Analysis Of The Main Problems
Analysis Of The Main Problems
A. The General Problem
The present section of the report is devoted to an explanation of the overall problem and analyses of the three main difficulties, i.c.,
Disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces.
Withdrawal of regular forces from the State, and The Northern Area. It is designed to explain how these problems developed so as to constitute obstacles to the arrival at a truce and, as a consequence, to a solution of the dispute; and how the implementation of a truce which appeared to be a question mainly of procedure and of short duration-approximately three months-became in fact a matter of substance.
Before entering into the factual analysis of the main problems, the Commission feels that it must mention a factor more difficult to evaluate in its effects on the attitude of the Governments of India and Pakistan to each other and, therefore, to the mediation of the United Nations in the Kashmir dispute-adjustments yet to be made on various territorial, military, financial and humanitarian questions resulting from the partition of the Sub-continent; in particular, during the period of the Commission's mediation covered in this report, the two Governments encountered further difficulties concerning the problems of waterways and evacuee property which have not yet been solved although solution has been sought at several inter-Dominion conferences.
The preceding narrative of the Commission's activities has dealt broadly with the main points at issue between the two Governments in regard to the implementation of their undertakings as embodied in the Resolution of 13 August 1948 and the Resolution of 5 January 1949. The Commission has found, during its labours of the past year, that the attitude of each Government toward these points has followed as a logical consequence of those basic premises which they have adopted as regards the dispute and with which the Security Council is already familiar. Before discussing in detail the principal issues which have stood in the way of an agreement to carry out a truce, and at the risk of over.simplification, there follows a statement of the general position of the disputants as represented by them.
The Indian Position
(a) India considers herself to be in legal possession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of the instrument of accession of October 1947, signed by the Maharajah of the State and accepted by the then Governor-General of India. From this basis premise, that is, the legality of her presence in the State and of her control over it, there flow logically certain corollary attitudes. The assistance which Pakistan rendered to tribesmen, who made incursions into the State, constituted therefore a hostile act; the entry of elements of the Pakistan regular Army into the State was an invasion of Indian territory. India has her armies in Kashmir as a matter of right, and controls the defence, communications, and external affairs of the State as a consequence of the fact of accession Pakistan has no locus standi Kashmir.
(b) From the fact of accession flows India's claim to be responsible for the security of the State; hence, the problem of demilitarization must take into account the importance of living in the State sufficient. Indian and State forces to safeguard the State's security. A plebiscite in the State would be for the purpose of continuing the accession which is, in all respects, already complete.
(c) India's claim regarding the northern areas of the State is also based on her fundamental argument. Her refusal to discuss with the Pakistan Government, or even to allow it to know the details of withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces is not only in line with that 'part of the Resolution which provides for the prior withdrawal of Pakistan troops, but follows on her insistence that Pakistan is illegally in Kashmir and has no rights in the matter. India's position on the question of the Azad Forces is not only bound up with India's pre-occupation regarding the security of the State, but involves the principle that forces which are in revolt against the Government of the State must be disbanded and disarmed. The cardinal feature of India's position is her contention that not in Kashmir by right, and that Pakistan cannot aspire to final footing with India in the contest. The Government of India, an its letter of 21 November to the Commission reiterated just position and commented upon arguments of Pakistan (Annex 43).
The Pakistan Position
(a) Pakistan bases its case on the contention that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India is illegal and rejects that there is any basis whatsoever for India's contention that the legality of this accession is "in fact and law beyond. question". This stand was first stated in the Pakistan complaint before the Security Council in January 1948, and has been reaffirmed to the Commission as recently as on 1 October 1949 in a letter from the Minister of Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan (Annex 42). Pakistan's main arguments. for its case are the following:
(1) The State of Jammu and Kashmir had executed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 15 August 1947, which debarred the State from entering into any kind of negotiation or agreement with any other country.
(2) The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir had no authority left to execute an instrument of accession on 26 October 1947, because his people had successfully revolted, had overthrown his Government had compelled him to flee from the capital.
(3) The act of accession was brought about by violence and fraud and as such it was invalid ab initio, and
(4) The Maharajah's offer of accession was accepted by the Governor-General of India on the condition that as soon as law and order had been restored, the question of the accession of the State would be decided "by a reference to the people". The Indian Constitution Act does not recognize a conditional accession. The action of the Maharajah and of the Government India has, therefore, no validity in law, (b) Pakistan states further that the Azad Movement was indigenous and spontaneous, the consequence of repression and misrule by the Maharajah's Government. The tribal incursions were likewise spontaneous and were the result of the reports of atrocities and cruelties perpetrated on the Muslim peoples of Kashmir and the East Punjab. The entry of Pakistan forces into Kashmir was necessary in order to protect her own territory from invasion by Indian forces, to stem the movement of large numbers. of refugees driven before the Indian Army order to the Government of Indian from presenting the world with a fait accompli by taking possession of the entire State by force. Pakistani quoting clause 1 of the Commission's Resolution of 5 January 1949, to the effect that the purpose of the plebiscite is to determine whether Kashmir should accede to India or to Pakistan, rejects the Indian view that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of India, a view which, Pakistan says, begs the very question which is in dispute. It is Pakistan's opinion that her action in lending assistance to the people of Kashmir is far less open to criticism than was India's intervention at the request of an autocratic ruler Pakistan has, from the first presentation of her case before the Security Council, contested the whole of the Indian thesis. She considers herself as having equal status with the Government of India and entitled, as a party to the dispute, to equal rights and considerations.
(c) The contention of Pakistan to equal status with India has had a direct influence on its position regarding the problems posed by the implementation of the truce: in Pakistan's view the truce should establish a balance of forces between the two parties and Pakistan asks, therefore, to be apprised of the plans of the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces before signing a truce agreement. It is Pakistan's opinion that any disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, which are local forces, should be balanced by a similar disposition of the State Forces or at least by a further reduction of the remaining Indian forces after withdrawal of the bulk. As regards the Northern Area question, Pakistan, apart from other arguments based on factual considerations and on the letter of the 13 August resolution, denies the claim of India to the right to assume in those territories the defence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a result of the established relations between India and the State.
By now it will have been seen that the three principal issues have emerged in clear focus. They must be solved before the two Governments can find themselves able to agree to proceed to the withdrawal of forces, the question of the Azad Forces, and the question of the Northern Area. The first two issues are closely interrelated; the third issue is rather more independent. These issues have become fundamentals in the dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu & Kashmir; attitudes of both Governments regarding them stems from the premises.
B. The Azad Kashmir Forces
The Resolution of 13 August 1948 recorded one major change in the situation as contemplated by the Security Council during its deliberations in the early part of that year, namely, the presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It did not, however record a second element which has developed subsequently into a serious problem in the implementation of that Resolution: The Azad (Free) Kashmir Movement whose fighting forces today number some 32 well-equipped battalions. This movement, Muslim in character, has become the centre of strong and violent resistance to the accession of the State to India. It controls a considerable part of the Western area of the State, claims to be fully organized as a Government and its political activities appear to be directed toward the accession of the State to Pakistan. The Government of India, of course, grants no recognition to the Azad organization and holds, officially at any rate, its existence to be a problem of internal public order. On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan has rendered important assistance to the Azad Movement; it has appointed the Azad forces with officers of the Pakistan army. Units of the Pakistan Army itself are present in Azad Kashmir and have operated in the closest cooperation with the local forces. However, Pakistan has not given formal recognition to the "Azad Kashmir Government''. In a letter dated 6 September 1948 Pakistan informed the Commission that it cannot make commitments on behalf of the Azad organization. The Commission has never negotiated with its representatives; having no international standing, the organisation can have no international responsibility.
At the time that the Commission adopted the Resolution of 13 August 1948 it had reason to believe that the Azad forces did not constitute a properly organized and equipped military force and that consequently their disposal, once the Pakistan Army had withdrawn from the State, would not constitute a major difficulty. In accepting the 13 August Resolution, India apparently agreed that these forces could be dealt with after the truce became effective. Four months later, during the conservations which immediately preceded the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, the Government of India stressed the importance it attached to the disbanding and disarming of these forces as a condition vital to the holding of a plebiscite. The Commission agreed that a large-scale reduction and disarming of the Azad forces should take place. Provision for this was made in the Resolution of 5 January as follows:
"As regards the territory referred to in A.2 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."
The Government of India now insists that arrangements for the disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces must be established before it can agree to a withdrawal of what can be qualified, even restrictive as the bulk of the Indian forces in the State. With the passage of time India has shown a growing tendency to consider the question of the Azad the central problem in establishing a withdrawal plan. The Government of Pakistan has agreed to the principle of demilitarization of the State but insists upon a strict adherence to the terms of the 13 August Resolution-the Azad Forces should not be treated as a part of the Truce arrangements, but only at such time as the final disposal of the forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line is considered. Following the Commission's return to Delhi, on 18 February 1949 the Government of India stated : "The disarming of Azad forces is really a matter of chronology. First there must be a cease-fire, and after that, a truce, as envisaged in Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August. 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in occupation of Azad Kashmir forces. So far as non Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out".
The Commission shared this view and it did not run counter to the opinion of the Government of Pakistan. Subsequent developments, however, made the matter more complex.
The Pakistan Minister for External Affairs, in his first meeting with the Commission, spoke on the implementation of the Truce and referred to the desirability of creating a Civil Armed Force! from the ranks of the Azad Forces in the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan troops; the function of this force, to be trained and reorganized by small nucleus of Pakistan officers, would be to maintain law and order in the Azad territory. This suggestion had first been put forward at a meeting of the Commanders-in-Chief held in New Delhi on
15 January 1949. This suggestion was formally presented as a concrete proposal by the Pakistan delegation to the Commission's Truce Sub-committee on 9 March (Annex 10). The statement contained a detailed plan for the reorganization and training of the Azad Forces based on the principle of creating a military balance in the State once the Pakistan regular troops have withdrawn. Mention was made of only a minor reduction in these Forces. Pakistan, under reference to Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, has maintained that any reduction in these forces would be conditional upon a reduction in the State armed forces and a reduction in the Indian armed forces beyond that of the bulk.
The Government of India (Annex II) took exception to the premises on which the Pakistan statement was based and declared that it would be impossible to accomplish a Truce Agreement along lines so fundamentally unacceptable to it, The Indian Government maintained that any arrangements. with regard to the Azad forces undertaken during, the Truce period should be so as to pave the way for their ultimate disbanding and disarming; it was prepared to discuss with the Commission the formation of a Civil Armed Force, not for the creation of a military balance between the forces on each side, but for the maintenance of law and order in the Azad Kashmir territory.
While a military balance would exist in the State during the Truce period in the sense and to the extent that the Resolution of 13 August does not call for the disposal of the Azad Forces, the Commission could not accept the Government of Pakistan's interpretation that "the declared objective of the truce arrangement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side...". There can be no other objective of the Truce arrangements than to establish peaceful and normal conditions throughout the State such as would be conducive to the organization and holding of a plebiscite (Annex 12).
In the Government of India's first submission on the implementation of the Truce on 28 March (Annex 16), which covered the main aspects of the matter, it was stated that as long as the Azad Kashmir Forces were not disbanded and disarmed, it would be necessary for the Government of India, in the interest of the security of the part of the State under its control, to maintain larger forces than would otherwise be necessary. The Government of India contended that the Disciplining and reorganization proposed by the Government of Pakistan would make these forces a greater menace to the security of the rest of the State and that there would be no security for those inhabitants not sharing the political views of pro-Pakistan elements. India regarded the disbanding and disarming of these forces as essential, but pointed out that a Civil Armed Force had to be created for the maintenance of law and order in the Azad Kashmir territory.
By the beginning of April 1948 it was evident that concerted action by the two Governments not only was not forthcoming but that their views were increasingly divergent and that the Commission would have itself to draft terms for an agreement. The question of the Azad Forces was undoubtedly crucial. The Commission elaborated a general plan which envisaged the creation of a Civil Armed Force, with the assistance of Pakistan, of approximately 10 battalions. This suggestion was presented orally to representatives of both Governments-more in the nature of a sounding out than a concrete proposal. The discussions which ensued, however, proved that Pakistan was thinking along the lines of a reorganization, with only a minor reduction, of the forces which were to retain a military and not civil character. India, on the other hand, appeared then to be thinking more along the lines of the creation of a civil police force. In the later stage of the discussions the representatives of Pakistan indicated that their Government would be willing to consider a Civil Armed Force for the evacuated territory, but only after the Truce Agreement had been signed and made public. Pakistan considered it impossible to persuade the Azad Forces to reduce their present strength in anticipation of a satisfactory agreement. They repeated that any reduction should be conditional upon the further reduction of Indian and State forces.
The Commission's first Truce Proposals, dated 15 April 1949 (Annex 17) do not mention the Azad Kashmir Forces. Conversations had shown that no agreement would be possible on the creation of a Civil Armed Force during the withdrawal period, and the Government of Pakistan insisted that the disposal of the Azad Forces was a matter that could not be dealt with at all in the Truce Agreement.
The inability of the Government of India to accept these proposals centered around the point (Annex 20) mentioned above. Although the Government of India understood the omission to be explained by the absence of reference to the disarming of the Azad Forces in Part II of the Resolution of 13 August, it nevertheless desired that the assurance given to the Prime Minister on 22 December 1948 should be made clear beyond doubt, and that decisions to implement this assurance should be taken not later than the completion of the withdrawal of Pakistan troops [The Government of India referred to the Aides memoire (Second Interim Report, S/1196, Annex 4)] in which it appears that it was the Commission' intention that large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Forces would take place as a condition precedent to the holding of a plebiscite.
The Government of Pakistan contended that there was a divergence between the proposal and the resolution of 13 August, as clarified to her, and on the basis of the points which the Government of Pakistan understood to be at variance, raised objections which, in effect, were refusal of the proposals as submitted. These points concerned, in the main, the withdrawal of troops and the defence of the Northern Area, Both of these problems are dealt with at length in the following chapter.
The Commission's revised proposals [the Truce Terms of 28 April 1949 (Annex 21)] introduced the following clauses with respect to the Azad Forces:
"III.B. Immediately upon the acceptance of these terms, the Commission will enter into consultations with the Government of India regarding the disposal of the Indian and State armed forces, and with the local authorities regarding the disposal of the armed forces in the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan troops, with a view to initiating implementation of point 4 (a) and (b) of Commission's Resolution of 5 January 1949. "III.C. If, before the expiration of the seven weeks contemplated in point II. A. decisions are reached in the consultations for the initial implementation referred to in III.B. above, the schedule of withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, as provided for in II.A. above, may be extended to three months, in order to facilitate the implementation of decision relating to point 4(b) of the Commission's Resolution of 5 January 1949."
The concept of providing for an initial implementation of Point 4 of the Resolution of 5 January 1949, through consultations with the authorities on both sides immediately upon the signature and not completion-of the truce, represented a compromise between the desire of the Government of India that the Azad question be disposed of as a part of the withdrawal of the bulk of her forces, and Pakistan's insistence that it not be considered until the plebiscite arrangements were begun.
Extension of time for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army was provided for in order that the Pakistan Army might assist in implementing the decisions which would ensue from those consultations. (See covering letters to the two Governments, Annexes 22 and 23).
India's reply to the Commission's Trure Terms, 18 May (Annex 48) reiterated the position taken in its previous correspondence with respect to the question of the Azad Forces and noted that the assurance which had been requested was neither given nor placed beyond all doubt. It was further noted that only "consultations with local authorities and not decisions were called for The Government of India expressed its concern that nothing was said in the proposals as to what would happen if no decisions were reached within the period of the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces; it could not contemplate the eventuality that arrangements for the plebiscite might proceed even if the 32 Azad battalions remained intact. Stressing that both from the standpoint of the security of the State and the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces should not be left in a state of uncertainty or be the subject of challenge and dispute, the Indian reply declared that it was of the utmost importance:
"(1) That the agreement of the Government Pakistan should be obtained now to the disbanding and disarming of these 32 battalions. The Commission has already agreed to large-scale disbanding and disbanding and has informed the Government of Pakistan that this is its objective. It should not therefore be difficult, if Pakistan has accepted this objective, to obtain its agreement."
"(2) The discussions regarding the procedure and phasing of the disbandment and disarming should commence immediately after the truce is signed. Decisions on a programme designed to achieve this objective should be taken as soon as possible."
"(3) The phasing of the withdrawal of Indian troops be not divorced from, and uld depend on, the progress made with the actual disbanding and disarming of the "Azad Kashmir" forces."
In answer to the Commission's inquiry as to the conditions on which India would be prepared to accept the Truce Terms, the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on 17 June 1949 (Annex 50) requested the following assurances :
"The commitment of the Commission with respect to the purpose of point 4(b) of its Resolution of 5th January, namely, the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces remains unquestioned. The consultations for initiating the implementation of 4 (b) referred to in paragraphs III (B) and (C) of Part III of the Com mission's proposals forwarded with your letter of the 28th April, 1949 will be for the purpose of reaching decisions as to the procedure and phasing of the large scale disbanding and disarming of these forces. Further, if, by the end of the seven weeks referred to in III C) of the Commission's proposals, the Commission should find that the large-scale disbanding and disarming of these forces is in practicable, the conditions mentioned in (2) of the Commission's resolution of the 5th January, 1949, will be deemed not have been completed."
Other conditions in that letter, relating to withdrawals and the North Area, as will be shown, went considerably beyond the scope of the proposals. Neither was the Pakistan reply of 30 May (Annex 49) an acceptance of the Commission's Truce Terms. As regards the Azad Kashmir Forces the Government of Pakistan understood that it was intended to associate the Plebiscite Administrator with discussions which dealt with the final disposal of forces in the State, not under the terms of the Truce, but under the Resolution of 5 January 1949. The Commission could of course readily agree that the Plebiscite Administrator Designate participate in the taking of decisions which affected the conditions for the plebiscite. However, the Pakistan Government added that it understood extension of time for the Pakistan withdrawal only to be so as to reorganize the Azad Kashmir Forces and not actually to implement decisions within that period of time, and defined the understanding by declaring that "the actual implementation of the decisions will start only after Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of 13 August, 1948 have been fully implemented." This was clearly contrary to the position taken by the Government of India.
At this juncture the Commission unanimously decided that it was useless to continue to negotiate separately with the two Governments since four months of repeated efforts had not brought the parties any closer to an agreement. To overcome the difficulties inherent in modifying the proposals by consulting first one and then the other of the parties, a joint meeting at ministerial level was suggested. As before, the question of the Azed Forces was immediately raised by the two Governments, this time in their observations on the procedural question of a provisional agenda. The Government of Pakistan in its letter dated 16 August (Annex 32) stated that the question of the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Forces "cannot be discussed during the forthcoming truce talks". India, on the other hand (Annex 31) insisted that the inclusion of this subject was "essential".
India, in not accepting the course of action contained in the Commission's last suggestion, which was that the differences arising out of the implementation of Part II be submitted to arbitration, informed the Commission that it declined to make any practical distinction between the Pakistan Army and the Azad Forces, which, India stated, having been armed, organized and trained by the Pakistan Army, were today in reality part of the Pakistan Army, and that they should be disbanded at the same time as the Pakistan Army withdrew The Indian Government declared that.
"this outstanding issue.... is not a matter for arbitration but for affirmative and immediate decision" (Annex 36).
.... the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir forces on which, apart from other considerations, depends the phasing of the withdrawal of Indian forces under B.1 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948, is no more a matter for arbitration than the complete withdrawal of the Pakistan forces" (Annex 39).
The Pakistan Government accepted without comment. the course of action proposed by the Commission in its memorandum on arbitration.
There is, indeed, no doubt that Azad forces now have a strength which changes the military situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies. Although it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the Azad Kashmir Pakistan is actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces, who have since then been working in close cooperation with the Pakistan regular army and who have been trained and offered by that army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in Part II of the Resolution of 13 August.
It cannot be said that either side has complied with the letter of Part I, Section B of the Resolution which prohibits any increase of military potential by either country in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
C. Withdrawal of Forces
As a result of the Cease-fire Agreement and the demarcation of a line on the ground, the State of Jammu and Kashmir at present is divided into two areas the part of the State east and south of the cease-fire line is occupied by the Indian Army with the State Forces and the Jammu and Kashmir Militia under its command, and includes the Valley of Kashmir and Jammu; the territory west and north of the cease-fire line is under Pakistan control, and includes Western Kashmir adjoining Pakistan and the large mountainous territory to the north.
Four principles were agreed to by the Governments of India and Pakistan in connection with the withdrawal of forces from the State: by Pakistan, that (a) her troops are to withdraw from the State; and that (b) she will use her best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State who entered for the purpose of fighting; by India, that (a) she will begin to withdraw the bulk of her forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission once the Commission has notified her that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals have withdrawn and that Pakistan forces are being withdrawn; and that (b) the Government of India will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire such forces as are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order.
In early March the Commission received the first concrete indication of the manner in which one of the parties envisaged the implementation of the Truce. A statement was presented by Pakistan to the Truce Sub-committee (Annex 10) which dealt in detail with a proposal for the reorganization of the Azad Forces in conjunction with the withdrawal of the regular forces, a programme which was suggested to take place within a period of three months. It also commented on the Indian withdrawal plan. Two statements in this document brought into clear relief the divergence of the view points with respect to the truce problem divergence which was constantly to be the source of disagreement in future negotiations: the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal with that of the bulk of the Indian forces. India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfilment by the Government of Pakistan of the condition of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces. (Annex 11)
The Truce Sub-committee meetings in March led to no agreement with respect to the implementation of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948. The Indian delegation found that the Pakistan statement involved political considerations and declined at that time in the Sub-committee to present its comprehensive views. The resulting correspondence, however, placed the Commission face to face with the conflicting interpretations which it would have to reconcile if a Truce were to be arrived at.
On 28 March 1949, the Government of India declared (Annex 16) that it was prepared to accept a period of three months for the completion of the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and for the creation of a Civil Armed Force to maintain law and order in the Azad Kashmir territory. The memo randum, which was in the nature of a response to the Pakistan delegation's presentation before the Truce Sub-committee, also contained a suggested schedule for the withdrawal of Indian forces. In this memorandum the Government of India stated that it was not willing to disclose its own programme to the Government of Pakistan, until a satisfactory agreement
had been reached regarding the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and the replacement of the Azad Kashmir Forces by a Civil Armed Force.
With these issues in mind, and constrained to formulate suggested terms within the framework of Part II of the 13 August Resolution, which makes an important distinction between the withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan forces, but makes no reference to the disposal of the Azad Forces, the Commission began the study of proposals which it might submit for the approval of both Governments.
The first proposals were submitted on 15 April 1949. As regards the withdrawal of forces the proposals strictly followed the procedure indicated in Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948. A period of 7 weeks was envisaged for the complete withdrawal of Pakistan troops. In a covering letter to the Government of India a plan was suggested for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces to take place within a period of three months. The Commission's proposals of different time limits for the withdrawal of the Pakistan and Indian forces was determined by the inadequacy of road conditions between Kashmir and India and the differences in terrain and distances between forward area in Kashmir and base areas in India and in Pakistan. For Pakistan, withdrawal is comparatively easy to achieve and can be quickly carried out. For India it is a more difficult and longer military operation.
In its reply, the Pakistan Government again raised the question of synchronization for the withdrawals and the request to be apprised of the proposed programme of withdrawal for Indian forces. The Commission replied that it would find itself in a position to disclose the schedule of withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces when agreement there on had been reached with the Government of India, and when both Governments had indicated their agreement to the other provisions of the 15 April proposals. The Commission also reiterated its statement (First Interim Report, S/1100, Annex 27) that synchronization of the withdrawals would be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission, In response to the Commission's proposals of 15 April, the Indian representative (Annex 20) said that the presence of thirty-two battalions of Azad Kashmir Forces was a factor which the Government of India had to take into account in determining the phasing of its withdrawals. He pointed out that during the seven-weeks period for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, the Government of India could not, with due regard to the security of the State, to the maintenance of law and order, and to the sealing off of the border against unwarranted infiltration, withdraw more than twelve battalions. (This reduction was considerably less than had been suggested in the Commission's plan for the three-months' period and in no case could be considered to constitute the bulk of the Indian forces.) He wrote that further withdrawals would depend upon and would have to be regulated according to the actual disbandment and disarming of the Azad Kashmir
Forces. The Commission revised its proposals and submitted the Truce Terms on 28 April 1949. In an effort to meet the request of the Government of India with respect to the Azad Forces, the Commission introduced a provision under which it would enter into consultations with the local authorities for the disposal of those forces immediately upon the acceptance of the Truce Terms. Although the period for the withdrawal of Pakistan forces was maintained at seven weeks, provision was made for its extension to three months, in order to allow the Pakistan Army to participate in the reorganization of the Azad Forces, should decisions be reached during the consultations. The Commission still could not meet Pakistan's demand that she be informed of the withdrawal plans for the Indian forces, but it informed the Pakistan Government that the withdrawals would be faithful to the Commission's Resolution of 13 August and would represent a coordination in timing which, in the Com mission's view, would constitute a synchronized action.
In replying to the Commission's Truce Terms of 28 April (Annex 21) the Government of India did not specifically deal with the question of withdrawals, but in a further reply to the Truce Terms dated 17 June (Annex 50) the Indian Government presented its own scheme for the withdrawal of its forces, reaffirming its reference to the interdependence of the phasing of the withdrawal of Indian forces and the progress made with the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces. India asked that her scheme not be communicated to the Government of Pakistan until a Truce Agreement had been arrived at. The Indian plan was, in the opinion of the Commission, far from a fulfilment of India's undertaking under the terms of the 13 August Resolution.
The response of the Government of Pakistan to the 28 April Truce Terms (Annex 49) deals at length with the withdrawal problem as conceived by the Pakistan Government. Again the obstacles to Pakistan's acceptance of the Truce Terms refer mainly to the synchronization of the withdrawals in accordance with a programme which can only be achieved, in Pakistan's view, if both High Commands have full information with respect to each withdrawal. The Pakistani Government's letter pointed out that the terms as presented to it gave no information as to the strength and composition of the Indian forces which were to be withdrawn, of the time during which the Indian forces would withdraw from the State, nor of the stages of withdrawal of the Indian forces. Complaining of the lack of information, the Pakistan Government stated that: "The only fact known to them, namely that the time allowed for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces is longer than the time allowed for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, appears to them to nullify the provision for a synchronized withdrawal promised by the Commission and to create a disequilibrium of forces after the period of seven weeks allowed for the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army."
Pakistan has been consistent throughout in her contention that the withdrawal of the forces on the two sides should be synchronized, that is, in the opinion of the Pakistan Government, that they should take place simultaneously and be arranged in such a manner as to obtain a balance between the remaining forces. This position is fundamentally opposed to the contention of the Government of India and has proved irreconcilable with it. The Pakistan Government bases this
position on a statement contained in a memorandum annexed to a letter from the Commission of 27 August 1948 (First Interim Report, S/1100, Annex 27). The Government of Pakistan had requested an indication from the Commission of the manner in which the Commission proposed "to secure synchronised and simultaneous withdrawal of the Pakistan Forces and the bulk of the Indian Forces from the State" The Commission, in replying, quoted Part II.B. 1 of the Resolution to indicate that no simultancity was intended, and added that synchronization would be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission.
The Commission's reply regarding synchronization cannot. be interpreted out of the context of the Resolution which, as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal. The Commission's reference to synchronization should be interpreted to mean that discussions with the Government of India concerning the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces would ensue without delay and lead to the establishment of a time sequence for the two withdrawals agreed upon between the respective High Commands and the Commission after the acceptance of the Truce Terms by both Governments. The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans. It was feasible, in the Commission's judgment and the Commission's military adviser had this in mind, that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage.
The Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a "synchronization" which would have been incompatible with the terms of the Resolution of 13 August. That Resolution does not suggest that Pakistan should be entitled to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultations envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of withdrawal of Indian troops. What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities. The danger of such an eventuality should not be overemphasized.
The Commission did take into account Pakistan's concern that the withdrawal be synchronized. It repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the two Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces. a part of that agreement, was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side.
As has been seen from the discussion of the Azad problems, and from the foregoing discussion on withdrawals, India is not prepared to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the "bulk" whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Forces is reached. Indeed, the Indian Government no longer discusses the withdrawal of her forces in terms of their "bulk" alone. Changes in the military situation in the State have occurred which, in the view of the Government of India, must condition the strength of forces which India can withdraw from the State and which, in her opinion must be taken into account in applying the terms of Part II of the Resolution, The importance which the Government of India attaches to these changes has so conditioned the forces she is willing to withdraw, that the Commission has been unable to agree on a plan which would comply with the provisions of Part 11 of the Resolution of 13 August 1948. As long as the Government [of India maintains its position that Pakistan Should not have information regarding the nature and timing of the Indian withdrawal before acceptance of the Truce by both parties, and as long as Pakistan considers that this information alone will vouchsafe beforehand that synchronization in the withdrawals is provided for, the prospects for an implementation of the Truce are remote.
The Commission has tried to obtain India's agreement to communicate to Pakistan the Indian proposals, or in any event the Commission's proposals, but without success. In its last communication to the Commission on the subject (Annex 51) the Government of India reiterated its stand that the question of the forces which India should retain in the State was a matter entirely between the Commission and India.
Replying to the Commission's proposal that the issues. relating to the implementation of Part II of the 13 August Resolution be settled by arbitration, the Government of India reaffirmed this position. In its letter of 8 September 1949 (Annex 36) the Government of India stated that "Once ways and means for the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Forces have been agreed upon, the Government of India anticipate no difficulty in reaching agreement with the Commission as provided for in P. 1 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948, about the phasing of the withdrawal of their forces from the State. Nor would they raise any objection to the Pakistan Government being informed of the programme of the withdrawal of Indian forces once the question of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Forces has been disposed of and Pakistan has begun to withdraw its forces."
In essence, the problem of the withdrawals lies in the fact that the sequence for the demilitarization of the State, as contained in the Commission's Resolutions of 13 August and 5 January, is not adequate to solve the present situation. The situation in the State has changed; the Resolutions remain unchanged. Again in this question, the Commission endeavour ed to find means of reaching an agreement without contravening the terms of the Resolution, but, taking into account the changes that have occurred in the situation, it found that the Government were strict in adhering to the letter of those clauses which met their position.
The conclusion to be drawn from the experience of the Commission during the past year, and from the attitudes of the two Governments as regards the withdrawal problem is clear developments in the State during the past year necessitate a modification in the original plan of demilitarization. Such a modification must treat the problem of demilitarization as a whole, eliminating all distinctions and comprising all questions concerning the final disposal of all armed forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
D. The Sparsely Populated and Mountainous Areas in the North of the State
In order to properly appreciate the special character of the territory in the north, it should be borne in mind that this vast area is extremely mountainous, the ranges forming a part of the Himalayas. There are passes that reach between 12,000. and 19,000 feet. The area forms the basis of the river Indus and only the routes along this river remain open throughout the year. The sparse population consequently is concentrated in the river valleys, with few, if any, major centres, and facing great difficulties of communication. The land tracks which must cross the passes, are used by traders for only some five months in the year.
The Government of India first referred specifically to this area, and established its claim with respect to in August 1948, on accepting the Resolution of 13 August 1948. The Prime Minister wrote (First Interim Report, S/1100, p.35) that "The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars or Pakistan troops....... We desire that after Pakistan troops and irregulars withdraw from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us...... We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen...and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia." During the first six weeks of negotiations in 1948 the Commission was occupied almost exclusively with bringing about an agreement between India and Pakistan on the cease fire. Although at that time resistance was being offered to the authority of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and sporadic fighting did take place in the north, regular forces of the Indian and Pakistan armies were not fighting in that area of the State. The conflict took place in the west where the Azad Kashmir Movement had its headquarters. The Commission was informed by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in July 1948. that regular Pakistan troops went into Kashmir (a) to prevent an Indian fait accompli in the State, (b) to halt the influx of refugees entering Pakistan from the east and (c) to ward off the danger of an armed attack upon Pakistan.
Subsequently the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan. The army defined the purpose of sending Pakistan troops into the State to be the holding of the general line Uri-Poonch Naushera. This line runs north-south along Western Kashmir. The Commission had, therefore, not given particular consideration to the situation which would arise in the Northern Area with the cease-fire; nor did the Commission at that time, under the stress of the urgency with which both Governments viewed the state of "undeclared war" have the time nor the facilities to investigate on the spot the situation to the north. The Commission in reply (First Interim Report, S/1100, p.35) to the Prime Minister stated that because of the peculiar conditions of the area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in the Resolution of 13 August and added that it believed that the question raised in the Prime Minister's letter could be considered in the implementation of the resolution. However this statement cannot be taken as a commitment but as an intention to study at a later date the best means for dealing with a special situation.
From the outset of the Commission's activities in February 1949 the contested issue of the administration and defence of the Northern Area was one to which both Governments attached great importance. The conflicting interpretations in this regard were first made clear during the Commission's Subcommittee meetings in March. The military representatives of India declared that they were not in a position to treat the cease-fire line in the North on the same level as the cease-fire line in the west since their Government considered that the former entailed political considerations and had to be dealt with independently and in the light of the Prime Minister's reservations as quoted above. The Pakistan representatives, on the other hand, advanced the argument, which was consistently maintained throughout the future negotiations, that the area to the north was as much a part of the evacuated territory as the area to the West and that both were under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command; they could not admit to any claim by the Government of India which would entitle her to advance beyond the positions occupied at the moment of the cease-fire nor that the State Government should be permitted to extend its administrative authority.
The Government of India on 28 March suggested a line which it wished to see established. This line included the which the Government of India felt answered the description given in the Prime Minister's letter of 20 August 1948. The Government of India stated that it did not intend to garrison these sparsely populated portions extensively, but that all it proposed to do was to maintain garrisons at selected points.
On 13 April the Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, sent the Commission a statement on his Government's views with respect to the truce. In it were further defined the strategic points which, in India's view, should be garrisoned by Indian armed forces. Fifteen points were mentioned. The Government of India expected that in addition to these points it would retain the right to patrol the intervening areas.
The claims of the Government of India in this connection were entirely counter to Pakistan's views on the matter. The representatives of Pakistan were unwilling even to consider the Northern Area as requiring separate or special treatment. There was no question in the minds that the provisions of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August applied equally to all parts of the State where fighting had taken place and where armed forces were facing each other. Since Pakistan maintain that this area had always been under its effective control, it drew the conclusion that any provision made in the light of India's claim would be a contravention of the Resolution of 13 August under which the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops was to be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
The Commission wished to comply with the offer made to the Government of India in August 1948 that the question could be considered in the implementation of the Resolution. It did so in every attempt which was made to secure agreement on a truce. It gave serious consideration to India's position, which was based on legal claims, and to her contention that in acceding to the creation of an evacuated territory in Western Kashmir over which she was to have no control pending a final solution, she was not to be expected to assent in the creation of another such territory in the North which India considered of importance to the defence of the State and of the trade routes to Central Asia. However, the Commission was equally bound to keep foremost in mind that the truce agreement was meant to be only an instrument by means of which the State was to be demilitarised and that the duration of this interim period was a short one. The Commission could not envisage a situation whereby extension of military activity of any sort might take place, nor could it be headless to the likelihood of armed resistance by the local population should Indian forces be garrisoned beyond the cease-fire line.
The Commission's first truce proposals of 15 April provided that "In the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir to the north. Observers will be stationed who, in the event that the defence of this territory becomes necessary, will advise the Commission. The Commission, in this case, or at the request of the Government of India, may agree that the Government of India post garrisons at specified points of this area."
This formula was regarded as an equitable compromise between the opposed views of the two Governments; it minimize the possibility of a renewal of fighting, yet took into consideration India's claim to responsibility for the defence of the State. However, both Governments expressed their dissatisfaction with it.
The Government of Pakistan presented a lengthy statement of its views regarding the area in question (Annex 24). It contested the basis of the Indian claim to post garrisons in the area, stating that "ever since the overthrow of the Dogra Regime [the Maharajah's Government the territory has been firmly under Azad control and has been properly administered." The Government of Pakistan argued that the military operations in the area for over eight months proved that there was no basis in fact in the Indian statement that the Maha rajah's administration in this area remained undisturbed except by "roving bands'', but represented instead the resistance of an organized and determined force of local men who fought the Indian armed forces; and pointed out that after the overthrow of the Maharajah's regime in October 1947, the Maharajah's Government had never recovered its hold over any part of the territory. The Pakistan Government further argued that there was no real danger of any tribal incursion, since such an incursion could only take place through territory held by Pakistan and Pakistan has given assurance to deal effectively with this contingency; and that Pakistan would be in a better position to deal with the hypothetical possibility of foreign aggression from the north. In any case, according to Pakistan, any act of foreign aggression would be a matter for the Security Council to consider. It could not be regarded as the sole or primary concern of India. In addition, Pakistan introduced economic, hydrographic and administrative considerations in favour of the thesis that the Northern Area is not integrated with the Kashmir Valley, but is instead more closely related to Pakistan.
Additional to the paper noted above, the Pakistan Government on 26 April 1949, recapitulated why it regarded the proposal to post Indian troops in the area north of the cease-fire line as a contravention of the Resolution of 13 August 1948. The Government of Pakistan laid stress on their understanding that the area in question is "evacuated territory in precisely the same way as the area west of the cease-fire line and referred to the Commission's letter of 3 September 1948
in which it is stated that " ... 'evacuated territory' refers to those territories which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command. Since Pakistan maintains that the Northern Area already in August was under the tactical control of the Pakistan Army, it considers that the area should be treated as "evacuated territory" for the purposes of the truce. Further it pointed out that the Indian forces are to be "posted within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire."
In replying to the 15 April proposals the Government of India reaffirmed its request that it be allowed to maintain garrisons at strategic points. It felt that the question of the administration of the area could be (Annex 20) discussed separately
In spite of the views of the two Governments, which remained firmly opposed, the Commission did not feel that it could in good conscience compromise on what it considered not only a fair proposal but one which would best achieve the purposes of the truce. The Commission did not ignore India's claim to the right to safeguard the security of the State nor did it put into question the legality of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. It had, nevertheless, to consider, as a Commission of mediation for the preservation of peace, the danger should Indian forces other than in an emergency, be permitted to occupy garrisons in an area which was declared hostile to those forces and to representatives of the State Government. The Commission was obliged to reaffirm, in a modified form, the principle it had already recommended to both Governments on 15 April.
In the Commission's revised proposals, that truce terms of 28 April, the problem was dealt with as follows: "Observers will advise the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator regarding developments in the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Without prejudice to the provisions of point 8 of the Resolution of 5 January 1949, should the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator conclude upon advice from the observers, or upon reports from the Government of India, that it is necessary for the defence of the area, the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator may request the Government of India to post garrisons at specified point."
In its reply to the truce terms on 18 May 1949 (Annex 48) the Indian Government repeated that the principle that Indian troops should garrison important strategic points should be accepted. The Government of India suggested that the points to be so occupied be the subject of discussion with the Commission, and again remarked that the question of the administration of this area be left over for the time being.
In a further letter, dated 17 June, commenting on the Commission's truce terms (Annex 50) the Government of India referred to the fifteen strategic points in the Northern Area at which it believed India garrisons should be maintained. It now stated that it would be willing to occupy only seven points in the expectation that all regular and irregular Pakistan forces will be withdrawn from the State. Should this expectation not be realized or should a threat to the security of the State or the maintenance of internal order arise from any other source, the Government of India desired to be free to garrison any or all of the fifteen points mentioned previously. India explained that she felt compelled to make this reservation because she believed that measures taken by Pakistan such as the construction of roads, the provision of arms and supplies to points like Skardu could, in the view of India, means only that Pakistan did not wish to withdraw from the territory or, after withdrawal, intends that those who stay behind can create turmoil.
In connection with the Northern Area, the reply of the Pakistan Government to the truce terms referred to Pakistan's previous correspondence on the subject and summarized four considerations in view of which the Pakistan Government again submitted that the proposal was not in accord with the Resolution of 13 August 1948, and "is unnecessary and, far from ensuring peace and tranquility in this area, is likely to create conditions of unrest and insecurity." The Government of Pakistan repeated (a) that the posting of Indian garrisons in the area is contrary to the provision in the resolution which permits the retention of Indian troops only in the lines in existence at the time of the cease-fire; (b) the proposal conflicts with the definition already mentioned above (para 263) and contained in the Commission's letter of 3 September, as well as with the assurance that neither the Government of India nor the Maharajah's Government will be permitted to send military or civil officials to the evacuated territory; (c) the proposal appears unnecessary since the threat envisaged might arise either from tribesmen or from a foreign power and in neither case is the Government of India indicated to safeguard the security of this area. Arguments to substantiate this contention are set out in the Pakistan reply.
In the correspondence between the Commission and the two Governments regarding the agenda for the proposed Joint Meetings the question of the inclusion in the agenda of the problem of the Northern Area was immediately raised. The Government of India, in its letter of 18 August (Annex 31) stated that it considered the inclusion in the agenda of the subject of the administration and defence of the Area as "essential". The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, in its letter of 16 August (Annex 32) stated that India's desire that the question of the responsibility for the administration and defence of the Northern Area be clarified at the Joint Meeting "... is not only outside the scope of the proposed joint truce talks but is contrary to the clear provisions of the 13 August Resolution and cannot be entertained."
The Pakistan Minister for Kashmir Affairs referred, in his letter of 26 April 1949 (Annex 24) to the Commission's letter to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan of 3 September 1948, which defined "evacuated territory" as referring to the territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which were at that time ("at present") under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command. The Pakistan Minister contended that this definition brought the whole of the northern area inside the "evacuated territory" and for this reason on officials of the State Government, nor any Indian troops, should be given access to the territory.
It seems, however, very doubtful whether the northern area were in fact in the autumn of 1948 under the "effective" control of the Pakistan High Command, in the sense that the Commission understood the term "effective control". The Pakistan Government (Annex 24) stated that no Pakistani regular troops at any stage were employed in the operations which took place between May and December 1948. Only one Pakistan officer, Commandant Gilgit Scouts, exercised "over all tactical and administrative control" in the area. But at the same time it is true that the local population was in active and organized resistance to the Indian Army. It was precisely because the Commission understood "evacuated territory" to mean that territory in Western Kashmir where regular forces of the Pakistan army were operating and assisting the Azad Kashmir forces that the Commission in August stated to the Prime Minister of India that the question of the military aspect of the territories to the North of the State had not been dealt with in the Resolution of 13 August. The Commission was informed that it was for the defence of the western area that the Pakistan regular forces had entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
While the Indian claim may have been based on valid arguments at the time it was first made in August 1948, (the Pakistan Government has said that there was no basis in fact to the claim even then), the Commission was faced with the incontrovertible fact that in March of the following year the validity of India's arguments was open to question in the light of the Commission's objective. The authority of the State Government had not only been challenged; by 1 January 1949, the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government had been eliminated from the area. The entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. In consequence the Commission could expect that the Government of India, taking into consideration the wholly temporary nature of the truce, would be willing to waive a claim which was to be decided shortly thereafter in the preparation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite. Neither Government however has been prepared to keep that consideration actively in mind when defining their positions vis-a-vis the withdrawal and reduction of armed forces in the State. When it drafted the 13 August Resolution the Commission did not consider the northern area in the same light as it did Western Kashmir. However, by January 1949 Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas; the area was administered by local authorities, not of the Jammu and Kashmir government, with the assistance of Pakistan officials. The spirit of the 13 August Resolution had to be observed. Its underlying principle was the withdrawal of forces from the State, the reduction, not the extension of military activities. It contemplated, and expressly stated, that the Indian Government would maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order.
The situation in the Northern Area to-day is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any point beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities by the Government of India although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Governments have agreed is not to take place on either side.
The Karachi Military Conference of July has settled the question of the cease-fire line. The line is now demarcated and agreed to by India and Pakistan. Until such time as the conditions envisaged in the Resolution of 5 January have been created and normal life begins to return to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the line which is today a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities should be scrupulously observed by the Governments of India and Pakistan and the opposing forces should remain behind it.