14031950 (b) Report of Sir Owen Dixon, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan [Original text, Sept. 1950].
14031950 (b) Report of Sir Owen Dixon, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan [Original text, Sept. 1950].
I have the honour to submit to the Security Council the following report of my attempt to carry out the duties committed to me by the resolution of the Security Council of 14 March 1950[S/1469].
By that resolution the Security Council called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements to prepare and execute within a period of five months from that date a programme of demilitarization on the of the Pakistan Government the corresponding kind of information about Pakistan's position.
I left Karachi for Srinagar in the Kashmir valley on 7 June. I remained in Jammu and Kashmir with my base at Srinagar from that date until 12 July. My purpose in going to Kashmir was to obtain a knowledge of the country, the people the topographical features, the cease-fire line, the general disposition of the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line and the other conditions and circumstances existing in the State which would or might assist me in understanding the dispute and the possible means of resolving it. I moved about good deal and, amongst other places, I visited a Bandipur, Sonamarg and Baltal, Poonch and the adjacent area, Rawaakot, the road from Rawalpindi through to Srinagar along the Jhelum Valley, which I traversed several times, and places and posts along that route, Skardu and Gilgit, Jammu and adjacent posts and Leh.
While I was in Srinagar I had more than one interview with Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of the State.
After I had completed my journeys, inspections and enquiries I remained at Srinagar and occupied myself in the consideration and preparation of plans. I would not have remained in Srinagar so long had it not been for the continued absence from the subcontinent of both Prime Ministers. I had formed the opinion that my best course was to deal with the Prime Ministers and if possible bring them together at a meeting with me at which a sustained effort might be made to effect a settlement.
The situation as I found it presented strange features. The parties had agreed that the fate of the State as whole should be settled by a general plebiscite, but over a considerable period of time they had failed to agree on any of the preliminary measures which it was clearly necessary to take before it was possible to set up an organization to take a plebiscite. From 20 October 1947 to 1 January 1949 the State of Jammu and Kashmir had been the scene of continual fighting and some very serious and difficult military operations had been conducted there. But the fighting had been confined to the State. On 1 January 1949 there was a cease-fire ordered upon the respective fronts and in July India and Pakistan agreed upon the position on the ground of the line which was to separate the territories they had respectively. On the Indian side of this cease-fire line the forces occupying the territory consisted of troops of the regular Indian Army. State troops and State militia. On the Pakistan side the forces were composed of troops of the regular Pakistan Army. Azad Kashmir forces and Northern Scouts. The cease-fire line itself was held in strength and thus two considerable armies stood opposed to one another.
The United Nations had established a corps of officers provided by various countries to act as observers and assist in maintaining the cease-fire along the line and to secure compliance by the parties with the terms of the armistice. Incidents in which the troops on one side fired on troops on the other or upon a civilian or civilians occurred frequently at some point or another on the line, but the incidents nearly all proved of small importance relatively and none threatened a general outbreak of hostilities.
The territory on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire. The line seemed to be administered through an Azad Kashmir "Government" on the west but in the north through political agents directly responsible to the Pakistan Government.
On the Indian side of the cease-fire line the administration. of the State was in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues, subject however to the federal powers of India over such matters as defence and external affairs, obtained under the instrument of accession to India. (See paragraph. 370 of the Constitution of India. These powers, however, were extensive enough the purpose of any matter which could arise in relation to the Kashmir dispute or its settlement. It was obvious to me that in my attempt to settle the dispute I must be governed by the course that had been taken by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and agreed upon by the parties. It might be true that the chances of such a course proving successful were much reduced by the failure of the parties over so long a period of time, notwithstanding the assistance of the Commission, to agree upon any practical measures in pursuance of that course for the solution of the problem. But the terms of the agreed resolution of 5 January 1949 were specific in appointing a free and impartial plebiscite as the means by which the question of the succession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided. What was wanting was agreement upon the matters, including demilitarization which were preliminary to even the commencement of the necessary arrangements for the taking of a poll of the inhabitants.
Primarily my duty, as I conceived it, was to attempt to bring about an agreement upon measures by the execution of which it would be made possible for the Plebiscite Administrator to begin his work of organizing an overall plebiscite. Only if and when I was satisfied that no such agreement could be brought about and all real chances of it had ended, ought I to turn to some form of settlement other than a plebiscite of the whole State. At the earliest stage possible I informed each of the parties that this was the position I adopted.
In examining the history of past attempts to effect a settlement of the dispute and in listening to India's explanation of its case and of the stand it took. I formed the opinion that if I was to succeed in bringing about an agreement upon the matters preliminary to an over-all plebiscite it would be necessary to meet certain objections which it would make. There was first the allegation, so often repeated by India, that Pakistan was an aggressor who had no locus standi and whose troops had no title to be within the State. There was the position taken by India that during the period of preparation for and the taking of the plebiscite that territory to the west of the cease-fire line should not be under the immediate governmental authority and direction of Pakistan or be administered by the Azad Kashmir "Government." There was the claim made by India that there must be no impairment of or prejudice to the recognition of the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir over the northern areas, i.e., the areas the north of the cease-fire line when it turns to run east. There was the assertion that if there was a very great reduction of troops on India's side of the cease-fire line, there would be danger of further incursions from the other side of These were objections the application and consequences of which might be developed in detail, but it is enough for me to state briefly their nature.
In preparing my plans to lay before the Prime Ministers I endeavoured to meet these various positions. But I was very much alive both to necessity and the difficulty of securing the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite. The plans I had in mind for the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line would, I thought, remove any difficulty there. But I felt much concern about the Indian side of the cease-fire line. If bodies of troops belonging to one side remained in populous areas, if all the powers of Sheikh Abdullah's Administration, which had the deepest possible interest in the result of the poll, remained exercisable, if the State militia went about under arms and the State police were left to exert whatever influence arises from their position in such a community, it appeared to me that there were the gravest dangers to a free expression of the will of the inhabitants, and almost a certainty that if the result was adverse to Pakistan it would challenge the plebiscite as neither free nor fair. I therefore worked up more than one plan or set of plans to deal with this situation. In doing so I saw that this was a question in which the Security Council itself was directly interested. For the plebiscite was to be conducted under its authority and it would not be right for me as the United Nations Representative to but forward or consent to conditions of settlement which would expose a plebiscite taken by the United Nations to reasonable, suspicion, on the ground that because of intimidation or the apprehensions of the voters for other reasons, it was not free and fair.
The Prime Minister of India returned to New Delhi on 24 June 1950 and the Prime Minister of Pakistan returned to Karachi on 13 July 1950. They both agreed to meet me in New Delhi on Thursday 20 July for the purpose of attempting together to settle the Kashmir question.
The meeting began at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the day arranged and continued from day to day until Monday, 24 July, when by common consent it was brought to an end. At the opening of the meeting I informed the two Prime Ministers that as far as I was concerned they could talk with the utmost freedom because, subject to one qualification, what they said need not be disclosed. That qualification was that, if my mission failed. I must report to the Security Council the nature of the proposals made and rejected, and if, on the other hand, agreement was reached, the agreement would of course be reported. I stated at the outset that I proposed to pursue the question of the measures necessary to make it possible to hold a plebiscite to determine the destination of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole, the first measure being of course the demilitarization of the area.
I found that neither country had any affirmative plans or proposals which its Prime Minister wished to put forward. I therefore proceeded to describe the course which I would propose to them.
The first matter which I raised was the necessity, in the event of agreement, of insuring that each party felt full confidence that whatever steps a settlement might make incumbent on the other party would, in fact, be taken, more particularly in the withdrawal of troops and the reduction of military strength, and I suggested that, independently of other reasons for confidence which I emphasized, this could be secured by avoiding indefinite undertakings and by stipulating that no cause for refusal or failure to do what the party undertook to do should suffice unless an appropriate authority of the United Nations so certified. To this there appeared to be no specific objection.
Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on I January 1948 of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already referred that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration; secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the subcontinent, I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law.
I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular force commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the cease-fire line should take place and far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them to settle.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed strongly his dissent from the third of the three positions I took up, that is to say the third of the positions stated above. But he expressed his readiness to accept, in compliance with my request, the proposition that as a first step in demilitarization the withdrawal of the regular forces of the Pakistan Army should begin on a specific day and that a significant number of days should elapse before the commencement of any operation involving forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.
The purpose of report in dealing with the meeting is to state what proposals were made and the extent to which they were rejected. For that purpose it is not necessary to adhere to order followed in the discussion, an order governed by the desirability of giving the Prime Ministers a general understanding of the basis of my proposals and also of pursuing them and any alternative suggestions in detail. I shall therefore state at once in outline what were the rest of my proposals for demilitarization of the area.
After fixing a day and hour for the withdrawal of the forces of the Pakistan regular army from the area west or west and north of the cease-fire line, the parties would, according to my proposal, fix so many days, from the commencement of such withdrawal, for India to begin the removal of the armed forces in the area east and south of the cease-fire line I asked for :
(a) The withdrawal of the forces of the Indian regular army;
(b) The withdrawal or disarming and disbandment of the Jammu and Kashmir State forces; (c) The disarming and disbandment of the Jammu and Kashmir State Militia.
I made no stipulation as to the these sequence of three operations relatively to one another.
On the other side of the cease-fire line my proposal was that Pakistan would commence to disarm and disband :
(a) the Azad Kashmir force; and
(b) the Northern Scouts.
I proposed that the day and hour for Pakistan's commencement to do so should be fixed by reference to the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular army. I suggested that the foregoing operations on each side should be divided into phases and that plans should be prepared for the carrying out of each phase by the respective Chiefs of Staff, and that may Military Adviser should consider each plan and should be entitled to recommend alterations.
I also suggested that the Pakistan plans should be settled first and that then my Military Adviser should furnish them to the India Chief of Staff so that such plans would be before them when settling their own plans.
Turning to the forces that either party might need on their respective sides of the present cease-fire line after demilitarization and pending the plebiscite, I said that this should be determined according to purpose. The presence of armed forces during the period preceding the taking of the vote and while it was being taken tended against the independence of voting and the fairness of the poll, and the number of the troops should therefore be as small as possible, I suggested that if the purpose was defined for which armed forces were needed it would then become a matter for the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with my Military Adviser to agree on the forces to be used and their disposition.
I said that as far as I could see there could be no need for troops unless for one or other of certain possible purposes which I stated. On the Pakistan side I mentioned the purposes :
(a) Of ensuring the fulfilment of the obligation of Pakistan not to permit tribesmen, marauders or other raiders to enter the Kashmir Valley from its side of the cease-fire line;
(b) of disarming and disbanding the Azad forces, a temporary purpose involving perhaps chiefly the Ordnance Corps;
(c) Of quietening the fears which might possibly arise among Muslims, if they were left entirely without any ostensible protection, and perhaps of aiding the civil power in maintaining order.
On the Indian side the purpose of troops would be: (a) To be available in aid of the civil power in maintaining order where the population was mixed in the south or south west of the State.
(b) To guard the northern approaches to the Valley against possible incursions through or by way of the Jhelum Valley, Keran and Tithwal and thence by Handwara, the Tragbal Pass from Gurais to Bandipur and the Zoji-la Pass and thence to Baltal and Sonamarg.
The Prime Minister of India rejected this plan on grounds of which it is impossible in this report to give an exhaustive statement. But he made these points and they are enough for the purpose of this report without going into arguments of a more abstract description. I state the points in a summary form:
(a) The possibility of Pakistan making an attack notwithstanding the withdrawal of its forces and notwithstanding any assurance it might give must be taken into account amongst other dangers for which Indian might need forces on its side of the cease-fire line pending the plebiscite.
(b) The need for protecting the area against the incursions of marauders or more serious dangers could not be limited to specific approaches such as I had mentioned.
(c) The Militia, which were organized and paid by the State, though under the command of Indian officers. performed duties of police and in any case could not be disarmed and disbanded without prejudicing the organization of the State. It was a thing India would not ask the State to do.
(d) The reason why India was being asked to limit the forces it would use in discharging its responsibilities in the defence of the State as part of India was because there had been an invasion of the State and because Pakistan and Azad forces remained within its boundaries, and that was a thing India could not countenance for a moment.
These matters were elaborately discussed. To the first point the Prime Minister of Pakistan replied that Pakistan would commit no such breach of faith, that in any case it would be folly for it to do so and even greater folly to commit its forces to an attack in Kashmir, and that to retain forces in order to protect the area against such a possible attack meant there was to be no demilitarization. With reference to the third point. I said that it was immaterial to me how the Militia were dealt with or disposed of so long as they did not form a body of armed men in excess of the forces which were allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line because they were agreed to be necessary for the military purposes in contemplation. There were other ways of seeing that they were not present as a body of armed men in the area while the vote was about to be taken. But it was inconsistent with the fairness or freedom of the plebiscite to have any such exhibition of force as would be involved in the presence of the Militia, more especially as the State Government was so vitally interested in the result of the plebiscite. As to the fourth point I said that the reason for my asking for a restriction of the armed forces in the area was in order to ensure the freedom and fairness of voting at a plebiscite to be conducted by the Plebiscite Administrator for the United Nations, and it was not because of the events to which he referred.
The Prime Minister of India had spoken of the kind of forces that should be used on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and had said that their purpose must be civil and they must have a civil character.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan did not deal with this question.
The attempt to obtain demilitarization appeared to break down because of the foregoing objections. No alternatives were suggested and no solution of the difficulties was put forward by either party.
The resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were based on the assumption that the boundary formed by the cease-fire line would continue until the plebiscite was held notwithstanding demilitarization. Neither Prime Minister sought to depart from this assumption. But India's attitude had been that authority other than that of the State should be recognized in the area. on the other side of the cease-fire line and paragraph 3 of section A of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that, pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
To meet India's position, which was emphatically maintained, and to resolve the difficulties to which the uncertainty of the meaning of the words "local authorities" and "surveillance" had given rise, I put toward a proposal for the area west of the cease-fire line. According to the proposal the administration of the services of government would proceed according to the law and custom of the State as existing before the troubles arose. It would be carried on by the persons now holding or assuming to hold the offices of district magistrate or subordinate offices. To insure that they carried out their duties and exercised their powers fairly and impartially and without interference with or prejudice to the holding of the plebiscite or what the Plebiscite Administrator directed, an officers of the United Nations would be attached to every district magistrate. His powers would be of supervision and he would report to the United Nations Representative, or his delegate, who would take what steps he considered desirable.
I proposed that it should be expressly provided that neither that provision nor any other provision in the agreement should be taken to import any recognition of the existence of any source of legal authority in such territory other than one depending upon and derived from the law of the State or to imply any derogation from or prejudice to the sovereignty of the State. I pointed out that my purpose was to provide for the practical exigencies which an interim period created and at the same time to give effect to the principle for which India sought recognition.
To this plan, however, the Prime Minister of India objected, chiefly, as I understood it, on the ground that it recognized existing district magistrates and subordinate officers and that, in the period since the troubles arose, men had been appointed to replace the former officers, and that they or some of them were or might be repugnant to India. No alteration of the plan however was suggested and no alternative was put forward.
For the northern areas, that is the territory north of the cease-fire line and east of the district of Muzaffarabad and of the Gilgit Subdivision and of the political districts of Gilgit Agency, I put forward a separate proposal. I did so because special difficulties appeared to be raised by the objections of India that, during the interim period from demilitarization to the plebiscite, the authority of Pakistan should not continue and should not be recognized. My proposal there was to appoint political agents representing the United Nations and to vest authority in them The plan provided that instead of the existing assistant political agents there should be a political agent or agents appointed by or under the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations, after consultation with India and Pakistan. The plan went on to make the power of these officers depend upon the law and custom of the State as at I August 1947 and to place upon them the responsibility of causing the powers vested in them to be so exercised that there would be no interference with or prejudice to either the holding of the plebiscite or the directions of the Plebiscite Administrator, and so that the administration should be fair and impartial. But, save as aforesaid, such an officer might administer the government through existing channels of authority and through the officers holding office, and he might act through the present assistant political agent To this solution of the difficulty raised about the northern areas the Prime Minister of India objected on the grounds :-
(a) That existing officers appointed by Pakistan were of a character which Indía could not countenance.
(b) That any consultation with Pakistan recognized its title to be in the Northern Area.
(c) That the political agents representing the United Nations would be necessarily guided by existing administrative officers and would be unable effectively to insure fairness etc.
(d) That in any event India must place garrisons or military posts in certain places on the northern side of the cease-fire line.
It was clear to me that Pakistan could not be expected to agree to the fourth objection. As to the other objections India did not put forward any suggestion for the amendment of the plan or for any alternative solution.
On the Indian side of the cease-fire line it appeared to me that some provision was necessary to ensure that arbitrary powers which at present exist were not exercised so as to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite and that police powers were not so used. As I have already said the Government of the State would be vitally interested in the result of the plebiscite. Paragraph 7 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 contains general provisions directed to considerations of this kind, I therefore put forward a proposal that, in order to give more specific effect to the undertakings given in paragraph 7 of the Commission's agreed resolution of 5 January concerning the free expression of political opinion and the release of political prisoners, the agreement should state that, immediately upon a date or period being formally named by the Plebiscite Administrator, certain provisions should apply until the final result of the vote had been declared by him. These provisions were that:
(a) A United Nations officer would be posted with or attached to each district magistrate.
(b) He should be entitled to see the administrative records and proceedings of the district magistrates and all officers subordinate to the magistrate.
(c) The duties of the United Nations officer would include observation, inspection, remonstrance and report.
(d) Without the prior consent in writing of the United Nations officer, no warrant or order for the arrest of any person should be granted or made under emergency powers, or any powers of detention or imprisonment or administration, and all prisoners held under the authority of any like warrant or order when such date or period was formally named by the Plebiscite Administrator should be set free within seven days, except prisoners to whose further detention the United Nations officer consented in writing. The proposal expressly excluded from the operation of the clause a warrant for the apprehension of a person on a criminal charge for the purpose of bringing him before a magistrate so that the charge may be dealt with, a warrant or order commitment for trial or committing or remanding to goal pending an adjournment of the hearing a charge, a conviction upon a criminal charge, and any order made in the exercise of judicial power.
To this plan the Prime Minister of India objected on the grounds that it involved an interference with the integrity of the functions of the State and an impairment of the powers of arrest, which might prove dangerous in the case of subversive elements and of person seeking to take advantage of the situation to stir up communal strife and violence.
Again no modifications or alternatives were put forward or suggested All these matters were fully discussed.
It will be seen that the plans described up to this point for dealing with the questions concerning the demilitarization of the State and other preparations for the the taking of the plebiscite dealt with these matters on the assumption that during the period of the plebiscite the State would be divided by the cease-fire line as a political boundary. It is evident that if the State could have been placed under one administration so that the political boundary would cease to exist a great many of the difficulties to which the foregoing plans were directed would disappear. Therefore by way of an alternative I put forward plans for bringing into existence for the plebiscite period a single government for the whole State. The plans were of their descriptions and I asked the Prime Ministers whether it was possible to put one or other of them into effect.
The first possibility about which I required was that of bringing into existence a coalition government, that is either a coalition brought about by a meeting of Sheikh Abdullah and Mr. Ghulam Abbas, Supreme Head of the Azad Kashmir Movement, or by placing certain portfolios at the disposal of the respective parties.
The second plan was for the formation of an administration for the entire State composed of trusted persons outside politics holding high judicial or administrative office and commanding general confidence. They body would be charged with the administration of the government of the State for a fixed period before the poll, perhaps six months before it. The Chairman would be appointed by the United Nations, and of the other members half would represent Hindus and half Muslims. The existing Ministers would continue to hold office but they would be relieved of their responsibilities during the period.
The third plan differed from the second only in the constitution of the administrative body. It was to be constituted altogether of United Nations representatives. None of these suggestions committed themselves to the Prime Minister of India.
In the course of the conference I mentioned very briefly one or two other possible ways of reaching a plebiscite. In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.
Having come to this conclusion I thought that I must either abandon all attempts to settle the dispute or turn from the plebiscite by which the destination of the whole State would be decided to some different solution. I ascertained from the Prime Ministers that the considered that with such a plebiscite in view, there was no longer any hope of agreement upon demilitarization or upon the conditions which would follow. demilitarization or upon any modified form of demilitarization or upon any course that would advance the position towards a settlement.
Having done so, I asked the Prime Minister of India, the Prime Minister of Pakistan being present, what was the attitude of India :
(a) To a plan for taking the plebiscite by sections or areas and the allocation of each section or area according to the result of the vote therein: or
(b) To a plan by which it was conceded that some areas were certain to vote for accession to Pakistan and some for accession to India and by which, without taking a vote therein, they should be allotted accordingly and the plebiscite should be confined only to the uncertain area, which I said appeared to be the Valley of Kashmir and perhaps some adjacent country.
I pointed out that in both cases it would be necessary to provide against the possibility of a break in the continuity of the territory which would go to the one party or to the other. I also pointed out that the second alternative might be worked out according to the 1941 census alone or upon wider considerations as well as the information it contains. Further I said that it would be necessary to agree that if the result was to put the upper waters of the Chenab River into the control of India, it would not divert them by artificial works so that Pakistan would receive a sensibly reduced volume of water.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan protested against the course proposed on the ground that it meant a breach on India's part of the agreement that the destination of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole should be decided by a single plebiscite taken over the entire State. But at my request the Prime Minister of India said that he would inform me of the views of India upon such a method of settling the Kashmir problem.
The Prime Ministers thereupon agreed to the adjournment of the conference.
In taking the course I have described I acted under the resolution of the Security Council dated 14 March 1950 by which I was required to place before the two Governments any suggestion which in my opinion was likely to lead to the solution of the dispute. Notwithstanding the attitude of the Prime Minister of Pakistan I considered that unless it was by a partition of the State either outright, or combined with a partial plebiscite limited to an area which included the Valley of Kashmir, no agreed settlement of the Kashmir dispute could be brought about. From that time therefore I devoted myself to an attempt to negotiate a settlement in such a manner.
I spent some time in New Delhi for the purpose of obtaining from India as definite an understanding as might be of its position with respect the suggested lines of settlement. After consideration the Indian authorities informed me that the Government of India would be prepared to discuss a settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of certain principles. The principles were, first, that the areas of the State of Jammu and Kashmir where there is no apparent doubt as to the wishes of the people in those areas, should go to India or Pakistan without a plebiscite; secondly, that the plebiscite should be limited to those areas where there is doubt as to the result of the voting and thirdly, that the demarcation should have due regard to geographical features and to the requirements of an international boundary. I was informed that in applying these principles the Government had been led to some conclusions which were described as tentative.
In the first place there should be a plebiscite in the Valley of Kashmir. The area should, however, include part of the Muzaffarabad District to bring in what India regarded as the natural geographical feature provided by the river Kishan ganga and its watershed on the north.
In the second place India considered that the following areas should go to it:
(a) The Province of Jammu so far as it lies east of the cease-fire line subject to minor corrections: one correction was to reduce the bulge in the cease-fire line near Gulmarg.
(b) In the district of Ladakh, the tehsil of Ladakh and the tehsil of Kargil, except approximately the area above the Suru River, which should go to India or Pakistan according to the result of the plebiscite of the Valley.
In the third place India was willing that the following areas should go to Pakistan. viz. Gilgit, Gilgit Agency, Gilgit Wazzrat, political districts and tribal territory and Baltistan, and so much of the Jammu Province as lies to the west of the cease-fire line as corrected.
India contemplated a boundary commission to apply on the ground the division which might be decided upon. It also appeared that India was prepared to include in any such settlement a term that it would not be any artificial work in the State to divert the waters of the Chenab River or reduce the flow substantially of the waters of the river, except that it might construct canals for irrigation confined within the State. Without reducing the waters of the stream, it might establish hydro-electric works for the production of electrical energy.
I was told that the Prime Minister of India would be prepared to attend another conference with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and me, so that the possibility of a settlement on such principles might be discussed.
The territorial demands which the foregoing information disclosed appeared to me to go much beyond what, according to my conception of the situation, was reasonable, and I so stated to the Indian authorities.
Thus armed with a knowledge of the position taken up by India, I went to Karachi,
I told the Prime Minister of Pakistan of what I had learned from India as the position it took, but I added an expression of my own opinion that the territorial claims it involved went too far and did not represent the division of the State to which in the end India might be expected to agree. But the Government of Pakistan declined to attend a conference on the footing I proposed in order to discuss, in the light of the position taken by India, the possibility of settling the dispute.
The primary reason of the Government of Pakistan for refusing to do so lay in its unwillingness to depart at all from the claim that the fate of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by an over-all plebiscite and that India ought to have agreed and ought still to agree on measures for holding such a plebiscite, and in its fear lest, by attending a conference to discuss an alternative plan, it might be considered to abandon that claim.
But as a second ground it was said that India's position was too indefinite, and if it wished to embark upon discussions of the possibility of settlement according to the suggested principles, it should itself make definite proposals.
I urged upon the Government of Pakistan the view that, by coming to a conference to discuss an alternative possible settlement, it could not be held to abandon its main contention, and that the purpose of a conference was by discussion to define what things parties were respectively prepared to concede and upon what things they took a fixed position. It was enough that the basis of the settlement to be discussed was a limited plebiscite and partition of the rest of the State, the Kashmir Valley being included in the plebiscite area. I did not see why it should not be possible for the parties to argue out the boundaries of the plebiscite area, the division of the remaining territory and the conditions for securing the independence of the voting until either they saw that they could not agree or else found some basis of agreement. Even on the assumption that the conference failed, Pakistan would come away from it better informed and, so far as I could see, without having suffered any real prejudice. But of the soundness of this view I was unable to persuade its Government. Pakistan maintained its refusal to attend a conference of the kind I proposed.
In the course of the discussion, however, I ascertained that if the basis of suggested settlement had been simple partition, a solution having the advantages of being immediate in its operation and self-executing, Pakistan would consider the matter, provided that it took the Kashmir Valley. I had little doubt however that India would not concede the Valley of Kashmir in an over-all partition.
I returned to New Delhi and informed the Prime Minister of India of the position taken by Pakistan. As I had expected, he declined to consider at all an over-all partition in which the Valley of Kashmir went to Pakistan.
The stand adopted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan had led me to the conclusion that there no longer existed any possibility of my bringing the parties to any composition of the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In this view I found that both Prime Ministers concurred. But at the end of some discussion with the Prime Minister of India of the consequences which followed, I put forward, as a last possibility of saving the situation, a suggestion that I myself should prepare a plan complete except for details.
The plan would be one for holding a partial plebiscite in a limited area including or consisting of the Valley of Kashmir, and for partitioning the remainder of the State. I would then call a conference and lay the plan before them for acceptance or rejection, or if independently of me the parties wished to modify it by agreement, for modification accordingly.
I told the Prime Minister of India that I thought that Pakistan might take the view that it could have no cause for fear that, by complying with my invitation to take part in such a proceeding, it would be considered as departing from its stand on the overall plebiscite and as waiving its primary claim. The course I suggested, I added, also removed the objection of want of definiteness in the terms of the partition and partial plebiscite which would be tabled for consideration at the conference.
After a little discussion of the chances of such a course proving successful and of the disadvantages which it would have if it proved unsuccessful, the Prime Minister of India took time to consider the matter. Later in the day he informed me that it had been decided to fall in with the suggestion, provided that Pakistan told me that the fact that my plan was based on partial plebiscite and partition would not in itself necessarily prove fatal to its consideration by Pakistan. For India would not agree to a meeting which could not but prove futile.
I returned to Karachi and placed before the Government of Pakistan the proposal that, as a last resort, I should prepare a plan of the kind stated and lay it before a meeting which I would convene and I told them of the condition imposed by India. At first the Government of Pakistan was unwilling to agree in the course proposed. But after much discussion of the matter I gave to the Prime Minister of Pakistan a statement that I completely understood his Government's position in standing on the overall plebiscite and I gave him an assurance that neither I nor any other authority of the United Nations would regard him or his Government as in the least degree derogation from or prejudicing that position if he complied with the request I made to him to examine and take into consideration the plan which I was ready to prepare and submit, although it was of an alternative character. My statement included an expression of the view that if Pakistan refused on the ground state to join in the consideration of the intended plan it would be wanting in the fulfilment of the duty which rests upon both countries to give willing consideration to any plan put forward as containing a possibility of reconciling the conflict between the two countries and thus avoiding the dangers to which the continuance of the conflict exposes both of them.
On the faith of the assurances my statement contained, the Government of Pakistan agreed to comply with my request to attend a conference to consider my intended plan, notwithstanding that it was based on an alternative to an over-all plebiscite. But Pakistan in its turn imposed a condition. The condition arose out of its insistence upon the view that India would not agree upon specific practical measures which would insure the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite.
In fact I had decided that I would use for the limited plebiscite area one of the measures which I had proposed for the whole State on the footing that the cease-fire line might thus be terminated. I intended to provide that an administrative body consisting of United Nations officers should be set up in the limited plebiscite area. The Plebiscite Administrator would be at the head of the body. The body would carry on the functions of government in the area until the poll was declared. It would not be the body's function to form new policies but to carry on the administration of government in the area. I intended that the administrative body of United. Nations officers should have power, if they thought fit to do so, to exclude troops of every description. If on the other hand they decided that for any purpose troops were necessary they could request the parties to provide them. Insofar as they allowed the views of the two sides to be laid before the people of the limited area, they would have power to secure equality to India and Pakistan in any such right as well as in other respects.
I informed the Pakistan Government that I intended to include a provision of this nature. It expressed doubt as to India's agreeing to it and said that it was not prepared to attend a conference which would break down at the threshold if India refused to accept it. I then offered to consult India in advance upon the matter provided that, subject to India's answer, Pakistan agreed to the course I proposed, namely that it would come to a conference to consider a plan to be prepared by me and would do so on the footing that the presence in the intended plan of a provision for a limited plebiscite would not prove an insuperable objection.
To this Pakistan agreed.
I then informed the Prime Minister of India by telegram of the assurances I had given Pakistan and of the kind of provision that my plan would contain for the purpose of securing the fairness of the plebiscite and its freedom from any suspicion of intent Latin. I asked him to inform me if he was of the opinion that the inclusion in my plan of such a provision in order to secure the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite made it impossible for him to accept the plan as a whole. Otherwise I requested him to name a date for the meeting.
The Prime Minister of India answered by telegram expressing an emphatic refusal to agree to any such provision. The telegram said at the end that if I came to New Delhi the Prime Minister would be glad to explain India's position fully to me to avoid any possibility of any misunderstanding.
Accordingly I went to New Delhi.
I shall enumerate the objections briefly as I collected them from the telegram and from my discussion with the Prime Minister at Delhi.
(a) Pakistan is an aggressor and it would be to surrender to aggression to allow it to take any part in the plebiscite. For the same reason and because of the danger involved, Pakistan's troops could never be allowed to enter the plebiscite area and therefore it was impossible to countenance the proposal to enable the administrative body to request the parties to
provide troops if it thinks them necessary.
(b) The provision would mean that the Government of the State would be superseded and went far beyond what is necessary for the purpose in view.
(c) Only those people belonging to the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be allowed any part in the "campaign" over the plebiscite. There can be no equality of any right between India and Pakistan in this or other relevant respects.
(d) The security of the State would be endangered. These arguments appeared to me to overlook the real nature of a proposal for partition and a partial plebiscite or else to make it completely impossible. The question whether Pakistan had or had not been an aggressor had, in my mind, nothing to do with the results of a partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite. To agree that Pakistan should take under a partition part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, it took not merely an interest in but sovereignty of the territory. Again, as I saw the matter, to agree that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan should pass to one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree to a text involving an equal interest in both countries in the result. Further it is to agree to the ascertainment of the will of the people by an independent authority because that authority will see that the plebiscite is freely and fairly conducted.
I had formed the opinion that it was not easy to exclude the danger that the inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir would vote under fear or apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are not high spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part they are illiterate. There were large numbers of regular soldiers of the Indian Army as well as of the State Militia and police, and more often than not they were under arms. The State Government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest. These are not matters that the Kashmiris inhabiting the Valley could be expected to disregard in choosing between voting as the Government of Kashmir asked them and voting for accession to Pakistan.
It appeared to me that the danger to the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite could not be removed unless, in the administrative hierarchy of the State so far as it controlled the plebiscite area, United Nations officers were interposed temporarily. The authority of the Ministry over the rest of the State would not be affected. The ordinary working of the machinery of government in the plebiscite area would go on without change, but for the limited area, the United Nations administrators would for the time being be responsible for the working of the machinery in order to see that it was not used to influence the voters, as otherwise it well might be in countless ways.
The presence of numbers of troops, armed militia and police in the Valley did not appear to me to be favourable to a free expression of the people's will, and I considered that the administrative body might be safely given powers to decide what was necessary to insure the maintenance of order and to protect the area from external danger if it found that any existed. I did not suppose that it would invoke Pakistan troops without good cause, but I saw no reason why both countries should not be under an obligation to provide troops if requested. I saw no reason to change the opinion I had formed or to depart from the provision I had intended to include. I could not expose a plebiscite conducted under the authority of the United Nations to the dangers which I believed certainly to exist. Indeed I came to conclusion that it would be impossible to give effect to the doctrines formulated by India in objection to my plan and at the same time frame a plan for partition and a limited plebiscite which I could ask Pakistan to accept.
The Prime Minister of India concurred in the view that no hope existed of an agreement for a plebiscite by which the fate of the Valley could be decided. No other acceptable expedient for disposing of the Valley could be suggested. The Prime Minister of India agreed therefore that there was nothing further that I could now do in the sub-continent. I returned to Karachi, where the Prime Minister of Pakistan took the same view. I left Karachi on 23 August 1950.
It will be seen that two main lines have been pursued in the attempts which have been made to settle the dispute between the two countries about the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The attempt to find a solution by taking a plebiscite over the whole State and so deciding by a majority to which country the entire State shall go has its origin in the first proceedings before the Security Council. It should be recalled that by the resolution of 21 April 1948 the desire of both India and Pakistan that the question of the accession of the State to one or other of them should be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite was noted with satisfaction. In the agreed resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949 there is a recital of the acceptance by the Governments of both countries of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.
From the date of this resolution until the present there have been continual efforts to bring about conditions in which the preparations for taking a poll might go forward. No one has supposed that they could even begin while much of the respective territories on either side of the cease-fire line was occupied by opposed armies and their base units. There are in addition many other clues to the holding of a free and fair plebiscite which must be removed before the State would be ready for the organization and machinery which the taking of a poll would make necessary. Unfortunately all this has been made to depend upon the agreement of the parties. It is enough to refer to paragraphs 2, 6 (a) and 10 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 and to the provisions of the resolution of 13 August 1948 upon which these paragraphs hang. There is, I believe, on the side of India a conception of what ought to be done to ascertain the real will of the people which is not that tacitly assumed by me. Doubtless it is a conception which Pakistan does not share. The resolution of 5 January 1949 contains some rather general provisions in relation to the holding of the plebiscite and the antecedent steps, and about those more general provisions the parties were able to agree. But to apply propositions of this kind a programme of practical acts and physical events must reed upon. Without this it is impossible for the Plebiscite Administrator to begin the extensive and difficult work of organizing the taking of a poll. It is the practical measures which have proved the obstacle, not the more general propositions.
Pakistan has complained of India's failure to agree on the practical measures which must precede the preparations for the actual taking of a poll, and has maintained that this failure is the result of a deliberate policy. But the fact remains that under the resolutions the agreement of India to the course to be proposed in these matters is a condition precedent to carrying out a plebiscite of the State, and there is no such agreement. Moreover, the United Nations Commission failed in its efforts to secure an agreement upon them: I failed in mine neither party put forward any other proposals and both appeared to concur in the view that the possibility of agreement has been exhausted.
The contention of Pakistan that it was incumbent on India to agree did not advance the matter practically. It was in these circumstances that I decided to turn away from a plebiscite of the whole State, an "overall" plebiscite, as a method of solving the problem of Kashmir. Partition of the whole State between the two countries is of course an obvious alternative. But unfortunately the Valley of Kashmir cannot itself be partitioned and it is an area claimed by each side. Pakistan claims is not only because it is predominantly Muslim but also because the Jhelum river flows form it and Pakistan will not readily give its claim. India is just as insistent upon its claim and has the advantage of possession. Some method of locating the Kashmir Valley to one party or the other is therefore essential to any plan of partition.
I am inclined to the view that no method of locating the Valley to one or other of the contending parties is available except a poll of the inhabitants. By the inhabitants I mean those of them who fulfil whatever may be fixed as the test of eligibility to vote. The difficulty of using the expedient of a plebiscite appears to lie entirely in the conflict between, on the one hand, the necessity of insuring that the plebiscite is held in conditions which make it an effective means of ascertaining the real will of the people independently formed and freely expressed, and, on the other hand, certain conceptions or preconceptions of the Indian Government. These are based in part on what India conceives to be the origin and course of the fighting in 1947 and 1948 and in part on its unwillingness to have any interference with or restriction of the powers of government in the State whether in reference to the use of armed forces or in reference to the civil administration. In addition, it may be, as I have suggested, that a different conception exists of the process of ascertaining the will of the people. Although I myself found no reconciliation of this conflict possible, it may be that with India's help some resolution of the conflict may be discovered. India may come to realize that the necessity of practical measures which will really secure the freedom and fairness of a plebiscite must be paramount over these conceptions. At all events I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement India and Pakistan it now lies in partition and in some means of allocating by Valley rather than in an over-all plebiscite. The reasons for this may be shortly stated.
The State of Jammu and Kashmir is not really a unit geographically, demographically or economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of one Maharajah. That is the unity it possesses. If as a result of an overall plebiscite the State as an entirety passed to India, there would be large movements of Muslims and another refugee problem would arise for Pakistan, which would be expected to receive them in very great numbers. If the result favoured Pakistan, a refugee problem, although not of such dimensions, would arise for India, because of the movement of Hindus and Sikhs. Almost all this would be avoided by partition. Great areas of the State are unequivocally Muslim. Other areas are predominantly Hindu. There is a further area which is Buddhist. No one doubts the sentiment of the great majority of the inhabitants of these areas. The interest of the people, the justice as well as permanence of the settlement, and the imperative necessity of avoiding another refugee problem all point to the wisdom of adopting partition as the principle of settlement and of abandoning that of an overall plebiscite. But in addition the economic and geographic considerations point in the same direction. The difficulty in partitioning the State is to form a sound judgment where the line should be drawn.
While what I have said deals broadly with the State as a whole, it is by no means easy to fix the limits on each side. That is because it is necessary that the territory allocated to each side should be continuous in itself and should be contiguous with that country, because there are pockets of people whose faith and affiliations are different from those of people by whom they are cut off, because the changes in the distribution of population as the result of the troubles cannot be completely ignored, and because geographical features remain important in fixing what may prove an international frontier.
I shall not deal with more particularity, and I say so much only in case the Security Council should be of opinion that it should take further steps to effect a settlement between the parties. But for myself I doubt whether it may not be better to leave the parties to themselves in negotiating terms for the settlement of the problem how to dispose of Jammu and Kashmir between them. So far the attitude of the parties has been to throw the whole responsibility upon the Security Council or its representatives of settling the dispute, notwithstanding that, except by agreement between them, there was no means of settling it.
When actual fighting was going on between them it was natural, if not necessary, that the Security Council and the Commission as its delegate should intervene between them and propose terms to stop the hostilities. But when this was done to the extent of stopping open hostilities and the question came to be how to settle the rival claims to Kashmir, the initiative was still left with the Security Council and the Commission. The whole question has now been thoroughly discussed by the parties with the Security Council, the Commission and myself, and the possible methods of settlement have been exhaustively investigated. It is perhaps best that the initiative should now pass back to the parties. At all events I am not myself prepared to recommend any further course of action on the part of the Security Council for the purpose of assisting the parties to settle between them how the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to be disposed of.
The continued maintenance of two armies facing one another across a cease-fire line is another matter. A danger to peace must exist while this state of things continues. Except for mutual distrust and fear, one of another there is no reason why the two countries should go on maintaining armies separated only by the cease-fire line. It is a boundary which might be kept by check posts and the like in the same way as any frontier between countries at peace. It is hard to behave that the Indian and Pakistan Chiefs of Staff would have any difficulty in arranging for a concurrent reduction of forces or in effecting the necessary change in the manner in which the cease-fire-line is held; they were instructed by their respective Governments to meet for the purpose.
Before leaving the sub-continent I addressed to the Prime Ministers severally a request that this should be done. It is a matter in which the Security Council is directly concerned because it involves a proximate danger to peace.
I recommend that the Security Council should press the parties to reduce the military strength holding the cease-fire line to the normal protection of a peace-lime frontier.
In the meantime it is my recommendation that the party of United Military Observers be retained on the cease-fire line. They cannot continue there indefinitely, but after a time the question of their withdrawal might be settled in consultation with the two Governments.
(Signed) Owen Dixon United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan