18091965 Text of the speech made by Mr.Mohammad Zafar (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No 1240 held on 18 September 1965.
18091965 Text of the speech made by Mr.Mohammad Zafar (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No 1240 held on 18 September 1965.
Pakistan is concerned over the seriousness of the situation in the sub continent and shares with the other nations the apprehension that, if war continues, it may engulf millions living in India and Pakistan. In view of the gravity of the present conflict, my Government suggested to the Secretary General, when he came to Pakistan, that the following actions need to be taken: first, there should be a cease-fire with immediate effect; second, immediately thereafter the forces of both India and Pakistan should withdraw completely from the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir, including the territory called Azad Kashmir; third, a United Nations force should take over the security function in the state; and fourth, within three months of the cease-fire a Plebiscite should be conducted in the State, under the auspices of the United Nations, to ascertain the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir on the question of accession of their State to India or Pakistan. Pakistan believes that this is the only way in which peace can permanently return to the subcontinent. There is no other way. I intend today to enlarge on this subject and indicate why Pakistan has suggested these measures. The reason is that peace can be achieved only through the enforcement of these measures. I believe that the purpose of Security Council resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September 1965 respectively, the purpose of the mission undertaken by the Secretary General, and the objectives of this meeting of the Security Council are to find ways and means to attain lasting peace.
As I shall be disagreeing with some of the observations made by the Secretary-General, I wish to say at once that, any disagreement apart, the Government and the people of Pakistan have the warmest regard for the Secretary-General and high appreciation for his dedication to the cause of peace. As for myself, I have particular regard for him because in the short period of time that I travelled with him from Beirut to Rawalpindi-and this was my first meeting with the Secretary General. I found him to be a man of high ideals and of sincerity of purpose.
May I now proceed to discuss the proposals made by Pakistan. I shall take them one by one to explain why we are urging the Security Council to take a decision in accord with those suggestions. First, Pakistan stands for an immediate ceasefire. This is what the Security Council has proposed.
Pakistan stands for a cease-fire because it believes in peaceful coexistence with India. We expected the two countries to coexist in peace like Canada and the United States, or like Sweden and Norway. We do not want any war with India. We are a smaller country both in area and population. India has nearly a million men under arms, four times as many as Pakistan. India has inherited from the United Kingdom, and has recently acquired from the United States, the USSR and other foreign Powers, a large defence production capacity of its own. Pakistan has in the main to rely for its defence supplies on foreign Powers.
Our main efforts have been devoted towards economic development. With hard and sustained effort, we have made substantial progress, but we need many more years to reach. our economic goals. And for that we need peace. How can we afford a war? We neither started the war nor do we want it to continue. Therefore we suggested, as the first proposal, that there should be a cease-fire.
The second step proposed by us is that there should be immediate withdrawal of the forces of both India and Pakistan from the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The reasons for this proposal are well known to the members of the Security Council and to the world. They stem from the following facts: first, the salient facts of the Kashmir dispute and the resolutions of the United Nations; and second, the extent to which the resolutions have been implemented by India and Pakistan.
The Kashmir dispute arose when the Maharajah of Kashmir, in spite of a standstill agreement with Pakistan, under coercion by the Indian Government and during the time when his people had revolted against him and routed his forces, tried to give away the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. But the rights of citizens are not a question of title or property which can be passed on by one owner to the other. The people of Kashmir continued their struggle against overwhelming odds. When India failed to crush them, it brought the issue before the Security Council, in January 1948. After extensive discussion of the problem and after listening to both parties, the Security Council adopted resolution 47 (1948) on 21 April 1948 providing for the cessation of hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the withdrawal of the combatants, and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. Subsequently, the Security Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Commission visited India and Pakistan, as well as Jammu and Kashmir. After strenuous efforts extending over nearly six months, it brought about an agreement between the two countries with regard to Jammu and Kashmir. This international agreement is embodied in the Commission's resolutions dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949
Taken together, these resolutions provide for, first, a cease fire and demarcation of cease-fire line; second, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and third, a free and impartial plebiscite conducted by the United Nations to determine the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan.
The Commission's resolutions were endorsed by the Security Council and accepted both by India and by Pakistan. These resolutions constitute the basic international agreement with regard to Kashmir. As a consequence of this agreement fighting stopped on 1 January 1949. An agreement on the demarcation of the cease-fire line was reached on 27 July 1949. Implementation of the demilitarization provisions of the Com mission's resolutions was, however, obstructed by India. The plebiscite Administrator-designate was prevented from assuming office and holding the plebiscite. India refused to synchronize the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian army with that of the Pakistani forces as proposed by the Commission. Since then, numerous attempts on the part of the Security Council and its various representatives have failed to secure. an agreement on the issue of demilitarization.
There is a long history of India's refusal to implement this agreement. I could cite chapter and verse, but I am afraid it would take up too much of the time of the Council. I shall therefore only recount a few points as briefly as I can.
First, India refused to submit its plan for the withdrawal of Indian forces when the Commission convened a meeting in March 1949 asking for withdrawal plans, and thus blocked progress in demilitarization. When eventually some sort of programme was presented to the Commission, India insisted that it should not be disclosed to Pakistan or to the Security Council. The Commission, however, placed on record its opinion that the Indian withdrawal plan was "far from a fulfilment of India's undertaking under the terms of the 13 August resolution".
Second, to meet one of the objections raised by India, General A. G. L. Me Naughton, as President of the Security Council for the month of December 1949, proposed to combine the two stages of demilitarization and produced a comprehensive programme providing for the withdrawal of the forces of Pakistan and India, and the reduction of the Azad Kashmir forces. His proposal of 22 December 1949 was accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India.
Third, by its resolution 80 (1950) of 14 March 1950, the Security Council replaced the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan by a single mediator, and at its 471st meeting on 12 April 1950 appointed Sir Owen Dixon as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. In his report dated 15 September 1950 to the Security Council, Sir Owen Dixon set out his conclusion with regard to the Kashmir impasses. "In the end, I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character as would, in my opinion, permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions. sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled."
Fourth, at its 543rd meeting on 30 April 1951, the Council appointed Mr. Frank P. Graham as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan He put forward several proposals to bring about the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite. The proposals of Mr. Graham were accepted by Pakistan, and again rejected by India.
Fifth, Pakistan also accepted the proposal put forward by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at their meeting in January 1951 for the posting of a Commonwealth force in Jammu and Kashmir to facilitate the withdrawal of the armed forces of India and Pakistan. This proposal, unfortunately, was again rejected by India.
That briefly is the record of India and Pakistan with regard to the implementation of the adopted resolutions by the Commission concerning demilitarization.
The third proposal made by Pakistan is designed to create an atmosphere in which a free and impartial plebiscite could be held in Kashmir. To this end, Pakistan has suggested that the forces of India and Pakistan be completely withdrawn from the State and, in their place, a United Nations force composed of contingents from Afro-Asian countries should be inducted. This should eliminate all possibility of coercion by either side at the time of the plebiscite.
The last proposal made by Pakistan is that the plebiscite should be held within a period of three months. The reason. for this proposal is stated in the letter dated 13 September 1965 from the President of Pakistan to the Secretary General: "...Pakistan is not against a cease-fire as such. In fact, in order to save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe, we would welcome a cease-fire. But it must be a purposeful cease-fire: one that effectively precludes that catastrophe and not merely postpones it. In other words, it should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict." [See S/6683, para 9]
It is imperative that a plebiscite should be held as quickly as possible and that the people of Kashmir be enabled to execute their right of self-determination as envisaged in the United Nations resolutions. Until this is done and a highly explosive source of conflict removed, the two countries cannot live together in harmony.
I have so far given the Council the reasons for each of the proposals which Pakistan has made. I would now like to explain why Pakistan insists that all these steps must be ordered and taken together and not separately. The stand of Pakistan is that the cease-fire should be a part of a comprehensive agreement. It is no use reverting to the same cease-fire conditions of 1949 which, instead of bringing peace to the people of Kashmir, have brought misery, suffering and war. Indeed, Pakistan is not imposing new conditions of its own. What it is suggesting is what the Security Council itself has pledged to the people of Jammu and Kashmir in the two resolutions of the Commission of 1948 and 1949. What was promised the people as a composite solution should not be splintered into ineffective fragments.
A clear issue like this should not have been confused. The representative of India must have noticed during his term of office as a judge that when a lawyer is unable to convince a judge, he tries to confuse him. Is the Minister for Education attempting to confuse the Security Council ? He has raised the question of the so-called infiltrators in order to cloud the issue of Indian aggression. The case put forward by the Indian representative is that members of the Pakistan Army crossed the cease-fire line and entered Indian-occupied Kashmir on 5 August 1965. I wish to contradict this allegation categorically and to place certain facts before the Council.
First, no troops of Azad Kashmir or Pakistan crossed the cease-fire line until after India had made repeated thrusts and had launched a major offensive against Azad Kashmir.
Secondly, the area of Kashmir under the occupation of India is about 50,000 miles, roughly equal to the total area of the United Kingdom. By India's own account, within less than forty-eight hours after the alleged crossings, action against Indian forces was taking place from one end of the occupied territory to the other. In and around Srinagar itself, pitched battles had occurred. India maintains approximately six divisions of regular troops in the territory. To this must be added some two divisions of police and militia of various kinds, bringing the total forces at India's disposal to well over 150,000 men.
India would have the world believe that a few thousand outsiders -- the figures are between 1,000 and 7,000-penetrated the barriers set up by the occupation troops and, operating amidst a hostile population, set the torch of resistance against India ablaze throughout the length and breadth of captive Kashmir. These are two basic facts which, if properly. appreciated, would suffice to explode the Indian fiction.
However, I feel that we need to examine the myth in some greater detail and see how it can stand scrutiny. It must be recalled that the original myth was that there was always a confusion about the Indian estimates of the number involved-of armed personnel entering Indian occupied Kashmir in early August. However, later the representative of India began to talk of "armed and unarmed personnel". I refer to the message read by the representative of India in which it was stipulated that: "...'armed personnel... must include all infiltrators from the Pakistan side of the cease fire line, whether armed or unarmed" and furthermore that "The present hostilities originated with large-scale infiltrators of armed and unarmed personnel from Pakistan." (see 1238th. meeting, para. 37).
The question arises: How can any representative state that "armed personnel" should also mean "unarmed personnel" ? The answer is not that India has parted with all rationality. The answer is that this utterly absurd contention is India's way of concealing the fact that those whom India calls "infiltrators" were but civilians, and a large proportion of them were unarmed. If it is kept in mind that the term "Pakistan side of the cease-fire line" denotes not Pakistan but Azad Kashmir, and also that the people who live on the two sides of the cease fire line are equally Kashmiris whom this fortuitous. line cannot separate from one another, one gets a glimpse of the truth behind the Indian assertions about infiltration. The truth is that this hue and cry about infiltrators was made to give India a pretext to launch a new campaign of terror and repression against the people of Jammu and Kashmir who have risen against India's military occupation of the bulk of the State.
This truth has been testified to by the well-known Indian humanitarian, a disciple of the late Mr. Gandhi, Miss Mridula Sarabhai, who has stated that in the guise of taking action against so-called infiltrators, the Indian Army turned on the entire population of India-held Kashmir and committed atrocities upon them. The Council needs to be informed that, days before the start of hostilities, the Indian Army set fire to the entire residential district of Batamaloo in Srinagar, simply because many freedom fighters lived in that district. The World Press reported this outrage, and published pictures of innocent women and children sitting outside their homes, now reduced to ashes and rubble, but little was known for a time about who had perpetrated it.
The truth can now be judged from the dispatch from Srinagar by Richard Cricthfield, published in the Washington Star of 1 September: "A question that hangs over this fabled vale like the snowy Himalayan peaks is why Indian troops are being used to silence political unrest million Muslims ?... among Kashmir's 2.5
"Kashmiri Muslims contend that local Indian authorities have been burning homes without the full knowledge of either Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri or the Indian. public...
" "...during the past three weeks hundreds of Kashmiri houses have been burned to the ground-about 440 in the summer capital of Srinagar alone and scores of others in from fifty to seventy villages scattered throughout the valley.
"There also are isolated eye-witness accounts of pillage, looting and rape.
"Indian officials claim Pakistani infiltrators started the fires. But both extremist and moderate Kashmiris and the victims themselves, interviewed while digging in the smouldering wreckage, claim the Indian Army was responsible.
"Mutual recriminations on who started fires aside, the practical issue is that the majority of Kashmiri people - including some Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims blame the Indian Army..
"...at Magam village, ten miles outside Srinagar, I was briefly detained at the local police station after photographing some forty burned houses. An Indian police inspector refused to discuss how the blaze started. "But in two other villages the peasants claimed Indian soldiers had put the torch to houses after first evacuating the occupants." This dispatch offers some other facts about the identity of these so-called infiltrators:
"...in a secret rendezvous in the old city, I interviewed one of the guerillas whom the Indians call Pakistani infiltrators and Kashmiris themselves call mu abids, or crusaders.
"All the infiltrators', he said, 'are Kashmiris, some from the Valley and others from Azad Kashmir. We have Punjabis, Punchies, Kishtwar and other Kashmiri mountain tribals..."
The words used further in the dispatch are important. "We want freedom. We are human beings. Our fight will continue until India is forced to leave this country."
I should like to quote from The New York Times of 15 August 1965:
The infiltrators could hardly have made their way so far from the cease-fire line-and in some cases more than forty miles without help from the local population. The largely Muslim Kashmiris have little love for India, and there is substantial support for union with Pakistan."
India has claimed that the so-called Pakistani infiltrators must be members of the Pakistan Army or Azad Kashmir forces because they were armed and well trained. The fact, however, is that the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line has been under such heavy firing from the Indian forces during the last year that Azad Kashmir nationals, living along the cease fire line, approached the Azad Kashmir Government for armed protection by Azad Kashmir forces. They were informed that this was not a practical proposition. Alternatively, therefore, they suggested that they should be given arms to defend themselves. And these arms were therefore provided to them to defend themselves. Most of these men, should be noted, are ex servicemen. The people of Azad Kashmir have a long tradition of fighting with the armed forces. They are well versed in the art of fighting. Some of these people may have joined the revolt in the Valley.
I now pass on to the question of aggression. When the Security Council met on 6 September [1238th meeting], it had to take account of an event which, while unprecedented in the experience of the United Nations, was precisely of the nature which the Organization was founded to prevent and suppress. This was the armed attack on the territory of one Member State, Pakistan, by another, India. The aggression occurred in the early hours of Monday, 6 September, two days after the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution [209 (1965)] appealing that an end be put to the violation of the cease fire line in Kashmir. That was India's response to the Security Council's appeal for a cease-fire. My delegation cannot but deplore the fact that, in the face of this arrogant challenge to the Council, and deliberate violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council contented itself with describing the situation euphemistically as an "extension of the fighting", although it recognized that India's action had added "immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation".
Following the reverses suffered by the Indian Army in the Rann of Kutch, Indian leaders let it be known publicly that they would hit Pakistan at a time and place of their own choosing. The following is the direct outcome of that threat.
On 15 May-long before the so-called Pakistani infiltrators took to arms in Indian occupied territory-India violated the cease-fire line and occupied three Pakistani posts in Kargil. That was India's first act of calculated aggression. Under pressure from the United Nations, India vacated those posts, but again on 15 August, before Pakistani forces could occupy them, India reoccupied those posts. That was done within hours of a public threat by the Indian Prime Minister that India would carry the fight to Azad Kashmir. The Defence Minister boasted in the Indian Legislature that "India had crossed the cease-fire line in the past and would do so again".
On 23 August the village of Awam Sharif, which lies clearly inside Pakistan territory, was shelled by Indian forces, Twenty five of the inhabitants-none of whom were army personnel-were killed. On 24 August Indian forces again crossed the cease fire line and seized two other Kashmir posts in the Tithwal sector. A few days later Indian forces again struck across the cease fire line in the Uri-Poonch sector. By the end of August they had seized a number of Pakistan posts there.
The Indian propaganda line was that they had seized the forgoing Pakistan posts with the limited objective of stopping "Pakistani infiltrators" from entering Indian-held Kashmir. This was only a trick to put Pakistan off guard and to delude the world. We had reliable information at that time that India was preparing to mount a big offensive with a view to capturing Azad Kashmir. This was the position which Pakistan faced on 1 September. India had committed aggression; it had reduced the cease-fire line to a nullity: it was planning to seize Azad Kashmir by force.
It was then that, in order to forestall further aggressive moves by Indian forces, the Azad Kashmir forces, backed by the Pakistan Army, crossed the cease-fire line for the first time since July 1949. They moved into the Bhimber sector and seized Chhamb and Dewa. The same afternoon the Indian Air Force went into action against our forces in that area, thereby forcing the Pakistan Air Force to intervene. The conflict was thus further escalated by Indian action.
Pakistan could have saved the isolated posts that India had seized in the Uri-Poonch sector if only it had given air support to those small outposts which were clamoring for it. We denied them air support, preferring to lose those posts rather than be the first to add a new dimension to this conflict.
On 6 September, after the Security Council had appealed to both India and Pakistan to cease-fire, India launched a three pronged attack against Lahore. Lahore, which is one of the most important cities of Pakistan-and I can say so with firmness because I myself am from Lahore-is situated only eighteen miles from the India-Pakistan border. The Indian leaders' threat to hit Pakistan at a place and time of their own choosing had thus been carried out. The aggression against Azad Kashmir was only a device for creating this opportunity. knowing as India did that we would be bound to react to its aggressive attacks on Azad Kashmir territory.
India thus carried the war to Pakistan, treacherously. launching an armed attack against Pakistan territory without even a declaration of war. This attack has been contained and Indian forces have been repulsed. However, heavy fighting continues.
The sheer escalation of attack by India provides clear evidence of Indian aggression against Pakistan. India tore up the cease-fire line; and the Indian Government radio described the Indian military action to annex Azad Kashmir as "the war of liberation". Time magazine of 10 September 1965 reported as follows:
"India became delirious with victory. News of the Indian advances was widely cheered in (Indian) Parliament. The Government radio announced the 'liberation' of 5,000 people and the establishment of Indian civil administration in the 'liberated' areas." And this is what the representative of India described yesterday as measures taken in self-defense.
I shall not take the Council's time with an account of the events and happenings of subsequent days. The fighting spread with a rapidity which is clearly indicative of the premeditation and planning that must have gone into the Indian attack on Pakistan. From weapon to weapon and from area to area. India has enlarged the conflict in such a manner that the two countries are today in a state of general war, and Pakistan is fighting the aggression along virtually the entire border in the west.
On the very day when the Secretary-General prepared to leave for the subcontinent, in pursuance of the mandate with which he was charged by the Security Council, Indian forces opened two new fronts against Pakistan, one in the south from Rajasthan, and the other from occupied Kashmir into the Sialkot area.
It is not possible for me, in the time at my disposal, to give the Council a full picture of the scope and nature of the struggle in which Pakistan is today engaged. This is what a foreign observer on the scene, J. Anthony Lukas, cabled in a dispatch from New Delhi which appeared in The New York Times, of 9 September:
"It is also felt that, with U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, due in Pakistan, Indian strategy may be designed to confront Pakistan with a military. situation that will make them sue for peace on terms suitable to India."
"Having been attacked along its entire frontier, Pakistan is fighting to defend itself against unlimited aggression from India, which claims to be imbued with the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence. And yet the representative of India asserts that his Government has done its best to limit the war. By invading Pakistan's territory along a 600-mile front, India has spread flames of war over the subcontinent and condemned its 550 million men and women to misery and fear, has given a setback to their hopes of social and economic progress, and has revived the historic animosities and rancours which one has hoped now belonged to the past.
If the people of the subcontinent are today on the brink of a cataclysm, the responsibility, ultimate and immediate, must be placed at the door of that country which for eighteen years has rejected every suggestion, thwarted every move, frustrated every effort and barred every avenue for a just and peaceful settlement of the dispute which divides India and Pakistan.
I would like now to refer to the visit of the Secretary General to Pakistan and India and to the reports which he has submitted to the Council. The Secretary-General's reports show that, while both Governments have agreed in principle to a cease-fire, conditions have been attached or implied with regard to which the Secretary-General did not feel competent to give an undertaking. He undertook, however, to bring these aspects of the replies of the two Governments to the notice of the Security Council for its urgent consideration.
We share the Secretary-General's disappointment that his valiant efforts in the cause of peace have not met with complete success. A careful perusal of his last report [S/6686] shows that this was due partly to his restricted terms of reference, and partly to the negative attitude of India, both now and in the past, with regard to the Kashmir problem.
The Secretary-General proceeded to the subcontinent under Security Council's resolution 210 (1965) adopted on 6 September 1965. This resolution called upon India and Pakistan "to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965". In pursuance of this directive, the Secretary-General appealed on 12 September [see S/6683, para, 6] to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India ``to order a cease-fire without condition, and a cessation of all hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict between India and Pakistan to take effect on Tuesday, 14 September 1965".
The Prime Minister of India made it clear in his letter dated 14 September [ibid., para. 8] that his acceptance of the Secretary-General's proposal for a cease-fire was subject to the following conditions. First, that the cease-fire orders would "be effective only in respect of the armed forces in uniform engaged in the present combat" and that the Indian Security Forces would remain free to deal with the so-called "armed infiltrators' ' in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, the Indian Prime Minister also made it perfectly clear "when consequent upon cease-fire becoming effective, further details are considered, we shall not agree to any disposition which will leave the door open for further infiltrations or prevent us from dealing with the infiltrations that have taken place". Thirdly, the Indian Prime Minister stated categorically "no pressures or attacks will deflect us from our firm resolve to maintain the solidarity and territorial integrity of our country, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part". In other words, he has clearly imposed a condition that the cease-fire. should not be linked to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which is the only cause of the present war.
It is no wonder that the Secretary-General found it impossible to accept these conditions. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister's letter of 14 September amounts to a rejection of the Secretary-General's proposal for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. While ostensibly agreeing to a stop page of fighting with the Pakistan Army and the Azad Kashmir Forces, India wishes to retain a free hand to deal with the oppressed people of Jammu and Kashmir, who have risen in revolt against their Indian oppressors and the quisling administration which has been operating in Srinagar under the protection of Indian bayonets.
The second condition sought to be imposed by the Prime Minister of India is in line with India's persistent refusal to withdraw its forces from Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were endorsed by the Security Council and accepted by both India and Pakistan. It is quite clear that there could be no real peace in Jammu and Kashmir if India were free to make the dispositions of its armed forces without regard to the international agreements on Kashmir.
The most preposterous condition, however, mentioned by the Indian Prime Minister is his determination to make the State of Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India. Since 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been regarded as a disputed territory. As far back as 21 April 1949, the Security. Council, in its resolution 47 (1948) noted that: "bo h India. and Pakistan desires that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial. plebiscite". That declaration was reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949, which, as I submitted earlier, was endorsed by the Security Council and accepted by both India and Pakistan.
When, in total disregard of those undertakings, the Governments of India convened a constituent assembly in Kashmir and that assembly sought to determine the future constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan launched a strong protest. The Security Council sought and obtained from the representative of India a categorical assurance that, while the assembly could express an opinion, it could "take no decision on the question of accession" and that this opinion "would not bind the Government of India or prejudice the position of the Security Council".
In its resolution 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951 the Security Council reminded both India and Pakistan of the earlier United Nations resolutions with regard to Kashmir and reaffirmed the stand of the Security Council: "that final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations".
That position was reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 122 (1957) of 24 January 1957.
The Indian Government's attempt to treat the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India is, therefore, a violation of its international undertakings with regard to Kashmir and is manifestly contrary to the repeated declarations of the Security Council. It is also a fact that the recent troubles in Jammu and Kashmir are due in no small measure to the steps taken in December 1964 to undermine the disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir and to complete the annexation of the State through a variety of legislative, administrative and juridical measures. Incidentally, these steps were taken in flagrant disregard of the assurances given by the Indian Prime Minister to the President of Pakistan on 12 October 1964 that, pending a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, nothing would be done by the Government of India to complicate the situation or to prejudice the position of Pakistan vis-a-vis Kashmir.
I gave close attention to the report of the Secretary General [S/6686] on his mission to India and Pakistan. That report contains a number of proposals which, to the best of my knowledge, the Secretary-General did not discuss with the Government of Pakistan during his visit to Rawalpindi. I have transmitted these proposals to my Government and I shall place our considered reactions before the Security Council as soon as I receive instructions from my Government. In the meantime I would like to submit a few preliminary observations.
I am wholeheartedly in agreement with the Secretary General's remark that the Security Council should continue to make further strenuous efforts for a cease-fire, as well as for a long-term solution of the Kashmir problem. This is a duty. and an imperative responsibility of the Security Council. The Secretary-General has made a number of specific recommendations with regard to the cease-fire, but I regret to have to observe that his proposals for a long-term solution of the Kashmir problem are neither precise nor effective. All that the Secretary-General has proposed in this regard is that the Council should request the two Heads of Government to meet together to discuss the current situation and the problems underlying it as a first step in resolving the outstanding differences between their two countries and in reaching an honourable and equitable settlement" (ibid, para. 9 (d)). There is on reference here to Jammu and Kashmir or to the implementation of the international agreement with regard to the State embodied in the Commission's resolutions which were endorsed by the Security Council and accepted by India. and Pakistan.
The Secretary-General's suggestion that the Council might consider the possibility of creating a small committee to assist in the talks between the two Heads of Government. "should its services seem useful and desirable to the two parties"(ibid.) is likely to be of limited value unless and until the Security Council clearly sets out the obligations assumed by India and Pakistan with regard to Kashmir and directs the committee to oversee their implementation.
Pakistan certainly welcomes the Secretary-General's offer of his own good offices in the search for a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem.
The Secretary-General has said that the Security Council can order a cease-fire under the provisions of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter and "that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter" (ibid., para. 9 (a)). I venture to doubt the necessity for such action. It would be the first time in the history of the Kashmir dispute that the Security Council would be contemplating action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Hitherto, all actions have been taken under chapter VI. Departure from past practice would be a momentous decision, and its implications would have to be carefully weighed before the Security Council proceeds further in this matter. We too will have to weigh carefully our reactions to such a move.
I would like now to make a few brief comments on some of the points in the statement of the representative of India at the Council's previous meeting.
The representative of India claimed that India's policies were based on the message of non-violence and peace. We have seen Indian non-violence in action in Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa. We have also seen this non-violence in the Rann of Kutch. We are witnessing it now on the borders of Pakistan. It is a matter of history that whenever India has had any dispute with its neighbours it has sought to settle it by the force of arms but to call it non violence.
The representative of India also referred to Mr. Nehru's offer of no-war declaration in 1950. This offer was welcomed by Pakistan, which put forward concrete proposals to achieve the desired aim. The Government of India was invited to agree that the settlement of every dispute would be sought through negotiations, and if necessary, through mediation; but if these methods were to fail, the dispute would be referred to arbitration. It was only thus that a no-war declaration Pakistan certainly welcomes the Secretary-General's offer of his own good offices in the search for a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem.
The Secretary-General has said that the Security Council can order a cease-fire under the provisions of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter and "that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter" (ibid., para. 9 (a)). I venture to doubt the necessity for such action. It would be the first time in the history of the Kashmir dispute that the Security Council would be contemplating action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Hitherto, all actions have been taken under chapter VI. Departure from past practice would be a momentous decision, and its implications would have to be carefully weighed before the Security Council proceeds further in this matter. We too will have to weigh carefully our reactions to such a move.
I would like now to make a few brief comments on some of the points in the statement of the representative of India at the Council's previous meeting.
The representative of India claimed that India's policies were based on the message of non-violence and peace. We have seen Indian non-violence in action in Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa. We have also seen this non-violence in the Rann of Kutch. We are witnessing it now on the borders of Pakistan. It is a matter of history that whenever India has had any dispute with its neighbours it has sought to settle it by the force of arms but to call it non violence.
The representative of India also referred to Mr. Nehru's offer of no-war declaration in 1950. This offer was welcomed by Pakistan, which put forward concrete proposals to achieve the desired aim. The Government of India was invited to agree that the settlement of every dispute would be sought through negotiations, and if necessary, through mediation; but if these methods were to fail, the dispute would be referred to arbitration. It was only thus that a no-war declaration
could carry conviction. Pakistan also pointed out that by joining the United Nations, Pakistan had already renounced the use of force. A bare announcement that we would not declare war unless attacked added nothing to these commitments; if anything, it detracted from them. An announcement that failed to substitute arbitration for compulsion would fail to carry conviction that there would be no resort. to force. The hypocritical character of India's offer of a no war declaration is well illustrated by the fact that Pakistan was invaded by India on 6 September 1965 without a declaration of war.
The representative of India claimed that India is a modern, secular State, while Pakistan is a medieval, theocratic State. These claims and accusations have been made by India ad nauseum in the past. Nothing could be further from the truth. The provisions with regard to citizenship, fundamental rights and social justice in the Constitution of Pakistan are as liberal as those of the constitution of any other modern State. They are in no way inferior to the provisions in the Constitution of India, Pakistan's treatment of its minorities compares favourably in every way with the treatment which India is meting out to its own minorities. This is borne out by the hundreds of attacks on the helpless Muslim minorities and the large-scale explusion of India Muslim nationals from Assam and Tripura which has been going on for the last three years. Over half a million of these unfortunate people have been pushed over the border into East Pakistan and have found refuge there.
I shall now turn to the episode of the Rann of Kutch, to which a reference was made by the representative of India. I will not go into the substance of the dispute, but I would like to point out that the existence of the dispute was explicitly recognized by both India and Pakistan. They also agreed in the Border Ground Rules of 1960 that, pending the final disposition of the territory, neither side would attempt to change in any way the status quo in the disputed territory. Earlier this year, the Government of India, for no apparent reason, decided to make an issue of patrolling by Pakistani border police along a track which runs some 1,800 yards into the Rann of Kutch. India claimed the entire territory. To make good this claim, India marched two full brigades of its regular troops and armour into the area, brought up a bomber squadron to the nearby airfield of Jamnagar, and the aircraft-carrier Vikrant to within twenty miles of Karachi. When, as was inevitable, a clash occurred in the territory, India moved up its entire army against the borders of Pakistan and threatened to wreak war and destruction upon our country. At that point the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom intervened, and through his good offices the Government of India was brought around to accept the arbitration of a three-man tribunal for settling the dispute. The most significant aspect of this incident is that, while presenting the agreement on the Rann of Kutch to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Shastri conceded in the most clear and explicit language that the Pakistani patrol track, which the Government of India had chosen to make into a casus belli, did in fact lie within the territory in the de facto control of Pakistan, and that Pakistani police had always moved along it. What I have stated is in the records of the Indian Parliament itself. Any impartial observer can draw his own conclusions from a study of this case. I venture to submit that no clearer case can be found of the systematic bellicosity which has characterized the Government of India's attitude to Pakistan The example of the dispute of the Rann. of Kutch shows how, behind its peaceable posturing, the Indian Government goes about seeking occasions to pick gratuitous quarrels with Pakistan.
The representative of India stated that the Government of India has only love and affection for the people of Pakistan and that even today India does not consider itself at war with Pakistan. On the morning of 6 September when, without a declaration of war, India unleashed an attack on Pakistan; its first act in this war was the strafing by Indian aircraft of a stationary passenger train at Wazirabad station, killing a great many innocent civilians. This is that love and affection.
As long ago as 23 August, the Indian army shelled Awam Sharif inside Pakistan territory, killing twenty-five persons and wounding fifty. In flagrant violation of international conventions, India's wanton attack on open cities of Pakistan and bombing of civilian populations started first with cities in Pakistan including the capital Rawalpindi, Karachi, Dhaka and Chittagong. In Rawalpindi and in adjoining villages, some two dozen persons, including two women and five children, were killed by Indian bombing, and over a dozen houses were demolished. In Karachi the bombs fell in the main residential areas, damaging houses and injuring the sleeping inmates. In East Pakistan Indian Canberra's carried out wanton attacks on civilian areas of five principal cities, including Dhaka and Chittagong. In the afternoon of 10 September the Indian Air Force again strafed civilian population in five East Pakistan districts, subjecting the civilian population to heavy bombing and strafing. The same night, the Indian Air Force bombed and shelled the civilian area of Sialkot city, damaging the main bazaar and fort area of the city of Sialkot with 1,000-pound bombs, A large number of the civilian population was killed during the bombings on Sialkot. Estimates of losses, which are extremely heavy, are being worked out.
Commenting on this, Roy Meloni, correspondent of the American Broadcasting Corporation, said in a recorded des patch on 14 September:
"If the Indians ever try to tell you that they have not bombed civilian targets inside Pakistan, you have my permission to tell them to go quietly to hell.
"Some nights ago, Indians bombed Sialkot about five miles from the Indo-Pakistan border and at least three miles from any military target, and they killed about twenty people. A further seventy were injured. The bombs fell in the heart of the city, ripped a mosque into ribbons; and I wept-yes, I cried-with the survivors, because this is not war, it is deliberate terror."
So the less said of this "love", the better it is. During the night between 13 and 14 September the Indian Air Force once again bombed the civilian populations in Pakistan in the cities of Peshawar and Kohat, killing sixty persons and injuring a large number as a result of indiscriminate bombing. In Peshawar alone thirty persons were killed. When the Indian Air Force Canberras bombed the civilian areas in Kohat, twenty-seven bodies had been recovered by the afternoon and digging for the rest was in progress when last reports came in. Forty-three persons were seriously injured. The casualties in both Peshawar and Kohat included a large number of women and children.
The main target of Indian bombers in Peshawar was two adjoining villages where many houses and two mosques were destroyed by Indian bombs. In Landi Arbab village a bomb directly hit a mosque and another bomb landed near a church and the residence of the American Consul in Peshawar. In Kohat, an Indian Air Force bomber hit the Liaquat Memorial Hospital, the City Health Centre and the district jail hospital. A large number of houses were destroyed. Once again on 15 16 September, the Indians bombed two villages in Sargodha, killing civilians and destroying a large number of houses.
This wanton Indian bombing of the civilian population in Pakistan's open cities continues. Only the night before last another seventeen civilians were killed and several men, women and children were injured when the Indians bombed another passenger train on its way from Lahore.
Let me now turn to the charges by the representative of India of Pakistan's alleged collusion with China. For many years India exploited Pakistan's membership of military pacts to sow suspicion and mistrust in the minds of China and the Soviet Union against Pakistan. For many years India enjoyed intimate relations with these Powers and sought to isolate Pakistan from these two great neighbouring countries. When the compulsion of Pakistan's national interest necessitated a normalization of our relations with China and the Soviet Union, and Pakistan began to take steps in that direction on the basis of the ten Bandung principles, India tried to turn these developments to its advantage by sowing suspicion of Pakistan in the United States. This "collusion" is but a figment of India's perverted imagination. If there was even a semblance of truth in these accusations, if "collusion" could be deduced from events, then the Chinese-Indian conflict of 1962 was the moment of our opportunity. Did we then attack India to liberate Jammu and Kashmir ?
The truth of the matter can be deduced from the fact that the mountain divisions raised and equipped by India in the last two years, with the assistance of the United States for the express purpose of defence against China, are now deployed in the plains of the Punjab and engaged in attacking Pakistan. Toward the middle of August, an entire brigade was moved from the Ladakh region to the Kashmir cease-fire line and it is this unit which was responsible for the breach of the cease-fire line near Tithwal. In fact the only Indian divisions which may appear to be stationed along India's northern frontiers are those in the east. These divisions can wheel around at a moment's notice to threaten and attack East Pakistan. The allegation made by the representative of India that Pakistan was conspiring with China for the destruction of India is not only baseless, but is also a blatant attempt to impress certain sections of opinion, particularly in the United States.
Pakistan's dispute with India arises from India's attempt to annex the State of Jammu and Kashmir against the wishes of the people of Kashmir, whom we in Pakistan consider as our kith and kin. The problem of Kashmir, as well as the agreement to hold a plebiscite, predates Pakistan's association with the Western Powers and its more recent efforts to establish good neighbourly relations with China and the Soviet Union. A solution of the Kashmir dispute, in accordance with the agreed declarations would serve neither some dark purpose of China nor of any other foreign Power. Pakistan has no ambitions beyond its borders. Unlike India, it seeks no foreign possession or sphere of influence. The last thing that we wish is that the Kashmir dispute should become embroiled in the conflicts and rivalries between the great Powers. It is not Pakistan which has gained in the past from the cold war bet were the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not Pakistan which today has a vested interest in the worsening of relations between China and the Soviet Union or China and the United States.
Having dealt with all the issues, I now remind this august body that in a similar situation in 1948 the Security. Council insisted on deciding the entire dispute. I would like to recall to the Security Council some of the statements made by the members of the Council as they are relevant to the issue now under consideration.
At the 236th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom said:
"We are then confronted with the question of how to stop the fighting. What will stop it, and in what way should it be stopped ?
"What these two Governments want, and what we all want, is that the moral power and authority of the Security Council be brought to bear on the situation so that there can be a conviction on all sides that justice is to prevail, and that violence need not go on. Moreover, our object is not only to stop the fighting, but to keep it stopped. We have to arrive at a settlement which will prevent a new outbreak."
At the 237th meeting of the Security council, the representative of Canada said :
The President has rightly pointed out that the ending of the fighting and the holding of the plebiscite under conditions which will be recognized as fair and impartial are two aspects of the same matter."
At that same meeting of the Security Council, the representative of China said: "It is obvious that the key to the problem lies in the plebiscite. If the principle of free and impartial plebiscite for deciding the all-important question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be accepted, much of the incentive to violence and the use of force would be removed."
At the 240th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of United States said:
"In fact, I should feel that it would be erroneous for the Security Council, in solving this matter-if it were acting under Article 37-to undertake to do it piecemeal, by handling the termination of hostilities with one hand and the plebiscite with the other I believe that method would be entirely incongruous and would not lead to any successful solution of the matter.
"It is my opinion that, if and when the Security Council deals with this problem, it must consider it as a whole, because unless it does, there cannot be a cessation of hostilities."
At the same meeting, the representative of Argentina
"Now that the disputes between India and Pakistan have been submitted to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, the delegation of Argentina will not be able to vote in favour of any draft resolution which does not leave the solution of the problem to be decided by a plebiscite, freely prepared, freely conducted and freely scrutinized under the authority of the Security Council.
"In order to solve a problem, and especially a problem of this nature, it is necessary to know the underlying causes. It is worthwhile remembering the Latin proverb, said: which says sublata causa, tollitur effectus, or, in other words remove the cause and the effects will disappear. In this case, the cause of all the disturbances, whether from India or Pakistan, or from the tribes, lies in the rebellion of the people of Kashmir against the absolute monarch who rules them as if he were running a farm and the 4 million inhabitants were so many heads of cattle and not human beings.
"If, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter already quoted, we assure these human beings that they themselves will be able to decide their own fate freely and without pressure from any quarter, I am sure that they will lay down their arms."
Finally, I would like to cite the remarks made on a later occasion. At the 467th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of Norway said:
"...the obviously correct point of departure: India's and Pakistan's agreement that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people. This agreement, first briefly stated in part III of the 13 August 1948 resolution, and subsequently elaborated in greater detail in the 5 January 1949 resolution, is not merely an important part of the edifice which has been laboriously built, up by the Cy m mission in the two resolutions; it is the keystone what carries the whole structure and to which all the others. parts are intimately related.
"We must bear in mind that it was under the terms of this agreement, incorporated in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which I have just mentioned, that cease-fire orders were issued by the opposing parties on 1 January 1949. The cease-fire agreement of 27 July 1949, completely demarcated on the ground, is also based upon and integrated into the same structure. Any attempt to bypass or whittle away its basic principles would jeopardize the cease-fire which has so painstakingly been established by the Commission.
"...It is for the plebiscite to determine the ultimate fate of the State.
"I would like to add that this principle, this keystone of the whole structure, has an importance which transcends the obligatory force it derives from the consent of the parties. The principle has its intrinsic value because it embodies the only criterion for determining Kashmir's fate which is compatible with modern democratic ideals."
I hope that the statements of members of the Security Council which I have quoted will suffice to establish that a simple, unconditional, cease-fire would not by itself suffice to bring about either peace or a durable solution of the Kashmir problem. It must also be recalled that the agreement with regard to the demarcation of the cease-fire line of July 1949 is only the first part of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The rest of the resolution, providing for withdrawal of the armed forces of India and Pakistan and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, have still to be implemented. India cannot insist on respect for the cease-fire agreement and yet continue to oppose implementation of the remaining provisions of the international agreement with regard to Kashmir.
I have set forth the proposals of my Government for the termination of the present conflict between India and Pakistan. They are based on principles which are self-evident. I put it to the Council: What could be more fair to the interests of India of Pakistan and of the people of Jammu and Kashmir than the proposition that we finally settle this dispute on the basis of the wishes of the people, freely ascertained? What could better secure a just and genuine peace for our entire region ? Are we asking too much when we ask the United Nations? base its approach to the problem on the principle of self determination which is the very soul of the Charter? Are we asking too much when we say that the people of Kashmir, whose land it is, be given a chance to decide their fate? Is it wrong on our part if we suggest that you cannot solve a problem pertaining to a people if you bypass those people ?
It is for the Council now to make India accept these proposals which do not involve capitulation on India's part but simply the fulfilment of a pledge solemnly and repeatedly given by it. These proposals are but the translation into concrete form of the imperatives of peace with justice. They lead the parties, not to an illusory cease fire, but to a peace containing an insurance against a renewed conflict and a catastrophe.
These proposals are an earnestness of our faith, our search for justice, our commitment to peace. If they are endorsed, we are confident that we can open an era of good neighbourliness. If they are rejected or laid aside, then the prospectus of peace recedes from our eyes and the hopes for justice are again deferred.
We have been invaded. To ask us to cease-fire is to ask us to suffer aggression. It is to ask us to dishonour our most sacred obligation of defending our land. It is to ask us to sacrifice our 5 million brethren in Jammu and Kashmir to whom a pledge has been given-here in the United Nations that they will be free to decide their future through an impartial plebiscite. Even in today's world of power politics, a nation has a soul, a sense of honour, a feeling of obligation imposed by solemn international agreements, such as the one which bound India and Pakistan to the proposition that Kashmir shall not be a part of either country unless it has so decided of its own free will. It is a pledge embodied in numerous resolute! on the Security Council. It is enshrined in our soul and consecrated by our blood. Let me make it clear: Pakistan would rather make the supreme sacrifice than let this pledge be thrown overboard.