17081948 Summary of the meeting of representatives of the Government of India with the members of the Commission to discuss the Commission s resolution of 13 August (S/AC.12/46) Held at New Delhi on Tuesday, 17 August 1948 at 3p.m.
17081948 Summary of the meeting of representatives of the Government of India with the members of the Commission to discuss the Commission s resolution of 13 August (S/AC.12/46) Held at New Delhi on Tuesday, 17 August 1948 at 3p.m.
Present
Government of India: Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs; Sir Girja Bajpai, Mr. Ayyangar, Mr. Pai, Mr. Vellodi.
Members of the Commission: Mr. Leguizamon (Argentina), Mr. E. Graeffe (Belgium), Mr. Samper (Colombia), Mr. Korbel (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Huddle (United States of America), Mr. Adams (United States of America).
The Prime Minister opened the discussion by stating that the Government of India had very carefully examined the resolution presented by the Commission and had requested this meeting with the representatives of the Commission in order to clarify certain of the provisions of the resolution of 13 August. He commented that the Government of India was sincerely anxious to effect a peaceful settlement of its dispute with the Government of Pakistan over Kashmir. It was important, however, that various steps towards such a solution be examined carefully, in as much as the taking of an initial step which was not a solid one might cause a further deterioration of the situation rather than contribute to its solution.
Turning to the resolution itself, Pandit Nehru said that he intended to comment only on the major points. Under part I he inquired, with reference to paragraph A, at what point the four days mentioned therein began. Mr. Korbel explained that it was the intent of this paragraph to provide that agreement as to the date when the cease-fire would begin would be determined within four days after acceptance of the proposals by both Governments, and that the four-day period began immediately upon such acceptance.
Turning to paragraph C, the Prime Minister inquired as to the exact meaning of "local changes in present dispositions". Mr. Korbel explained that these were changes which the commands of both sides would agree were essential to facilitate a cease-fire. The two commands, he said, would agree on such changes, the cease-fire would then be issued, and then the changes would be carried out. He emphasized that changes would be effective only if agreed upon by the two commands and that, if no agreement were reached, the forces would stand on their present lines. Pandit Nehru inquired if the truce line would be the same as the cease-fire line, to which Mr. Korbel replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister then remarked that, before an effective truce could be arranged, it would be necessary that a fairly precise line be worked out. He explained that there were several pockets in which at present there were no military forces. Some of these, he stated, Indian forces could occupy at will, but at present they were unoccupied. In such a case, he inquired, what would the line be and who would determine the line ?
Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had endeavored to avoid going into military details and to limit itself to matters of political importance. Mr. Graeffe explained that it was the Commission's intent that the cease-fire line would be along the lines occupied by the respective forces and that any no-man's-land which existed would remain.
The Prime Minister digressed to comment on the possible legal implications of accepting a cease-fire along present lines. He wondered if a certain legality would not be accorded to the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir by acceptance of the proposition that the cease-fire be effective along the present lines. India, he said, maintained that it was legally in Kashmir, and though this might be contested by Pakistan, one thing was certain, and that was that the territory did not belong to Pakistan, and therefore that its troops were illegally in that State. Mr. Korbel replied that the document had to be considered as an entity, and that part II with its provision for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops should be considered along with part I. He doubted that the Government of India was thereby in any way recognizing the legality of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir. The Prime Minister observed that, even so, acceptance accorded a validity to the presence of those troops from the point of view of a truce, that is, from a military sense.
Returning to the idea that certain pockets would exist if present lines were accepted, Pandit Nehru recalled that the representatives of India had, at an early meeting of the Commission in New Delhi, suggested a precise line along which a cease-fire should be effected. He believed that in the absence of such a definition, it could be anticipated that events would take place in those pocket areas which would be denied and that much difficulties would be created thereby.
A second consideration which bothered the Government of India with reference to the fixing of a cease-fire line along the present lines was that those lines ran very near to the Pakistani frontier and that in a short time varying from one half to two hours, the tribesmen or the Pakistani Army itself could overrun the positions held by garrisons left by the Indian Army, and that a situation might be created worse than that of last October. He contended that India needed to have certain strategic points for defence against sudden attack.
Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had been quite aware of that danger, but that it had tried to strike a military balance. The Commission felt that if the two Governments could be brought together, the danger of a sudden incursion would be removed. Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would remain and that on the other side only the Azad forces would remain in their present positions. Should the eventuality envisaged by the Prime Minister occur, the whole weight of the United Nations would be turned against Pakistan.
While agreeing that this might be so, the Prime Minister remarked that, should such an incursion take place, it would take another eight months to rectify the situation. He further remarked that he did not believe Pakistan could consider itself threatened by the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir. If the Government of India were of evil intent, he said, its forces. would attack Pakistan directly and not via Kashmir and Gilgit. On the other hand, he considered that Kashmir was directly threatened by the presence of Pakistani troops in that State. He concluded his comments on the subject by stating that, in order to ensure the security of Kashmir, there must be no possibility of a sudden incursion such as had previously occurred.
Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission fully recognized the concern of the Government of India for security, but that In all frankness he had to tell the Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan was equally fearful of invasion by the Indian forces. The Commission, he said, could not assure either country on this question of security. The present document, he said, was a first step in that direction. If the Commission could succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of Pakistani troops, it would have the obligation, while on the sub-continent, of watching over Pakistan. Once the Kashmir problem had been satisfactorily settled, it would then be the duty and right of the Government of India, should the State finally be placed under the sovereignty of that country, to take all necessary measures for the security of that area.
The Prime Minister reiterated his fears of possible infiltration with or without the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan and mentioned the strategic points previously enumerated to the Commission which the Government of India considered that its forces must hold in order to ensure the security of Kashmir. Mentioning Domel in particular, he remarked that, if Government of India forces held that point, a natural boundary between the two would be established along the line of the river, and that Pakistan would, in no sense, be threatened through the occupation of that point by the forces of the Government of India inasmuch as Pakistan was from twenty-two to twenty-six miles distant.
Mr. Korbel commented that such a readjustment of the front line went beyond the cease-fire and said frankly that the Commission, after giving careful consideration to the Indian point of view in that respect, had not been able to accept the view. However, such a readjustment should not be ruled out if the respective Commanders-in-Chief agreed to make such a change. He emphasized again that the success of the revolution depended on the existence of good will between the parties, to which the Prime Minister replied that the Commission had here to deal with a hysterical and neurotic state of mind.
Mr. Huddle remarked that the Commission had come there with an open mind, and that after being there a short time had become confirmed in its belief that it could not impose any conditions on the parties. The Commission was simply an intermediary and, as such, it had endeavoured to ascertain the feelings of the two parties. The Commission had concluded, he said, that both parties genuinely wanted an agreement. The Commission had been careful to avoid dicta and in some quarters had been criticized for not taking a stronger position. The Commission, he said, had given consideration to the military considerations involved. The present draft was a compromise, but the Commission believed that its acceptance by the two parties would provide a basis for a common discussion. The Commission, moreover, had reason to believe that if the resolution were agreed to, incursions such as were feared by the Government of India would not take place. The resolution, he said, was so worded as to avoid sudden or abrupt changes in the military situation which would leave a possibility for attack.
Mr. Huddle then referred to a recent article in the London Times which, with reference to the destruction of a water works in Jerusalem, had criticized the Security Council for assuming unto itself certain powers, in that case the giving of guarantee to either side, which it did not possess. The United Nations, he concluded, had no power to back up guarantees of that sort and consequently the Commission in the present instance was working entirely on a basis of securing agreement between the parties. The Commission, he felt, believed that it had "down to earth" proposals and that it was not dealing in theory. Mr. Graeffe corroborated that view, saying that he believed that, in the resolution of 13 August, the parties had a basis on which the edifice of a final solution could be built.
Turning to part II, Pandit Nehru inquired whether the principles elaborated therein were considered to be final or whether they might be subject to change on the basis of the comments which either party wished to advance. In reply. Mr. Korbel explained that the Commission was glad to provide any explanations of the text but that, as worded, the preamble meant that the Commission wished both parties to accept part II in principle, following which the details could be worked out. The Commission, he said, had hoped four weeks ago that an unconditional cease-fire could be worked out, but that in response to the request of the Government of India, the Commission had drafted proposals coupling the cease-fire with certain conditions. The conditions finally proposed were those which the Commission considered just, and which could be defended before the Security Council.
The Prime Minister inquired again if the principles as elaborated represented the Commission's final decision, or whether it was open to the Government of India to put forward ideas for changes. Mr. Korbel replied that, in the Commission's opinion, no possibility for discussion should be excluded, but that the draft was not open to change as a result of bilateral discussions.
Remarking that that answer limited the scope of discussions very greatly, the Prime Minister proceeded to comment on various other proposals under part II, feeling that the Commission might like to have the Government of India's views thereon. The formulation of paragraph 1 under section A, he said, constituted "rather a feeble and complicated way of saying something very simple". On that same point, Mr. Ayyangar said that the Government of India readily accepted the principle that Pakistani troops should be withdrawn, but that it was not in accord with the reasons given in support of that principle.
Mr. Korbel pointed out that the Prime Minister himself had said that the Government of India was not concerned with humiliating Pakistan but wished to effect the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. Paragraph 1 under section A, he said, secured that result. The Commission, he said, did not wish to concern itself with the juridical questions involved but on that point had followed the line adopted in the Security Council resolution of 21 April (S/726).
Turning next to paragraph 3 under section A, the Prime Minister inquired if that wording envisaged any change in the status of the territory, or whether it recognized the jurisdiction of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over that territory. Mr. Korbel remarked that that point incorporated the suggestion which the Prime Minister himself had advanced and that the phrase pending a final solution was intended to recognize the temporary nature of the administration by local authorities.
Sovereignty over the territory was not to be changed. Asked by the Prime Minister if the Commission would function as a representative of the State authorities, Mr. Korbel replied that he did not know if the Commission were competent to do that. The Prime Minister, appearing to accept that interpretation, commented that in practice the Kashmiri authorities would not interfere with the administration of the area. He pointed out, however, that no local administration then existed and that one would have to be created. The area, he said, was then occupied by people one hundred percent sympathetic to Pakistan, as a result of non-Muslims having been driven out or killed. He wondered how it would be possible for the Commission to distinguish raiders from the local population and remarked that it was his understanding that all revenue records and others had been burned and that Pakistani nationals would remain out of uniform, making it difficult for the Commission to select people truly representative of the local population. Mr. Korbel remarked that the Commission was aware of its inability to fully control the administration of the evacuated territory and, therefore, had intentionally used the expression surveillance.
Turning to section B, the Prime Minister felt that it was faulty in requesting the simultaneous withdrawal of the two armies inasmuch as the Pakistani army was there illegally. In reply, Mr. Korbel explained that, as drafted, that provision provided not for the simultaneous withdrawal of the two armies, but rather that the Indian forces would begin withdrawal after being advised by the Commission that Pakistani forces had begun withdrawal. The requirement that Indian troops begin their withdrawal before Pakistani forces had completed their withdrawal from the State, he said, had been arrived at to meet Pakistan's fears of an attack by Indian forces and to make it easier for Pakistan to accept the withdrawal of its troops. Mr. Huddle reiterated that the Commission had not wished to impose any abrupt changes under which the security of either party would be threatened. He believed acceptance of that provision would provide an earnest of the good faith of the two parties.
With reference to paragraph 2 under section B, Pandit Nehru remarked that it would be necessary for India to retain troops in Kashmir for defensive purposes as well as for the
maintenance of law and order. Recalling that the same issue had been raised in the Security Council, he said that the Government of India must have sufficient troops to protect the territory against external attack. Mr. Korbel commented that, in his understanding, the phrase law and order could be interpreted to include maintenance of adequate defence inasmuch as that was essential to law and order.
Commenting on paragraph 3, the Prime Minister criticized what he considered the unilateral nature of the request made therein to the Government of India and the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He wondered whether a similar proclamation should not be required of the Government of Pakistan with reference to territory evacuated by Pakistani troops. In reply, Mr. Korbel commented first that he did not think that provision demanded the guarantee of any new rights. With respect to the Prime Minister's remark, he said that he thought that the Government of India would have severely criticized the Commission had it asked Pakistan to assume any responsibility with reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
In response to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to how long the truce would last, Mr. Korbel replied that it was intended to be effective until a final solution had been reached, but he considered that that was a point which could be discussed by the two parties.
Turning finally to part III, the Prime Minister inquired if the Commission had any ideas regarding the general lines which a final solution might take. Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had no right to submit a solution on which the parties had not agreed. He said that the Commission believed it possible that a solution different from that envisaged in the Security Council resolution might be worked out and that the Commission would be quite willing to help in that respect. However, if no agreement could be reached the Commission, he believed, would have to fall back on its instructions from the Security Council.
Thanking Commission members for their explanations of the resolution, the Prime Minister stated that he expected to be able on the following day to inform the Commission when it could expect a final answer from the Government of India. Before such an answer could be arrived at, he said, it would be necessary to consult the Cabinet as well as the representatives of the Government of Kashmir.
Mr. Korbel thanked the Prime Minister for the opportunity to discuss the resolution with him and appealed to him to give careful consideration to that resolution before deciding upon an answer.
The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.