Documents

20091965 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Zafar (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965.


20091965 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Zafar (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965.

 

I have just seen the draft resolution submitted to the Council and have listened with care to the explanation given by its sponsor. The draft resolution, as stated by the representative of the Netherlands, is the result of informal consultations among members of the Council. My delegation was not involved in those consultations. Permit me, however, to make a few observations of the preliminary nature of this draft resolution.

 

The question that the Security Council has been considering during the past week, and which has been on the agenda of the Council since January 1948, is the question of Jammu and Kashmir. It is essential to concentrate all future endeavours on a settlement of the outstanding differences between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. It is in that sense that we understand the reference to Kashmir in the preamble to the draft resolution.

 

We notice that the cease-fire is regarded by the Council as the first step towards the attainment of a peaceful and enduring solution of the Kashmir problem. Indeed, as I have recalled in my previous submission to the Council, the cease fire orders were issued on 1 January 1949 and the agreement on the demarcation of a cease-fire line was reached on 7 July 1949, in pursuance of the international agreement with regard to Kashmir embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The cease-fire agreement is part and parcel of the Commission's resolutions and does not stand by itself.

 

In my statement on Saturday, 18 September 1965 (1240th meeting), I also briefly reviewed the history of Kashmir since the reference of the dispute to the Security Council, I showed that, so far, only the first parts of the two agreed resolutions of the Commission have been implemented. Implementation of the remaining provisions has been blocked by India's refusal to proceed with demilitarization and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.

 

In regret to note that the draft resolution fails to deal with the basic problem. For a settlement of the Kashmir problem, paragraph 4 of the draft resolution calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan "to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter" of the United Nations. In my intervention a short while ago I gave an outline of the bilateral talks with regard to Kashmir between India and Pakistan. I pointed out that while Pakistan is always ready for meaningful talks with India to resolve the Kashmir dispute, experience has shown that such talks have proved futile. Resumption of bilateral talks would again be futile if India continued to repudiate its international undertaking with regard to Kashmir as embodied in the Commission's resolutions and claimed that Kashmir had become an integral part of India.

 

My Government must once again reiterate that the continuing force and validity of the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 do not become obsolete simply because the other party chooses to resign from them. Solemn international commitments cannot be so easily repudiated. The Commission's resolutions still provide the surest and quickest means of resolving the Kashmir dispute and achieving a lasting peace and amity between Pakistan and India.

 

On the other hand, should the Security Council adopt this draft resolution, we feel bound to warn and to put on record that unless the basic cause of the present conflict is removed, another and wider conflagration is bound to ensue.

 

In my statement of 18 September 1965, I put forward a four-point peace plan to end the war between Pakistan and India and to secure peace with justice. Permit me to recall what I said: first, there should be a cease-fire with immediate effect; second, immediately thereafter the forces of both India and Pakistan should be withdrawn completely from the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir, including the territory called Azad Kashmir: third, a United Nations force should take over the security functions in the State; and fourth, within three months of the cease-fire a plebiscite should be conducted in the State, under the auspices of the United Nations, to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir on the question of accession of their State to India or Pakistan. These four proposals do not impose on India any disability which Pakistan, for its own part, is not prepared to accept. Therefore, they are fair, reasonable and constructive and point to the quickest and surest way to end the bloodshed and to secure lasting peace. There is no other way than a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to resolve the differences between the two countries in a just and honourable manner. This is the reason why Pakistan has adhered faithfully to the idea of a plebiscite for all these years and insists that it should be held.

 

I would therefore request the members of the council to consider these aspects again and not to accept and adopt this draft resolution.