04051962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1011 held on 4 May 1962.

04051962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 1011 held on 4 May 1962.

 

I have no desire to prolong this debate unduly. My colleague from Pakistan said this morning that I had covered a wide field. I think the Council well knows that the limits of this field were not set by me; we were not asked to come here on this occasion. What is more, since I introduced my observations, the representative from Pakistan has covered large areas of what he alleges to be a fact. I believe I tried to finish in as short a time as possible, but anyway, he covered a wide field; the initiative did not come from me.

 

Secondly, I want to say right away that it is not my intention, nor part of my Government's policy, to go into large numbers of matters which Sir Zafrulla Khan has memories about. This is not a place to write his memories or what V.P. Menon, an ex-Government official, after a time in the Government, had written, without authority of Government. I know the name Menon carries some weight, but not every Menon's. Therefore, we start from the beginning.

 

The first thing is that Sir Muhammed tries to repudiate that there had been any threat before the Security Council. That all depends on what you mean by "threat". A threat may be in words; it may be by display of force; it may be by other action. But we have no doubt in our minds; and in the view of the Government of India, as expressed by the Prime Minister in Parliament two days ago, we will not negotiate, we will not carry out conversations under threats of any kind. On the other hand, our policy is not likely to be changed because someone, unwisely, I think, tries to introduce the element of threat.

 

Be that as it may, what was said here I am not going to repeat. Sir Muhammad said that once; it was raised again yesterday and therefore, I will not read the whole of this. But he did say this much even later :

 

"I intend and I trust I will be able to do it when I come toward the close of my submission to the Security Council -to stress one aspect which was stressed here by the late Mr. Warren Austin: that nobody should deceive himself that, merely by covering over the question, it will be settled. If the Security Council does not want the elements in the State who started the liberation battle to start it again if the Security Council does not desire that the tribes men should get out of hand and pour into Kashmir again, if the Security Council does not desire that the people of Pakistan should get out of hand and-if I may mix the metaphor-take the bit between their teeth and run away with the whole system of ordered Government, and if the Security Council does not desire that powerful neighbouring States should plunge into the vortex when it starts again, the Security Council had better take note of the realities of the situation." [1007th meeting para.63.]

 

I submit, both in substance and language, it is nothing short of a threat: but even that is not the main thing, because I think we can afford to live with them. We have lived with these threats, and what is more, with the violations of international law and neighbourly behaviour from this country for the past fourteen years. We will still exercise restraint in regard to these matters.

There are two other things to be considered: one, the responsibility of the State in regard to the use of its territory by what are called "tribesmen '', in the same pattern as in 1947. "We know nothing about them: we cannot stop them: they are co-religionists, and this, that and the other." This is exactly the same pattern being followed, and it is not to be wondered that we begin to think about what is happening. But over and above that, I believe there are some international obligations on States which are Members of the United Nations and, therefore, have full statehood.

 

It is an extraordinary statement that the people of "Azad' Kashmir and the people of Pakistan who are citizens of Pakistan may get out of control and Governments become powerless. This is a statement we cannot easily accept. That is to say, on the one hand, if a citizen of a State is badly treated by another, then the State rightfully comes to his rescue. On the other hand, if a citizen runs amok, then he has no responsibility. This cannot be, coming from Sir Muhammed, an ex-judge of the World Court. This is a very strange interpretation of the behaviour of nations. He is probably proceeding on the mistaken theory that there is no legal responsibility, in regard to what its citizens do. But external responsibility of a State-the external responsibility in these matters must attach to every State. Even when volunteers leave a country to participate in an internal war somewhere, States are supposed to bear the responsibility.

 

In this connexion, Oppenheim says that a State's responsibility concerning international duties is a legal responsibility; a State must, according to international law, bear various responsibility for the injuries and acts of private individuals. My colleague must have been familiar with this in the famous decision handed down by the World Court to the effect that it is the obligation of every State not to allow, knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. If Pakistan again either connives at or even permits if Pakistan cannot control its citizens, it has little right to be a State and Government under the laws of civilized nations.

But what worries us is that we find the same pattern as before. You heard the statement by my colleague that I was not Foreign Minister at that time. With this there is no argument: the Foreign Minister of the country is expected to accept the responsibility of his Government to continue its institutions. But I will leave all that alone. I am glad to think that this gloss denotes a reconsideration of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of making a statement of this kind in this Council. Let us hope that this process will continue.

 

But when you look at what has been said by responsible people in Pakistan in the last two years I do not go very far back because there was a change of regime but according to what has been said, he was not the Foreign Minister and therefore not responsible. It was said by the present President of Pakistan on 29 December 1958: "Amid resounding cheers''

 

Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): On a point of order. Mr. President.... Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I did not interrupt the honourable gentlemen, Sir.

 

The PRESIDENT: The representative of Pakistan has the floor on a point of order.

 

Mr. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan): My point of order is this. I have not said-and I challenge the Defence Minister of India to say that I have that I am not responsible. I merely said that I have no personal knowledge of certain incidents, and the Defence Minister of India said. "Foreign Minister, and not knowing what was happening ?" I then said I was not Foreign Minister at that time; I was abroad.

 

I have not said that I am not responsible. I am responsible for everything that happened. I represent the Government even whether I was Foreign Minister or not. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I have said what I have said.

 

The PRESIDENT: The representative of India now has a floor. I know that in the course of his statement there will be points to which others may wish to object. I request all members here to refrain from interruption. If they should take exception, I will be glad to give them the floor after the representative of India has finished. Please continue.

 

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): This is not a question to be disposed of by simply arguing about whether one person was Prime Minister or not. What was said was that these atrocious things that were recited that day would shock the Council or anybody elected. They were done, in our opinion, as a matter of fact, by those who had been promoted by Pakistan, by forces officered by Pakistan officials, and things of that character and therefore the Pakistan Government had knowledge of them. I gave in 1957-and do not propose to repeat it now and I gave yesterday evidence from responsible people who had suffered in those circumstances, statements which side that the Pakistan Government had knowledge of this matter. And if they had knowledge of this matter-and on the face of it they had knowledge of it-then if the Foreign Minister says he was not the Foreign Minister, that does not hold much water. That is all I have to say. Anyway that does not come into this.

 

Now continue General Ayub Khan's statement of December 1958, at the Chittagong public meeting :

 

"Amid resounding cheers the President declared that Pakistan will consider no sacrifice too great to ensure the liberation of the people of Kashmir. The question of Kashmir is a question of life and death for us and we are prepared to stake everything for freeing Kashmir."

 

Previously, in an interview given foreign correspondents he had said:

 

"We must have a satisfactory solution. It affects our security and our whole existence."-That is a point I will come to later on when we speak about the rights of the peoples of Kashmir. "Should we be forced to adopt extreme measures the responsibility will be that of Bharat" -that is, of India. "Asked if he meant war, General Ayub said: Yes, certainly"."

 

President of "Azad" Kashmir, speaking at Muzaffarabad also said:

 

"The liberation of Kashmir was the question of life and death both for Pakistan and the people of Kashmir and they were determined to achieve their objective at all costs."

 

Lieutenant-General K.M. Shaikh, who is now the Minister of the Interior, speaking on 19 January 1959, declared: "We will jointly work for the liberation of Kashmir. That is why I still wear my uniform." He was talking to the so-called "Azad" Kashmiris. The paper [Pakistan Times] also reported that: ".. the tribesmen had offered all help to the Government in settling the dispute and they were even ready to start a 'jihad' against India on this question". A "jehad" is a holy war, and here we have listened to the representative of Pakistan telling us that religious questions do not come into this.

 

Said the President of Pakistan again that "......Kashmir was as much a question of life and death for Pakistan as for the people of Kashmir, Kashmir was vital for Pakistan not only politically but militarily as well". Therefore the issue for Pakistan is not the right of the people freely to express themselves, but their argument that Kashmir is necessary for their security.

 

Mr. Akhtar Hussain the Governor of West Pakistan was quoted as follows:

 

"The Government was fully alive to the growing concern the tribesmen over Kashmir and the Canal Water deadlock and would spare no possible means to get these life and-death problems resolved. If need be, he added, offers of sacrifices extended time and again by the brave tribes men in this behalf would be fully utilized".

 

That was at the time when they were obsessed by the idea of mediation, under a mediator who was a United States citizen the chairman of a bank. A great deal of effort was made to resolve this Canal Water question, which at great sacrifice to ourselves has now reached the state-whether it is settled or not know-where it is no longer a live controversy, at least at the moment. But in defence of such statements made by responsible ministers of the Government-I do not mean responsible ministers of the Government-I do not mean responsible in a parliamentary sense, but ministers of the Government - how can we say that these people are not egging the tribesmen on ?

 

Major Mohammad Yusuf, the Resident and Commissioner of the Frontier Regions, replying to an address of welcome at a huge representative "Jirga" of Mohmand tribes at Shabqadar-and he is the main man responsible-said he was confident that when and if an emergency arose, they would come to the help of their Kashmir brethren. A "Jirga" is a collection of people, of tribes. If it is said that tribesmen are not necessarily conditioned by the resolutions of the Security Council, how can a responsible official say things like this?

 

"The Kashmir dispute was a powder-keg, and unless it was peacefully resolved it could lead to a conflagration", declared the President of Pakistan on 8 June 1959 at Muzaffara

 

bad. Mr. Khurshid, the present President of the "Azad" Government, so-called, said in the course of his speech that:

 

"... it was the good fortune of the Kashmiris that a 'mard e-Mujahid' like General Mohammad Ayup Khan was at the helm of affairs in Pakistan, and that he had promised that he would not rest until the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir was liberated."-Mr, Khurshid added that he had full faith in that promise, as he knew that a "mard e-Mujahid" means what he says.

 

"The bearded Ahmadzai Chief called upon the big Powers not to tax our patience but to press for an early solution of the problem instead. Otherwise we will have to resort to a jehad' to free the Kashmiris from the tyrannical yoke". This is of the Government of India. This refers to Malik Jalat Khan, Chief of Ahmadzai tribe.

 

President Ayub Khan, speaking in October 1960-not so long ago said that the Pakistan Army, the defender of the motherland, "could never afford to leave the Kashmir issue unsolved for an indefinite time. And it said that we are seeking military solutions! The President also said around that same time :

 

"I assure you that the feelings of the people of Pakistan on Kashmir are not less agitated than yours are."-he was speaking to the people in "Azad" Kashmir.-"The people as well as the Government of Pakistan, and particularly the Army of Pakistan, have all along remained perturbed and restive at your worries and the miseries of those who live on the other side of the cease-fire line."

 

The Council will remember. I set out the circumstances of those "miseries" yesterday, when I spoke about the progress made in Kashmir.

 

Again, the President of Pakistan, on 27 October 1960 said that the Kashmir problem was "time-bomb never very far removed from the flash-point". He said: "Unless the intention is to make it explode through lack of foresight and statesmanship, the answer is to defuse it as quickly as possible, and that cannot be done without touching it." In other words, it is a threat of war.

 

President Ayub Khan. on 25 May 1961 was quoted as having declared that: "...Pakistan would have to pursue every means available for the solution of the Kashmir problem. The President told a questionnaire that it was wrong to think that Pakistan was depending on the United Nations alone for the solution of the Kashmir problem."-Then I do not know. why they came here.-"He emphasize that the people of Pakistan could not forget Kashmir, because the present cease-fire line was a constant source of danger to Pakistan's rail, river and road system, and provided in numerable defence problems."

 

The President of the State says this and challenges the very kind of uneasy truce on which we rest. The cease-fire line was the result of the exertions of the Commission at that time and was agreed to by military representatives on both sides who met in Karachi afterwards. Now they say that the cease fire line is a constant source of danger to Pakistan's rail, river and road system. I do not know how it is but would not like to go into the question of how many railroads there are.

 

President Mohammed Ayub Khan stated:

 

"The people of Pakistan would not hesitate to sacrifice even their lives for the cause of Kashmir as the safety and territorial integrity of Pakistan, especially the West wing would be always in danger unless the problem of Kashmir was solved..."

 

The President of "Azad" Kashmir said:

 

".. that the 'Azad' Kashmir regular forces were not a purely defensive force"-and these are the descendants of the local authorities that the Commission set up and that we were supposed to assist- "but they had been created with a specific objective"-by whom were they created, by Pakistan-"and therefore had a mission to fulfil... He said: ``Let it be borne in the minds of all Kashmiris that there is no peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue and that they should from now on concentrate their potentials on finding a solution by other means." Mr. Khurshid again said: "Thirteen long years had been lost in debates and now only military action remained for the solution of the problem." That was on 4 February 1961.

 

The Lt. General Azam Khan-the Governor of East Pakistan-said in Dacca: ".. that the people of Pakistan would sacrifice their life, if need be, for getting their right of self. determination for their Kashmir brethren." At least in this case there is some talk about the Kashmir brethren.

 

Mr. Khurshid again declared on 4 April 1962-that is, after the Security Council had first met-"that the armed forces of the 'Azad' Government will be equipped with modern arms to liberate the occupied territory at any time when they are forced by circumstances to do so." Addressing a public meeting of Kashmiris in the Town Hall, Mr. Khurshid also said that the people of "Azad" Kashmir and Kashmir living in Pakistan would be given military training and arms and ammunition.

 

Here is a news dispatch from Dawn, Karachi. It says:

 

"President Mohammad Ayub Khan said here today that in an emergency, Pakistan would use all the weapons in her armoury" and this is where her military allies come in-"to safeguard her independence. In such a situation, he said, there would be very little time to consult anybody," meaning his allies-"and we would not care if anybody is annoyed by our action"-I make a present of this to the United States-"The President was asked by a questioner at a question and answer meeting of Mardan Basic Democrats whether, in view of the Indian troops concentration on the Pakistan border and the possible threat of aggression, Pakistan would be able to use the weapons received under the United States militará aid.... The President said he did not think Pakistan's SEATO and CENTO alice would not come in her aid if she became a victim of aggression, but even if they did not, Pakistan would fight the enemy with all its strength and every weapon in its armory. He was confident Pakistan was strong enough to deal with any aggressor firmly.

 

On various occassions Sir Muhammad here and elese where, and other Pakistan representatives, have spoken about the concentration of the Indian Army on the Pakistan border. In our system of government, ministers do not command armies nor do they engage in their development. But they have certain responsibilities in regard to the matter. At least they know where they are and how they are deployed. I want to tell this Council, with all such responsibility as I hold that even in the recent action of the Indian Army against Goa, troops had to be withdrawn from the area near Pakistan. There was not any armoury, no additional troops nor anybody within forty miles of the Pakistan border because we knew that it would be cited as an act of provocation. We have every reason to be suspicious, having had experience two years before on the Assam frontier about all these things But in spite of that, no concentration of any kind was made. Still, we are perfectly entitled to do so because that is our sovereign territory.

 

It is quite true that on the border between India and Pakistan there are troops, but the entire concentration of the Pakistan Army is within ten to thirty to forty miles of our frontier. Where is Abbottabad? How long does it take for troops to go from Abbottabad to Kashmir? But the concentration of the Pakistan Army is in Western Pakistan, within a stone's throw from our frontiers, whether it be in Kashmir or anywhere else. So this is a purely irrelevant argument. What is more, now that this has been said, I do not want to throw all of our domestic internal matters into the Security Council, but I am left with no other choice.

 

Recently, there was a general election in India. There was internal tension in the State of Punjab on account of the differences between the different political parties. One of them was probably prone to violence and things of that character. It would be the duty of the Government to be on guard against internal difficulties, and some police forces which were normally on the border were withdrawn for the election. We took the risk because it is far more important that there should be no difficulties inside the country. The police forces that were normally on the border and they are relatively small army personnel on the frontiers of India, mainly guarded by the police, were withdrawn.

 

The Pakistan Government took this opportunity for organizing what is called a boar hunt, that is to say a hunt presumably, ostensibly for wild animals, except that on this particular occasion the Pakistan Army and police were asked to take part. These are all methods of countries that adopt the practice of undeclared war. We communicated to the Pakistan Government that it was creating difficulties for us because we had withdrawn police in that area and that it was not right that they should concentrate policemen and soldiers in that area and difficulties. They did not listen to us. So if there is any question of concentration it is from the other side-there have been skirmishes between the Pakistan armed elements and ourselves in the last ten years and on various occasions when there was a great deal of provocation and when attempts to probe the Indian frontier were made, it sometimes was necessary to take action and we had to take action.

 

I want to tell you here that we will continue to do so. We have no intention of allowing you to put your foot on our soil.

 

I therefore wish to reiterate the conviction of my Government that the Pakistan representative has come here both against the Security Council and the Government of India. I want to assure you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government that our action is not likely to be dictated by this kind of provocation because provocation is one of the means whereby we may be put in the wrong, where we may take an unwise action. Therefore, we have no intention of paying greater attention to it than it deserves.

 

Then we come to the newer facts that have to be dealt with. You will find that soon after this had been disposed of, both the speaker from the Soviet Union, who can take care of himself, and my humble self, have been taken to task merely for repeating what the representative of Pakistan said, and he said something that is entirely not factual.

 

The representative of Pakistan said:

 

"In the context of their first urgent concern-that is, the Security Council's-that is to say, to bring about the cessation of hostilities-they took up the position : 'Why is the fighting going on ?' And they came to the conclusion and it was perfectly obvious-that the fighting was going on as the people of Kashmir desired to come to a decision with regard to the accession, through the exercise of their own choice, and not the Maharajahs. Therefore, once they were assured that their desire, their wish, their objective would be fulfilled through completely peaceful means they would realize that it was not necessary to go on fighting for it. Consequently, that was affirmed and reaffirmed, not only by the members of the Security Council, but also by the representatives of India and the representatives of Pakistan." [1010th meeting, para. 53].

 

I submit that this is totally unrelated to fact. There have been questions about consulting the wishes of the people, if you like. There have been references to a plebiscite, to withdrawals, to demilitarization and to all kinds of things, but there has never been any question of the cease fire having to be established in relation to this particular factor. The whole idea of the cease fire at the time was that unnecessary bloodshed was going on. And, as has been rightly pointed out by Sir Muhammad, the cease fire was not agreed to by us at a time when our armies were in re treat. In the winter of that year the armies of India were fighting at the Zojila Pass, where Indian tanks were in a actionat a height of 12,000 feet and the Pakistan Army was in flight. We could have pressed those advantages home. It was at that time that Pakistan rushed to Paris to the third session of the United Nations General Assembly, and it was not a defeated army that

was trying to sue for peace or to save its skin by a cease fire. Whatever the representative of Pakistan may think or whatever may be thought by responsible members of the Council-as all of you are that shows that our intention was not to seek a military solution but to obtain a vacation of aggression through the good offices of the Security Council, on the one hand, and, on the other, through the realization by the Pakistan Government that this was an unneighbourly relationship. That was our position from the very beginning.

 

I may say here and now that it has always been the position of the Government of India that Pakistan has committed aggression against us. What all these arguments about the plebiscite and about the determination of the people's will- has to do with Pakistan we cannot understand. Time after time the United Nations Commission has said that Pakistan has nothing to do with this matter at all. Pakistan was not to take part in the plebiscite. Pakistan comes here as an aggressor. Pakistan came here because we bought a complaint of aggression. Otherwise Pakistan would not be here at all. We made a complaint with regard to aggression in Kashmir, and the President, who is an old hand at this, will remember that the answer of Pakistan contained a number of points-so far as my memory serves me. Out of these only one referred to Kashmir. All the others referred to various other matters.

 

That reminds me of the tale in Aesop's fables about the tailor who lost a needle in his dark house and, because he could not find it there, went out into the lighted street to look for it.

 

There was no answer to the question of aggression, and there was no answer in the Pakistan reply with regard to Kashmir. It was all about Hyderabad and Junagadh, what V.P. Menon had said, and this, that and the other.

 

In the letter of 20 August 1948 the Prime Minister of India worte to the Commission : "Finally, you agreed that part III, as formulated, does not in any way recognize the right of Pakistan to have part in a plebiscite."

 

And the Chairman of the Commission answered:

 

"The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation."

 

May I explain here that a great deal has been said about the presence of the "Azad'' Government and the "Azad" army. These are all developments that took place long after. There had been the prior passage of the resolutions and commitments by both sides, and yesterday I read to the Council a passage in which it was said that the "Azad" Government was not to be recognized and that it would not change the situation at all. At one stage we demanded the disbanding and disarming of the "Azad" forces, and there was some doubt in the mind of the Commission whether it would be possible to disband them because they were part of the populations in that area. Leaving aside the question that the "Azad '' army was composed of the population of the area, we insisted on the disarming and the disbanding of this army.

 

Then Mr. Lozano, on behalf of the Commission, agreed with us that if the Council so desires I will read the text, but it is unnecessary; I do not think it can be contradicted since it is all printed in the proceedings of the Council-that disarming meant disbanding. He said that disarming must include dis banding, or words to that effect. Disarming implied disbanding. and therefore the whole of this rebel army that had been built up by Pakistan had to disappear. Thus, Pakistan has no locus standi in this matter at all. It comes here as an aggressor, and what an aggressor has to do is to mend its ways and vacate aggression. That is our position. Now I want to say this quite firmly because, due to shortness of time, one tends to be rather abrupt. The second point concerns accession. I think that this question of accession has been argued and can still be argued until the cows come home, as it is said. But, to summarize our position, we regard the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India as full, complete and final, irrevocable and, what is more, perpetual. There is no way under our Constitution whereby any part of the territory of India under the suzerainty of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir before accession can be made over to anybody else legally. That is to say there is no unwinding of an accession, and all these passages read out about what the Prime Minister said at a particular time or about what someone else said at some other time will not cut any ice. accession is full and complete. The position is that this

 

Apart [from all legal questions, the Government of India is entitled to hold the position that for the maintenance of its integrity and its security it cannot adopt the process whereby States can opt in and opt out at will, and no State at this table. with a system of parliamentary or congressional government would accept that. Yesterday I quoted French, United States, British, Austrian and other instances and cases of international law in support of this. The United States, as I said, was engaged in the most sanguinary war in history in order to maintain the sanctity of the union.

 

Then we come to the "Azad" force again. What did the Commission say? We have been told that this force is part of the area. The Commission in its third report:

 

"There is, indeed, no doubt that the 'Azad' forces now have a situation..." a strength which changes the military

 

The cease fire was agreed to in the context of things as they were, and the whole idea of a cease fire is that there shall be a general stoppage-a tourniquet put on hostilities. That is, there must be a standstill, but the Commission says in its report: "There is, indeed, no doubt that the 'Azad' forces now have a strength which changes the military situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies. Although it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the 'Azad' Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces, who have since then been working in close co-operation with the Pakistan regular Army and who have been trained and offered by that Army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that, if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease fire period would be pro longed throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the 'Azad' territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in part II of the resolution of 13 August."

 

There are two matters that come out of this. One is the change of circumstances that has taken place. First of all, all the arrangements of 1948 and 1949 were in the context of thinking that there was a ceasefire and that in a few months perhaps within a year there would be a settlement of this matter. But in our submission the Pakistan Government, by not carrying out part I of the resolution which I read out to the Council yesterday, made the truce conditions imposible prima facie, Over and above that, however, section A of part II was repudiated in action, and the Commission's report itself sets out that that was the position.

 

Sir Muhammad stated yesterday, as far as I could understand what was being said, that with regard to the northern areas they had no complaints to make. The Commission has stated-and I have repeatedly quoted this before the Council -- that to its knowledge Pakistan at the time of the passing of these resolutions and the agreement on the cease fire had no authority in those areas. It is quite true that the Government India had not reached so far at that time, and the fighting situation ended soon after partition. The Commission said:

 

"It seems however very doubtful whether the northern areas were in fact in the autumn of 1948 under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command, in the sense that the Commission understood the term 'effective control. The Commission was informed that it was for the defence of the western area that the Pakistan regular forces had entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir".

 

That is to say, it was not for the purpose of abstract justice, of giving the people the government they want, or anything of that kind. They had entered the western area in order to defend the western area of Pakistan. It was purely a war action by a country in order to take another country that was necessary for its defence.

 

What was the answer to that? By January 1949, Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas. I submit that that is a violation of the cease-fire agreement and changes the situation completely. And then they talk of plebiscite, after building up a huge army such as I have described, on the other side. They then wish to blame the whole matter on one side.

 

In a document of the Security Council proceedings, the question of Pakistan was considered. On 26 April 1949, nearly four months after the cease fire, Mr. Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs for the Government of Pakistan, disclosed the following in a letter to the United Nations Commission :

 

"Efforts are being made to make the route Gilgit (-Bunji)-Skardu also jeepable within a short period." They had no right to build these roads :

 

"There exist: a good all-weather Dakota strip at Gilgit ; a good all-weather Dakota strip at Skardu; a Dakota strip at Chilas."

 

This was all in the northern mountain areas where we had temporarily withdrawn even from advanced positions, in order to make a peaceful settlement. That these air strips were constructed under Pakistan occupation is clear from the following:

 

"In addition to necessities of life, other goods such as fine cloth, soap, cigarettes, etc., have begun to move in fair quantities since the construction of Dakota strips at Gilgit and Skardu, and the making of the Balakot-Gilgit road into a jeepable one."

 

I have no desire to read all these matters again. While it is true that it is very difficult for members of the Council to study these documents, they are all there and therefore, I am not going to go through the exercise of repeating these arguments again. Sir Muhammad, no doubt, if he had the time, would repeat them and would go on repeating them and I would then have to answer again. The facts are all there. So far as we are concerned, the accession is final. Pakistan has not only violated international law by aggression; what is more, she has withheld relevant and material facts from the Council. In the first place, they said that they had no knowledge of the movements of the tribesmen, that they had not connived at them. Today the representative of Pakistan read from the letter of somebody of whom I have not heard before, as evidence of non-atrocities in Baramulla. In any event, members of the Commission are ready even today to go to Baramulla and to ask the people about the battle scars of that city, where practically every house had been burned down and, according to a newspaper report of that time, all but a few thousand of its inhabitants had fled the place; and the crimes were of a very heinous nature It is useless to repeat all these matters.

 

Now we come to what I described as some of the new facts in the situation. Yesterday, partly because there was not much time, and since we know that perhaps some of these matters had better not be related, unless we are compelled to I spoke relate them, I withheld some of these observations on the continuing situation that now exists in that area.. yesterday about 400 bomb explosions in the State of Jammu and Kashmir-and these are not children playing with fire crackers. There has been loss of life and much communal trouble. They put a bomb in a Hindu temple and spread the story that Muslims are doing it. They put a bomb in a Mosque and say the Hindus are doing it. Pakistan's entire policy toward us has been based upon the idea of creating division and hatred among different classes of people. This has been the history not only of Pakistan, but of its creators, the Muslim League, for the last fifty or sixty years.

 

There has been aggression into our territory. In 1958, the Pakistan Government, in violation of the cease-fire agreement, organized a crossing of the cease-fire lines by civilians from the part of Kashmir under its unlawful occupation. There was no secrecy about it. There was a lot of propaganda to contact these so-called volunteers, who were comparatively well paid, to come over under the guise of civilians, to have a mass exodus. into our territory, and conceal weapons in order to commit sabotage. At that time, the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations, at the instance of the Government of India, had to bring the matter to the Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army. In his letter, No. CMO/92, dated 25 June 1958, the Chief Military Observer stated:

 

"I have drawn the attention of GHQ Pakistan to the advisability of exercising stricter control over the activities. of civilians close to the cease-fire line, particularly in relation to the use of explosives."

 

It was a few days before the organized movement to cross the cease-fire line began that an attack along the cease-fire line had been planned. These crossings were the subject matter of two letters addressed by the Permanent Representative of India to the President of the Security

Council, one dated 14 July 1958 and the other dated 15 August 1958.

 

Meanwhile, we thought things were going to improve because the Chief Military Observer informed us in India as follows:

 

"I have had assurance from the Chief of Staff, Pakistan Army, that immediate steps will be taken to control the civilians in this area on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line."

 

And I am free to admit that when we received this assurance, our army people were more or less inclined to take it at its face value because, being soldiers, I suppose they do that sort of thing.

 

Since then, the Government of Pakistan has given assurances of good conduct on behalf of the civilians in the area; none of these assurances has been honoured. Since that time, Pakistan has used civilians as a screen to conceal its activities of aggression. Civilians have been encouraged not only to cross the cease-fire line on our army and police pickets and our villages, but also to occupy areas on our side of the cease-fire line and generally to promote instability in the region. A large number of encroachments have taken place, as many as twenty-nine. The report which I have is nearly a year old now. But there were as many as twenty-nine encroachments along the cease-fire line on the international border.

 

It can easily be understood that the boundary between the area of Jammu and Kashmir, which is administered by India. and Pakistan, is partly covered by the cease-fire line and partly covered by the international border which runs through Jammu. In Jammu for the last twelve years, certain areas which had been in Indian territory have been occupied by Pakistan troops. But generally, with a desire to avoid large scale conflict, we have not pushed them out. That is our territory on which aggression has been committed after the cease fire, after the resolution, and while all discussions were going on. I think that perhaps the patience and the general restraint which we have exercised in these matters is taken for granted. As I said yesterday, it is mistaken for subservience. These are acts of aggression, in complete violation of the cease-fire agreement. Pakistan objects to any encroachments being cleared, and we have tried to clear them either by talks or in other ways, on the ground that the activities of civilians are not covered by the cease-fire agreement. We cannot push the civilians out because there might then be a skirmish and trouble. We cannot complain to the United Nations authority because they will claim that the people involved are civilians and not soldiers and that, therefore, the United Nations cannot deal with them. That is the position. It draws support for its view from some of the awards given by the Chief Military Observer. This is not the place for us to express our opinion about the Chief Military Observer and his staff. That will be done elsewhere.

 

No Government worth the reputation of being a Government can allow this sort of thing to go on, least of all the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, which is responsible for the administration, including law and order. Taking a cue, I suppose, for the military observers, the built police posts opposite the military posts built on the other side by Pakistan. The State Government of Jummu and Kashmir, Government of India nor its Army, built police posts and, not naturally, they manned them with the necessary strength to control that area.

 

Here is the report on this matter. In order to deal with this mounting lawlessness, disorder, subversion and sabotage, the Jammu and Kashmir Government was compelled to open two additional police posts, one of which was in Balakote, within the 500-yard zone. There was an agreement that within 500 yards, military people should not go. This was merely a restoration of a police station that had existed in this area before 1947. The second was at Tarakundi, 600 yards from the cease fire line, The local Superintendent of Police informed the United Nations Field Observer about this decision to set these posts, and the latter raised no objection. The Government of India informed him that these posts would be built for the maintenance of law and order, and the United Nations Observer raised an objection. But, when the police post was set up, a United Nations Field Observer was also present in the area. These posts are intended to enable the police to discharge normal functions. However, no sooner were they set up than they came under continuous and heavy machine-gun-fire and other fire from the Pakistan side. And, when we talk about a violation of the cease-fire line, I want to say that they are not just rifle shots or pistol shots or anything of that kind. Light machine guns, grenades and other war equipment are utilized. And it is not as though they fire one round: when they fire, it goes on the whole time, and practice little battles take place in these areas. United Nations Observers have seen the Blakote post being fired upon when it was being established, and also on subsequent occasions. Not satisfied with this, Pakistan armed forces and Pakistan police organized predetermined raids against these two posts. Indian army authorities have lodged complaints.

 

If I read all this, it will take a very long time. At any rate, violations of this kind have been taking place.

 

The representative of Pakistan has raised an argument of international law, and I would hate to join the issue with him --- because, after all, who am I to dispute what may be the very learned opinion of an ex-Judge of the World Court? But I would like to say that India is the successor State of the British Empire, of the British power in India. This is not something we invented. Certain orders were passed under the Government of India Act of 1935, as amended in 1947, which is called the Indian Independence (International arrangements) order, 1947. This was passed, I believe, somewhere around 6 or 7 August-anyway, before 15 August, before the partition under the signature of the Governor-General. This is equally binding on both States, and it says under Articles 1 and 2: "The international rights and obligations to which India is entitled and subject immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947, will devolve in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

 

"Membership of all international organizations together with the rights and obligations attaching to such membership, will devolve solely upon the Dominion of India.

 

"For the purposes of this paragraph any rights or obligations arising under the Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference....."

 

This is the only thing I am going to read. It is quite true that I was told: "Well, there are many matters to be settled. The territory which is neighbouring the Dominion of Pakistan she will carry it out."

 

It will be noticed that, in the statement of the representative of Pakistan, he treats "successor Government" and "successor authority" as synonymous. There is a difference between a "successor Government" and a "successor authority." Pakistan was entitled, where it was a successor authority, to deal with these matters. But I do not think we need to be satisfied with the Government of India Act, even though it is binding on Pakistan.

 

This matter came up before the United Nations and this is not a secret document. The Secretariat of the United Nations, while dealing with Pakistan's claim, found itself in the position of having two make administrative decisions with far-reaching legal implications, and it consulted the British Government. The British Government was of the opinion, quite correctly, that Pakistan had not succeeded to the treaties of British India and that, in strict law, if commenced this life unfettered by conventional obligations. The Secretariat thereupon delivered the following opinion:

 

"From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a part of existing State breaks off and becomes a new State. In this analysis, there is no change in the international status of India; it continues as a State with all treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, with all the rights and obligations of memberships in the United Nations. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new State; it will not have the treaty rights and obligations of the old State, and will not, of course, have membership in the United Nations.``

 

So Pakistan was admitted as a new Member, which Britain and ourselves supported at that time. And it is too late in the day to argue the question of succession. India happened to be a successor State, and that is why I ventured on the question of paramountcy yesterday. I did not say that we inherited paramountcy from the British Crown, because paramountcy has been loosely used in relation to the King himself, I said that paramountcy had two aspects. One was a ceremonial or state aspect, where the friend and any of the King comes in. But there is a functional aspect. The position assumed by the King could not be carried out unless he had the instruments at his disposal, the money and the equipment and the people and the territory of British India. For this paramountcy to be effective, British India should be there. The King went away, and he could not use the force of the United Kingdom or of his other Dominions in order to carry out these obligations. And so, rightly or wrongly, he told them: "So far as the Crown is concerned, this comes to an end." But that does not put out the functional obligation.

 

That is all I said, And, what is more, while I did raise that point, it was not said that the question of the relation or the membership of Jammu and Kashmir, to the territory of the Union, was based upon paramountcy. That is based upon the accession, so far as law is concerned-and, so far as the fact is concerned-upon the history of the past and the will of the people, whether it is exercised by plebiscite or not.

 

When we come to this question of plebiscite, I am free to confess and we cannot deny it, for it is in the papers all over -the word "plebiscite" has been used many times. it was thought that a plebiscite would be taken indeed. If it had been possible, if Pakistan had honoured its obligations, if it had not concealed facts from the Security Council, it had not indulged in provocations and egged on disturbances, and if the local authorities had remained as local authorities, if the Government of India had been able to garrison the northern area as it was allowed to do under the resolutions, if it had been able to ward off other troubles-in those circumstances, a plebiscite could have been taken. But time passed and conditions changed. At one

 

Then we are asked: What is the meaning of the Mount batten Statement ? Mountbatten did make a statement. He did not make it out of his own head. He was speaking as the Head of the Government of India, and we take full responsibility, as the Government, for what the Governor-General said, because he was a constitutional Governor-General. He simply meant, as I said yesterday, that we were not satisfied- not in legal terms, but we were not satisfied in political and moral terms merely to have the signature of the Maharajah, in the same way that they got a nabob running away with his dogs That was not sufficient for our purposes. We wanted the moral authority of the people, and I said repeatedly yesterday that we followed the practice of the British Government, which consulted us as the great national movement of the country not a parliament-not by a referendum, not by a plebiscite. India did not become independent by self-determination. I know of no British colony or no British dependency that became independent by self-determination. It was always by arrangement. So what Mountbatten's latter means was that we would take every step to ascertain that opinion. And we did that, immediately this was done, we ascertained the will of the National Conference. We got their consent. The Maharajah agreed that the head of the National Conference would be part of his Government. That is not what happened in Juna gadh or anywhere else.

 

I have no intention of going into these extraneous problems. Kashmir is big enough for the Security Council-with the limitations on its time.

 

Secondly, who has stopped the ascertainment of public opinion in Kashmir? So far as the Indian-administered area of Kashmir is concerned, as I have said, there have been three elections. This was ridiculed by the representative of Pakistan two days ago, but I think wisdom prevailed and, today, he did not do so, because the facts were against him. There have been free elections lately organized under the Election Commission, open to the public in every way. We have a free Press and everything else. There have been three elections in the last twelve years. Therefore, the people with whom we have any authority have been able to express their opinion. The people who have not expressed their opinion are the people in so-called "Azad '' Kashmir, because they have no parliament, they have no newspapers, they are not allowed to vote in the constituencies for which the Kashmir Constitution provides. Over and above this, when we came here last time, in about 1957, the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir was in session. Now, under our law, even if the Constituent Assembly were to decide differently, the accession would not be changed.

 

But in fact that Constituent Assembly-not by some sort of rubber-stamp decision, but by debate for a very long time, with arguments on both sides and a real interesting parliamentary debate for a long period-came to the conclusion, as regards the alternatives, that they may do this, that they may do that, that they may do the other thing. They set out the consequence of doing this, that or the other and they decided. that the accession of India was necessary for Kashmir-and they were not speaking only for their part but for the whole of India,

 

Therefore, first there was the opinion of the national movement; there was the fact that over a period of years there was contentment and progress in that land. There have been no protests about going away. All the going away business is Pakistan, not in Kashmir. It is not as though the Kashmir People want to go away, but it is an external authority, an invading country which wants to filch them away, and that is an entirely different situation.

 

Secondly, there were free elections, the maintenance of public institutions, free debate and free communication. Over and above that there is a Constituent Assembly. I speak about the Constituent Assembly with this limitation that the Constituent Assembly has no sovereign authority in regard to the Union, but as an expression of opinion, as expressing the attainment of opinion that is correct. The only party which is preventing the right of the people to speak for themselves is Pakistan and its preachers in Kashmir; it is the Pakistan and its preachers in Kashmir, it is the Pakistan Army, with the augmentation of its forces both from its internal and external strength.

 

Therefore, India is not to be blamed; the Government of India is not to be blamed and the Security Council is not to be blamed if there has been no plebiscite in this matter. There is this word "plebiscite" again. Even the Commission has said that if the plebiscite is not possible, not practicable, then we will try other means. I do not know whether the Council would want me to read the Commission's report which says that if the plebiscite is not practicable, if it is not possible, then we shall try other means. This has also been said by Sir Owen Dixon in his report.

 

So the idea is not as though it is the law of the Medes and the Persians that cannot be changed. We submit to the Council that insofar as we have a moral obligation, which we will respect, we will respect, we have taken every step to ascertain the will of the peoples. The will of the peoples in Kashmir is in affinity with the Union; they are part of the Union; they are citizens of India just like anybody else. The people who are being kept out are kept out by external force, they are held captive by an empire under a colonial system. That is our contention. Therefore, there is no answer to this question except the vacation of aggression by Pakistan. We also submit that the Government of India has at all times stated that Pakistan and ourselves cannot be treated on a plane of equality in this question. In this matter my caveat is the continuous use of the word "dispute" by Sir Muhammed Zafrulla Khan. In popular language anything is a dispute. If people differ in an argument, you can call it a dispute. are now speaking in the Security Council in the context of the Charter and its provisions. We have maintained from the very beginning that this is not a dispute but a situation. There is no dispute between us and Pakistan. How can there be a dispute between us and Pakistan in a matter in which Pakistan has no locus standi? Pakistan, by its own unlawful action, has created a situation. That situation creates some difficulties for us. And as far as the Charter is concerned, I do not know if it is necessary for me to talk about it. Therefore, while I have no objection to using the word "dispute" in colloquial terms, in terms of the Charter we are not engaged in a dispute whether political, legal or anything else. A situation has arisen through a fact of aggression that has taken place so far as our country is concerned.

 

Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan also pretended that we had quoted Sir Owen Dixon out of context. He is perfectly entitled to do so, because I pointed out instances to him where Sir Muhammad mentioned things out of context, only quoted things in part. Now what did Sir Owen Dixon say? He spoke on a number of occasions on the Kashmir dispute in the Security Council in the course of the period beginning with 1 January 1948. He said:

 

"... India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already referred to Pakistan as an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration; secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going into the causes presumably formed or reasons why it happened, which part of the history of the subcontinent,"-without going into that history - "I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law."

 

I submit that the Security Council had not pronounced on it, that Sir Owen Dixon had not gone into the history of it, and yet he insists that there has been a violation of international law. This strengthens the argument about violation rather than weakens it. If he had been asked to go into it, it would have been another matter. But even though he had not been asked to go into it, it stuck out a mile, that is going into the territory where they had no business to go. After all, it was not a no man's land. Sir Owen Dixon goes on to say:

 

"I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the cease-fire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed?...

 

That is to say, here again there is an argument that Pakistan forces only need to withdraw, and so on, and then we withdraw, and so on. But the whole trend of the discussion has been that these are aggressors and they must go: and when they have gone we ought to do certain things in order to bring about peace,

 

Now a great deal has been said about interpretation, so called, of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan referred to interpretation in another context, something about the Cabinet Mission; which is not relevant here. Anyway, I did not hear much of it. He spoke of his interpretation, the interpretation of Pakistan or whatever it was. It is my understanding that both in municipal law and international law, treaties, statutes, or whatever they may be, must be interpreted in their natural meaning. It is not necessary to refer to a tribunal when words have a certain meaning. That is the law inside civilized countries and between nations.

 

It is clear that parts I, II and III of the resolution of 13 August 1948 form an indivisible whole and implementation of one part is conditional upon the implementation of the other. Thus, for example, part II of the resolution can be implemented only after part I has been carried out and the implementation of part II, B, withdrawal of Indian forces, is conditional upon the carrying into effect of Part II, A, and finally part III ascertaining of the free will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir-is to be carried out only after part II has been carried out with discussion between the Commission - not with Pakistan, but between the Commission and the Government of India, as to what is the best way of proceeding. At no time did Pakistan come into the picture at all.

 

Moreover, various parts of the resolution stand or fall together. There cannot be one without the other. No other interpretation can be attributed to the above resolution if the various parts of it are read in their "natural and ordinary meaning". A fundamental principle of interpretation is that words of a treaty or an international agreement must be given their "natural and ordinary meaning". Thus, in a case relating to Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations wherein the International Court of Justice was asked to give an advisory opinion, the Court stated:

 

"The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is the end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used these words. As the Permanent Court said in the case concerning the Polish postal Service in Danzig (P.C.IJ., Series B, No. II, p. 39): 'It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd.'

 

"When the Court can give effect to a provision of a treaty by giving to the words used in it their natural and ordinary meaning, it may not interpret the words by seeking to give them some other meaning."

 

In this case, there is no difficulty, and the thing is set out there-the Pakistan Army, its nationals, and the "Azad" forces must withdraw. They had no business to be there and had no business to have gone in there.

 

Both today and yesterday statements were made by the representative of Pakistan on behalf of his Government saying this, that and the other. One of these things is that they would withdraw their forces. I submit that during the last fourteen years we have not prohibited them from withdrawing their forces nor has the Security Council, and if the Government of Pakistan has not withdrawn them, and what is more in actual performance has acted in the reverse manner, what credence is to be attached to these statements? They are merely strings of words. If in the last fourteen years they have not withdrawn these troops but have improved them so that they are as good as the regular forces of the Pakistan Army, they are still on our frontier; they are equipped with air forces, weapons of modern character into the details of which I need not go-well, instead of withdrawing their forces they have been building them up. This argument has gone on during these fourteen years and all the time in the background before the Security Council not only have the relevant facts been withheld but contrary versions have been given.

 

The late Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah said had no control over the tribesmen, but the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as I pointed out yesterday, reviewed the tribesmen and egged them on. It was the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah who called Lord Mountbatten and said: "If you will do this I will call the whole thing off." How could he call the whole thing off if he had no influence over them? It was the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah who gave orders to the British Commander-in-Chief to wage war against India. Fortunately, the British Commander had either the sense or the discretion not to do so.

 

These are the facts, and now they come here and say, in a vacuum, before the Security Council, that they will do this and they will do that nobody is preventing them from doing it. If Pakistan withdrew its entire forces and all the works that go with them and cleared out of the place where they have no business to be, then a new situation would arise. In this new situation any Member State of the United Nations would act according to the principles of the Charter against the background of the history of the case. But this is a conundrum. It is an argument, it is an offer, and we see nothing that is worthwhile in this matter. I submit that it is the very same representative who has told this Council time after time that neither aided nor abetted the tribesmen, but that the tribesmen would go in and they were not able to stop them. It is like some of those people who train dogs, and say in the presence of the dog, "If you are not careful the dog will bite you." It is practically as if they gave an order to bite people. In the same way, they say these tribesmen will get in. If the Pakistan Government is so incompetent that the writ of its law does not run in its own territory, who can make a promise on behalf of that Government?

 

The Government of India does not stand here in sackcloth and ashes. It has carried out a very heavy responsibility and in In spite of our moral, legal and every other kind of obligation, in spite of the pressure of our public opinion, we shall not take the initiative in war-like action. But today, as I said, there are other circumstances. We read that a communique has been. issued in Karachi or Rawalpindi-or whatever the capital of Pakistan is for functional reasons-and in it is stated that negotiations have been undertaken with a view to ensuring the tranquility of the border and developing good unneighborly relations. That is to say, Pakistan has entered into an agreement, if the communique is true, with China in order to settle our borders. I have said they have no right to dispose of property that is not theirs, and I want to say here on behalf of the Government of India that we shall not be bound by any agreement they may reach, temporarily, permanently, or in any other way. We shall not be bound by it or any agreement in which conditions are created inimical to the security of India. I want to submit that it is a violation of international law and a disregard of the resolutions of the Security Council to trade in sovereignty of our territory which has been agreed to at all times not only by the Security Council itself but by the representative of the United States, Mr. Warren Austin, whose statement I read out the other day.

 

The sovereignty of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir lies with the Union of India. Jammu and Kashmir is now part of the Union and, therefore, it is not in the gift of Pakistan, She is not entitled to negotiate with China or anybody else nor enter into international negotiations; and in trying to play off both sides against the middle she is violating international law. Not only is she violating international law, she is acting in a way which is in total disregard of the decisions of the Security Council with far-reaching consequences.

 

Furthermore, I want to say on behalf of my Government that the Pakistan Government has no authority whatsoever to constitute any kind of polity in the area that is under her occupation. The Commission had very definitely laid it down that there shall be no consolidation. But consolidation has already taken place in regard to the areas under occupation. Annexations have taken place and now "de-annexations' ' will have to take place before there is peace. There has been a great deal of talk of "Azad'' Kashmir as a kind of independent State. They have set up information offices in various places and this, that and the other; Pakistan has never recognized them but anybody. who is opportunist enough to do so may recognize them. However, the creation of any polity in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir would be a violation of international law and a disregard of the decisions of the Security Council, and we shall not recognize them and certain consequences follow from this.

 

Therefore, what I said yesterday is conditioned by these new circumstances. The Government of India and the people of India cannot be put into the position of having new States created in their own territory nor can they concur in any agreements or alignments. The Government and people of India will not sit quiet and do nothing about it if we are forced to take action by changes made in our relations in eastern Asia or on our frontiers.

 

Here, therefore, are very serious matters. It is not merely a question of scoring a debating point. I want it to go on record that no agreement, no negotiation, no understanding however temporary-because all things are temporary, since they take place in the context of time-will bind the Government of India. We shall not submit to the implications of any undertaking we may have given to our people to the Security Council, or to the world; all that is conditioned by these changed circumstances. The security of our country is something which we cannot barter away. Changes that take place on our borders not outside our borders, but within our borders-are a matter of concern to us.

 

These conditions exist; these are the new circumstances which have arisen and it is the wish of my Government that we should submit to the Security Council, and place on record, that no changes that may take place in this way, either in the form of the demarcation of boundaries submitting certain areas to foreign jurisdiction or the demarcation of boundaries without consultation with us, will be binding upon us. No attempt to set up a government in "Azad'' Kashmir and say that it is a government, in "Azad" Kashmir or any other country, will be binding upon us either because under our Constitution it is only permission to demarcate boundaries inside the Union. Therefore, the so-called territory of "Azad" Kashmir, and other areas alleged to have acceded to Pakistan in the Himalayan region, we say, continue to be integral parts of the territory of the Union. This is one of those things on which the Government of India will not yield.

 

To conclude my observations, we are at all times prepared to find ways and means for reducing tension. We recognize that in this world it is not always possible to obtain logical solutions. We also recognize that aggression somewhere may well become aggression all over the place. We also recognize that conflicts are likely to spread. For all these reasons I repeat the under taking on behalf of the Government of India-an undertaking which I am sorry to say Sir Muhammad thought he should ridicule, when it is his Government which for twelve continuous years has refused to enter into a no-war agreement with the Government of India-we say: whatever our differences, we will try and settle them or leave them unsettled but we shall not go to war. That proposal of ours has been turned down time after 1947 onwards. What they say is yes, we will enter into a no-war agreement with you when you have done what we want you to do. What is the point of agreement? It is not we who are on the warpath; we have enough constructive work to do in our own country. We are not exciting feelings in this way; we are not shaking the world in general by creating more tensions throughout east Asia.

 

One more point: It has been said -and I think the Council should not be misled in this matter that Pakistan is an Islamic State-a theocratic State. We do not quarrel with that; it is not our business at all what kind of State they have. What is called a two-nation theory has been propounded even though it may apply to what was formerly in a sense partitioned, some phrases have been said, somewhere, that populations of one predominant types will be grouped that way, and others will be grouped this way. But the Prime Minister at the time, in his statements, and in the acts of Parliament, made it quite clear that this does not apply to the Indian States; and Sir Muhammad charges me with having suggested that he had said something about communal compositions and the claim of Pakistan-I do not know what that is the claim of Pakistan, the claim of con quest, the claim of aggression, the claim of force, the claim of illegal occupation. But in answer to that, he says it is not the claim of religion, as such.

 

First of all, I want to point out to him that he misquoted Lord Mountbatten in support of his argument, and said that accessions were to take place having regard to one-two-three -religious or whatever it is communal affiliations something of that kind, quoting the name of V.P. Menon who is no longer an employee of the Government of India, who used Government records without permission and without authority.

 

We neither accepted nor repudiated it. Lots of people write books: it is one of the occupations of retired people. We are not bound, therefore, by what these people said; but I would like to read out to you the position of the Pakistan Government with respect to the internal changes taking place.

 

There is a well-known axiom international behaviour that States do not die: Governments may change. Therefore, the present Government of Pakistan repudiates it, and, by its conduct, indicates its repudiation. It is bound by the policies that have been expressed by its predecessors, both in public and, even more, in the Security Council. I would like to read out to you what happened on 18 February 1957. The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan spoke to this Council on this matter of plebiscite, because we said at that time that religious consideration should be kept out of it:

 

"It would be perfectly legitimate in the case of a plebiscite to draw attention to religious, cultural, linguistic, economic, geographic, strategic and other ties, affinities and considerations that might sway the choice. So long as nothing has been done to incite lawlessness or to exercise coercion, the exercise of all considerations that might affect the choice would be legitimate.

 

"I think that Mr. Krishna Menon-and I bow before him for his knowledge of the English language-forgot to differentiate between the word 'election' and the word 'plebiscite'. Whereas in an election it is the duty of a Government to see that it is free and no religious arguments are brought in, in the matter of a plebiscite, wherever it is held, it is held because of religious differences or of ethnic differences or of geographic, linguistic or other differences. Therefore in a plebiscite it is quite legitimate for people to appeal to the electorate for these reasons before they decide whether to accede to one side or the other. In the matter of an election, it is quite different. I am very sorry that Mr. Krishna Menon is not here today..." [770th meeting, paras 31-32.]

 

And it is not only one passage. There are dozens of passages in the statements made by Pakistan leaders. In fact the whole idea is that. Then Sir Muhammad says that we are not averse to plebiscites, and that we indulged in this practice before. His facts are wrong. I have some knowledge of this because I handled this matter. There was no plebiscite in the former North-West Frontier Province. What was done was this. The North-West Frontier Province at that time had a kind of Parliament which had been given by the British, although it had no total responsibility. Since there was some dispute and although the general expectation was that the North-West Frontier Province would remain with the Union, we said, "If there is any doubt about it"-ultimately, after days of argument -"let there be a referendum". And there was a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province which, for various reasons, was boycotted by the majority. Out of the remaining minority Pakistan obtained the majority. Several thousand of them who boycotted it are now in goal. And their leader, a man known as "Frontier Gandhi '' in popular terms, has been in Pakistan prisons for years and years. One of the pioneers of our national

movement, who had suffered imprisonment under the British and had been in various demonstrations and agitations in the past, indeed, a great national leader, he languishes in prison.

 

Anyway, what took place? There was a referendum. It is quite true that in Sylhet there was a referendum. All countries make mistakes and that was one of the mistakes we made. But that again was not in fact a plebiscite. It was a referendum. The difference is small, but it was not a plebiscite. We abided by that referendum and it has not been felicitous for the stability of that part of India. But it is wrong to say that, therefore, we are familiar with plebiscites, and that the plebiscite is one of the things that we ordinarily use. It is wrong to say that as a reply to the argument which I quoted from the British Foreign Office documents to the effect that it was not a practice in parliamentary systems - not their practice. I also quoted Australian and other laws against it, and to say in reply, "You are accustomed to the plebiscite" again is a misstatement of fact.

 

I conclude by saying that first the Government of India holds the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as full, not temporary or provisional, as final and perpetual. There is no power in India to cut as under any part of this territory except by an act of cession to be sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly. If there was a political agreement it would be our responsibility to do that.

 

Secondly, we will not sit back if changes are made which are in violation of the provisions of the Charter, the decisions of the Security Council and things of that character. Equally, in spite of our legal, moral, political and every other right and interest we shall not take the initiative in war action in the use of force against Pakistan, because we know that over and above everything, and over and above the Government, there are people in Pakistan who are friendly to us.

 

Thirdly, we shall not at any time submit this matter to what is called mediation or arbitration, and we are not frightened by having it thrown in our face that this is a normal method of international settlement. There are many matters on which we will go to arbitration. We have gone to arbitration in regard to Pakistan itself on small matters, but we will not agree to arbitration or mediation on the question of the sovereignty of our territory. I said this in 1957 and I repeat it with the authority of my Government. The sovereignty of a country and its independence, like the honour of a man, are not the subject of arbitration, and I am quite certain that the other representatives of nations which sit here will appreciate this argument. Not one other country would be free if its sovereignty were to be subject to arbitration. Suppose two political parties of equal strength inside a country said. "Let us arbitrate. Let us go to somebody else and see who should govern this land". Where would they go?

 

This is the fourth submission I have to make. We have come here on the basis of allegations that there was a threat to peace and security in that part of the area. If there are threats, those threats and the conditions are created by the people who complain, and we are not responsible for them. The remedy lies in the hands of those who have sought to come here.

 

No new factors have been added and a great deal of the time of the Council has been taken, and there are new members present and for that reason we have had to repeat many things we have said before. There have been 105 or 107 meetings of the Council on the subject, but irrespective of the number of meetings that we hold you cannot argue a nation into dependence. India is an independent country, with no desire to absorb or encroach upon other people's territory but equally bound in honour, bound by its own interests, by its obligations to its own people, to safeguard its integrity and protect its frontiers. In doing so it will not be provoked by threats of aggression, but at the same time we look to the Security Council not to allow itself to be used as a forum for tendentious propaganda.

 

We have not violated any agreement that has been reached in the Security Council. The continuous calling of meetings of this kind, when no new circumstances have arisen, does not

lead anywhere. We have been asked why we do not talk together as two neighbours. My Prime Minister invited the President of Pakistan to come and talk. We cannot negotiate because we are not equal in this matter. We are equal in other ways, but in this matter, we are not equal. We are, however, quite prepared to talk this thing over, but Sir Muhammad comes here and says that direct negotiation does not work. That is to say, even before they come they rule it out. You know, there are many people of good-will, but the question is how they apply it. If they think that no bilateral negotiations can produce any result they are very much místaken. We have no objection to talking to anybody, friend or foe, opponent or ally, but we do not think that there is any [room for the Security Council to order us or to instruct us or to make suggestions about a thing of this kind.

 

It has been said that India should give an undertaking that it will not violate the cease-fire line. That would be a very dishonourable thing, because we have not done anything of the kind; why should we keep on renewing a declaration when we have never violated a declaration?

 

My country stands here with no pangs of conscience of any kind. Our hands are clean in this matter. We came here on a charge of aggression and we expected you, the eleven members of the Security Council, to stand up and say the Charter should be defended. We have gone a long way, and we shall go a lot further, we shall not walk out of this Council at any time, even if the discussions do not lead anywhere. But if we have to sit here and listen to continual misrepresentations of our people, like the one given yesterday, for example, that a thousand people had been killed in West Bengal-whether this has any relevance to this matter or not. I tell you it is an utter falsehood.

 

And then there have been references to the refugees. What is the story of the refugees? 1,100,000 people came from Pakistan into India. Less than 100,000 people have gone from India into Pakistan after the great migrations. A million more people came from Pakistan to India even during the migrations. Sir Muhammad has quite unfairly drawn the attention of the Council to the grim atrocities of which both countries are ashamed. It is quite true that in the post-partition period there was tumult in India and other circumstances which it is not thought necessary to refer to at the present time. So far as my country is concerned, my Prime Minister and Mr. Gandhi, everybody, has repeatedly stated that it was something that the whole world, not only our own people, but all human beings, was ashamed of-but that has nothing to do with this Kashmir situation. It had to do with other matters and the promotion of this communal rancour or the misrepresentation of men like my Prime Minister in public-all this is likely to create bad feeling and only lays the foundation for more. difficulties in future.