22061962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962.
22061962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962.
In my last statement, when I spoke on the draft resolution. I took care to reserve my position with regard to the various statements of the members of the Council. I deliberately. did not make those comments at that time in order that the Council might proceed with its business on the draft resolution. Even after I had made that reservation and the voting had taken place, and there had been another long discussion on which it is not my business as a non-member of the Council to comment. I still had reservations with regard to entering into a debate again. Although the representative of Pakistan had all time from the fifteenth of this month onwards - and the liberty to intervene in this matter, he did not do so. Now he has spoken at the tail end of the discussion, It would hardly be fair to my country and Government to leave unanswered the statements which, if they remained unanswered on the record, might perhaps be taken as unanswerable. That would not be proper. My Government and I would not be able to justify this to our people or to our Parliament.
Although the representative of Pakistan, with all his skill and ability, has tried to condense these points, it is necessary to reply to them because what he has been to throw a number of stones-a stone can be a very small one but it can hurt a lot and its impact can be widespread. It quite easy Sir Muhammad to say that accession is "dispute", it is necessary for me prove that it is not dispute. The tactics are the same as in the case of their infringements upon the border. They choose the place where they fight. If shot it will be into the jungle, but they shoot in villages. They choose the place of the aggressor. These are always tactics of people who do not follow rules of war peace. shall deal with these points one by
First, the representative of Pakistan said that the Government of India has said that there is a dispute. This certainly "disputes" popular language in the sense that there is difference of opinion, there are different views, there difference of interests; but there is "dispute" in terms of Charter. It is "situation" which was created by aggression. of Pakistan against the territory India. At one time it admitted by Pakistan itself, in that they said that they were there. Therefore, other people who came there were to be this situation aggression and not dispute. They have said that there points dispute, namely accession. Accession, even if it is in dispute, would not come here. Validity accession, at is a legal point. There no dispute about the fact accession; the fact One or fourth remain them by illegal occupation. Therefore, even if the issue merely a question of the legality of accession it would not have come here .
But since Sir Muhammad raises this question accession again, what am I do except point that, as we repeatedly said, the accession of the State Jammu Kashimir Union of India, both her Act Accession and Constitution, the agreement of British Government, Pakistan and ourselves, full, complete, and irrevocable. Therefore, any removing the State Jammu and Kashmir, or any part of from Union would country. Therefore, it is not right to say that accession is still in dispute.
As I said once before today and once on a previous occasion, this was admitted and was stated in this Council by no less a person than the representative of the United States, whose statement I quoted on the last occasion, when Mr. Warren Austin said that the sovereignty of Kashmir lay with India, and that is why she is here otherwise she would not be here at all. Moreover, on the question of accession, if it was a dispute, the Security Council still could not be seized of it. On the other hand, if Kashmir had not acceded to India, we would not be entitled to be here.
Then comes the question of the UNCIP resolutions. This is a matter which unfortunately requires very considerable elaboration. It does mislead a number of members of the Council who, I have no doubt, are well intentioned. It has been said more than once that two UNCIP resolutions wash out all our contentions about sovereignty and so on. In fact, they do. nothing of the kind. Each of the main paragraphs in these resolutions was discussed by the Commission and by the Government of India, mainly by the Prime Minister, and when we agreed to it clause by clause or part by part it was in the context and on the basis of the assurances that were given to India. I could read the text to the members of the Council if they had time to listen. But I shall summarize the point of these assurances,
The first assurance was: "Responsibility for the security of the State rests with India." This was not only agreed to by the Commission, but it was also stated in the resolution of 13 August itself, when the Government of India was asked to maintain garrisons in the Northern areas, to keep external forces from coming into our territories, and to assist in the maintenance of law and order within the cease-fire lines in the places which are now illegally occupied by Pakistan and which it was anticipated they would evacuate, so that the territory would be returned to India.
Secondly, "The sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the entire territory of the State shall not be called into question". On this particular matter, I would like my colleagues to note that pointed questions were asked by the Prime Minister and the answers were given by the Commission in the manner I have mentioned.
Thirdly, "Plebiscite proposals shall not be binding upon India if Pakistan does not implement parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August 1948". Part I has not been implemented. The only part of this resolution that has been implemented is the cease-fire part. Even Mr. Gunnar Jarring, when he went to India, discovered that the implementation was open to question: If you look at the resolution, you will see that part I, para. A, deals with the ceasefire which has been implemented. Para. B follows "The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." That was 13 August. The Commission itself found on 13 August that. they had organized forces, and battalions had come into existence. The Commission itself said that it created a "material. change in the situation" and that therefore it could not be said that the provisions had been implemented. Therefore, the whole of paras. B and C remain unimplemented. Unless these are implemented, we do not come to the second part. In spite of that, we went on discussing truce terms envisaged in part II in the hope that part I would be implemented.
The fourth of these assurances given was that, "There shall be no recognition of the so-called 'Azad' Kashmir Government". I am bound to say that there has been no recognition by the United Nations although attempts have been made in that direction. But Pakistan. is a party to this agreement. There were no "Azad" Kashmir forces recognized at that time, they could not be recognized as an entity, let alone as a government.
The fifth condition was that "The territory occupied by Pakistan shall not be consolidated". Not only has it been consolidated, but it has been annexed to Pakistan under their constitutional law and some sort of accession obtained from some parts contrary to any provisions anywhere.
The sixth assurance refers to the: "Reversion of administration of the evacuated areas in the north to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and its defence to the Government of India and to maintain garrisons for preventing the incursion of tribesmen and to guard the main trade routes."
I was to submit that what I am reading were and are not demands by India, and were not proposals submitted to the Commission but are assurances given to India on behalf of the Council.
The seventh of these assurances states that: "Azad'' Kashmir forces shall be disbanded and disarmed". That is to say, since these "Azad '' Kashmir forces were presumed to be at that time for the most part people from that area itself, they could not be sent away; they belonged there. Therefore, the only thing was that they should be disarmed and disbanded. There was some argument about this, and the Commission ultimately agreed that disbanding and disarming go together and cannot be separated.
Finally, there is: "The exclusion of Pakistan from all affairs of Jammu and Kashmir". Right through this argument there is no question of Pakistan having anything to do with this plebiscite, except under the control of the Plebiscite Commissioner at the time of the plebiscites. If it came about, they could have observed. The Plebiscite Commissioner was to be appointed by the Government of India, the administration was to be provided by the Government of India, as is the custom in taking plebiscites in Trust Territories. That was the position in regard to these assurances.
When speaking about this resolution, therefore, you can not divorce it from these assurances and the other assurances that have been given at various times. As the President has asked
me to be brief, I cannot say very much more on this question.
Then we are sometimes asked, why is there no plebiscite 7 Apart from the question of "changed conditions", the impossibility of taking it, how can we take a plebiscite, even if we wanted to, unless part I and then part 11 part III of the resolution of 13 August are implemented ? In the implementation of part III will come the discussion between the Government of Pakistan and India separately with the Commission as to the manner of determining there is not even a reference to a plebiscite in the third part of the resolution the future of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people, The implementation of part III was prevented not by us but in Pakistan from those days onwards We immediately proceeded to democratize the area under our control. Elections have taken place not only nationally, not only in towns and urban areas, but also in villages all over the territory. There is democracy in the areas administered as part of the Union right down to the village level. I know that this is not part of the pattern of Pakistan, but that does not mean that it is not what was intended. We had never agreed to a plebiscite under any circumstances, but to a plebiscite at that time following all these things step by step. In any case, there has been no opportunity, even within the existing limitations, for the people of the so called "Azad" areas to express their views in any way whatsoever.
The texts of these resolutions are before you and, as I pointed out, each of these paragraphs was agreed to in this way. India accepted this resolution, but Pakistan did not accept it at first. After three or four months of negotiations, they stated their acceptance.
Then came the 5 January 1949 resolution. Mr. Stevenson. has referred to one paragraph in it. It should be understood that the 5 January resolution was supplemental to the previous one. It is like an architect's plan, that is, when the third part of the resolution was implemented then, if we agreed on a plebiscite, the way of doing it was there. That was the idea of that resolution. It is clearly set on paragraph 4 (6). We have nothing to hide in this matter.
It is quite true that immediately after the cease fire, which incidentally we helped to bring about-and it was done in the context of an advancing, not a retreating army-we did think of a plebiscite as a solution once the State was rid of the invader. The entire on us of delay in this matter of prevarication and obstruction, has been on the side of Pakistan, largely, I am sorry to say, on account of the support given to it by other people; I do not mean military support only, I mean pope largely through interpretations arising partly from lack of knowledge of this matter or from other reasons.
I shall skip a number of other points and then come to this point raised by Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla Khan which obviously will have a kind of superficial appeal for some people, that is to say, that the Security Council had promised the people who were fighting for liberty in Kashmir that the matter would be settled in a certain manner. Who were the people fighting for liberty in Kashmir? Pakistan and its predecessors were fighting for the British Government against the people who were fighting for liberty in Kashmir.
It was also said that the whole of the trouble in Kashmir arose because of the rebellion against the Maharajah by the people. As I said, unfortunately for me but perhaps fortunately for you, because you do not want to be bored by it, there is a whole set of papers here which I cannot read out now. If it is the desire of the council, we could either file them as a document or read out to you. This is the diary of Major-General Seott, the British Commander of the Maharaja's forces. He was not suppressing a rebellion. There is no instance in this diary, except in one or two places, of incidents occurring in which the local population joined the intruders. Apart from that, the diary of Major-General Scott, which I intend to submit as one of the documents, states on 31 August 1947, that is to say sixteen days after independence, in a note: "Encounter on 29th between the Military proceeding to Bagh and hostiles who were armed with modern rifles..." I will not read all of it because it is well documented. The Maharaja's army was not dealing with the population of Kashmir but with the people who had come from the trans-Kashmir area from and over the territory of Pakistan. We had been told by the then Prime Minister and we had accepted in good faith-that this invasion was not undertaken with their connivance or their assistance. The intruders, we were told, could not be stopped because they were co-religionists or something of that kind. They were, however, the armed gangs from west of the Jhelum River and they had been at large in Western Poonch since 4 September.
We see an entry in Major-General Scott's diary on 16 September 1947 as follows: "Report in Pakistan army visited Albeg on 14th within State border and a Sikh centre".
Unless this diary is read out fully, it does not convey the whole picture. In view of the President's appeal, I am however prepared to be brief and not do this. Therefore, any idea the Council may have here of poor people being suppressed by a tyrannical Maharajah, whom we had gone to rescue, is an entirely wrong picture. What happened was that the territory, after the breaking of the standstill agreement Mr. Jinnah, who is no longer with us, was invaded by external forces and hordes. They committed plunder and rapine, even burned churches, committed atrocities on nuns and what not, and did everything I read out to you last time. It was in those circumstances, when nearly a quarter of a million of these people, who came from outside, were destroying the State, that accession was offered by the Maharajah, not in the way suggested by the representative of Venezuela according to which he simply signed a form. He wrote saying that "my people have been destroyed, my State will be destroyed unless you come to our rescue. Since I know that India will not go beyond its borders with its armed forces, I have made up my mind now to accede to India ''.
The argument that is being repeatedly advanced is that Lord Mountbatten said something at that time and wrote in letter at that time. No one denies this. What is more, he wrote it on the advice of the Government of India, for he was the constitutional Governor-General. What is to be remembered, however, is that there was a document of application for accession and an acceptance by the Governor-General which made the accession complete. The letter is not part of that document, it is a separate matter. Once accession is completed, anything else that is said is a unilateral declaration on our part which it may be moral or immoral for us not to implement, but it is not a matter for the Security Council. We could not implement in the way we desired because as we said even then, and it has often en repeated in this council, even by our friends, that Lord Mountbatten also said, it was to have been implemented when the country was rid of invaders-and the country has never been rid of invaders. It was not as though anything he said had been morally, legally or otherwise breached in performance.
Then, reference has been made to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. In 1957, the United States delegation was slightly misled on the question of the Constituent Assembly. In fact, they thought that the delegation of India had made long speeches in order to practise what is familiarly called in this country fili-bustering. I could not have filled in for five days in any case, but over and above that we have said from the very beginning-not vis-a-vis the Security Council, but vis-a-vis the Constitution of India-that under our system the States may express the forms of government they want, and so on. It is quite unlike the United States where they have State rights vested in the States: our reserve powers are in the centre. And so we say, well, of course, we will very gladly allow you to say all these things, but they will not be legally binding. They have, or may have, a moral effect, no doubt, but they are not binding upon us. There was no need to drag in the Constituent Assembly here, but if the Constituent Assembly discussions have any validity, they are all against the case made by Pakistan, I have no desire to repeat all the details because they have also been placed on the record. There have also been references to unilateral denunciation. We have made no unilateral denunciation of any treaty, but everyone is well aware that no country can carry on an agreement that is totally against its interests. We cannot, whatever may be pleaded, accept anything which will lead to the dismemberment of India.
We are told that we want a release from the UNCIP resolutions. We want nothing of the kind suggested or implied by those who say this. If we wanted to be released from the UNCIP resolutions, why do we honour the cease-fire line? Yet it is a cease-fire line which we have many reasons for, because it is not always administered-according to us - with the degree of impartiality that is required of those concerned. What is more, Pakistan, even after the marking of the cease-fire line, has taken territory-which we could retake by force, but that would lead to an aggravation of the situation. So, striking a balance, we let them keep it for the present. There are other parts on the other side of the international frontier of Jammu and Kashmir where there have also been breaches of this kind by Pakistan. As many as 140 violations of the cease-fire line have taken place this year. There are approximately ninety or ninety-five incidents inside Kashmir organized by Pakistan, by way of violence and sabotage, in which Pakistan, British and American ammunition has been found. I am not for a moment suggesting that either the British or the Americans gave it to them for this purpose, but what I am saying is, give a child a knife to play with and he will hurt somebody. He will not ask his parents' permission to do so.
We have been asked why we do not go to the World Court for an advisory opinion. I certainly understand Mr. Zafrulla Khan's respect for the World Court; he has been there for some time, but this is not a matter for a World Court or for an advisory opinion. This is a political issue and, what is more, we are both members of Sir Patrick's much-loved com mon-wealth and under the terms of our adherence to the World Court we have made some exceptions in regard to the matters which can be referred to it, and while there may be reason why they or we should not change these reservations, we are rot going to pour the baby out with the bath water, without finding out what the consequences will be. With the common and the uncommon markets, all kinds of disputes may arise and we shall find ourselves, instead of being in a fraternity, engaged in all kinds of litigation. That is my personal opinion. So the question of reference to the World Court does not arise.
Before I conclude, and I shall not take much more time, I should like to refer to the skepticism that exists in regard to our argument about changed conditions. Let me point out what it means. If I had the time I could quote instance after instance in which the United States, from the time of the Revolutionary War and its independence right up to the time of President Roosevelt, has invoked this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in order to get out of obligations which could no longer be applicable. However, there is no time to do so and I will leave matters there, but the United States alone is not in this; indeed, every important country in the world has had to act accordingly when the conditions under which agreements had been reached were no longer obtained.
In 1881, the United States invoked certain changes of circumstances as a reason for revising the provisions of the Clayton Bulwer Treaty of 19 April 1850 between Great Britain and the United States. Lord Granville, who was the British Secretary of State at that time, replied that the opinions of acknowledged writers on international law could be quoted in support of his own opinion that "The principles upon which the whole argument of the despatch is founded are... novel in international law". He therefore treated the matter from the side of the practical considerations it involved, reserving the legal dispute. That is to say that at that time even the British Government, while having doubts about it, did not reject it.
Then other Secretaries of State-in regard to the Panama Canal, a very sore subject-argued in 1882 and 1883 that the treaty was voidable because the articles relating to the Canal had become obsolete, and because Great Britain had violated important provisions of the treaty. The first contention was based upon an interpretation of the treaty, contested by Great Britain, according to which the treaty related "to a particular ship Canal to be constructed by a particular company", and so on. So, anyway, conditions had changed.
Then we come to the Secret Treaty of London of 1915. France, Great Britain and Russia agreed with Italy 1915 that if the latter entered the war against the Central Powers on the side of the Allied Powers, the former would consent to the extension of Italy's frontiers in case of victory. But President Woodrow Wilson argued in 1919 and 1920 for a revision of the treaty of 1915, diminishing the rights promised to Italy because "the whole face of circumstances has been altered" since 1915. That was with regard to a street treaty which, at that time, was considered to be even more binding than an open treaty.
I shall not read many more of these. There are so many of them. There is your own country, Mr. President. On 10 July 1929 France invoked precedent and practice in its support of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, Mr. Paul-Boncour asserted that "a series of diplomatic notifications emanated from the British Government which denounced, by virtue of the same clause rebus sic stantibus, a whole series of treaties concerning the abolition of the slave trade, believing that the treaties which had ruled a determined situation in the middle of the century no longer responded to present circumstances". He asked:
"What was the reception afforded to this act-this unilateral act-of a great Power declaring the treaties abrogated the sole fact that they no longer corresponded to present circumstances, though none had mentioned it save Great Britain? What was the reception given to this unilateral application, pushed to the extreme of the clause of rebus sic stantibus?" His conclusion was that no objections were raised, and that the incident constituted. "A whole series of examples which prove that it is a constant rule of public international law that, even when it is not expressed, the clause of rebus sic stantibus is tacitly understood in treaties of unlimited duration".
I wish to say here and now, firstly, that because I have read only a few such instances, that does not mean that there are not many more of them, and Security, that we are not for a moment suggesting that either the resolutions of the Security Council or anything else that takes place here have the status of a treaty. We are saying here that even if they were a treaty, that is the situation. We have not accepted the position that there were any treaty obligations, or even that they are obligations. We have said that they are "engagements" which we have entered into, and that they therefore cannot be treated as treaty obligations.
Then it might seriously be asked whether these "changed conditions' ' of which we speak are so serious as to affect our position. Our answer is that conditions have changed in the sense that Pakistan, in violation of its obligations under international law, has annexed our territory, committed fresh aggressions after 13 August 1948, taken over the territories in Gilgit and other parts of the northern areas, accepted accessions-or some similar thing-from the small titular chiefs in the northern part of the Kashmir area, in Hunza and Nagar, thereby changing the whole political contours of this area, and has thus created changed conditions. Secondly, Pakistan has entered into a military alliance with other countries, both of Asia and Europe, whereby-as representatives will find if they read the SEATO treaties-along with most of them, and as a party to that agreement, Pakistan takes South Asia under its protection. The political map has thereby been changed, and all this was done after the Kashmir situation arose.
Thirdly, conditions have changed because of the creation of "Azad'' Kashmir-practically a separate entity. Sometimes we are told it is administered from Karachi, now from Rawalpindi. sometimes not. It may be that a separate State has been created. But conditions have changed by virtue of there being at least twenty-five to thirty battalions of so-called "Azad" Kashmir forces which are front forces for the Pakistan Army -today, equipped with modern weapons made available to Pakistan from its own resources or by its military allies.
It was expressly stated that the territory under aggressive occupation should not be consolidated. That was part of the undertaking given to us by the Commission. The consolidation, as I said, has taken place-in fact, so much so that they have a Minister of Kashmir Affairs in their Government.
I will not say anything about the psychological war that continues to make it impossible under the circumstances to obtain an affair plebiscite. We are a secular State, all of our organization is political and has nothing to do with the religious aspect of a people. We are not prepared to face a position where religious fanaticism is to be, or is, protected.
Over and above all this then has occurred the situation in which Pakistan today-not for any good reasons, but merely for nuisance value and as an instrument to put pressure on us -has entered into negotiations and, I believe, has concluded agreements with the Central Government of the People's Republic of China. That agreement is in total violation of any rights or authority Pakistan may possess, for Pakistan has no sovereignty over this State; it is not Pakistan's to trade away or negotiate about. Secondly, it was not necessary even for considerations relating to Pakistan's own security. What is more, it has been done on a basis which we cannot accept-that is to say, our position in regard to China and Chinese claims, which is not under discussion before the Security Council.
Our frontiers are "delimited" and "demarcated". For the most part, they are demarcated, but they are delimited throughout. Our frontiers are delimited in their entirety by historical circumstance and all the other factors that go with it, and demarcated in places. Now, Pakistan has agreed that they are neither demarcated nor delimited! That is to say, they have sold away our birthright as far as they could. All these changes that have taken place in regard to our own territory and in South-East Asia are matters which make the position, as you see in the book, no longer possible.
I am sorry, therefore, that some countries which, quite rightly, have an affinity for legalisms, take one clause out of an agreement and say that we agree to self-determination or something of that kind. This is not tenable.
I am sorry that other extraneous circumstances have lengthened the meeting to this extent, but mainly thanks to your kind courtesies and to the patience of the members. I have made my brief submissions. I would like to express my appreciation to you and to the Council. I do not suppose I have succeeded in boiling down Anna Karenina to ten pages, but I have tried to counter-I will not say the arguments but the impact of the stones thrown at us at the last moment, although there was plenty of time to do so on some other occasion.
I wish to say here and now that we are as anxious as anybody that there should be no breach of the peace-of international peace and security-in our area, because our people would suffer most by it. We are as much concerned about international peace and security as any other Member of the United Nations. Even those who do not agree with us, I hope, would not challenge that.
Secondly, I wish to say that, when the Security Council is asking us for direct talks on the one hand, and also referring to the of not changing the situation by force, I wish the following to be taken into account: On behalf of the Government of India-not only now but on all the occasions when we have met we have said that, irrespective of our legal, moral, political and equitable claims, or any other rights we may have, it is not the intention of the Government of India to change or redress the wrongs against us by taking the initiative through the use of force.
We were not asked to make this statement: we volunteered it. What is more and must be obvious to all, despite the fact that no part of the agreement has been implemented or honoured, the cease fire is still being observed.
In answer to our challenge to the attitude of the Government of Pakistan, and compelled by our peaceful declarations Pakistan, through Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan the other day said something somewhat-but only somewhat-similar. His statement goes on to say in effect: "Of course, if people come and invade the country, we cannot be held responsible." So one statement (ours) is unqualified and unreserved: in spite of our experiences over the last ten years, in spite of our 5,800 miles of frontier with Pakistan, in spite of our experiences all along our frontier with Pakistan, we have said we shall not take the initiative in the use of force. And I go further and say: we shall not even succumb to small acts of provocation, even though we may be logically justified in retaliating in the face of what is continually happening. We can take some of it, but if we should really be faced with an invasion of our country. I am sure there is no one around this table who would say that we are to submit to further aggression.
With regard to the "guarantee" of which Sir Muhammad spoke, as I have already said, however, it should not be forgotten that this comes after the first statement a few days previously threatening us with war. He has said that they would not seek to bring about a change in the situation except by peaceful methods-that Pakistan would always have recourse to peaceful methods for a settlement. But he took care to say that he was "bound to warn the Security Council that the situation may not always continue to remain passive. Not that the Government itself will do something to convert it into a situation of tension, but tension might arise. That is not something which anybody should raise his eyebrows over. Does it happen? It has happened. Governments are upset, new How can Governments take their place and new Governments can change policies. People get out of hand. There is nothing extraordinary in what I have mentioned to the Council. I have merely stressed that there is a live dispute..."[1010th meeting, para. 65]. There are likely to be changes in government, more so in our country where there are elections, than anywhere else, yet we have not made any reservations. This, therefore, is a very qualified statement compared to ours.
Finally, we are two Members of the United Nations, and, as Sir Patrick would wish to stress, also member States of the Commonwealth. There is no reason why we should not talk to each other: we have talked to each other on a number of issues. But it is one thing for us to initiate talks in that way, and something else to hold talks under some mandate of the Security Council, with its concomitant implication of a report back, and the same kind of controversy going on.
What I really want to point out is this: that during this year my Prime Minister, directly, in his own person, and through our respective representatives, has made at least two efforts to initiate this, and each of them has been turned down. Yet now the Security Council turns around and says that the "two parties" should get together, and so on. I told my friend from Ghana the other day that I understand the desire for conciliation and peace. However, a different approach should be adopted towards those who do some things and towards those who do not. While this does not mean that you should not urge the holding of talks in that way, the fact has to be taken into account that the fault is not on our side.
I shall therefore conclude these observations by saying that the Government of India will continue to pursue the path of conciliation and maintenance of the articles of the Constitution of the Union and of all that we are legally entitled to, refraining from the use of force on our initiative. But if, on account of changes that are taking place and that I read about to you a while ago, a condition should arise involving tribal raids on the territory, we shall take whatever police or military steps are required to meet them. When such a situation arises, we shall meet them as we have tried to meet them in the past. Equally, if there are promoted any alliances involving any part of sovereign India, though under the illegal occupation of any other country-that is, Pakistan - then a new situation arises.
There is a great deal of loose talk about doing this or that or the other. The only good thing that has emerged from all the deliberations in this Council over the years, as well as from our efforts and theirs, is the willy-nilly cease-fire line. In spite of all provocation, I say, in all conscience - I know something about this in spite of all provocation, we have not allowed war to break out. I hope the Security Council, in spite of the other extraneous circumstances that may condition the thinking of some of its members, whatever side they may belong to, will take into account the fact that, for us, this is a question of great and vital importance on which is centred the unity of India, the secular character of our State, and, what is more, the internal peace of the country, where there is a population of so-called minorities numbering nearly a hundred million, where very large economic and social experiments-if you like to call them that are taking place, sometimes shaking the out of date foundations of a time-worn society.
If it is your desire to see progress take place, that cannot be achieved merely by passing resolutions which have no meaning, which cannot apply in the present circumstances, and which would be used by Pakistan only in order to prove to their people that "we have big people outside to assist us and therefore you can do what you really want to do"-that is, attack India, provoke her and be intransigent.
It is not our desire to create more trouble in the world than there already is. But at the same time, the Council should not mistake our desire to go on adopting a calm and patient approach in this matter for an attitude of weakness or subservience or a willingness to surrender our sovereignty under pressure. We shall never negotiate our sovereignty; we shall never surrender our sovereignty. But we shall make a very peaceful effort to prevent the situation from developing into one that would threaten the peace of the world, whereby it would threaten the peace of India as well. The Union of India, its integrity and progress, is a matter of vital concern to us. We are often told by our friends who have our well-being at heart of their great concern for us. Do they really mean that? If they do, they will bear this mind.
I thank you and the members of the Council for your kindness and patience.