Kashmiri Bhatta

24031949 VII. Recommendations

24031949 VII. Recommendations

That the Security Council should ask the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to secure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire be faithfully observed; also that the two Governments be enjoined to abstain from any measure liable to augment tension in the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the final settlement of the future of the State.

That the Security Council designate as its representative a single individual whose terms of reference will be defined after the consultations envisaged in point 3, below, and who would proceed to the Sub-continent with broad authority from the Council to endeavour to bring the two Governments together on all unresolved issues; the representative designated to take into account the objectives pursued by the resolutions of the Commission, already agreed to by both Governments, for the establishment of conditions conducive to the holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir whereby the will of the people as to the future of the State may be freely and impartially ascertained.

That the Security Council should consult with representatives of the two Governments in order to arrive at terms of reference for its representative-including consultation regarding the scope of his authority to settle eventually by arbitration, those issues involved in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as may remain outstanding which impede the creation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite.

/S/ Carlos A. Leguizamon (Argentina) S/ Robert Van De Kerchove d'Hallebast

(Belgium)

/S/ Hernando Samper (Colombia)

/S/ Robert B. Macatee (United States of (America)

APPENDIX

Related Questions

I. NOMINATION OF THE PLEBISCITE ADMINISTRATOR

Paragraph (3) (a) of the Resolution of 5 January 1949 reads as follows: "The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence." The Governments of India and Pakistan were consulted on names of personalities who would be acceptable as Plebiscite Administrator. Both Governments agreed that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz would be acceptable to them and on 24 March 1949, following the Commission's recommendation to the Secretary-General, the Commission was notified of his acceptance and nomination. The Plebiscite Administrator will enter into functions only when agreement will have been reached between the two parties on the completion of Part I and on the details for the implementation of part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948.

II. PRISONERS OF WAR AND POLITICAL

PRISONERS

This question relates more specifically to the Resolution of 5 January which cannot be implemented concurrently with the Resolution of 13 August, but only subsequently..

In March 1949 the Commission was informed by the Pakistan Government that political prisoners in Kashmir were reported to have been given heavy punishment! sentences and even condemned to death by the Maharaja's Government.

The Government of India however raised the objection that the Resolution of 5 January, paragraph 7 of which covers such questions, cannot be put into force until the truce has

been signed and the Plebiscite Administrator appointed.

The Commission therefore judged that it would be difficult to pursue the question further, but it obtained an assurance that the prisoners considered at that time had not been sentenced to death, and that their cases were still proceeding in court.

The Commission's Truce Proposals of 15 April (Annex 17) contained a clause to the effect that all prisoners of war would be released within one month and that all emergency laws promulgated as a consequence of hostilities would be repealed within one month and all political prisoners arrested or prosecuted under these laws, whether condemned or not, would be released during the same period. In its reply dated 17 April (Annex 20) the Indian Government declared that they accepted the proposal concerning prisoners of war and that with regard to the rest of the clause in question it was not clear under which provision of the Resolution of 13 August it had been made, The Indian note further stated that the matter fell under point 7 of the Commission's Resolution of 5 January 1949. It could not be regarded by the Government of India as legitimately connected with the Truce Agreement proposed. The Pakistan Government made no observation. In their final Truce Terms of 28 April 1949 (Annex 21) the Commission, in order to keep more strictly to the letter of the Resolution of 13 August 1948 replaced the previous clause by the following:

"It will be made publicly known throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

" The Government of Pakistan replied to this proposal in its letter dated 30 May 1949 (Annex 49)

"It is understood that the Commission is fully alive to the importance of taking concrete stops, such as the release of political prisoners and the abrogation of emergency laws, to implement the declaration under Paragraph III of the Truce Terms. The Pakistan Government trusts that the Commission will do everything possible for the restoration of human and political liberty in the State in actual practice. Unless the public declaration envisaged in Paragraph III F is followed immediately by concrete action, the psychological effect on the people of the State would be of a highly undesirable character."

The Commission sought to bring about those conditions in formulating its proposals.

III. REFUGEE PROBLEM

As a consequence of the disturbances a great number of persons had to leave their homes in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The problem of the Kashmir refugees is naturally a matter of deep concern to the Governments of India and Pakistan.

This problem is not dealt with in the Resolution of 13 August 1948 but is covered by that of 5 January 1949. Consequently the Commission need not take it up at present, although it should be borne in mind in view of the need to create a favourable atmosphere for the plebiscite and also on humanitarian grounds.

Paragraph 6 (a) of the Resolution of 5 January 1949 stipulated that all citizens of the State who had left it on account of the disturbances would be invited and be free to return and exercise all their rights as such citizens. The same paragraph contemplates the appointment of two commissions. one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan, to operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator for the purpose of facilitating the return of the refugees to their homes.

After an interview on 11 March with representatives of the International Red Cross, who described their activities in the field of relief for Kashmir refugees, a letter was sent by the Commission to the two Governments asking them to study this problem.

In this letter the Commission referred to the citizens of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who had left it at the time of the disturbances and who under the Resolution of 5 January 1949, should be invited to return to their homes and be guaranteed their rights as citizens of the State.

It was suggested by the Commission that, as provided for under the Resolution of 5 January 1949, two refugee commissions should be set up in the near future, both operating

under the authority of the Plebiscite Administrator.

The Commission felt and still feels that very useful preparatory work can be done by the two Governments even before the Plebiscite Administrator enters upon his functions.

On 3 May, the Personal Representative of the Secretary General sent a further letter on behalf of the Commission asking the two Governments for information as to what steps they had taken to set up the two above-mentioned commissions.

The Pakistan Government replied on 6 May that a certain amount of preliminary work had been done but that no decision had been taken on the composition and functions of the proposed commission.

On 10 May the Government of India informed the Commission that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir was drawing up a plan for the collection of information about persons who, as a result of the hostilities, had been obliged to leave their homes, whether such persons were inside or outside the State; it added that with this end in view a number of enquiries had been made of the commandants of refugee camps in the State and in India proper.

The Personal Representative of the Secretary-General sent a letter of reminder bearing on this subject to the two Governments on 7 September.

The Government of India replied that the refugees in India, who were dispersed in a large number of camps, were going to be concentrated in a single camp on the border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in order to facilitate their repatriation.

As regards the refugees in India who are not in camps, the Indian Governments is prepared to do a census of them but considers that this conduct be done when their repatriation is imminent since they are predominantly a floating population. The Indian Government would welcome a plan for repatriation to the Azad territory, since almost all the refugees in question come from that territory.

It takes the view that in the meantime a repatriation commission would serve no useful purpose.

The Indian Government considers that under the auspices of the Plebiscite Administrator a joint plan of action with the Pakistan authorities should be drawn up..

The Pakistan Government's reply, dated 21 September 1949, states that a census is being carried out of refugees in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir and that the results will be communicated to the Commission.

As regards the Pakistan Refugee Commission which the Commission had proposed be set up, the Pakistan Government asks for information about the functions of this body and indicates its preference for a joint commission of representatives of the two Governments, as was suggested in Paris at a meeting held on 2 December 1948. Alternatively it suggests that both the commissions to be established should operate within the State of Jammu and Kashmir under the surveillance and direction of the Plebiscite Administrator.

IV. OBJECTIONABLE PROPAGANDA

When the Commission returned to the Sub-continent, Both Governments drew its attention to the propaganda which was being carried on the opposite side in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

This propaganda, which maintained the suspicion and hatred resulting from the hostilities, was hardly compatible with the Commission's work.

In the Resolution of 13 August, there is a clause requiring the two Governments to appeal to their respective people to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. In the Commission's view, the cease-fire in the military sphere should have been accompanied by a "cease-propaganda".

In a letter dated 12 February (Annex 2), the Commission requested the two governments, in identical terms, to exercise their influence so as to bring about the cessation of all propaganda which goes beyond legitimate political activity. The Commission regrets that this undesirable propaganda does not as yet seem to have been abandoned.

V. ADMISSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA

The Commission received from the Pakistan Minister for Kashmir Affairs a letter dated 11 June 1949 (Annex 52) protesting against the decision taken by the Constituent Assembly of India to reserve four seats for the representatives of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and also against certain statements made on the occasion of that decision by members of the Delhi Government.

The Commission replied in a letter dated 20 June 1949 (Annex 53) stating that it would submit the Pakistan Government's communication to the Security Council. That is what is now being done.

It cannot be denied, however, that this step was undesirable from the political point of view, since it was bound to increase tension between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question.

In the Commission's view, it is difficult to oppose this measure of the Indian Government on purely legal grounds. The Commission did not consider there was any useful purpose to be served in approaching the Indian Government on this matter.

The Pakistan Government refers to this matter in its letter of 1 October (Annex 42). Commenting upon that letter, Sir Girja S. Bajpai in his letter dated 21 November (Annex 43) sets forth the reasons which in his Government's view justifies the participation of representatives of the Jammu and Kashmir Government in the Constituent Assembly of India as follows:

"While the constitution of India, which, inter alia, provides for the relations of acceding States to the Government of India was under consideration, it would have been unfair to the Government and people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to deny them the opportunity of participating in the discussion of that constitution. Such participation was not intended to and does not, in fact, alter the Government of India's determination to abide, in the matter of accession, by the freely declared will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Should that will be against the State continuing to be part of India, if and when it comes to be expressed in a constitutional way under conditions of peace and impartiality, the representation of the State in the Indian Parliament would automatically cease and the provisions of the Constitution of India that govern the relations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India will also cease to operate."

VI. "LOCAL AUTHORITIES"

Part II, Section A. 3, of the Resolution of 13 August

1948 provides that pending a final solution, the territory of the State evacuated by the Pakistani troops would be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. The Commission was not faced with the need to define its relations to the local authorities, nor was it called upon to investigate the matter in detail since this provision was to go into effect only as a result of a Truce Agreement. The provision was intentionally phrased in the broad term "local authorities in order to overcome the difficulties which might. have arisen in August 1948 as regards the actual administration. of the area and which, at that time, might have entailed a delay in bringing about the cease-fire. In this connection, the Indian Government pointed out that in the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan troops, the Commission would have to consider not only local officials, but also the "Azad Kashmir Government''.

The Government of India expressed to the Commission its concern that "de facto" recognition of this "Government" not be granted by the Commission and that, on the other hand, the guarantees of freedom of speech, etc., for which India undertakes to secure respect in the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under her control and which are essential for the preparation of the plebiscite, be not only paper guarantees in

Azad territory, but be enforceable and enforced. In the Government of India's view the Azad territory constitutes a vacuum which can only be filled by the "surveillance" of the Commission.

Source: UN Document No. S/1430)

Czechoslovak Delegation Report

Addendum to the third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan minority report of the Czechoslovak delegation.

16 December 1949

The third interim report of the Commission places on record the failure of a seven-month effort to fulfil its task of causing, by its mediation, the Governments of India and Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute by the peaceful means of a plebiscite. From the said failure of the Commission's mediation mission it must be concluded that the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which are the starting points of all negotiations, are out of keeping with the actual, present-day situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and that no compromise acceptable to both the Governments can be reached on their basis.

In putting on record the impossibility of attaining a positive result, the majority of the Commission proposes that the task the Commission had been charged with should be entrusted in one mediator, and in paragraph 286 of its report indicates also the road to arbitration.

The report, together with a description of the various phases of the negotiations and relevant documentation, is made to show that the mediation proceedings were handled correctly and in every way objectively, and that the negotiations that were conducted on the basis of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were wrecked on account of the intransigent attitude of the two Governments.

The Czechoslovak delegation co-operated to the fullest extent with the Commission to achieve the solution of the Kashmir problem, and in presenting its views in a separate report it wishes to throw light on those phases of the Commission's mediation efforts where the majority report fails to state clearly the reasons of the failure.

It is of course quite obvious that, as a mere holder of a mandate from the Security Council, the Commission could, on taking over its task, only take cognizance of the given situation, and no fault can be ascribed to it as far as the core of the dispute proper is concerned.

On the other hand, however, it is necessary to state that the mediation efforts of the Commission did not contribute in a constructive way to the positive solution of the whole

problem.

It needs placing on record that :

(a) The Commission has made a serious mistake in that it cancelled the joint political conference which had been convened with the assent of both the Governments for 22 August 1949, at New Delhi.

(b) By its unauthorized proposal for the arbitration of the truce agreement it overstepped its terms of reference.

(c) The secret arbitration offer of the Commission was, before being presented to the Government of India and Pakistan, placed at the disposal of the Government of the United States and the United Kingdom, and President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, in a synchronized action, made use for a public interventionary pressure.

(d) The interim text of the secret arbitration memorandum came into the hands of the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi at the same time or even sooner than it was officially presented to the Indian Government, without even an attempt on the part of the Commission-despite urging by its Chairman at the time to institute due investigation of both cases of a flagrant breach of the integrity of the Commission's proceedings.

(e) The Commission did not show sufficient sagacity when presenting its basic proposal for a solution of the Kashmir problem, the proposal which was adopted as the resolution of 13 August 1948, in which the Commission deeply underrated the significance of the "Azad forces" and failed altogether to take into account the situation in the "northern area", on which two problems subsequently all the Commission's work kept on foundering.

(f) The Commission did not succeed in winning public confidence on either side, and on the contrary left the sub-continent charged by the Press, both before the conclusion of its labours and after its departure, of pusillanimity and even of double-dealing.

The Commission stated itself in its first interim report. that it had come to the sub-continent un-certain how it would be received and whether it would acquire the necessary cooperation of both Governments. This lack of confidence in its mission, however, can be seen throughout its labours. Instead of taking a firm stand on definite issues, where it was necessary, the Commission preferred to resort to clarifications and promises, thus compromising its own position and achieving on the whole nothing positive.

The failure of the Commission's mission is therefore not solely ascribable to the intransigence of the Governments of India and Pakistan, both of which understandably tried in the course of repeated negotiations to gain the most advantageous position; the reasons must be also looked for in the activities of the Commission per se, with a proper light thrown on the substance of the whole problem of Kashmir.

The report of the Commission sets forth the three most important obstacles which balked its effects to reach agreement:

(a) Disposal of Azad Kashmir forces,

(b) Withdrawal of regular forces from the State, and

The reasons for the insolubility of these problems must be sought just in the shortcomings of the resolution of 13 August 1948. In its part II, the full implementation of which is the basic condition for any further measures that would ensure a fair and unhampered carrying out of a plebiscite, there is not mention whatever of "Azad forces'', because the Commission did not assume that the cease-fire line would be of such long duration. The "Azad forces' 'meanwhile grew by the spring of 1949 into 32 determined and fully armed battalions, which according to an evaluation by the military adviser of the Commission represent a "formidable force". Owing to this fact, which is at variance with part I, section B, of the said resolution forbidding both parties any increasing of their military potential, the situation has materially undergone an absolute change and so a new problem was created as to what within the meaning of the resolution represents the "bulk" of the Indian army in Kashmir. From this have arisen logically further difficulties concerning the disarming of the "Azad forces' ' and the synchronization of the withdrawal of troops.

Similarly, due to the lack of sagacity on the part of the Commission, the situation was rendered more difficult also for the solution of the other main problem, the "northern area".

When dealing with its proposal to both Governments, adopted as the resolution of 13 August 1948 first by the Government of India and subsequently sanctioned as the resolution of 5 January 1949 also by the Pakistan Government -the Commission entirely failed to concern itself with the situation in strategically very important territory to the north of Kashmir.

Having ascertained this shortcoming, the Government of India submitted a reservation in respect of the resolution dated 13 August 1948, concerning its right to administer the northern territory, of which, on the basis of the military situation then existing, it maintained that it could not be put on a par with the "Azad territory" to the west of Kashmir. Instead of rectifying the aforesaid shortcoming by a formal rider to the resolution which in fact the Government of Pakistan sanctioned only five months later the Commission replied by a letter dated 25 August 1948 [S/1100] in which it acknowledged to the Prime Minister of the Indian Government the receipt of his reservation and stated that they question might be examined when the resolution of 13 August 1948 was implemented.

This obligation of the Commission, which due to the Commission's own faulty judgement - therefore did not represent any formal part of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission now explains as only a declaration of an intention to study later on the situation in the north, outside of the scope of the part II of the said resolution.

From the legal point of view, the Government of Pakistan does not, therefore, consider the Commission's letter of 25 August 1948 as legally binding on it, because it was only a question of the exchange of correspondence between the Commission and the Indian Government. Moreover, the situation in the "northern area" had meanwhile undergone a material change, in that the Pakistan Army, which was not bound by the resolution of 13 August 1948, conquered many strategically important places during the interval before, by the resolution of 5 January 1949, it is also sanctioned by the Government of Pakistan.

The Governments of India and Pakistan evaluate the legal weight of the Commission's letter of 25 August 1948, each from its own second point quite contrarily, of course. In the regard it has to be pointed out that, as early as of 3 September 1948, the Government of Pakistan notified to the Commission its definition of evacuated territory "as referring to the territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which were at that time under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command". And here- due to the Commission's lack of understanding of the situation is the core of all subsequent legal contentions affecting the northern area, which the Commission has not been able to abridge.

While the Government of India made on 20 August 1948 a clear reservation regarding the position in the northern area, two weeks after that the Government of Pakistan, in its aforesaid notification, made a claim of great consequences mortgaging practically the political future of vast territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir where the Pakistan army or forces under its High Command could have gained the upper hand.

The Commission claims that at that time it had no practical means at its disposal to verify the factual situation in the different parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This is, however, exactly the reasons why the Commission should have been firm, at least on the legal ground, and should not have resorted to empty promises. The Commission, facing later on minorially changed situation in the northern area, is bound to admit that, while the reservation of the Government of India of 20 August 1948 may be legally valid, it is physically impossible to implement it.

The latter of the Pakistan Minister of Kashmir Affairs of 26 April 1949 (Annex 24), contending that the definition of 3 September 1948 brought the whole of the northern area inside the "evacuated territory", is a logical sequel to Pakis tan's position of 3 September 1948, and at the same time a reflection of the Commission's short-sightedness.

di Whatever are the reasons for not rectifying the oversight in the resolution of 13 August 1948 by a proper formal, legal instrument, it is to a great extent the Commission's own fault that its mediatory efforts to solve this second main problem have not proved successful.

In this connexion another matter of real importance has to be pointed out: the legal question of retroactivity of the resolution of 13 August 1948. The Belgian and Czechoslovak delegations requested the Legal Adviser of the Commission to submit a working paper showing the Commission's position in this regard. The said working paper through no fault of the Legal Adviser, whose efforts should be rather appreciated amounts to a masterpiece of evasiveness. The Commission itself cannot clarify its own legal instrument.

After the rejection of its proposal of 28 April 1949 to bring about a truce agreement, to which both Governments lodged material reservations, the Commission's majority considered on the whole any further efforts at mediation as futile and, from the beginning of June 1949, the United States delegation strove to bring the Commission round to the idea solving the question of the trucc by arbitration.

In its declaration which took the form of a resolution. (S/AC.12/233) the Czechoslovak delegation on the other hand argued that "it is the conviction of the Czechoslovak delegation that there exists on the part of the Commission a legal and at the sometime even a moral duty to send invitations to both Governments to attend a joint political meeting before taking into consideration any other means of solution".

The Commission was prepared to accept the Czechoslovak proposal but only subject to a successful termination meanwhile of the planned negotiations for the fixing of a definitive line of demarcation, on the realization of which the Czechoslovak delegation instead with all the weight at its command

This trying-up with a favourable result of the military. negotiations in Karachi the Czechoslovak delegation declined with the basic declaration that "it is a serious political matter which must be considered on its own political grounds without any connection with military talks in Karachi, whatsoever might be their result." The majority of the Commission nevertheless adhered to its stand-point that the ultimate decision on the convening of a joint political meeting of both Governments would be made according to the result of the military consultations.

The pessimistic attitude to the Commission toward any negotiations for an agreements on the fixing of a definitive line of demarcation was shown to be entirely unjustified, and after their complete success the Commission approved in its morning session on 29 July 1949- with the single exception of the United States delegation, which abstained from voting-the Czechoslovak proposal for the calling of a joint political conference of both Governments.

However, the measure of mistrust with which the Commission took this last of its important steps in mediation can be gauged from the fact that on the same day, 29 July, in its afternoon session, it also passed the Czechoslovak delegation abstaining the proposal of the United States delegation of arbitration proceedings for a truce agreement, for which the Governments of India and Pakistan were recommended to accept as arbitrator Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz.

The reasons given for the hasty passing of the arbitration proposal of the United States delegation was the much-stressed anxiety that the joint political conference might end in failure and that, in order to save time, it was necessary to have a new proposal in readiness.

The Governments of India and Pakistan actually did accept the proposal of a joint political conference which was to make a start on 22 August 1949 in New Delhi, with members of the cabinets of both Governments taking part. However, four days prior to its inauguration, the Commission decided in its session on 18 August 1949, to send telegrams to both Governments (annex 33), saving that the Commission itself was cancelling the joint political conference.

The reason for which this decision was made was the finding of unbridgeable conflicts in the answers of both Governments as to their ideas on the programme of the conference. A detailed explanation in his respect is being set forth in the majority report. What the report omits to mention, however, is that these conflicting points of view were well-known previously not only to the Commission itself but also to the two Governments. The Czechoslovak delegation agreed with the view that a possible failure of the joint political meeting might give a worse turn to the situation, but it maintained that the responsibility rested with the Governments of India and Pakistan, which had expressed their willingness in principle to enter inro direct negotiations with each other under the chairmanship of the Commission. A prepared conference that had already been widely announced by the international Press could be cancelled only by the participating Governments. They would in that way themselves offer proof that mediation was excluded, when they could not even be persuaded to make any start whatsoever with the discussions of the question in dispute.

These fully reasoned arguments fell rather flat however, and in spite of the warnings uttered by the Czechoslovak delegation that an infringement of the terms of reference was involved, the Commission forthwith set about preparing the arbitration action it had passed in advance on 29 July 1949. How out of order it was, however, to cancel on the

Commission's own responsibility at an already-convened joint political conference could be seen at the end of August 1949, on the occasion of the handing over of the arbitration offer to the two Governments. The Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, informed the Chairman of the Commission on 29 August 1949 in Karachi in the presence of the Principal Secretary to the Commission that the Pakistan Government was greatly surprised that the Commission had cancelled the conference. Something to the like effect was also said on 30 August 1949 in New Delhi to the Chairman of the Commission and its Principal Secretary by a representative of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, two days later, by the Prime Minister of the Indian Government, Pandit Nehru, who manifested great astonishment and expressed disappointment at the decision of the Commission. The reason for their standpoints was the conviction they voiced that parties to a dispute need not have identical views for that is why disputes are being carried on - but they must sit down round a table and must at least start discussions if any solution is to materialize.

The course of the discussions on the offer of the arbitration of the truce agreement for which the Commission was not even authorized on the basis of its terms of reference made it clear indeed that the Commission was not free from outside influence, although it was to act only according to the mandate of the Security Council in the interest of the United Nations Organization as a whole. The interventions by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee were only made possible on the basis of precise and timely information emanating from the Commission itself. This reality needs examining, just as it is necessary to subject to investigation the circumstances that and how it should be possible for a secret memorandum of the Commission on the subject of arbitration to get into the hands of British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi at the same time or earlier than it could be officially presented to the Government of India.

In this connexion it should also be observed that since May 1949 there appeared in the press of the United States frequent notices of the shortly-to-be-expected arrival of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on the sub-continent. At the beginning of June the American Press brought the news - said to be emanating from Lake Success that the Commission would take the road of arbitration proceedings. This news was published a day ahead of the time when the United States delegate placed before the Commission his first arbitration proposal. The reports of the American Press were of course explained as pure speculation on the part of journalists, but by a rather strange coincidence they did find precise expression for proposals which were just being handled by the Commission in its non-public sessions. Coupled with information conveyed time and again by Admiral Nimitz to the Press, the Commission considered it as an interference with its work, and its secretariat repeatedly by means of cables drew the attention of Lake Success to the necessity of remedying matters.

As far as Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz is concerned, there is no doubt that he acted in good faith. In his various utterances there was, however, a lack of reticence in connexion with the cool and reserved wording of the letter of 18 March 1949, by which the Indian Government acquainted the Commission with its consent to the Admiral's designation as Plebiscite Administrator. The Commission, however, did not as was highly advisable-convey to Admiral Nimitz the verbatim text of the said notification and bears, therefore, itself the responsibility for the lack of moderation on the part of the designated Plebiscite Administrator. The climax to the undesirable publicity came with the article dated Lake Success, 23 August 1949, transmitted by: PTI under the headline: "Kashmir deadlock may be referred to an arbitrator". The Commission took up this matter in its meeting on 24 August 1949 and, in expressing its concern over this type of publicity, considered it unanimously an interference with its work and prestige. In the course of an exchange of views it was decided to address a telegram to the President of the Security Council asking that the Secretary General should be requested to because in the Press a statement stressing that it lay with the Commission itself to decide what action should take, and thus counter the impression. The Commission derived initiative from the Press or any other sources (S/AC. 12/SR.223).

A question all on its own is the case of a member of the United Nations Secretariat, Mr. Cordier (S/AC. 12/257), who, on 26 August 1949, withheld the aforesaid cabled protest of the Chairman of the Commission, at the time a Czechoslovak delegate, to the Chairman of the Security Council, at that time a delegate of the Soviet Union, against outside interference with the work of the Commission. The cablegram was unanimously approved and voted upon by all members of the Commission, which only got to know through Mr. Cordier's cabled reply of 4 September 1949 that he had not delivered the complaint which was addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council personality. In this connexion it should be particularly stressed that this interference of the Secretariat with the competence of the Commission and the Security Council at the same time exactly coincides with the time of the Anglo-American intervention, which was carried out on 31 August 1949. The explanations given to the Commission by cables of Sir Alexander Cadogan and the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, rejecting the Commission's telegraphic complaint of 6 September 1949, are not only inadequate, but both cables are actually drafted so as to constitute a reproach to the Commission; they were dealt with in the statement of the Czechoslovak delegation of 16 September 1949 (S/AC.12/267).

The Commission conducted a series of strenuous negotiations and did a considerable amount of paperwork without a positive result. Besides the shortcomings bringing from its own faulty judgement of the two fundamental problems, the "Azad forces'' and the "northern area", the Commission was handicapped by the fact that it judged its task for the greater part only from the technical angle, without a capacity for seeing and drawing its conclusions from the whole political background of the Kashmir problem.

On the other hand the offer of arbitration that exceeds the scope of the Commission's terms of reference was in no way accidental. The United States delegation strove - as already mentioned for arbitration from as early date as June of the current year, with the quite frankly avowed intention to bring Admiral Nimitz at the earliest possible moment to the sub-continent in the capacity of arbiter. The Commission on its part was favourably inclined toward the arbitration proposal because it did not itself greatly believe in its mediating mission, mainly because it was clear on the whole how difficult would be the implementation of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

Even if both Governments had signed a truce agreement, it would have remained doubtful nevertheless whether the conditions of the carrying out of a free and unhampered plebiscite in the spirit of the said resolution would really be capable of realization. In any arrangement of a truce by means of arbitration there was a great probability that the truce arbiter could practically become the arbiter of the dispute as a whole.

The Kashmir dispute, however, as an affair of the whole forum of the United Nations and in its solution all preliminary conditions and guarantees of its just settlement must be preserved. If every one of the Member States of the United Nations Organization would take a similar course of action to that of the United States of America and the United Kingdom in their interventions under absolute disregard of the competence of the appropriate organs of the United Nations Organization, each and every mediation action would be made impossible and the United Nations Organization would be seriously undermined.

If a peaceful solution of the dispute is to be attained it has to be assured that the Commission does not become an instrument of policy of certain Great Powers.

The mediation efforts aimed at the solution of the Kashmir problem, and first of all the basic conditions for any further successful work of the mediation organ itself, must be put on a new basis, enjoying the unanimous support of the Security Council.

It cannot be, indeed, deduced from the failure of the Commission's mission that any further mediation in the Kashmir dispute is precluded. All it needs is a proper evaluation of the actual facts.

The resolution of 13 August 1948, due to its many serious shortcomings, cannot in its present form remain the basic legal instrument of new mediation efforts. All these shortcomings should be thoroughly analysed and exposed before a decision is reached upon new terms of reference. The interdependence of provisions of the said resolution with those of the resolution of 5 January 1949- especially with regard to the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir - should be replaced by broader provisions of new terms of reference, since under the present situation not only the attainment of the truce agreement but its implementation likewise is impossible.

The conclusion presented in the majority report expressing doubts about the flexibility of the Commission composed of five members is unwarranted. It was not a lack of flexibility but rather too much flexibility as demonstrated by so many and so important clarifications, elucidations, etc. which considerably contributed to undermining the Commission's position, as a result of a vain attempt to please both parties to the dispute at the same time.

After the experience of the past it is quite clear that the new mediation organ must be really independent and untrammelled by any outside interference. A guarantee of full independence would be enjoyed by a Commission consisting of representatives of all the members of the Security Council.

The new Commission, taking advantage of being in possession of all the necessary facts, duly evaluated by The Security Council itself, would be in a position to carry out its mediation task without delay, at Lake Success, in an atmosphere much more suitable for reaching the Truce Agreement than when on the sub-continent.

Prior to this, however, it should be taken into consideration that the Governments of both India and Pakistan - as already stated-voiced strong and concurrent protests because the joint political meeting did not materialize. It should be, therefore, recommended to the representatives of both Governments to avail themselves of the opportunity of the Commission being present here to much now, in a joint meeting at Lake Success an understanding at least on the most outstanding differences emanating from the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 respectively.

Such a procedure would constitute the best premise for the new mediation effort and would contribute in a simple and constructive way to its success, if not eventually settling the problem of the truce agreement.

(Signed) Oldrich Chyle Representative of Czechoslovakia

Lake Success, 16 December 1949

Report of Mr. McNaughton

Letter dated 3 February 1950 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the representative of Canada, communicating his report on the India-Pakistan question

[Original text: English] [6 February 1950]

You will recall that the Security Council on 17 December 1949 [457th meeting] requested me, as President, to "meet informally with the two parties and to examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem". I reported to the Council on 29 December 1949 [448th meeting] on the discharge, up to that date, of my responsibilities pursuant to this decision. I also agreed, at the request of the representatives of India and Pakistan, to continue to hold myself at their service as long as my mandate from the Security Council ran; and I undertook to report to the Council whenever the Council so desired, in order to bring it up to date regarding the discharge of these responsibilities.

As I have understood the mandate given to me in this matter by the Council, it terminated at midnight on 31 December 1949, when my term of office as President expired. Consequently, I have not undertaken any substantive action in this matter since that date. However, I agreed, at the request of the parties, to act as a transmitting agent for them in interchanging their views, to the extent that they wished to use my services for this purpose.

The purpose of this letter is to report to you on my activities in this regard since the Security Council meeting of 29 December 1949, and to give you the text of the communications which have passed between myself and the representatives of India and of Pakistan respectively. I should add that, in making this correspondence available to the Security Council, I am acting with the written agreement of the representatives of India and of Pakistan.

You will recall that, as reported to the Council on 29 December 1949, I undertook at the request of the representatives of India and Pakistan to formulate a proposal for demilitarization, designed to make possible the realization of conditions for holding a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as provided in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission which both parties have accepted. This proposal was handed to the representatives of the two parties on the night of 22 December 1949. Replies to this proposal were received, respectively, on 28 December 1949, from the Government of Pakistan, and on 29 December from the Government. of India.

The reply of the Government of Pakistan to my proposals follows.

Letter Dated 28 December 1949 Addressed to the President of the Security Council from

the Representative of Pakistan

I have the honour to refer to the proposals which you handed over to me on 22 December 1949, concerning settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir and to say that the Government of Pakistan has authorized me to communicate their acceptance of these proposals subject to the amendments set out in annex 1. As you will be pleased to observe, these amendments do not seek to alter your proposals and were suggested to bring out more clearly the objective you have in view. They are confined to such of the amendments originally proposed by us as you agreed might well be accepted as clarifications of intent. A memorandum explaining the amendments is enclosed (annex II).

(Signed) Mohammad Zafrulla Khan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan

ANNEX I

Amendments Proposed by Pakistan to the Proposals of 22 December 1949 of the President of the Security Council

(1) Sub-paragraph 1 (a)

For the words "the future of Jammu and Kashmir" substitute the following: "the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan".

(2) Sub-paragraph 2 (a)

At the end of sub-paragraph 2 (a) add the following: "the final disposal of all forces remaining in the State will be determined by the Plebiscite Administrator under the resolution of 5 January 1949 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)".

(3) Sub-paragraph 3 (a)

Omit the words "to the Government of India" in the first sentence of sub-paragraph 3 (a).

(4) Paragraph 4

Add the following as sub-clause 4 (c): "of obtaining an assurance from the appropriate authorities on either side of the cease-fire line and of making it publicly known throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed."

(5) Paragraph 5 Put a full stop after the words "India and Pakistan", and substitute the immediately following words "and which" by the words "These resolutions".

(6) Paragraph 6

Omit the words "and enduring".

ANNEX II

Explanations of Amendments Proposed by Pakistan in Annex I

(1) Sub-paragraph 1 (a)

The phrase employed in the original is vague. The amendment seeks to substitute the accepted language of the preamble to the Security Council's resolution of 21 April, 1948 and of paragraph 1 of UNCIP's resolution of 5 January, 1949 [S/1196].

(2) Paragraph 2

As is apparent from its heading, paragraph 2 of the proposals deals with "demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite". The proposals do not affect the arrangements already arrived at with regard to the plebiscite stage. The concluding sentence of paragraph 5 of the proposals provides that "the functions and powers of the Plebiscite Administrator remain as set forth in UNCIP's resolution of 5 January, 1949". These functions include the final disposal of all forces remaining in the State (see paragraph 4). The amendment makes it clear that the final disposal of all forces remaining in the State after the programme of demilitarization envisaged in paragraph 2 of the proposals has been carried out, will be determined by the Plebiscite Administrator under UNCIP's resolution of 5 January, 1949.

(3) Paragraph 3

The use of the words "to the Government of India" in sub-paragraph 3 (a) might lead to difficulties and is open to serious objection. The assurance sought could be expressed in general terms or to the United Nations.

(4) Paragraph 4

The amendment seeks to incorporate paragraph 3. section B, part II of UNCIP's resolution of 13 August, 1948, in the proposals.

(5) Paragraph 5

This is only a drafting change.

(6) Paragraph 6

The use of the words "and enduring" might give rise to misunderstanding as to the scope of the proposal. The reply of the Government of India, dated 29 December 1949, to my proposal, follows.

Letter Dated 29 December 1949 Addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Representative of India

As suggested by you, we asked the Government of India whether they would wish us to suggest amendments to your proposals in order to meet the objections which I submitted on their behalf. My Government has authorized me to propose such amendments and I am enclosing these for consideration.

(Signed) B.N. Rau

ANNEX

Amendments Proposed by India to the Proposals of 22 December 1949 of the President of the Security Council

Proposed additions are italicized and proposed omission are bracketed

(1) For sub-paragraph 2 (a) substitute: "(a) The programme of demilitarization should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular and irregular forces of Pakistan; the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line."

(Also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir, and on the other, the Azad Forces.)

(2) For sub-paragraph 2 (b) substitute:

(b) After the withdrawal of Pakistan forces referred to in sub-paragraph (a)

(i) The responsibility for the defence of the "Northern Areas" shall vest in the Government of India; and

(ii) The responsibility for the administration of the "Northern Areas" shall vest in the Government of Jammu and Kashmir which will guarantee that there shall be no victimization of the inhabitants of the area."

The "Northern Area" should also be included in the above programme of demilitarization and its administration should, subject to United Nations supervision, be continued by the existing local authorities.)

(3) In sub-paragraph 3 (a) for "tribal incursions" substitute incursions by tribesmen or Pakistan nationals" and for "tribesmen" substitute "tribesmen or Pakistan nationals".

(4) In paragraph 4 in line 8 for "this United Nations Representative" substitute "the United Nations Representative" and in line 11 for "This United Nations Representative" substitute "In addition to the functions assigned to him in paragraphs 3 and 6, the United Nations Representative".

(5) In sub-paragraph 4 (b) for "respectively" substitute "as the case may be" and at the end of the sub-paragraph add "and of the guarantee referred to in sub-paragraph 2 (b)".

(6) In paragraph 6 for the words ``to make any suggestions to the Governments of India and of Pakistan" substitute. "to make to the Governments of India and of Pakistan and to the Security Council any suggestions' '; and at the end of the paragraph of "their disposal" substitute "the disposal of the two Governments for the purpose".

(7) These are the main amendments; there may have to be minor or consequential amendments, which we think it unnecessary to detail at this stage.

On the evening of 29 December 1949, following the meeting of the Security Council on that date, I interchanged the replies of the two parties. The reply of the Government of Pakistan was handed to the representative of India at 7.35 p.m., 29 December. The reply of the Government of India to my proposal was handed to the representative of Pakistan at 7.50 p.m., 29 December 1949, Just before receiving the reply of the Government of India, the representative of Pakistan left in my office a letter to me regarding his views on the procedure to be employed in interchanging the replies of the two parties. The text of this letter to me, dated 7.30 p.m. 29 December 1949, from the representative of Pakistan reads. as follows:

Letter Dated 29 December 1949 Addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Representative of Pakistan

In your statement made to the Security Council this afternoon you stated, with regard to the further procedure that you had intended to follow, "I had then intended to see their representatives separately with a view to endeavouring to narrow the differences, in so far as might be possible, in discussions with them."

You will recall that when your proposals were conveyed to us it was explained to us that though the parties were at liberty to suggest any amendments, you would put forward to the other party only such amendments as were substantially in accord with your proposals and which you could commend to the Security Council.

I presume that the further procedure indicated by you in your statement made to the Security Council this afternoon is subject to the same condition as you attached to the consideration of any proposed amendments at the time of communicating your proposals. This is all the more necessary as the approach of the Pakistan Government to your proposals has been governed by that condition and any departure from it would upset the basis upon which the consideration of your proposals has proceeded and on which the reply of the Government of Pakistan communicated to you by me on 28 December is founded.

(Signed) Mohammad Zafrulla Khan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan

On 30 December 1949, I replied to the representative of Pakistan on this question of procedure. The text of my reply follows.

Letter Dated 30 December 1949 Addressed to the Representative of Pakistan from the President of the Security Council

I have received your letter dated 7.30 p.m., 29 December 1949, stating that you had understood that I had placed some limit on the handling of amendments suggested by either party. Since this does not exactly coincide with my interpretation, I think I should restate the position, as I have understood and intended it, regarding the status of my proposal and of any amendments thereto.

You will recall that my formal position in this matter is based on the Security Council's adoption [457th meeting] of he proposal of the representative of Norway, that "the President should meet informally with the two parties and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem". In other words, the status of my proposal is not that of any authoritative decision by the United Nations. As I said in my statement to the Security Council yesterday, I formulated my proposal at the request of the parties, and have throughout maintained the position that what I hope to see come to pass is an agreed settlement. I hope that my proposal will be a contribution to this end.

My intention and understanding throughout has been that unless my proposal is accepted by both parties, it has the informal status which it derives from the Security Council resolution to which I have referred. I have naturally hoped that my proposal would prove acceptable to both parties as a basis for further negotiation, and I have, I hope, made it clear that it could be amended either by agreement between the parties, or in drafting matters by myself for purposes of clarification of the understood intention. I also undertook to assist the parties, by discussing with them and transmitting to the other any amendments of whatsoever nature which the Governments of India and Pakistan might wish to propose. Naturally in making myself available for this purpose, I would, to the extent that I feel it might contribute towards reaching agreement between the parties, be prepared to discuss any amendments with the party which intended to put them forward, and, if that party wished me to transmit them to the other, then at an appropriate time after their receipt I would discuss them with the other party also.

In other words, I have throughout intended to retain freedom to form and express my own views on any amendments, to commend them or otherwise as I may feel right, but at no time have I contemplated imposing these views on anyone, be it the parties or my colleagues in the Security Council. It has certainly never been my intention to refuse to put forward to the other party any amendments which either government might wish me thus to transmit, Were I to refuse to transmit any amendments, I would cease to be acting as a channel between the parties, and in fact I might have been held to have assumed a function never contemplated either by the Security Council or myself, in which I might have come to act as a block to communications between the parties.

I hope you will agree that the position on amendments which I have indicated is the one most calculated to assist the parties in reaching an agreement.

When you handed over your letter yesterday evening. I understand that you told Mr. Carter that your Prime Minister has further proposals regarding paragraph 6 of the proposal which I had put forward. I will be very glad to receive these proposals, and if you wish me to do so, to transmit them mediately to the representatives of India. If you wish to have a preliminary discussion of your proposal with me before its transmission to the representatives of India, I am, of course, very happy to be at your disposal.

(Signed) A. G. L. McNaughton President of the Security Council

Subsequently on 31 December 1949, I received a further additional reply from the Government of Pakistan, regarding paragraph 6 of my proposal. The text of the letter from the representative of Pakistan follows.

Letter Dated 31 December 1949 Addressed to the President of the Security Council from the

Representative of Pakistan

The Prime Minister has enquired whether he would be right in presuming that the intent of paragraph 6 of your proposals of 22 December is that the "solution of the Kashmir question" mentioned in that paragraph would be in accordance with the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which under paragraph 5 of the proposals are to be med except in so far as their provisions are modified by the proposals. To obviate any doubt on the point, I propose that the following clarifying words be added to paragraph 6 after the words ``solution of the Kashmir question", namely: "in accord with the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949".

(Signed) Mohammad Zafrulla Khan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan

On that same date this additional reply from the Government of Pakistan was transmitted by me to the representative of India. On 2 January 1950, the representative of India called in

my office to make oral comments, on behalf of his Government, concerning the reply received to my proposal from the Government of Pakistan. In my absence the representative of India was received by Mr. Arnold Smith. On the basis of these comments by the representative of India, and at his request, Mr. Smith undertook to write a letter to the representative of Pakistan transmitting the comments of the Government of India on Pakistan's reply. The text of this communication to the representative of Pakistan was, of course, cleared beforehand with the representative of India, in order to ensure that it precisely reflected the position of the Indian Government on Pakistan's reply. The text of this letter from Mr. Smith to the representative of Pakistan follows.

Letter Dated 4 January 1950 Addressed to the Representative of Pakistan from the Principal

Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

General McNaughton has been requested by the representative of India to forward to you comments received from the Indian Government on the amendments to his proposals of 22 December 1949, which you gave to him on behalf of the Government of Pakistan under cover of your letter of 28 December, 1949.

These comments are as follows:

(1) Sub-paragraph 1 (a) No comment was made.

India reserved its position.

(2) Sub-paragraph 2 (a)

According to India's understanding, the basis of General McNaughton's proposals is demilitarization, with the agreement of the two Governments, in one comprehensive instalment. The amendment proposed by Pakistan seems to envisage demilitarization in two instalments. The Government of India sees no necessity for this and, therefore, is not disposed to accept the amendment proposed by Pakistan.

(3) Paragraph 3

No comment was made. India reserved its position.

(4) Paragraph 4

This amendment was not accepted by India on the grounds that it would, in effect, give the Azad authorities (on the one side of the cease-fire line) the same status as the lawful government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (on the other side of the cease-fire line.)

(5) Paragraph 5

India has no objection to this amendment.

(6) Paragraph 6

No comment was made. India reserved its position.

(7) Paragraph 6 (Amendment forwarded by Pakistan in the letter of 31 December 1949). The purpose of paragraph 6 of the proposals presented. by General McNaughton would seem to be to broaden the terms of reference of the United Nations Representative so as to enable him to make whatever suggestions he considers to be likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the Kashmir question. The amendment proposed by the Government of Pakistan would have the effect of limiting the Representative's functions to helping in the implementation of such agreements as may be reached between the two Governments on the programme of demilitarization. In other words, this would make paragraph 6 of the proposal superfluous. For this reason the Government of India finds itself unable to accept the amendment proposed by the Government of Pakistan.

(Signed) Arnold C. Smith Principal Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Subsequently, on 13 January 1950, I received from the representative of Pakistan the comments of his Government on the reply to my proposal received from the Government of India. The text of this message from the representative of Pakistan follows.

Letter Dated 13 January 1950 Addressed to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations from the Representative of Pakistan

Will you kindly refer to Sir B. N. Rau's letter dated 29 December, 1949, enclosing a copy of the Government of India's amendments to your proposals of 22 December.

Our views were explained to you at our meeting on 30 December 1949, but as for the purposes of your report to the Security Council you may wish to have them in writing, I set

them out below in brief.

It appears from Sir B. N. Rau's letter that the Government of India did not accept your proposals, but at your suggestion formulated its objections in the form of amendments. This is confirmed by a perusal of the so-called amendments which amount to a clear rejection of your proposals and seek to substitute in their place a scheme wholly incompatible with them. In these circumstances the Pakistan delegation does not feel that any useful purpose would be served by attempting an analysis of the Indian proposals and entering upon a refutation thereof.

(Signed) Mohammad Zafrulla Khan Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan

On 16 January 1950, the operative part of this communication was transmitted by me to the representative of India.

This is a comprehensive record of my activities since the Council meeting of 29 December, in interchanging the replies and observations received from the two parties regarding my proposal of 22 December 1949. I do not believe it is either necessary or desirable for me to comment on the replies of the two parties. Moreover you will of course understand that in exchanging these replies and observations I acted solely as a channel of communication; and that may transmittal of these communications did not imply either agreement or disagreement with the particular interpretations put forward by one party or the other regarding any part of the proposal of 22 December. In conclusion, I should say that in acting as I did in December as President of the Security Council, and in formulating at the request of the representatives of India and of Pakistan my proposal of 22 December, I believe I have acted in strict accord with the mandate given to me by the Council's decision of 17 December 1949, and that this matter was carried forward as far as was possible under the circumstances.

Since the expiry of my mandate on 31 December 1949, I have acted, at the request of the parties and in accordance with the wish of several members of the Council expressed at the meeting of 29 December 1949, as a channel of communication between the parties; and I feel that this responsibility is also now outdated.

In the absence of clear evidence that further mediation by me would seem likely to assist the Governments of India. and Pakistan toward an agreed course of action, I do not believe that further activity on my part would serve any useful purpose.

It is my view that the further procedure to settle this dispute should be determined by the Security Council; and in this connexion, I think that the two parties should be given an opportunity to explain their policies and state their views to the Council. When this has been done, the Council will be in a position to determine the action which is appropriate. As regards my own view, you have the proposal which I submitted to the parties on 22 December 1949, and I have nothing to add to it. In regard to my proposal, you will recall that I had a full opportunity to explain to the Council, on 29 December 1949, the principles on which it is based. Briefly, two main elements were in my mind in drafting the proposal. In the first place I felt that it would be most unwise to discard whatever measure of agreement had thus far been achieved between the two parties, unless some alternative agreement had first been reached between them. In the second place I sought to concentrate on the development of appropriate arrangements for the future rather than to attempt an analysis, or to pronounce judgment, on the highly controversial and disputed issues of the past few years.

I would like to add that my conversations with the representatives of India and of Pakistan, and my association with this problem during the two years when I sat on the Security Council, have impressed me deeply with the paramount necessity of resolving this controversy. So long as the dispute over Kashmir continues, it is a serious drain on the military, economic and, above all, on the spiritual strength of these two great countries. It is obvious that the real long-term interest of both India and of Pakistan lies in mutual friendship in co-operation, and that the prosperity and security of each will be increased directly with the prosperity and security of the other. Generosity and sympathetic understanding are always the two keys to good-neighbourliness between nations, and thus to the great future which these two neighbours will surely have.

Finally, I should like, through the President, to express my appreciation for the courtesy which the representatives of India and of Pakistan have shown me; and to express to the President, to the members of the Council, and particularly to the representatives of India and of Pakistan, my best wishes for success in the efforts now being made to find an early and enduring settlement of this important question.

(Signed) A. G. L. McNaughton Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Proposal in Respect of Jammu and Kashmir made on 22 December 1949 by General A. G. L. McNaughton President of the Security Council, Pursuant to the Decision of the Security Council taken at its 457th Meeting on 17 December 1949

The principal considerations underlying the following proposals of the President of the Security council are : (a) To determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, to take place as early as possible;

(b) Thus to settle this issue between the Governments of India and Pakistan in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants, as is desired by both Governments;

(c) To preserve the substantial measure of agreement for fundamental principles which has already been reached between the two Governments under the auspices of the United Nations;

(d) To avoid unprofitable discussion of disputed issues of the past, and to look forward into the future towards the good-neighbourly and constructive co-operation of the two great nations.

Demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite There should be an agreed programme of progressive

demilitarization, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease- fire line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on each side of the ceasefire line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forcesso disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite.

(a) The programme of demilitarization should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line; also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the armed forces and militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad forces.

(b) The "Northern Area" should also be included in the above programme of demilitarization, and its administration should, subject to United Nations supervision be continued by the existing local authorities.

Suggested basis of agreement

The Governments of India and Pakistan should reach agreement not later than 31 January 1950 in New York on the following points :

(a) The Government of Pakistan should give unconditional assurance to the Government of India that it will deal effectively within its own borders with any possibility of tribal incursion into Jammu and Kashmir to the end that, under no circumstances, will tribesmen be able unlawfully to enter the State of Jammu and Kashmir from or through the territory of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to keep the senior United Nations military observer informed and to satisfy him that the arrangements to this end are and continue to be adequate.

(b) The Governments of India and Pakistan should confirm the continued and unconditional inviolability of the cease-fire line.

(d) Agreement should be reached on the minimum forces required for the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and on their general disposition.

(e) Agreement should be reached on a date by which the reduction of forces, to the level envisaged in paragraph 2 above, is to be accomplished.

(f) Agreement should be reached on the progressive steps to be taken in reducing and redistributing the forces to the level envisaged in paragraph 2 above.

In respect to the foregoing matters, the Governments of India and Pakistan should further agree that a United Nations representative, to be appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations in agreement with the two Governments, should supervise the execution of the progressive steps in reduction and redistribution of armed forces and that it should be the responsibility of this United Nations representative to give assurance to the people on both sides of the cease-fire line that they have no cause for fear at any stage throughout the process. This United Nations representative should have the duty and authority:

(a) of interpreting the agreements reached between the parties pursuant to paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) above; and

(b) Of determining, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan respectively, the implementation of the plans for the reduction and redistribution of armed forces referred to in sub paragraph 3 (f) above.

When the agreed programme of demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite has been accomplished to the satisfaction of the United Nations representative, the Plebiscite Administrator should proceed forthwith to exercise the functions assigned to him under the terms of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949, which, together with the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, was accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan and which are now reaffirmed by these Governments except in so far as the provisions therein contained are modified by the relevant provisions of this document. The functions and powers of the Plebiscite Administrator remain as set forth in the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949.

The United Nations representative should be authorized to make any suggestions to the Governments of India and of Pakistan which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the Kashmir question and to place his good offices at their disposal.

[Prepared in identical copies to be delivered to Sir Girja Bajpai for the Government of India and to Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan for the Government of Pakistan, respectively.]

(Signed) A.G.L. McNaughton President of the Security Council

Documents

24031949 VII. Recommendations