23121948 Communication dated 23 December 1948 from the Government of India Addressed to Mr. Alfredo Lozano, Representative, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
23121948 Communication dated 23 December 1948 from the Government of India Addressed to Mr. Alfredo Lozano, Representative, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
New Delhi, 23 December 1948
I have already forwarded to you authentic copies of two aide-memoire embodying the substance of your discussions with the Prime Minister of India. On the basis of the explanation given by you of the Commission's plebiscite proposals and the understanding arrived at in the course of the conversations between you and the Prime Minister, the Government of India, animated by a sincere desire for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute and by their willingness to assist the United Nations Commission in achieving this objective, have decided to accept the proposals.
As you yourself said, the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator will take some time. The Government of India has no objection to the preliminaries of choosing a person of high international standing and commanding general confidence being started, but they would prefer the proceedings to be kept confidential for the time being. No public announcement of the name of the person selected should be made without prior consultation with them.
My Government would be glad to be informed, if necessary confidentially, through their High Commissioner in Karachi, of the reply of the Government of Pakistan to the Commission's proposals. That Government should not be informed of the Government of India's acceptance until after it has communicated its reply to Your Excellency.
(Signed) G.S. Bajpai Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of India Aide-memoire 1
21 December 1948
Mr. Lozano, accompanied by his alternate, Mr. Samper, and Mr. Colban, personal representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, met the Prime Minister yesterday. day. The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sir G.S. Bajpai were also present. The discussion of the Commission's plebiscite proposals fell into two parts: general; and particular in reference to individual clauses.
The Prime Minister drew attention to Pakistan's repeated acts of aggression against India. In spite of the presence of Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir, which is Indian territory now, and the offensive action of Pakistani troops, the Government of India had accepted the Commission's resolution of 13 August. Pakistan had not accepted that resolution.
In paragraph 143 of its report (S/1100) the Commission has referred to its conference with the Prime Minister on the conditions attached by the Government of Pakistan to its acceptance of the resolution of 13 August. As stated in paragraph 144 of the report, the Prime Minister had informed the Commission that he stood on his original premises that the Pakistani forces must be withdrawn from the State before the Government of India could consider any further steps. This had specific reference to an amplification of part III of the resolution of 13 August.
Nevertheless, the Government of India had agreed to informal conversations in Paris which had resulted in the formulation of the proposals now put forward by the Commission. The Government of India naturally wondered how far this process of rejection of proposals put forward by the Commission by Pakistan and the adoption of a responsive attitude on the part of the Government of India towards the Commission's proposals could continue. The Commission must realize that there were limits to the forbearance and spirit of conciliation of the Government of India. The Prime Minister emphasized firstly that, if the Government of India were to accept the Commission's plebiscite proposals, no action could be taken in regard to them until parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August had been fully implemented; secondly that, in the event of Pakistan not accepting these proposals or, having accepted them, of not implementing parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August, the Indian Government's acceptance of them should not be regarded as in any way binding upon them; and thirdly, that part III of the Commission's resolution of 13 August provided "that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance to the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultation with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free suppression will be assured".
The present proposals appeared to limit the method of ascertaining the will of the people regarding the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to a plebiscite. While the Government of India adhered to their position in regard to a plebiscite, they had pointed out that, in view of the difficulties of holding a plebiscite in present conditions in Kashmir, other methods of ascertaining the wish of the people should also be explored. The Commission had itself recognized the difficulties of carrying out a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Government of India feels that the exploration of other methods should not be ruled out.
As regards the Prime Minister's first point, Mr. Lozano inquired whether there would be objection to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator until Parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August had been implemented. Both he and Mr. Colban thought that the Plebiscite Administrator could do useful exploratory work even before arrangements for holding a plebiscite could be taken in hand. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was always open to the Commission to employ advisers or experts for work within its terms of reference. The Government of India, however, would regard the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, as such, premature until parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August had been implemented.
Mr. Lozano accepted the second point made by the Prime Minister. As regards the third point, he said that the Commission wished for the possibility of a plebiscite to be explored first. Should the Plebiscite Administrator, however, find a plebiscite to be impracticable, the way would be open to consider other methods for ensuring a free expression by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their wish regarding the future status of the State.
Preamble: The phrase "The Governments of India and Pakistan simultaneously accept" is incorrect in that either Government may not accept the principles supplementary to the resolution of 13 August. Even if both Governments accept them, the acceptance cannot be simultaneous. The wording should be changed accordingly.
(b) The question was raised whether the form of words employed was intended to give to the Plebiscite Administrator powers of interference in the administration of the State, for instance, by "direction and supervision of the State Forces and Police", mentioned in paragraph B.8 of the Security Council's resolution of 21 April 1948. Mr. Lozano said that this was not the intention of the Commission and that the words quoted above had been deliberately omitted. The Prime Minister pointed out that all the Plebiscite Administrator could in reason expect was that, for the purpose of organizing and conducting the plebiscite and ensuring its free dom and impartiality, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir should give him such assistance as he might require.
Mr. Lozano said that a Plebiscite Administrator of international standing and commanding general confidence who would be appointed after consultation with the Government of India could be expected to act reasonably and that the Commission did not intend that he should usurp the functions of the State Government in the field of normal administration and law and order. His functions and powers would be limited to ensuring that the plebiscite was free and impartial.
(b) The Prime Minister drew attention to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces which had been armed and equipped by Pakistan and were under the operational command of the Pakistani army ran into tens of thousands. Their presence in the territories referred to in A.3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August even after demobilization, would be a constant threat to the territory under the control of Indian and State forces, a deterrent to the return of many refugees, and an obstacle to the free expression of opinion regarding the future status of the State by those who might be opposed to the accession of the State to Pakistan. Mr. Lozano pointed out that it was the Commission's intention that there should be large-scale disarming of these forces, though it would not be possible to require withdrawal, from these territories, of genuine inhabitants of these areas.
(a) Mr. Lozano agreed that it was not the Commission's intention that the Pakistan Commission should operate outside Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistan Commission would not operate in the territory referred to in A.3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August.
The Prime Minister then raised the question of the "free return" to the State of all citizens who had left it on account of the disturbances. He said that the tendency of Pakistan would be to push as many people as possible into Jammu and Kashmir. If the plebiscite was to be limited, as it should be, to genuine citizens of the State, the entry into the State of persons claiming to be citizens would have to be most carefully checked. With regard to how this was to be achieved, Mr. Lozano said that the Commission fully realized the necessity of an accurate and effective check but had not gone into details. Possibly those returning to the State could be stopped and examined at the frontier. The Prime Minister pointed out that, considering the length of the frontier and the case with which people could slip across the border over the mountain tracks, a check on the frontier would neither be easy nor effective, except by the deployment of large forces.
Apart from the problem of entry there is the even more important problem of the reimagination and protection of those who have left the State on account of recent disturbances. Homes have been destroyed; property has been lost; there has been wholesale dispossession of persons from the land that they used to cultivate. It is not enough to "invite" these persons to return to the State. They have to be given full security and to be housed, fed, and put in a position to maintain themselves. It may be necessary to lodge these returning citizens of the State temporarily in camps for distribution to their homes. They could not, however, be expected to remain in relief camps for long or to take part in a plebiscite from such camps. The administrative and economic implications of this task were at once significant and onerous.
They must receive full attention.
(a) It is assumed that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will decide whether or not a person entered the State for a lawful purpose.
(b) India is a secular State; the United Nations is also a secular organization. Pakistan aims at being a theocratic State. An appeal to religious fanaticism could not be regarded as legitimate political activity. Mr. Lozano agreed that any political activity which might tend to disturb law and order could not be regarded as legitimate. The same test would apply to freedom of press and of speech.
As regards the freedom of lawful entry and exit, this must obviously be governed by B.6 of the proposals. It is assumed that in the territory under their control entry and exit will be regulated by rules framed for the purpose by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir with due regard to the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. Mr. Lozano said that a system of permits would probably be necessary.
(c) Persons guilty of ordinary offences against the law will not be regarded as political prisoners.
In all their negotiations the Government of India has emphasized the paramount need of ensuring the security of the State. The Commission recognized this in its resolution of 13 August; it has also provided in 4 (a) of the plebiscite proposals that measures with regard to the final disposal of Indian and State forces will be taken with due regard to the security of the State. The Government of India wishes to emphasize the supreme importance which they attach to adequate provision for the security of the State in all contingencies.
Aide-memoire 2
22 December 1948
Mr. Lozano and Mr. Colban met the Prime Minister at 11 a.m. The Honourable Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai and Mr. Pai were also present. Mr. Lozano said that the aide-memoire of the conference
which took place on Monday, 20 December, was a correct account of the proceedings. He suggested, however, that the phrase "large-scale disarming" of the Azad Kashmir forces used in the portion of the aide-memoire dealing with B.4 (b) of the Commission's plebiscite proposals did not, perhaps, represent the Commission's intention. What the Commission had in mind was the disbanding of these forces; disarming, it was assumed, would follow.
The Prime Minister pointed out that disbandment was not the same thing as disarming. Pakistan had raised something like thirty-five battalions of 28,000 to 30,000 men who now formed part of the Azad Kashmir forces. The presence of such a large number of armed people, even if the regular formations were disbanded, would not be conducive to ensuring either the security of that part of Jammu and Kashmir which is under the control of Indian and State forces, or the security of those inhabitants of the territories referred to in A.3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August who did not fully subscribe to or share the political views of pro-Pakistan elements.
Moreover, the question of the re-entry into these territories of State citizens who had left it on account of the present conflict had to be kept in mind. With such a large number of members of the Azad Kashmir forces under arms, former inhabitants of these territories who held different political views would not dare to re-enter and would therefore be debarred from participation in a "free and impartial" plebiscite. In view of this explanation. Mr. Lozano agreed that the phrase "large-scale disarming" should be regarded as correctly interpreting the Commission's intention.
Discussion then turned on B.10 of the proposals. Mr. Lozano, answering an inquiry of the Prime Minister, said that the Commission did not contemplate that the Plebiscite Administrator should undertake any administrative functions in regard to the plebiscite until parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 had been implemented, Until such implementation, the conditions for the discharge of such functions would not exist. What the Commission had in mind was that discussions on details connected with the plebiscite might begin as soon as possible since this would create a good impression all around. Mr. Colban supported this view on the ground that the announcement of a Plebiscite Administrator of high standing would have an excellent psychological effect.
Mr. Colban added that, of course, if difficulties arose in the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August the preliminary consultations regarding the functions of the Plebiscite Administrator and other detailed arrangements for the plebiscite would have to be deferred.
Unless the cease-fire was carried out and Pakistani forces, hostile tribesmen and Pakistani nationals who had entered the State for purposes of fighting had withdrawn, there could not be in the territories referred to in A.3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August, any local authorities with whom plebiscite arrangements could be discussed.
As at present worded, could be interpreted to mean that consultations with the Plebiscite Administrator should start. immediately on the signature of the truce. This clearly was not feasible. Mr. Lozano and Mr. Colban pointed out that, when the paragraph in question was drafted, all these considerations were not present to the mind of the Commission. The Commission, according to Mr. Lozano, had assumed that, since the Prime Minister of India had informed the Commission, two days after it had placed before him the conditions attached by the Government of Pakistan to their acceptance of the resolution of 13 August, that he stood on his original premises that the Pakistani forces must be withdrawn from the State before the Government of India could consider any further steps, action in relation to would be feasible only after satisfactory progress had been made with the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August.
He and Mr. Colban agreed that the consultations envisaged in could take place only after the Commission was satisfied that satisfactory progress had been made with the implementation of part II of the resolution, that is after hostile tribesmen, Pakistani forces and Pakistani nationals who had entered Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of fighting had withdrawn from State territory. Mr. Lozano said that this was the interpretation of which they would present to the Pakistani Government in Karachi.
Mr. Lozano stressed the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator as soon as possible. In view of the preliminaries that had to be gone through, he thought that it might take some time before the Plebiscite Administrator was finally appointed. The Prime Minister pointed out that, if Pakistan accepted the present proposals and carried out its obligations under part II of the resolution of 13 August promptly, he saw no reason why the appointment should take much time. What he wished to emphasize was that there would be nothing which the Plebiscite Administrator could usefully do in India until progress had been made with the implementation of part II of the resolution as now explained by Mr. Lozano and Mr. Colban.
As regards alternative methods of ascertaining the wish of the people regarding the future status of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. Lozano said that the statement in paragraph 3 of the aide-memoire dated 21 December 1948 was substantially similar to his own record which reads: "Mr. Lozano said that it would be up to the Plebiscite Administrator to report to the Security Council (through the Commission) if he found the plebiscite procedure to be impossible for technical or practical reasons. The Plebiscite Administrator and/or the Commission could then recommend alternative solutions." Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister once again emphasized the need for security for displaced State nationals returning to the territory referred to in part II A.3 of the Commission's resolution of 13 August. Equally important would be the task of rehabilitation of refugees returning to this area as well as to the part of the State under the control of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved. Not only organization and machinery but time and money would be needed to accomplish the formidable task of restoring these unhappy persons to what once was their home. Until this task was completed, the conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite would not exist. Mr. Lozano recognized the importance of this matter and pointed out that it will have to be carefully gone into when the consultations on the details of the present proposals take place.