Conclusions

13081948  Conclusions

The Commission has endeavoured in the previous chapters to present an objective and factual report on its activities on the Sub-continent from February to September 1949. The roots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong undercurrents-political, economic, religious-in both Dominions have acted, and do act, against an easy and prompt solution of this outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan. These currents which at this early stage of national formation are often antagonistic and account to a considerable degree for the misgivings, reluctance and hesitancy, which the Commission felt were often present in the negotiations and which restricted both Governments in the concessions which they might otherwise have been prepared to make to facilitate agreement The Commission, however, has no doubt that both Governments are keenly conscious of their duties and responsibilities as members of the United Nations, and that both desire a final and peaceful solution of the Kashmir question.

In drafting the report the Commission has therefore intentionally avoided comment on its own appreciation of the broad and complex background of the relations between the two countries, significant as the overall relations unquestionably are in the greater understanding of any one issue. It has felt it wise to restrict itself to the specific problems arising out of the implementation of the agreement entered into by India and Pakistan under the Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Commission must note, however, that the issues of the disposal of Azad Forces, the withdrawal of troops, and the defence and administration of the Northern. Area, have made the Truce an end in itself; the difficulty in disposing of them to the satisfaction of both Governments has been, if they are judged independently of other implications and exclusively as preliminaries to a plebiscite, out of proportion to their real importance.

The agreements in the Resolutions represent an advance toward a final settlement. The Commission has all along been re-assured by the representatives of both Governments that they are willing to meet their obligations. As a consequence of that advance the primary and immediate objective of the Security Council was fulfilled with the cessation of hostilities on 1 January 1949 and in the Karachi Agreement of July when the cease-fire line was demarcated. That it is not the intention of either Government to resort to the use of force is proven by their efforts to observe the cease-fire and their mutual co operation in correcting and minimizing such minor incidents as did occur during the months before a line had been demarcated on the ground.

The function of investigating the facts with which the Commission was invested by the Security Council has also been completed. The protracted negotiations of the past have provided thorough knowledge of the facts of the case. This is a positive achievement. The main issues which have prevented the Governments of India and Pakistan from progressing more rapidly toward a settlement of their dispute over Kashmir, and the conditions which they believe should regulate the putting into effect of their commitments, are now in sharp focus. The Commission trusts that United Nations action in the future should prove more effective with the foundation which this investigation provides.

The Commission employed a variety of methods in its efforts to bring about agreement of the two parties to the implementation of their undertakings. During the past months it has conducted separate negotiations with representatives of the two Governments, it has sponsored joint talks, and has submitted to them the Commission's own proposals based on frequent consultations, and lastly, suggested arbitration of their differences with respect to the Truce.

The period of investigation has been completed. Within the framework of its terms of reference, following in its endeavours the provisions contained in its Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the Commission feels that the possibilities of mediation open to it have been exhausted. Over a prolonged period, in a changing and dynamic situation and restricted by long-standing related clarifications which proved to be a real impediment to reaching agreement, the framework of the Resolution of 13 August has become inadequate in the light of the factual conditions in the State. The Commission has been unable, therefore, to ediate much beyond what is today a rather outmoded pattern. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been demilitarized, as was envisaged in Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, and until this is achieved the conditions necessary to the holding of a plebiscite cannot begin to be established. As has been seen from those parts of the report entitled Withdrawal of Forces and the Azad Kashmir Forces, the Commission believes that the problem of demilitarization must be treated as a whole, and that the distinctions relative to demilitarization which exist in the division of the problem into Truce and Plebiscite periods as visualized in the original plan of demilitarization has proven one of the most difficult obstacles in achieving agreement on the problem. It is evident that the presence of large numbers of troops in the State is not conducive to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. The demilitarization of the State is essential to permit the holding of a free and unfettered plebiscite.

It is imperative that a settlement of the Kashmir issue be reached and the Commission believes that it can be reached. To this end, conditions should be established at an early date. which will make possible the holding of a plebiscite whereby the wishes of the people of the State regarding the future of the State may be freely ascertained.

The Commission doubts whether a five-member body is the most flexible and desirable instrument to continue in the task. In the Commission's view, a single person can now more effectively conduct the negotiations which, to be successful, must be carried out in active and constant consultation with the two parties. The designation of a single person with broad authority and undivided responsibility offers a more practical means of finding the balance and compromise necessary to advance the settlement of the dispute.

Finally, the Commission feels that, since the Government of Pakistan accepted the suggestion that the issues relating to the Truce be settled by arbitration, and that the Government of India has stated that it does not object to the principle of arbitration as provided for in the Charter, further consideration should be given to the use of this procedure.

Note: Declaration of the Belgian Delegation

With reference to the last paragraph of the Chapter of the Appendix to the present Report, entitled "Admission of Representatives of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Constituent Assembly of India", the Belgian Delegation feels that it is its duty to draw the serious attention of the Security Council to this matter, as it reveals a conception of the problem, the consequences of which are liable to create important difficulties for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. Before the plebiscite envisaged in the Resolution could take place, the Government of India was to proceed to the organization of a "Constitutional" life by means of elections or by a consultation of the people in the part of Kashmir under its control. This policy would lead to the gravest consequences.