediately all measures to improve the relations between the two countries by avoiding any increase of their military potential in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and by instructing their official spokesmen and urging all their citizens, organizations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

(2) That the Security Council consider the possibility of a renewed effort being made to obtain an agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

(3) That if the Security Council decides that a renewed effort to obtain an agreement should be made, it might consider. instructing the United Nations Representative to implement its decision by continuing the negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to obtain an agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Such negotiations should be carried out in the seat of the Security Council and the Council should instruct the United Nations Representative to report to the Council within six weeks.