25101965 Text of the speech made by Mr. Bhutto (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965.
25101965 Text of the speech made by Mr. Bhutto (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965.
The consideration of the India Pakistan question by the Security Council has now reached a stage which will be decisive, as much for the issue of war or peace in South Asia as for the effectiveness and authority of the United Nations. I base this statement on the request we made for this meeting and on India's response to it, as indicated in the letter of the Permanent representative of India to the United Notions [S/6823]
I am grateful to the President and the other members of the Security Council for having convened this meeting, at our request, to consider the rapidly deteriorating situation between India and Pakistan. The reasons which prompted our request were the virtual collapse of the cease-fire and the total disregard by India of the letter and spirit of Council resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965.
This resolution provided for various essential measures to facilitate an honourable settlement of the political problem underlying the conflict between India and Pakistan-namely, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. It was stated authoritatively in the Council that the resolution stood as a whole and had to be implemented as such. It represented the Council's commitment to secure a peaceful settlement of the dispute. That was emphasized by the members of the Council and also by numerous Member States speaking in the general debate during the current General Assembly session.
What is India's attitude to that commitment ? As far as the world is concerned, today India has unmasked itself. It has said that it is not prepared to participate in the Council's deliberations if these go beyond paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965). In other words, it shows contempt for the Council's resolution and the Council's authority. That fact is so plain that it needs no elaboration.
The Council is told that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and that any discussion relating to it amounts to a gross interference in India's internal affairs. That is to say, the Council's deliberations for eighteen years. extending over more than 100 meetings, with all the statements made by its members, the resolutions adopted, the pledges given, the commitments solemnly entered into-all these are to be expunged because India has decided to annex Jammu and Kashmir and unilaterally to repudiate all its obligations. In the history of the United Nations, has any Power-South Africa included-gone further in its brazen defiance of the world Organization?
It is for the Council to deal with that defiance. Meanwhile, I shall proceed with reporting the present situation as we see it.
When the Council met on 27 September [1245th meeting] to consider the situation, it did so as result of the Secretary General's report that the cease-fire agreed to unconditionally by the Governments of India and Pakistan was not holding. The Council reaffirmed its previous resolutions and demanded that the parties urgently honour their commitments to the Council to observe the cease-fire and withdraw their forces as necessary steps in the full implementation of resolution 211 (1965).
Nearly a month has elapsed since the Council adopted its last resolution, but the cease-fire continues to be unstable and negotiations have still to begin on withdrawal of troops and a settlement of the political problem with regard to Jammu and Kashmir. In our submissions before the Council, we have consistently affirmed that, while a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops must necessarily form a part of the effort to reach a permanent settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, it was unrealistic, in political terms, to divorce the problem of the cessation of hostilities from that of settling the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
The reason for this is not far to seek. One of the parties considers the cease-fire as something which merely facilitates its continued hold on the greater part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is therefore unwilling to allow such stabilization of the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops as would permit the Council, as well as both parties to the dispute, to proceed with the task of finding a peaceful settlement of the dispute. It is for this reason that my delegation has constantly urged that the Council would be defeating even the immediate purpose which it had in mind if it allowed India to escape with the impression that the Council had resigned itself to the continuance of the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir.
It is also on this account that my Government has always urged the Council to remind the parties not merely of their duty to refrain from the use of force in contravention of the United Nations Charter, but also of their responsibility to honour and implement in good faith the obligations and commitments undertaken by them under the United Nations resolutions which lay dawn the accepted and agreed solution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
In its resolution 221 (1965) the Security Council demanded that India and Pakistan should issue orders for a cease-fire to take effect on 22 September at 7 a.m. PMT. Pakistan compiled-see the letter dated 22 September 1965 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations [S/6699/Add. 1] India asked for an extension of the dead-line by eighteen hours on the pretext of giving sufficient notice to local commanders. The Council agreed to extend the time limit by fifteen hours. As we expected in Pakistan, India utilized this opportunity to improve its military position. While pretending to get ready for a cease-fire, India moved an entire division against Khem Karan, on the Indo-Pakistan border, in a frantic bid to regain lost ground. Simultaneously, it launched major offensives in the Wagah, Sialkot and Fazilka sectors. Most of these actions were, however, thwarted as a result of the vigilance of our Army commanders and the stiff resistance of the Pakistan troops.
Even after the cease-fire, there was no letup in India's aggressive attitudes and activities. India has been flouting the cease-fire agreement by following a deliberate and systematic plan to forcibly seize as much territory as possible. It has also been endeavouring to improve its position on the actual line of control by creeping forward and occupying areas which it failed repeatedly to capture during the war.
Since 23 September there have been a large number of violations of the cease-fire by Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir and against Pakistan territory. These have been reported to the United Nations observers by our military authorities and to the Secretary-General by our Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In spite of their endeavours, the United Nations observers have not been able to ensure effective observance of the cease-fire or vacation of territory seized forcibly by India since 23 September. It is no wonder that the Secretary General is concerned about the deterioration in the situation and the mounting tension in various sectors of the battle front and that he has come to the conclusion that "the existence of the cease-fire must be considered precarious.
At the 1245th meeting of the Security Council, on 27 September, I mentioned some of the breaches of the cease-fire committed by India between 23 and 26 September. I also drew the attention of the Council to the first three reports of the Secretary-General which showed that our complaints were well founded [S/6710 and Add. I and 2]. The Council was naturally concerned over this state of affairs and again called for strict observance of the cease-fire. Let us see how far India has complied with the Council's directives.
Since 27 September there has been no diminution either in the number or in the gravity of breaches of the cease-fire committed by India. Numerous complaints have been filed by our military authorities, of which only a small proportion have been investigated so far by United Nations observers. Their reports, however, leave no doubt as to India's responsibility for proved violations of the cease-fire. I shall not weary the Council with details of all the cases investigated by the United Nations observers, but I should like to invite the Council's attention to some of the major breaches of the cease fire which India has committed during this month and which have been dealt with in the Secretary-General's reports of 18 October [S/6710/Add. 4] and 23 October (S/6710/Add. 5). In the Domel-Tangdhar sector, on 6 October 1965, the Indians. launched a major offensive at the Jura and Shahkot bridges in the presence of United Nations observers. This fact is borne out by the Secretary-General's report of 18 October, from which I quote:
"Observers stationed at Jura reported that the Jura and Shahkot bridges had been shelled and attacked by Indian troops at 1045 hours on 6 October... A later report from the observers, received on 13 October, indicated that Indian attacks at those bridges had continued in the presence of the observers and that Pakistan troops had returned the fire... In view of the heavy mortar firing, the observers had to withdraw west of Jura." [S/6710/Add.4, para. 12.]
An Indian operational order captured by Pakistan forces. during this fighting reveals that the 19th Indian Division stationed in Indian-held Kashmir was ordered to clear the bulge cast of the river Kishanganga and to dominate the river line. Three Indian battalions were used to destroy the Jura and Shahkot bridges, supported by medium, field and mountain artillery. Helicopters were also used for logistic support. A photostat copy of the skeleton operational order as roted down by the Indian Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion, the Kumaon Regiment, who took part in this operation, is being distributed for perusal by the members of the Security Council [S/6828] This Indian operation continued for more than ten days, in total disregard of India's cease-fire commitments and the intervention of United Nations observers. This premeditated attack has created an extremely dangerous situation, the consequences of which will alone. be borne by India and by India
In the Kotel-Naushera sector, on 7 October, Indian troops, supported by artillery, attacked Pakistan positions on the Indian side of the cease-fire line in the Khuiratta-Jhangar area. Again this aggression took place in the presence of the United Nations observers, who confirmed that the Pakistan position mentioned in our complaint had been attacked by the Indian troops at 0140 hours and at 0215 hours during the night of 6 to 7 October, and that Indian troops again shelled the Pakistan area between 0625 and 0925 hours on 7 October. They also reported that two of the Pakistan positions had been occupied by Indian troops on the night of 7 October and retaken by Pakistan forces later in the same day. Paragraph 22 of document S/6/10/Add, 4 refers to this incident.
In the Uri-Poonch sector, the Indians are building a road linking Punch town with Uri, thus committing a serious violation. of the case-fire. The United Nations Military. Observer Group has been informed of this violation and of the fact that Pakistan forces will have to take action to prevent the construction of the road.
With regard to the Chamb sector, as is now well known, on 29 September the Indian local commander issued an ultimatum to Pakistan forces in the Chhamb sector to vacate areas under Pakistan control, failing which Indian forces would launch an offensive action. The Indians launched a well coordinated attack on 1 October in the area between the 81 st and7 4th Northings. This area has been in the possession of Pakistan forces since before the time of the cease-fire. The above facts have been substantiated by the United Nations observers in the area, as can be seen from paragraph 11 to 21 of the Secretary General's report of 7 October [S/6710/Add. 3],
In Pakistan, the Indians have been reorganizing and regrouping their forces in front of the Lahore Sialkot and Kasur sectors, contrary to the spirit of the cease-fire and they continue to disregard the interventions made by the United Nations observers, as can be seen from paragraph 46 of document S/6710/ Add. 4. This paragraph states:
"On the morning of 13 October, between 0920 and 1000 hours Indian troops fired with tank and field artillery at Pakistan positions in the Skipton area on both banks of the Canal. The observers saw no reaction from Pakistan artillery, but believed that there was an exchange of small arms fire. At approximately 1005 hours the firing stopped and the observers took this opportunity to place their jeep with the United Nations flag on the west bank of the Canal in full view of both sides. Nevertheless, firing was resumed by Indian troops with artillery anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles and lasted nearly one hour."
In the Ferozepur sector, in violation of the ceasefire agreement. India brought the 23rd Infantry Division, equipped through United States military aid, from the north-eastern frontier of India to Ambala, an Indian military station close to West Pakistan. A few days ago this division was moved to Ferozepore. All the evidence indicates that India intends to launch an attack on the KhemKaran sector, which has been in the occupation of Pakistan forces since before the time of the cease-fire.
In the Sulemanki sector. On 4 October Indian forces engaged our posts at Sandarke with heavy guns and small-arms fire, which created an extremely tense situation. The Rajasthan sector, according to the Secretary-General's report dated 23 October, is considered by the Chief Officer of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission to be probably the most potentially dangerous sector of the conflict between India and Pakistan" [S/6710/Add. 5, para. 2].
Indian forces in the Rajasthan area have made repeated attacks in pursuance of a deliberate and systematic plan to seize territory which has been under Pakistan control since before the cease-fire came into effect. On the morning of 7 October 1965, Indian forces in approximately battalion strength attacked our post at Lokhandwala, which has been in our occupation since before the cease-fire. They used mortars and medium machine guns. On 9 October, the Indians attacked Kelnor, an outpost on the Indian side of the border held by Pakistan since before the cease-fire. This breach of the cease-fire has been confirmed by the United Nations observers, as can be seen from paragraph 70 of document S/6710/Add. 4.
On 12 October, the Indians attacked our position at Ghotaru. These attacks have been confirmed by the United Nations. observers in the area, as can be seen from paragraphs 66 and 67 of document S/6710/Add. 4.
On 14 October, the Indians attacked Pakistan. village of Nawatala. This is confirmed by paragraph 71 of the. Secretary-General's report dated 18 October [S/6710/Add. 4] and by paragraph 8 of his report dated 23 October [S/6710/Add. 5.], which reads;
"On 15 October also, an observer in the Chor Barmer sector who had proceeded to the village of Nawatala reported that the village had been attacked on 14 October by Indian troops and occupied by them the next day. When the observer told the Indian major that the village previously had been definitely occupied by Pakistan troops, the Indian local commander replied that he had instructions to clear Pakistan infiltrators from Indian territory. The observer later received the same reply from the Indian battalion and brigade commanders..."
This shows India's respect for the cease-fire.
On 15 October, the Indians, after capturing a Pakistan held post at Kelnor, crossed the Indo-Pakistan international boundary near the village of Bhame Jotar, which is well within Pakistan's territory. This constitutes not only a serious breach of the cease fire, but also an act of aggression against Pakistan.
Our Army authorities informed the Chief Officer of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission on 18 October that Indian forces in the Rajasthan area were being reinforced by one fresh infantry division. These reports were confirmed by United Nations observers, who informed General Macdonald on 11-22 October that there had been "a substantial build-up...in the Jaisalmer sector" (S/6710/Add. 5 para. 13].
The threat of Indian aggression is, however, not over. The Indian Chief of Staff has agreed "to stop offensive action and forward movement" [ibid, para. 14] only pending consultations with his Government. I must make it clear to the Council that if India proceeds with its evil intentions and launches an attack on our positions in Rajasthan, the armed forces of Pakistan will take whatever military action is deemed necessary in this and other sectors of the war front.
In a futile attempt to justify her aggressive action in the Rajasthan sector, India has been asserting that Pakistan held only the border outpost of Munabao in Rajasthan when the cease-fire came into effect. This Indian lie has been finally nailed by the Secretary-General in his report dated 8 October [S/6710/Add. 4]. I invite the Council's attention to paragraphs. 68 of the report, in which the Secretary-General categorically states that "The above-mentioned positions under attack by Indian troops"-Malesar. Raichandwala and Ghotaru-" are located in the area held by Pakistan forces.
Again, in paragraph 70. In the same report, he refers to Kelnor, which was attacked by Indian forces, as "a Pakistan held position near the border on the Indian side. And then, in paragraph 71, when the Secretary-General reports the Indian seizure of Nawatala, it is made clear that this area "had been definitely occupied by Pakistan troops.
Apart from the above serious cease-fire violations in Jammu and Kashmir and along the Indo-Pakistan borders, the Indians have committed inhuman atrocities on the civilian population in parts of Pakistan which are under their occupation. Acts of barbarity being committed by Indian military authorities against Pakistani prisoners of war have been reported to the Secretary-General. Documents captured by the Pakistan forces reveal that the Indians are violating the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Wounded Pakistani prisoners of war have not been given adequate medical treatment, and some have been killed in the Rajasthan and Fazilka sectors. All such cases have been brought to the notice of the United Nations Observation Mission in the hope that it would be able to persuade the Indians to abide by the Geneva Convention and to accord humane treatment to the prisoners of war.
The Security Council, in its resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September, called for the withdrawal of armed forces subsequent to the coming into effect of the cease-fire. In identical telegraphic messages sent to the Governments India and Pakistan on the same day, the Secretary-General stated inter alia: "I request your plan and schedule for the indicated withdrawal of your troop. [S/6599, para. 3.].
Again, the Secretary-General, in his telegram dated 23 September 1965 to the Prime Minister of India the President of Pakistan, said:
"...it is my duty to inform you that I expect to receive from you at a very early date your plan and schedule for the required withdrawal of any of your troops that are now on the wrong side of these lines". [S/6699/Add. 2, sect. II.]
Pakistan's response to the Secretary-General's request was positive and constructive. The Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, in his letter to the Secretary General of 26 September [S/6715] pointed out that :
...no withdrawal can take place until it has been jointly agreed to by representatives of the two armed forces and a mutually accepted programme of withdrawal has been prepared.
The Indian reply and subsequent communications to the Secretary-General, on the other hand, were contentious and designed to delay the withdrawal as long as possible and to provide India with excuses to refrain from any plan of withdrawal that may be formulated whenever it suited India.
In his letter of 13 October [S/6719/Add. 2 para 4] to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, the Secretary-General expressed his concern over the fact that "the withdrawals...foreseen in the Council's resolutions have not taken place. In this letter, the Secretary-General put forward two possible courses of action: first, that:
"...each party might find it possible to formulate its own plan, and schedule of withdrawal and that the respective time schedules might be coordinated with the assistance of United Nations military observers.
Alternatively, the Secretary-General suggested that :
..appropriate military representatives of each side be brought together by and with an acceptable representative to be designated by me to meet either in the area or at United Nations Headquarters for the purpose of formulating an agreed withdrawal plan.
Pakistan took a practical approach to the problem and accepted the second alternative suggested by the Secretary General. It was also recommended that the meetings should be held in the subcontinent rather than at United Nations Headquarters, as all the relevant information would be more easily available in the subcontinent, and senior military officials could take part in these meetings.
Let us now look at the Indian reply to the Secretary General's proposals. The Prime Minister of India, in his letter of 18 October 1965 [S/6810] stated that: "..since a cease-fire has not yet been effectively established, the stage for a planned schedule of withdrawals over the entire area of conflict has not yet arrived". This is tantamount to saying that withdrawals cannot take place before the cease-fire becomes effective. The Council has already heard the extent to which India is observing the cease-fire agreement. India's deliberate and continuous violations of the cease-fire might very well be used to block withdrawal of forces. The tactics used by India to thwart demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir since 1948 are likely to be repeated here again. I am sure that the Council will see through the Indian designs and machinations and will not let India once again flout the will of the United Nations on one false pretext or another.
In a letter of 22 October to the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, the Secretary-General welcomed our favourable response to his suggestion. He proposed to send Major-General Syseno Sarment of Brazil, Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, to the area at an early date to visit both capitals and to arrange for representatives of India and Pakistan to meet at some mutually agreed place, possibly near the front lines, and to seek agreement on a plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties. We have accepted the proposal. India's reply is still awaited.
The record is open for all to observe. The only logical conclusion is that India is flagrantly violating the cease-fire and then using the ineffectiveness of the cease-fire as a means to frustrate any plan for withdrawal. Pakistan accepted the cease-fire in good faith and has taken no offensive action since it came into effect. But surely we cannot be expected to carry out the cease-fire unilaterally and then follow it by a one-sided withdrawal. The Security Council must also bear in mind India's past record when it frustrated all the attempts made by the military sub-committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan to effect demilitarization in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. India must not be permitted to repeat its past tactics with regard to withdrawal of troops and once again hold up the implementation of Security Council resolutions. If the Security Council is determined to implement its resolution 211 (1965), it should compel India to show respect for the cease-fire and co-operate with the Secretary-General in implementing the withdrawal provisions of the Council's resolutions.
I must remind the Council that a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops are, in the words of Council resolution 211 (1965), only the first essential steps towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan with regard to Jammu and Kashmir. The Council must now address itself to this basic problem.
As the President of Pakistan has pointed out in his communication to the Secretary-General of today's date [S/6825]:
"To effect a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops would be dealing only with symptoms, not the disease. Present indications are that, unless the Council gets down to dealing with the root cause of the conflict, the present cease-fire may prove to be only a short lived luli fighting. The institution of a Security Council Commission such as we have proposed would be evidence of the determination of the Council to see the conflict urgently and peacefully, resolved, a fact which should result in a lowering of tension in the subcontinent and thereby help to strengthen the expectation that the cease-fire would endure."
The need for prompt action under paragraph 4 of Council resolution 211 (1965) has become more urgent than ever on account of the large scale arrests by India of political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir and the expulsion of thousands of people who opposed Indian rule. It is a fact, which many impartial observers have attested to, that almost simultaneously with the cease-fire India let loose a reign of terror in the occupied portion of Jammu and Kashmir.
In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 18 October 1965 [S/6810], the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations drew attention to the situation which prevails in that unfortunate land. He quoted from the dispatches sent by correspondents of a number of reputable and well-known newspapers to show the brutality with which the Indian occupation authorities have set upon the people of Jammu and Kashmir. As the Council can visualize, there are stringent restrictions on Press dispatches from Srinagar. Yet stories are beginning to trickle out which give us some idea of the extreme measures employed by India to wreak vengeance. on the people of Jammu and Kashmir....