22061962 Text of the speech Made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962,
22061962 Text of the speech Made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962,
We have sat at this Council table now for several days, listening patiently to discover some reason for the convening of this meeting and to what its deliberations are likely to lead. We have now reached the stage when from our point of view, the unfortunate position was reached yesterday, when the United States received seven votes and was therefore able to continue this meeting. My Government has always taken the view that there was no reason for convening the Security Council because no new situation had arisen to aggravate any positions in Jammu and Kashmir, so far as we are concerned, although there might have been actions on the other side.
We understood that that was the position of a large number of countries and that this meeting was convened merely at the insistence of the State of Pakistan, with which others concerned agreed. My country, Government and people are mystified by the fact that, though the insistence was on the side of Pakistan, the initiative in the debate was taken over by the United States from the day the present sitting began.
This afternoon-though I did not see it till this moment, I saw this draft resolution this morning-we still had hopes that, realizing the consequences of the action that is proposed in the resolution on the general situation in Jammu and Kashmir, Ireland would refrain from putting its name to the draft resolution which we had expressly informed that Government would be regarded by us as an unfriendly act-I do not want to exaggerate this, I am sure my friend, Mr. Boland, would accept it in the spirit in which it is made. I think that the sense of shock in our country about the Republic of Ireland being the spokesman-I would not use any other word-of this particular move would be very considerable. The relations between our two countries did not begin yesterday, and I mean the close relations between our two countries. They go back to the last century, right through the period of the struggle of the Irish people against repression and empire, to that dis possession of their lands and all the troubles that went on, to the days when the Mayor of Cork died in his defiance of the Empire. Later the Irish Free State was formed. However, Ireland was not formed by a process of agreement; it was formed through the imposition of force by the Empire. However that may be, I cannot but say, in sorrow-not anger but in sorrow - that we deeply regret that Ireland has become the spokesman for this draft resolution, although it is perfectly within its sovereign rights to do what it likes. Equally, so are we, to think as we are led to think about it.
Now we come to the text of this draft resolution. We do not yet have the text of Mr. Boland's speech in our hands, but I listened to it very carefully. The sentiment that ran right through it was that this draft resolution represented the consensus of opinion in this Council or the majority opinion. I have been in some pain, after Ambassador Plimpton's speech yesterday, to analyse this assumption. In that analysis one finds that the statement does not reflect the opinion even of the majority; it reflects the opinion of Pakistan, whose case has been somewhat ably argued by a number of members. First of all, it was said that seven members -- that is to say, the majority in this case-are supporting this position. Yesterday Ghana, on the one hand, and Venezuela entered their caveats against that statement. Mr. Haseganu suggested when he spoke that the UNCIP resolutions were impracticable or that they could no longer be implemented. This is therefore not part of the majority view. The total number of members who supported that point of view would be five and not seven. of the members did give expression to sentiments in regard to negotiations, so called, between Pakistan and India. Most of them-I believe with the exception of the United States and the United Kingdom-emphasized the necessity of creating the necessary atmosphere for fruitful talks. If I am wrong about that, I shall withdraw it. Ambassador Plimpton also quoted five members in support of the idea of the good offices of a third party. Two members-Ireland and Ghana-qualified their statements. The remaining three, even if we take all five as constituting a group, are still a minority. Ambassador Plimption said yesterday that all members had not failed to comment on the responsibility of the Security Council in this matter.
We do not deny the responsibility of the Security Council. On the other hand, the main basis of our position would be that the Security Council has a tremendous responsibility, but that the question is whether, in exercising or discharging its responsibility, it is doing so to any benefit. Ambassador Plimpton quoted seven members in support of the view he had taken. Four members, the United Arab Republic, Ireland, Chile and France qualified their statements in this respect. The remaining three constitute a minority. I am not going to say any more about this aspect now; I shall do so at a later stage.
Then we come to the draft resolution itself [S/5134]. We have no vote in this Security Council. We are here by invitation under the relevant article of the Charter in order to participate in these proceedings. It is the practice of the Council to hear the views of the party concerned as though we were a member, except for the purpose of voting.
At the present moment I propose to confine myself to this draft resolution and not to dwell on the large numbers of statements which have gone into the record, statements which my Government cannot intend to leave uncorrected. The first paragraph of the preamble reads:
"Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the India Pakistan question".
I suppose this refers to the speeches made in April and May in regard to which the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom wanted time to contemplate. They contemplated for a month and a half or approximately that time, and then acquiesced in calling this meeting-under Pakistan pressure. They did call this meeting, however, and have expressed their opinions -no doubt, after contemplation. They still wanted time to contemplate, that is to say, it is right to conclude that either they made those statements after consideration, or without consideration. We decline to believe the latter. If they made their statements after consideration, my Government does not see any reason whatsoever why these meetings should have been dragged out almost to the point of dilatoriness. As I stated previously, this is hardly the way to treat a Member State of the United Nations. Having suggested that there was some grave urgency in this matter, and after one of the Governments concerned had communicated the difficulties it had in attending meetings of this kind-meetings which would serve no purpose whatsoever-the Security Council has met for a couple of hours each day, not for the purpose of further clarification here but no doubt for other reasons which we now see resulting in this resolution.
My Government, first of all, is against any resolution coming from this Council at this time, because from our point of view, any resolution that might come out at this time would not have any factual relevance. It would not be of any value unless it was a resolution calling upon Pakistan to vacate its aggression. That the Council is not ready to do. Someday it will do so, we do not consider that impossible. We think that any resolution from this Council, like the present one, will only be interpreted in India, on the one hand, as a very partisan statement. The effect on Pakistan, on the other hand, would be to lead it to think that in this matter and in its aggression it has the moral support of the great Powers who occupy these chairs.
However, dismissing this aspect, we come to the next preambular paragraph which reads:
"Having considered the Report of the United Nations Representative, Mr. Frank P. Graham".
I presume that this means a private consideration because we have not considered the report in this Council. The report has been here for four years, it has never been presented and never been received. This does not worry me. us very much because Dr. Graham's position is one to which we are not a party. When the UNCIP was appointed after a certain amount of conversation, discussion, and so on, ultimately we became a party to it and we agreed to it. UNCIP dissolved itself and afterwards, with the exception of Sir Owen Dixon, the various representatives were appointed on the unilateral decision. of the Security Council, to which we are not a party.
Following the traditions of our country, however, whenever these famous gentlemen have visited our shores, we have offered them our traditional hospitality insofar as our poor resources would permit, and we have treated them with the courtesy that is characteristic of our relations with visiting people. But apart from that, we have not recognized Dr. Graham's position in regard to this matter. We would not be prepared at any time to say that these efforts have in any way assisted in the solution of the Kashmir question, as it is now popularly called; but rather that they have aggravated it.
Then we come to paragraph 1 of the draft resolution which reads: "Reminds both parties of the principles contained in its resolution of 17 January 1948, and in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949".
These three resolutions at least must be taken in two parts. The resolution of 17 January 1948 was an appeal to the two parties not to aggravate the situation.
For fourteen years, the Security Council knows-through the records and through the communications made to it by UNCIP, and by all the facts of which, as lawyers would say, you can take "judicial notice"-the resolution of 17 January 1948 had been continuously disregarded by Pakistan, by resorting to continuing and progressive aggression, which we fully discovered only afterwards and which was laid before the Council, and also to very substantial psychological warfare in the shape of propaganda for what is called the "jehad", the holy war against India.
With regard to the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, this is not the time to go seriatim into the various paragraphs. We want to say, however, and not merely for the purpose of the record, that we hope that even at this late stage some of the members will not allow preconceived notions on this problem to override the factual situation. These resolutions were hammered out between UNCIP on the one hand and, so far as we are concerned, our Government mainly our Prime Minister on the other. In regard to each of them and to the main parts of these resolutions, the UNCIP at that time gave us various categorical assurances. Those assurances were not private assurances; they were not personal assurances; they were assurances of the Security Council and they were commitments on behalf of the Security Council.
Therefore, we submit that we cannot speak about the 13 August 1948 resolution or the 5 January 1949 resolution without taking the whole of them as one body and, what is more, in the context in which they were formulated, and, even more, including the assurances These assurances were to us very solid parts of whatever engagements we had entered into.
The word "obligations'' has been used very freely, particularly by the United States. Speaking in the Security Council in 1957 and 1958, my Government made it clear that while it would honour all international obligations, the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949-which, as I said, differ slightly from the resolution of 17 January 1948-were, in the view of our Government, engagements and not obligations. Those engagements were carried out in the context within which they came about and if the resolutions were not implemented, the fault does not lie with us.
Therefore, to speak of the principles contained in the draft resolution as though no changes have taken place in twelve or fourteen years is not only unrealistic, but it is to disregard the political, economic and other realities and the military realities-obtaining in our two countries and in our part of the world. What is more, it is to disregard the continual violation and flouting of decisions and resolutions and the concealment of facts from the Security Council.
Mr. Stevenson was at pains, in opening this debate in this particular continued series of meetings on 15 June, to read out paragraph 1 of the resolution on 5 January 1949. It was of course possible for him to do that if he so desired. It is possible to read the scriptures and to prove anything by one paragraph. The whole of that resolution, first of all, is supplementary to the resolution of 13 August 1948, and until the 13 August resolution had been implemented the 5 January resolution had no meaning.
Secondly, if paragraph 1 of the 5 January resolution must be read, then paragraph 2 must also be read, and there are so many others that should similarly be read with it. I do not intend to elaborate on the matter at this stage, but I want to say that clause 1 of the operative paragraph of the present resolution is probably stronger than any resolution adopted here, most of which we have not accepted. It is not in conformity with the facts that are now obtained.
The only part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 that has been implemented by and large is the cease fire. It is the intention of my country to observe the cease-fire agreement until someone else seriously breaks it on a large scale and in such a way that it cannot be maintained any longer. So, even though the other parts of that resolution have not been implemented and logically we would therefore even be entitled to disregard the cease-fire agreement, we do not intend to do so.
Then comes paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which :
"Urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on the question at the earliest convenient time
I shall stop there and read the rest of it afterwards. Here I want to say that we have always taken exception to the practice of treating Pakistan and ourselves on the same basis in regard to this question. We are equal Members of the United Nations; in that way we do not claim any differentiation. But in regard to this question they are the aggressors and we are the aggressed.
We bought a complaint here. That complaint is in regard to the situation created by Pakistan in respect of Kashmir. The only answer Pakistan gave relevant to Kashmir on 15 January 1948 was to say that it was not invading, that it was not in Kashmir. That, therefore, is the first preliminary objection to treating India and Pakistan as though they were two peas in a pod. That has always been the usual British practice; here, however, when it comes to a serious matter of this kind, we must go into the substance of the question.
We have said that this Council is not a court of law. You are not a World Court. This body has no right to go into legal questions or to pass judgement on them. At best it is a body representing the United Nations and basing itself on the principles of political relations in terms of international morality and law, and I also submit those who want remedies here. must come with clean hands. But over and above that the immediate objection to this is that those who sponsor the draft resolution and, I fear, the majority of the Members of the Council either are ignorant of the fact or refuse to accept the position that in the last few months-let alone the carlier past -the Government of India, as embodied in the person of the Prime Minister, has repeated the head of the State of Pakistan to come and talk these things over-negotiations may not be the right word, but any way the intention was to talk theses things over.
The Prime Minister, during his visit to West Pakistan, extended an invitation to President Ayub Khan on 23 September 1960. My Prime Minister went there. This invitation was renewed through Pakistan's Minister, Mr. Akhtar Huisain, on 10 January 1962, when the latter met the Prime Minister in New Delhi. The invitation was again renewed by our High Commissioner in Karachi on 1 March 1962. The Security Council was informed of all these invitations in document S/5060 and at the 990th meeting of the Council. Therefore we say that you cannot issue a proclamation in the air calling upon the two parties, when one party has invited the other to come and they have been refused. What is more, the other party said that they preferred to come not to us, but here. It follows that there has been no response to the move for bilateral meetings. If the resolution had said "calls upon the Government of Pakistan to respond to the repeated invitations of India and to go and talk to them", that would have been reality. But the approach adopted in the resolution displays partiality and I am certain that my Government is not prepared to accept this position.
As regards the second point, the representative of France, the President, has referred to it more than anyone else. The resolution says: at the earliest convenient time with the view to its ultimate settlement in accordance with Article 33 and other relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations".
To a lay reader, a person who does not know the details and nuances of these things, if he reads this draft resolution alone, it looks very nice; that is to say, what could be better than arbitration, conciliation and all those ideas have been set out? He would therefore think this is a very equitable and honourable thing for nations to do, and what they expect from membership of the United Nations. But what is forgotten is that this issue comes under Chapter VI, under the pacific settlement of disputes, and not anywhere else.
It is and has always been our submission-and we shall continue to uphold it-that the position that exists in connexion with the so-called Indo-Pakistan question is not a dispute in terms of the Charter. It is a situation created by Pakistan's aggression on our territory, by the annexation of that territory and by the repeated violations of the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, and therefore Article 33 is inapplicable to this case in any way. But even if it is said that the substance of Article 33 can be defended on grounds of good conscience and should be accepted by nations-that is, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement-I submit that all but the last have been tried all these years. We have had so many negotiation this-here, in Geneya, in Paris, in all kinds of places. There have been men of goodwill who have come over and talked to us and we have talked to them. So there have been negotiations, direct and indirect, times without numbers. As to inquiry, I suppose even the Security Council would be satisfied with the volume of material which has come out as a result of inquiry. As to mediation, this has also been tried, in the sense that men of goodwill have talked to us, including McNaughton, Dixon and Jarring.
However, when we come to arbitration, international law, as I shall point out at the appropriate time, lays down certain principles that are basic to arbitration. There are some things that are arbitrable, others that are not arbitrable. That is true in individual relations, domestic and international relations. There are some things which are beyond arbitration; The sovereignty of a country, its independence and integrity, are not subjects for arbitration. The belief that they are so arises from a groundless fallacy of which the United States delegation has no cause to be guilty, because Mr. Warren Austin, speaking many years before this Council, laid it down without any reservations whatsoever that sovereignty lay with India, and therefore there is no question that there has ever been any dispute on this matter.
We hold therefore, that, as regards the substance of Article 33 which would be applicable in good conscience, the substance of it, not the form of it-that has been carried out. The invoking of Article 33 in the resolution is a further attempt to exert pressure on us in this matter. The Security Council is being used as a means of propaganda, so that the representative of Pakistan can come here say, time after time: "Yes we agreed and India did not agree". What they agreed to is a different matter. "We agreed and India did not": he has sometimes forgotten that the crucial resolution, the one of 13 August, was largely hammered out by us and, what is more, was accepted by the Government of India long before Pakistan touched it.
The draft resolution then says:
Appeals to the two Governments to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of negotiations". We have no objection to this appeal. But, so far as we are concerned, it is pushing an open door-and those who push an open door are likely to fall on their noses !
The draft resolution "appeals to the two Governments to take all possible measures"-when, for years, we have informed this Council of the psychological war being waged by Pakistan, and of the gathering of troops intruders, or threats of the same. Even this morning, the news from India is that, in the puppet regime of so-called "Azad '' Kashmir, they have been collecting people, and other agencies of Pakistan's creation have been collecting people, in order to make so-called tribal invasions of India.
I do not know whether at this time you want me to read. many things out. The main mouthpiece of the Pakistan Government, the newspaper founded by the first President of Pakistan-some people regarded him as the founder of Pakistan -says:
"The final settlement of the Kashmir question is not going to be worked out in New York. The hands of the Indian tyrant will be forced by other means, leaving him no alternative but to liberate his victims."
The same paper went on to say that, if India wanted a war, we would have one, and they would raze Delhi to the ground, and every city in India would be destroyed, and things of that kind. Fortunately, we take all these things in our stride.
On 9 May, the same paper said that on the BBC television - the BBC does not normally allow people to say things of this kind, I lived, long enough in Britain to know this-the representative of the "Azad" Government of Jammu and Kashmir said:
"The faith of Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council has been shaken, and they might soon take up arms on the Algerian pattern."
The same paper, reporting the answers to question by Mr. Ludovic Kennedy of the BBC, went on to say:
"Mr. Khurshid declared that Kashmiris would take up arms rather than go on 'breaking their heads against the stone wall' of Indian intransigence. He confirmed that the recently & elected Council in "Azad'' Kashmir had adopted a resolution requesting China for assistance in the Kashmir struggle for freedom. He also expected the people and the Government of Pakistan to participate in Kashmir's fight for liberation from the yoke of Indian militarist colonialism."
Again, ten days afterwards, one of their leaders an announced that "the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference has decided to resume the Kashmir liberation movement following the failure of the United Nations to solve the Kashmir issue".
A great deal has been said about the dignity, the responsibility and the role of the Security Council. is the Security Council going to pass resolutions under threats of this kind-we had one when Sir Muhammad began his speech on the last occasions I am glad to say that he modified it toward the end ?
"The All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference" not a public meeting, you know, but the main political party, in so far as they have any political parties-an nounced today its intention to resume the liberation movement by the middle of August of this year. This decision was taken at the annual session of the Conference, concluded today. The Conference decided to recruit 10,000 trained Mujahideen (crusaders) within three months from today."
They cannot find people from "Azad" Kashmir to undertake this mission, and therefore, according to our information, 1947 is to be repeated, and the tribal peoples from the North Western part-what was formerly the North-Western Province -are to be enlisted.
Mr. Bhutto, one of the Ministers of the Pakistan Government, said last month, after we met here-these dates are important-after we met and concluded the last session, this Minister, who must presumably be reflecting the views of his Government, even in a non-parliamentary system, told a news conference that "Pakistan now realized that the Kashmir problem would have to be settled by our intrinsic strength', and that the Kashmiris might rise to the same height as the Algerians."
I will not tax the Council with more editorials, because it can always be said that they have a free Press and that nobody can prevent anybody from saying this or that. But the President of the 'Azad'' Government again comes on 27 May, a few days after we met here, and reiterates that "The fight of liberation would have to be fought on three fronts -namely, the diplomatic front, the propaganda front, and on the ground." He also said that "he was glad that some people who until recently had talked of peaceful agitation had ultimately agreed with his point of view that the Kashmir liberation fight would have to be an armed struggle".
The representative of Pakistan at this table is one of those people who have talked not about peaceful agitation, but about peaceful settlement. I suppose there is a difference between the two.
I would ask the Council not to dismiss this newspaper, though it is one of several; I would not say that it is an official paper-I do not mean to say that-but it is usually regarded as expressing the voice of the Government in that country, not only in this regime but in previous regimes. It goes on to say:
"Pakistan must have the Kashmir question settled, no matter what it takes, no matter what it costs. Indeed, the repudiation by India of the Security Council resolutions, including the one calling for the cease fire, and the aggressive redeployment of her forces have made Pakis tan's task a little easier. The great impediment to the liberation of Kashmir, namely, our obligation to maintain the cease fire, no longer exists. The grave danger to our territory, our interest and our people is mounting. Acts violence, intimidation and threatening speeches have become a common feature across the border to keep us away from liberating our Kashmir brethren.
"Pakistan is threatened with an all-out war if the 'Azad' Government of Kashmir makes any move to alleviate the sufferings of the Kashmiris under Indian occupation, while that country's determination to occupy the 'Azad' territory is voiced on every conceivable occasion by the Defense Minister. These threats, of course, can hold. no fear for us. If India wants an all-out war, it will get one. If Lahore, Dacca and Karachi are bombed, Bombay, Amritsar and New Delhi will be razed to the ground".
Nobody has said anything about bombing Karach or any other place.
"For us in Pakistan, the virtues of peace are no different from the virtues of a war of liberation."-a very good statement-if it is a war of liberation-and when a great newspaper does not know the difference between peace and war, you know what you are dealing with "The people of this country were prepared for the present aggressive posture of India and the repudiation by her of international commitments, having witnessed the impotence of United Nations"-that is for you-'and of the big Powers in regard to the occupation of the Portuguese enclaves. We should no longer ask ourselves whether we should start defending our country when the first bomb drops on our territory or when soldiers cross our borders. The time for active defences has come.``-that is preventive war, you know - "Now is the time to thwart the designs of the Indian expansionists. The massing of forces within striking distance of our territory is an aggression of which we have to take note. The repudiation of the cease fire is nothing but a declaration of war. We have never sought and do not seek a shooting war, but neither do we want peace so much that we are willing to pay for it by permitting India to perpetuate an occupation of Kashmir and constantly menace our very independence. To gain our objective-the liberation of Kashmir-we should readily accept aid or friendship from whatever quarter it comes. What does if our friend ship does not meet the nationalistic purpose of our allies? As we have said, Pakistani regards as real friends only those who stand by it on the crucial question of Kashmir."
That may be the reason why some people subscribe to these things.
The Security Council says that it is appealing to the two countries to maintain a peaceful atmosphere. As I said earlier, the appeal loses its point because you are pushing against an open door on one side. Even in the highest circles in Pakistan, no attempt has been made to create a favourable atmosphere. As I pointed out, not only has there been no favourable response to India's repeated request for a "no war" declaration, but even the invitation from the head of our Government to the Head of State of Pakistan, who is also the Prime Minister de facto, has not produced any response.
The representative of Pakistan has successfully made every attempt in the Security Council to keep this debate in progress and to create a sense of controversy in order, perhaps, to promote feelings of irritation with India and cause difficulties for that country.
The operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution reads:
"Urges the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to refrain from making any statement, or taking any action, which may aggravate the situation.".
We have asked this Council repeatedly for the past twelve years to point out to us what statement we have made that are aggravating the situation, even though the fact remains
that forty thousand square miles of our territory are occupied by the other side.
The operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution reads:
"Requests the Secretary-General to provide the two Governments with such services as they may request for the purpose of carrying out the terms of this resolution".
That part of the resolution is innocuous; it is one of those omnibus clauses that are added on to resolutions. Furthermore, we do not want to bring the Secretary-General into this controversy at all. In any case, since we are not likely to request these services, that paragraph is inoperative.
This, therefore, is the draft resolution which has been submitted when each of the Governments concerned knows for a fact that it will not lead to the solution of any question. It will only aggravate the situation and will be used in Pakistan for a purpose which is entirely different from what is intended. Besides, it is entirely contrary to fact.
The draft resolution ignores several very crucial points that were made by members of the majority in this Council. One of these points is that conditions have changed. In spite of the fact that the representative of Venezuela devoted most of his speech [1014th meeting] to arguing the case for Pakistan, he did point out that there is no question about Pakistan not having any sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir. If Pakistan has no sovereignty there, I do not know how it dares to do anything on our territory. The fact that there have been many changes in conditions was recognized here by France, by Ghana and by Romania-which is not part of the majority, but still a member of the Council; Ireland also spoke of this, but it does not appear in that country's resolution- Venezuela, Chile and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have all said as much. Everyone has referred to these changed conditions, and when the time comes for it, I propose to submit to the Council both no the law and facts which apply to these changed conditions in Kashmir.
It is not my intention to make a more detailed statement at the present time but I hope, in fairness to my Government and in view of the large number of misstatements that have been made in the Council-either out of ignorance or for political reasons that I will be allowed to put this record straight so that, on a future occasion, it will not be said-as has been said so often that the Government of India did not take exception to this, that or the other.
We have the same feeling as a lot of other people that the repetition of these things is becoming a bit tiresome. But then, if I neglect to object to any cular point, that commission is brought up at the ensuing meeting and it is said then that India had no objection. Therefore, we intend at the appropriate time, if that is the pleasure of the Council, to put our position with regard to this matter more fully on record.
The only other speech to which I should really refer is the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. I shall not do so for several reasons. The first is that it is expected; the other reason is that I have no desire to aggravate the relationship between our two countries. But I hope that they will stop speaking to us in that fashion, enjoining us vaguely to preserve the status of the Commonwealth in regard to these matters. Pakistan is a military ally, not only one of the members of the Commonwealth. In the context of things as they appear, therefore, such statements, fall very unpleasantly upon our ears. But our relations with the United Kingdom, in spite of everything, are very close and no doubt Sir Patrick Dean follows his instructions and his own wisdom in the matter.
I wish to reiterate to the Council that in passing this resolution it will not be, as Mr. Boland has said, discharging a duty that will in any way promote the function of the Security Council to pass resolutions without a purpose. If I may say so, we sometimes develop a habit of doing and then do them whether they have a purpose or not. I remember being interviewed by a newspaper editor on television some time ago. He told me that I did not understand his difficulty, that sometimes great problems arise in the world that are so difficult that it becomes impossible even for statesmen to unravel them yet the Press had to write editorials and pronounce on such problems in quick time I told him that I could understand the nature of an obligation to pronounce out of ignorance.
Similarly, there is no real obligation for the Security Council to pass draft resolution which is not likely to lead to anything but which will only proclaim to the world that this question has not received the kind of consideration that it should from members of this Council and nations that are committed to the same principles as we have observed in our country. Therefore, I submit, with all the earnestness at my command, that the uncommitted countries in particular should not now become parties, either passively or actively, to a resolution of this character.
I have no desire to analyses closely the other statements that have been made which will only lend strength to forces of disruption either in India or in relation to India and Pakistan, for that would not be calculated to lead to peace in our part of the world. Conditions have changed. Since I intend to refer to them more fully later on, shall not do so now-I therefore request the members of the Security Council, even though a draft resolution is before them, not to complicate the difficulties in the situation by adopting it or even supporting it.