18071948 .Notes on the informal meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan with two members of the Commission (S/AC. 12/22) Held at Karachi on Sunday, 18 July 1948 at 9.30 a.m. Present
18071948 .Notes on the informal meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan with two members of the Commission (S/AC. 12/22) Held at Karachi on Sunday, 18 July 1948 at 9.30 a.m. Present
Government of Pakistan. Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Foreign Minister), Mr. Mohammad Ali (Secretary-General).
Members of the Commission. Mr. Lozano (Colombia), Mr. Adams (United States of America).
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan said that Pakistan was carefully studying the suggestion of the Commission for a cease-fire agreement which, as he understood, had also been submitted to the Government of India. However, as he had said yesterday, he had hoped that the Commission would have already formulated definite proposals in this regard.
Mr. Lozano explained to the Foreign Minister that the intention of the Commission in simultaneously submitting this suggestion to both Governments was to have the opportunity of narrowing whatever differences there might be between the points of view which might lead to a definite proposal acceptable to both parties.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan briefly reviewed the history of the dispute and said that India from the very beginning had based its case on the legality of the request of the Maharajah for accession to India. Pakistan completely denied this position; it denied that an accession had ever been effected, and maintained that the question of accession was one for the future, to be determined by the plebiscite. Therefore, India's contention that legally it had a right to be in Kashmir was not recognized by Pakistan. Pakistan was more justified in coming to the assistance of the Kashmiri forces, which represented the people of the State, than Indian troops were justified in coming in at the request of the Maharajah. The Government of India had progressively receded from its original position, which was that the question of accession was to be ultimately determined by a fair and unfettered plebiscite. Its position now was that the bringing about of the necessary conditions for conducting such a plebiscite was a constitutional question to be decided by the Maharajah and his Government.
Sir Mohammed stated that, in order to arrive at a satisfactory agreement on the cease-fire question, three mini mum conditions had to be met: (1) Indian troops should be withdrawn from the State; (2) the proposals for a cease-fire order should have the consideration and approval of the "Azad Kashmir Government"; (3) provision must be made for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the Muslim population following the withdrawal of Indian troops.
Sir Mohammed was not clear as to how adequate protection could be afforded to the population upon the withdrawal of the troops from the State. To Mr. Lozano's suggestion that a mixed force, along the lines of the Punjab boundary force, might offer such protection, Sir Mohammed replied that the Punjab boundary force had been a failure and that perhaps the Commission might consider the possibility of an agreement being reached by which Pakistani troops would police Muslim areas and Indian troops would police non Muslim areas, both under neutral officers and under the exclusive authority of the Commission. He did not object to the retention of local State forces provided that they also were under neutral control. He pointed out, however, that the local State forces were practically non-existent.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, while he would have to consult his Government, he believed that Pakistan would agree to the withdrawal of its troops from Kashmir upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. He further stated that the dispute was a result of the continued hostility of the Hindus towards the Muslims. In a broader sense, this had created serious economic problems for Pakistan. For instance, the Government of Pakistan had just received telegrams from the Commander-in-Chief, requesting funds and provisions in order to take care of about 10,000 refugees who had recently come out of Kashmir into Pakistan. Sir Mohammed was of the opinion that a cease-fire order, without strong neutral forces to maintain law and order, could never be enforced. If the Indian forces and other Hindu and Sikh invaders now in Kashmir remained, it would be impossible to stop hostilities. He referred to the pressure which the Indian Government was exerting upon the State of Hyderabad. He said that, although he did not wish to comment on the merits of the Hyderabad case, he regarded it as an example of what was to be expected in Kashmir if the Indian troops and volunteer elements such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh were allowed to remain.
Sir Mohammed pointed out that, in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Kashmir, it would be necessary to withdraw all the forces, including volunteers, from both sides and to bring in an international force, as he had suggested in the Security Council, for the maintenance of law and order. In view of the world situation, however, this might not be possible at this time. The Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the idea of an international force and the role of the United Nations in the dispute. In his opinion, the more authority the Commission assumed, the quicker a solution could be found to the problem. The Government of Pakistan was pleased that the Commission continued to exert its authority. It hoped that the Commission would not merely make recommendations, but would phrase its decisions in terms of directives.
In connexion with the second of the conditions set forth by the Pakistan Government for a cease-fire agreement, Mr. Lozano observed that if the Commission agreed that any proposals for a cease-fire should have the approval of the "Azad Kashmir Government", this would, in his opinion, constitute a de facto recognit of the "Azad Kashmir Government" and introduce an additional complication into the situation. As the plebiscite had not yet taken place in Kashmir, the Commission could not anticipate itself and extend tacit recognition to a group whose strength remained to be determined.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan replied he did not wish to elaborate upon this question. The Security Council had received Sheikh Abdullah, who had been brought there by the delegation of India as the representative of the Kashmir Government. However, the "Azad Kashmir Government" representatives had not been formally received by the Council. He himself had not met Sardar Ibrahim until after the latter had come to New York. While in New York, Mr. Ibrahim had met informally a number of representatives in the Council. Among them, General McNaughton, Mr. Noel-Baker and Senator Austin had commented favourably upon what they regarded as the capabilities of Mr. Ibrahim. Sir Mohammed did not think there would be any objection on the part of the Commission to hearing the representatives of the "Azad Kashmir Government", either in informal session or in private. It was important that those representatives should be heard, and this would not constitute a recognition on the part of the Commission. Indeed, anyone interested in the problem had a right to be heard, for a better understanding of it. The Foreign Minister emphasized that in submitting the second point, he had not intended to trick the Commission into recognizing the "Azad Kashmir Government". His only aim was to ensure that its views should be taken into account in the formulation of any cease-fire agreement, whether by the appearance of representatives of the "Azad Kashmir Government" before the Commission or through the Pakistan Government as intermediary.
Mr. Lozano referred to Sir Mohammed's suggestion of withdrawing Indian and Pakistani troops to defined positions and placing them under the control of neutral officers. He wondered if the Pakistan Government could obtain from the "Azad Kashmir Government" the acceptance of such a formula without the Commission submitting it directly to them.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan considered that this might be possible as a matter of procedure, but he emphasized that the views of the "Azad Kashmir Government" must not be ignored by the Commission.
Mr. Lozano said that since the case had been discussed in the Security Council, the situation had altered in view of the presence of regular Pakistani forces in Kashmir. This had weakened the position of Pakistan in the dispute.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan replied that he had previously stated the reasons for the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir. They could not allow a situation similar to the one in Hyderabad to arise in Kashmir.
Mr. Mohammad Ali observed that the Pakistani troops had gone into Kashmir because, had they not done so, the Indian troops would have taken possession of the whole State, bringing about a fait accompli . An additional reason was to prevent the flooding of the border region by refugees.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan stated that the Pakistan troops had moved into Kashmir early in May for three reasons: (1) to protect the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by Indian forces; (2) to prevent a fait accompli in Kashmir by the Indian Government; and (3) to prevent influx of refugees into Pakistan. The exodus of refugees from Kashmir had already created grave economic problems and placed Pakistan in an unfavourable position in connexion with the proposed plebiscite.
Mr. Lozano inquired whether, if a satisfactory solution for a cease-fire agreement were reached, the question of partition of Kashmir would be considered. He made it clear that. he did not wish to commit himself to the desirability or otherwise of such a solution.
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan replied that under no circumstances would his Government consider the partition of Kashmir. At present, Kashmir had a border of only 20 or 30 miles adjoining India. Should India obtain possession of Jammu, this would considerably extend the Kashmir-India frontier and would constitute a constant threat to Pakistan. Furthermore, both India and Pakistan had agreed that a plebiscite was the basis for any solution of the problem. The plebiscite was a condition sine qua non of the acceptance of the act of accession, as set forth by the Governor-General of India in his letter of 27 October 1947 to the Maharajah.
Sir Mohammed stated that another problem which was of concern to Pakistan was the position of the Gilgit Agency. He discussed the background of the relations of the Gilgit Agency with the British Crown. In late October 1947, representatives of the Gilgit Agency had requested accession to Pakistan, but the Pakistan Government had not taken any decision at that time. There had been frequent requests from the Gilgit Agency which had clearly indicated that, if no action were taken by Pakistan, it would seek accession to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He had received reports a few days ago that Gilgit town had been bombed by the Indian Air Force. This was wanton murder, since there were no military targets. Sir Mohammed felt that Pakistan would soon be requested to send military aid to Gilgit Agency and that, if it did not do so, such aid would be obtained elsewhere.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs inquired whether the Commission wanted his reply in writing or whether it would prefer to have a representative of Pakistan appear before the Commission. He reminded Mr. Lozano that the Government of Pakistan was willing to appoint a representative under paragraph 16 of the resolution of 21 April (S/726). Mr. E. Graeffe had suggested on his visit to Karachi that perhaps it was not yet time to have a liaison representative with the Commission. If the Commission now wished, Sir Mohammed would be glad to appoint a representative who would be at their disposal.
After discussion, it was agreed that the Pakistan Government would not communicate with the Commission further either on the appointment of a representative or the cease-fire agreement until requested to do so by the Commission.
In conclusion, Mr. Lozano suggested that the world was badly in need of the example of a pacific settlement of a dispute. If the Kashmir dispute were settled amicably, it might well be that Pakistan would find its position strengthened when seeking outside assistance for the solution of its economic problems.