04051962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1010 held on 4 May 1962.

04051962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1010 held on 4 May 1962.

 

The speech of the Defence Minister yesterday ranged over a wide field, and this morning we have had the good fortune to listen to the views that the representative of the USSR has expressed on behalf of his Government. In both of those statements there are certain elements which, if left unchallenged or unexplained, might constitute a misunderstanding of the position of Pakistan. I have therefore ventured to request, Mr. President, that you kindly give me the floor to give such explanations as are called for, and I thank you for acceding to my request.

 

Before I take up the specific matters that have been raised with reference to the merits of the case, whether it is by the Defence Minister of India or by the representative of the USSR, I want to isolate one matter mentioned by both representatives. It does not relate to the merits of the case and it has certainly this morning been put in the forefront of the observations of the representative of the USSR and was referred to by the Defence Minister yesterday afternoon.

 

It was said, and has been repeated this morning, that I voiced a threat, to the Security Council, of the use of armed force for the purpose of resolving this dispute, and I asked the Security Council to take note of it. Now, in the first place, the context in which I used the words that have been quoted was that the Security cil, when the matter was first brought before it by India, took the view that they are to concentrate, not upon determining the legality or otherwise of certain positions or attitudes or questions that had been raised, but, first, on bringing about a ccessation of the hostilities that were in progress, and, next, on reaching a Solution of the dispute between the parties, In the context of their first urgent concern-that is to say, to bring about the cessation of hostilities-they took up the position: "Why is the fighting going on? And they came to the conclusion and it was perfectly obvious-that the fighting was going on as the people of Kashmir desired to come to a decision with regard to the accession, through the exercise of their own choice and not the Maharajah's. Therefore, once that was assessed that their desire, their wish, their objective would be fulfilled completely through peaceful means they would realize that it was not necessary to go on fighting for it. Consequently, that was affirmed and reaffirmed, not only by the members of the Security Council, but also by the representatives of India and the representatives of Pakistan.

 

Now, that portion of my submission on Friday [1007th meeting] and it was on the faith of that assurance, those promises, and subsequently the obligation undertaken by both sides, that this question will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, that eventually the Commission succeeded in bringing about a cessation of hostilities.

 

I said that this matter had been pending for a long time. Frustration was being felt with regard to the pursuit of peaceful methods for its settlement, because no visible progress was being made. Therefore, people felt that, perhaps in the end, no solution would be found through peaceful methods. I expressed an apprehension, in the words that have been quoted, that, if the Security Council does not wish the people of Pakistan to get out of control, as a result of this sense of frustration, and that the people of "Azad" Kashmir should again have recourse to their battle for liberation-the President of 'Azad" Kashmir has already used that expression in public and Press statements which have been reported in the newspapers here and which some of the members of the Security Council may have seen that the tribesmen should wish to plunge into the business again and that, as a result there would be chaos in that region-and in that case, it might not be possible for neighbouring Government to keep out of the situation that would thus be brought about, and not to plunge into the "vortex"-then, the Security Council had better address itself to promote the settlement of the question through peaceful means.

 

I held out no threat whatsoever, of any kind. I represent the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan is anxious to proceed toward settlement of this question on the basis of the obligations undertaken by both sides. I have made it quite clear more than once-I may have to make it again later that, if there is a difference with regard to what those obligations are, as there appears to be, not only between India and Pakistan, but also with regard to at least one member of the Security Council who has spoken this morning, it is useless to conclude, "Let it be; it is finished". No dispute is decided by, "Let it be; it is finished". It is an old adage : not only justice must be done, but it must be seen to be done. It is not enough I am saying this for the sake of argument that the interpretation that India puts on certain parts of the resolutions accepted by both sides, and the interpretations put on some parts of them this morning by the representative of the USSR, might turn out to be correct on fair and impartial determination; it is possible; a determination can go either way. If that should happen, I have said that Pakistan would at once rectify any default in respect of it that it might have committed.

 

Let me give an illustration. I will come to this question of interpretation and determination later. It has been said that under the resolution, Pakistan undertook to withdraw its forces from all parts of the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir before India was to withdraw any part of its forces. That is illustrative of the kind of difference that has arisen. Something was attributed to me which I did not say. But I will come to that later when I deal with this question itself. I am just using this as an illustration. Assume that a fair and impartial interpretation did say that that is so, that under the obligations assumed under the resolution by Pakistan, do so; this is the meaning of the resolution, this is what the Commission explained, this is the obligation undertaken by Pakistan, then Pakistan will at once start withdrawing its troops and complete the withdrawal within the shortest possible time, not seeking shelter behind any excuse whatsoever. Still, assuming all that, you cannot say that nothing further need be done because there is a difference of interpretation, because a long period of time has passed, because conditions on one side are very much better, things are very desirable, a great deal of progress has been made and I will come to all that later. If you say nothing further need be done, all you doing is ensuring the continuance of the dispute which still keeps two countries apart, two countries which, in spite of their geographical situation, in spite of the composition of their populations, in spite of all these differences still co-operate in many matters and could cooperate much more closely over the whole range of relations between two independent, sovereign States. Their relations still continue to be disturbed when it is said that nothing needs to be done. It will lead to further exacerbation, to further deterioration of relations to further increase in tensions, and the Government may not be able to help the situation. Time after time we have seen that happen in country after country.

 

And what threat was there in it? Was there a threat that, if something did not happen by a particular date, the Pakistan Government would lead its troops into Kashmir, into the occupied part of Kashmir and renew the fighting? The Pakistan Government has set a record in this case of seeking a settlement through peaceful methods, a record of which the representative of the Soviet Union appears already to be tired. Perhaps some other members of the Security Council are tired also and are thinking why go on? Why go on knocking at a door which seems difficult to open ? But we must continue to go on knocking at the door, however difficult it may be to open, because if the door does not open there is no alternative left but for things to go on accumulating till an explosion occurs somewhere or other. However, this does not mean-and repeat this again that the Pakistan Government has at any time had any intention of seeking a solution of this dispute through the use of force,

 

I was invited by the representative of the Soviet Union, in this connection, to give a guarantee similar to the one given by the Government of India. I will say one or two words with regard to the guarantee repeatedly given by the Government of India before I express myself on that matter.

 

I have noted the guarantee given by the Defence Minister of India yesterday afternoon. I do not question for one moment that that expresses the intention of his Government. But look at the record, Junagadh acceded to Pakistan. We were told yesterday afternoon, and I agree, that the question of accession is not a creation of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, that it results from the Government of India Act of 1935. The Government of India Act of 1935 sought to set up a Federation of India between the British Indian Provinces and the Princely States, Portions of it which related to provincial autonomy were put into effect in 1937, but difficulties arose in putting the federal portions, which related to the Central Government, into effect and that part of its never came into being. Had it done so, subsequent developments would have been entirely different. Therefore, although the idea of accession was part of that arrangement of the Federal Union, as a matter fact, nobody at any time urged anybody to accede to anybody else in any way.

 

Now, it was said that in accession-again, I have to revert to it later; I am here dealing with the question of threats and the non-resort to the use of force-it was said that in accession all that was needed was that the ruler should sign the application form and the Head of State of one Dominion or the other to whom the form was addressed would say, "I accept". But what happened with regard to Junagadh? What happened subsequently in Junagadh? India occupied it by force and is in occupation today. No State was under compulsion to accede to one side or the other. The Indian representative went on, before the Security Council, with regard to Kashmir-and that I will come to later also that they could choose freely to accede to one side or the other or to remain independent. Hyderabad, with 14 million people and an area as large as one of the principal States of Western Europe, did not wish to accede to Pakistan, so there was no question of Pakistan's coming into the picture. But they did not desire to accede to India either. They desired to enter into treaty relationships with India, bringing about a situation parallel to what accession would bring about, but only by treaty. And what happened there ? India led its forces in. Regarding Hyderabad, at any rate, I would not enter into any controversy. We are not concerned with it here; it is not a parallel case. But a solution was adopted involving the use of force; that is what happened.

 

Well, I am glad that now a categorical guarantee is given that India will not attempt the solution of this question through force. Statements have been made-statements which I quoted to the Security Council in my first letter [S/5058] and perhaps even in my second letter [S/5068], during the months of January, as well as later in my submission to the Council on 1 February [990th meeting, which would show to anybody distinctly that threats were being uttered with regard to attempting the vacation of the so-called aggression in the State of Jammu and Kashmir committed by Pakistan through the use of force. One of those statements, as I said, was by the President of the Congress in its annual session. There had been a massing of Indian forces within easy range of the Pakistan frontier. The Prime Minister of India, when asked about it in Ferozepur just across the river from Pakistan, said, "I do not trust Pakistan. I have, therefore, to keep these armed forces along the borders of Pakistan''. Later, some of them went back again to the neighbouring province, but to the stations which they had occupied before the crisis arose. This kind of thing has not happened once; it has happened at least three or four times. On no occasion has Pakistan responded with a similar movement. It has addressed communications or appeals to India, or it has mentioned the matter in the Security Council.

 

That is the record on both sides. Again I do not say that India may not have been justified, in the atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that exists, in taking the precautions that it took. On the other hand, Pakistan was justified in apprehending that the use of force might eventually be resorted to in the situation that had been created. That is how, as a matter of fact, the present discussions arose-not merely for the purpose of looking at the situation which had been created by these public declarations and the massing of forces, but in order that the Security Council could address itself once more to finding a way towards the peaceful settlement of this dispute which cannot be settled merely by saying that there is nothing to settle. The dispute exists. It will continue to exist. The longer it exists the greater the apprehension that something or other might lead to a sudden amount of tensions, and then even Governments become powerless to control the tensions.

 

So much about the threat. With regard to the guarantee, as I have already said, the Pakistan Government has no intention- and I mentioned that as a guarantee-to bring about a change in the situation through any peaceful methods. It will always have recourse to peaceful methods for its settlement. But it is bound to warn the Security Council that the situation may not always continue to remain passive. Not that the Government itself will do something to convert it into a situation of tension, but tension might arise. That is not something which anybody should raise his eyebrows over. How can it happen? It has happened. Governments are upset, new Governments take their place and new Governments can change policies. People get out of hand. There is nothing extraordinary in what I have mentioned to the Council. I have merely stressed that this is a live dispute and no live dispute can be settled merely by covering it up-as I said last time.

 

I propose now to address myself to some of the matters that were raised yesterday afternoon. I do not intend to take up every point that was raised, but mainly the points on which reliance was placed for the Security Council to draw some conclusion or other which was not only relevant to this dispute but also important in the context thereof.

 

With regard to the question of the relationship between what was British India, and subsequently became Pakistan and India, and the princely State, I understood the Defence Minister of India to have put forward a thesis. I do not know whether I completely apprehended what the thesis was, but so far as I was able to understand it-not that what he said was not clear, but I was not quite sure about the thesis itself-it was that this doctrine of paramountcy and suzerainty did not arise between India and any of the Indian States merely through accession, but that, with the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent, the paramountcy with regard to the Indian States vested in the Government of India as a successor State. The Government of Pakistan, presumably, had nothing to do with it. Though the expression was not used by the Defence Minister of India, I think he was quite clear that the Government of Pakistan had nothing to do with it because it was just a new State carved out of India; it was not a successor State.

 

Although I do not claim that I have a mastery of international law with regard particularly to these aspects, I am unable to recall any justification anywhere, either in international law or with regard to what actually happened in the transfer of sovereignty, for the proposition that India inherited the paramount of the British any more than Pakistan inherited it. India and Pakistan were the two successor States-two Dominions created out of what was British India. Pakistan chose a new name. India kept the old name in English, although in the vernacular the name of that larger successor State in Bharat. The mere fact that India chose to retain the English name "India'' did not make any difference to the actual or constitutional position that there were two successor States, on a much larger one with a much larger population and larger resources, and larger in the international setting, and so on, certainly, and the other smaller in all those respects. But nevertheless they were two independent sovereign States, both successor States.

 

It was said-perhaps as an illustration or even as an argument in support of India's having inherited the paramountcy in respect of all Indian States-that Pakistan had to apply for membership of the United Nations while India continued to hold the old seat. But that was simply a matter of agreement between the two. It did not result from the position that one was a successor State and the other was just a charitable creation. It had to be decided what should happen with respect to membership of international organizations. Either both should apply for membership of the United Nations-India already was a Member or one should hold the seat that already belonged to the sub-continent and the other should apply anew for membership. Part of the agreement of partition between the two was that India should continue to occupy that seat and Pakistan should apply for admission. It was not the result of any constitutional doctrine or doctrine in international law that one was a successor State and the other was not.

 

But assume for one moment that the theory put forward by the Defence Minister of India has any basis. Then why is it that on 26 October 1947, Mr. V.P. Menon had to go to Delhi to find out whether India would come, according to the words used by him, "to the rescue of the Maharajah '' by sending military forces ?-If there was already suzerainty and paramountcy, India was under obligation to do so. And why did Mr. Menon bring back the message to the Maharajah that India would send its forces to save the State or to rescue the Maharajah or rescue the State, as the case may be, in the emergency with which the State was faced, only if the Maharajah would apply for accession and if India was able to accept the accession and that, otherwise, they could not go to his aid? If there was paramountcy and suzerainty already, not only could they go to his aid, but also they were under obligation to do so.

However, there is further clearer proof of the position that I have stated. The partition statement of 3 June 1947 authorized by His Majesty's Government, which announced how the transfer of power from Britain to India would take place, has, among other clauses, the following:

 

"16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on the administrative consequences of any partition that may have been decided upon :

 

"(a) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government including Defence, Finance and Communications;

 

"(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty's Government for treaties in regard to matters arising out of transfer of power."...

 

Where is there a distinction that one of them is a successor State and the other is, well, something else ?

 

Paragraph 17 of this same statement says:

 

"17. Agreements with tribes of the North West Frontier of India" they have been referred to in another context a good deal yesterday afternoon and also in this controversy "will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority."

 

Who was "the appropriate successor authority." The Government of Pakistan ?

 

In addition, the preamble in Section 1 of the Indian Independence Act takes up the same position. The preamble says:

 

"An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions."

 

No distinction here between India and Pakistan-there is one India. It continues:

 

"Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

 

"1. The new Dominions. (1) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known. respectively as India and Pakistan."

 

Does that even out on the question ?

 

Then, finally, Section 7, of the Act, which I have already read out and which is on record, provides quite clearly that from the appointed date all treaties, engagements, everything between His Majesty and the States will lapse. There is no question there with regard to any suzerainty or paramountcy vested either in one Dominion or the other.

 

The second question which I shall take up is the question of the accession on which the thesis that I put forward was to some degree not questioned, but the position obtained today. was questioned. It was said that all that was needed for final, irrevocable, unalterably accession was that the Ruler should. offer accession and the Dominion to whom he offered it should accept it and that thereafter no change in it could take place. That is what is being said today: Thereafter no change in it could take place it is unalterable. In the first place, what meaning then is one to attach to Lord Mountbatten's letter to the Maharajah in which he says that in consistence with the policy of his Government, where the question of accession is in dispute between the Ruler and his subjects-I am giving the gist of that part from memory, I am not quoting the letter that has been quoted - the decision must be made by the freely expressed wishes of the people and in accord with that policy, it is the wish of his Government that when law and order has been restored the wish of the people in that behalf shall be ascertained. What was it? What meaning is attached to it? It was the Governor-General's letter as the Head of the State. He was writing on behalf of his Government, it must have some meaning.

 

Then, on 6 February 1948, before the Security Council, Mr. Ayyanger representative of India stated this :

 

"I would pass on to the remarks of the representative of Pakistan as regards the question of accession. These remarks appear in his speech to the Security Council during the 240th meeting. The representative of Pakistan said: 'India's reply and India's stand throughout has been: We accepted Kashmir's accession provisionally-for the moment in order to deal with the emergency that had arisen; and once the emergency was out of the way, the question of accession would be decided by the people through a plebiscite"."

 

He does not accept that as being quite accurate. He then goes on to set out his own version of what the position of the Government of India was- and that is important.

 

He says that that is not quite an accurate description of India's attitude. Now, here is the representative of India and he is being very careful that anything which differs even slightly from what is the correct position of his Government should be corrected at once, and what is the correction? He says:

 

"That attitude would be more correctly described in the following words: 'We accepted Kashmir's offer of accession at a time when she was in peril, in order to be able to save effectively from extinction. We will not, in the circumstances, hold her to this accession as an unalter able decision on her part. When the emergency has passed and normal conditions are restored, she will be free, by means of a plebiscite," "

 

-and I emphasize "plebiscite" and will come back to that later, because yesterday the Defence Minister said that his Prime Minister and I suppose he meant his Government also had never used the word "plebiscite", had only used the expression "the will of the people" when that statement was made

 

" 'either to ratify her accession to India or to change her mind and accede to Pakistan or remain independent. We shall not stand in the way if she elects to change her mind.' That "-he went on to say "I think, is the

 

proper description of India's attitude." Mr. President, if it is convenient to adjourn at this stage I would be ready to proceed when the Security Council reconvenes after lunch.

 

186. Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1011 held on 4 May 1962.

 

I am dealing with the question on which the Defence Minister of India yesterday [1009th meeting] took the position that Kashmir being a part of India, there was no question of its going out of India in any way. He brought in general theories also but the position was mainly on the ground of their Constitution.

 

I have already drawn the attention of the Security Council to the relevant portion of Lord Mountbatten's letter to the Maharajah and the statement made on 6 February 1948 before the Security Council by the late Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, The Defence Minister said that Kashmir is as much a part of India as Gujarat, and he named one or two other States in India.

 

I shall now draw the attention of the Security Council to the statement made in the Indian Parliament on 26 June 1952 by the Prime Minister of India. I would also beg the Council to observe, not only the text of the statement, but the date on which it was made, 26 June 1952-four-and-a-half years after these occurrences had taken place and the so-called accession had been made, and nearly four years after the 13 August 1948 resolution:

 

When we say that the people of Kashmir will decide, that does not limit the accession in any way. We put it on higher grounds. If, after a proper plebiscite, the people of Kashmir said, 'We do not want to be with India,' we are committed to accept that. We will accept it though it might pain us. We will not send an army against them. We will accept that, however hurt we might feel about it we will change the Constitution, if necessary. India is a great country and Kashmir is almost in the heart of Asia. There is an enormous difference, not only geographically but in all kinds of factors there. Do you think you are dealing with a part of U.P. or Bihar or Gujarat?"

 

Now, the Prime Minister here not only makes the position quite clear, but he makes a clear distinction between the States that were part of India and Kashmir, with regard to which there was an international commitment that the people will decide through a plebiscite.

 

Then, in its advisory opinion, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in the case of the "Treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or speech in the Danzig territory", handed down on 4 February 1932 had said this. "It should however be observed that, while on the one hand, according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another State, on the provisions of the latter's Constitution, but only on international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to avoiding obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force."

 

Article 13 of the "Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States" was adopted unanimously in the annex to General Assembly resolution 375 (IV) on 6 December 1949, on the basis of the recommendation of the International Law Commission, of which, at that time, Sir B.N. Rau, Constitutional Adviser to the Indian Constituent Assembly, was a member, and in which he concurred, Article 13 states:

 

"Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution on its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty."

 

Now, to go on to another topic. The Defence Minister of India appeared to attribute to me the statement, or the claim, or the argument, that because Kashmir has a majority of Muslims in its population, therefore it should belong to Pakistan. To the best of my recollection, I have never, throughout the course of these discussions, advanced this argument or this claim, and this applies to my last submission to the Council also. It is true that we have, among other facts, drawn attention to the composition of the population. We have stated that culturally the people of Kashmir are much more akin to Pakistan than to India. We have stated that Kashmir's lines of communication, as they existed at the time of the partition of the sub-continent, all went into Pakistan-the railway lines, the three rivers, the main road which was open all the year round: that economically Kashmir's integration was with Pakistan: and that, on the basis of all these factors, we could have urged that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, but that we did not do so; that it is a matter which must be decided by the people of Kashmir. So if there is any doubt with regard to any statements made on behalf of Pakistan before the Security Council on that point, I clear it up here and now. This is our stand, that we have an international obligation and we think that on its merits-and also as a question of principle, since it is right in itself-this question should be decided through the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir, and the method for that free expression of wishes has also been agreed upon by the parties.

 

On the other hand, it was India that raised the question of the composition of the population. We do not say they did. not raise it properly, but they raised the question in connexion with the accession Junagadh. I shall draw attention only to two documents in that connexion, although there are several.

 

In his telegram No. 251, dated 22 September 1947, the Governor-General of India communicated with the Governor General of Pakistan. After setting out how his Government looked upon the unilateral action of Pakistan in accepting the accession of Junagadh, he went on to say:

 

"The possibility of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan Dominion in the teeth of opposition from its Hindu population of over 80 per cent has given rise to serious concern and apprehension to local population and all surrounding States which have acceded to Indian Dominion.".

 

We are not objecting that this question was raised. It is a relevant question, because here telegram said that the Government of India considered Pakistan's action in this matter as being in utter violation of the principles upon which partition was agreed and effected. Everybody knows that it was affected on the basis of the majority areas of one community and the majority areas of the other community.

 

But we have not made that claim in regard to Kashmir. Our claim is that the people should decide, in a free world.

 

Then, in his telegram of 8 November 1947, the Prime Minister of India said this to the Prime Minister of Pakistan:

 

"...but it is essential, in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions, that there should be acceptance of the principle that, where the of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the State should finally accede to one or the other Dominions should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people."

 

Now I go on to the question of the plebiscite. It was, I think, stated by the Defence Minister of India that the Minister of India had never committed himself to a plebiscite. I think he said the Prime Minister had never used the word "plebiscite", but at any rate he had never committed himself to a plebiscite. He introduced this topic by saying that the plebiscite is in any case not a very satisfactory manner of dealing with such questions. I shall not enter into an argument about this matter, but I will remind the Council that with regard to two portions of the subcontinent, that is to say what used in those days to be known as the North-West Frontier Province and, in the northeast, the District of Sylhet, the provision in the Partition Agreement was that their inclusion in Pakistan or in India should be decided by means of a referendum. And it was decided in each case. The SO referendum was held and the decision was taken in accordance with its result. So that the idea of a referendum between the two Dominions, especially with regard to partition, was neither foreign nor considered clumsy or impractical. It was resorted to and an effect was given to it.

 

Now, we come to the question as to whether the Prime The Minister of India has or has not committed himself to a plebiscite in Kashmir. In his telegram of 21 November 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India first set out the principles on which the question of the accession of Kashmir could be decided, and then said:

 

".. (iii) To undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession; I have repeatedly stated that as soon as the raiders have been driven out of Kashmir or have withdraw and peace and order have been established, the people of Kashmir should decide the question of accession by plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as those of the United Nations. It is clear that no such reference to the people can be made when large bodies of raiders are despoiling the country and military operations against them are being carried on. By this declaration I stand."

 

The late Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, when addressing the Security Council on 15 January 1948, said:

 

"In accepting the accession they"-the Government of India-"refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by plebiscite as soon as peace had been restored. They had subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary under international auspices."

 

Again, on 3 February 1948, speaking before the Security Council, Mr. Ayyangar said:

 

"As the Security Council is aware, the Government of India is fully committed to the view that, after peace is restored and all people belonging to the State have returned there, a free plebiscite should be taken and the people should decide whether they wish to remain with India, to go over to Pakistan or to remain independent, if they choose to do so."

 

I would also draw the attention of the Security Council to: the words "or to remain independent, if they choose to do so". The word is "remain", they have not to become independent. Where is paramountcy?

 

The Prime Minister of India, addressing the Constituent

 

Assembly of India, as it then was, on 5 March 1948 said this:

 

"Even at the moment of accession we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum. We insisted further that the Government of Kashmir must immediately become a popular Government. We have adhered to that position throughout and we are prepared to have a plebiscite, with every protection for fair voting, and to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir."

 

Again, on 11 September 1951, in a letter addressed to the United Nations representative, the Prime Minister said this:

 

"As regards paragraph 4, the Government of India not only reaffirms its acceptance of the principle that the question of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through. the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, but is anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible."

 

I would like to be permitted to quote an extract from The Statesman, a well-recognized paper of long and respectable standing. I should like to quote it a statement of the Defence Minister of India himself, dated 2 August 1951, Mr. Krishna Menon said:

 

"No one is more devoted to peace at the present time than our Prime Minister. It is not the intention of the Government of India to go back on any commitment it has made. We adhere strictly to our pledge of plebiscite in Kashmir-a pledge made to the people of Kashmir because they believe in democratic government... We do not regard Kashmir as a commodity to be trafficked in."

 

Then, in a joint Press communique issued by the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 20 August 1953, it was stated:

 

"The Kashmir dispute was specially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion"-that is, the opinion of the two Prime Ministers-"that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite."

 

I now come to the question to which the Defence Minister was pleased to devote a good deal of time, that of aggression, and he took it up in two parts: aggression by the tribesmen and aggression by the Pakistan regular Army units going into the "Azad '' Kashmir area. With regard to what is known as the incursion of the tribesmen, I think it is only fair that one should keep in mind the background of conditions prevailing at that time over the greater part of the subcontinent, especially in the northwest. The conditions were that so far as Pakistan was concerned, even the civil administration was not yet in proper running order. The situation was that India took over the buildings, the machinery, the offices and so on. It was done by agreement: I am not mentioning this as a grievance, it was part of the circumstance then; but India did take over a running machine. Pakistan, so far as the setting up of a Central Government was concerned, had to start from scratch. Everything had to be provided and the state of public order, unfortunately, both on the Indian and on the Pakistan sides of that region was such that two of the special trains bringing official records, and probably even pens and pencils and ink and such things from New Delhi were bombed on the way. Several of the ministries that had to be set up did not even have chairs, stools or benches for the officers or clerks to sit on. They did not have the paper and pencils with which to work. That was the condition of the civil administration.

 

On the other side, the army which could be the principal instrument of controlling this kind of eruption that took place, was still being sorted out. There was an Indian Army to which reference was also made by the Defence Minister of India yesterday with regard to the difficulty of getting together units for them when they decided to go to the assistance of the State. He said that they were still being sorted out, some were to go to Pakistan, some were to remain in India. Much more so was the condition on the Pakistan side of those units that were based there. Sometimes even small units were composed in such a way for both communities that they had to sort them out and send part of the personnel to one side and part of the personnel to the other side. That was the situation.

 

In addition, as our very first written representation to the Security Council in January 1948 would show, because that was one of the problems which Pakistan raised before the Security Council, we had not received our share of arms, ammunition. and equipment for our army. The whole thing was helpless. condition of confusion.

 

Then, as I have said, the happenings in West Pakistan and along its borders on the other side and again I want to make it quite clear that what happened in those days was a disgrace to humanity-showed that no distinction could be made. People seemed to have sunk below the level of beasts. Excesses of every type were committed on both sides, with noble examples shining out in the intense darkness of people putting their own lives in danger and sometimes laying down those lives, in order to protect the members of the other community.

 

So there was courage also, there way heroism, there was devotion to friendship, to human relation-ships or to principles of humanity. But by and large, it became a raging sea of beastliness. In Lahore the conditions were such that though there was a provincial government, it was helpless in dealing with the train upon train that came in loaded with refugees with people, with corpses of people who had been killed while in the train, people who were maimed, children with their hands cut off, their eyes gouged out, women with their breasts cut off and all that. What took place on both sides was to the shame and disgrace of all of us.

 

In that condition, this tribal incursion was going on and, no doubt, during the trouble in question all those things happened, as the Defence Minister of India said yesterday but he seemed to imply that somehow it was the Pakistan Government that was doing that, or at any rate that it was inciting it or encouraging it.

 

He himself drew attention-and I appreciated his doing it-to one heroic act on the part of one of the people commanding the tribal levies themselves. I would draw attention. to another, and I would do so because there seems to be some misunderstanding with regard to what the position was at Baramulla. This is a letter written by the Mother Superior of Saint Joseph's Hospital, Baramulla, Kashmir, addressed to Begum Shah Nawaz and her daughter, Miss M. Shahanawaz. I quote from the original of the letter, which was written on 1 January 1948:

 

"We cannot let this season of greetings pass without sending you a very affectionate remembrance from us all with our prayers and every best wish for a very happy New Year and God's blessings on all your undertakings. We will never forget how you two brave girls of the Pakistan Voluntary Service risked your lives to save us from Baramulla when the bombing and the machine gunning from the air made our situation this dangerous and impossible." This bombing was not by the tribesmen: this machine gunning was not by the tribesmen : the tribesmen had no aircraft of any kind. It may well be understood by whom it was but again I am not apportioning blame, Perhaps it was necessary, but anyway it constituted a danger. The letter goes on :

 

"Be sure we shall never forget you and we want to come to see you again. We have been so busy making clothes for ourselves and working at war refugee camps." this was within Pakistan

 

"We hope to go back to Baramulla soon. Otherwise I think we shall all join the Hazara Kashmir forces."

 

The Hazara Kashmir forces were not the Indian forces : they were on the "Azad" Kashmir side. Here is a lady who, it was said, was subjected, with those under her protection and control, to conditions of all kinds that were created by Pakistan. But here they are writing from Pakistan to two Pakistani women. Their wish was to go back to Baramulla at once, and if they could not go they would join the Hazara Kashmir forces. Their letter concluded:

 

"Please accept a very tiny present we have made for you as a sign of our gratitude and remembrance of you both. Yours affectionately, Mary Philippa."

 

There were these instances also. Here are these two women from Pakistan who were trying, like so many others, to assuage the distress, the misery and the suffering that was brought about by these conditions all over.

 

I referred to the last time I spoke to the happenings in some of the Indian States. As a matter of fact, with regard to Patiala, there was so much excitement among the tribesmen themselves that many of them, knowing that they were only in Kashmir, and having not much idea of the geography of that part of the country, were asking, "How far is Patiala", because they had

heard what kind of things had been going on in Patiala and their ambitions seemed to be to go there. There was all this excitement all around. It was not the doing of any particular Government. To the Pakistan Government it was said- and the charge was read out-"You may not have done this or incited this but you did nothing to control it." Which Government, in the position in which I have said the country was, with no military forces available and with the civilian administration not yet in proper running order could have done anything against this sort of cyclone of misery that was sweeping over the land? Impliedly, the Defence Minister also stated with regard to or two incidents that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had said that he had no personal knowledge of these instances. The Defence Minister said, "It is surprising: Foreign Minister of a country, and he has no knowledge of these incidents." But he was obviously under a misapprehension, and I want to correct him with regard to the dates. I was not the Foreign Minister of Pakistan when all this was happening, and I was not even in Pakistan at the time. I was away, and I received news about this. I received news of my own home being looted and of my people being driven out from their homes. I have never seen that home since I left India about 4 September. I was mourning with everybody else all that was happening but I was not in Pakistan. I was holding no public office. I became Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 26 December 1947, six days before the complaint of India was filed before the Security Council in respect of Kashmir.

 

Then did Pakistan try to do anyhow? Did we do nothing at all? This is what we tried to do. On 4 November 1947, in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Pakistan set out the steps proposed by Pakistan to deal with this situation. There was at Lahore, on 1 November, a meeting of the Joint Defence Council of both sides, to which Lord Mountbatten came from Delhi and Mr. Jinnah had come from Karachi. At that meeting certain proposals were submitted to Lord Mountbatten, who agreed to put them to his Government. These are the proposals that were made to deal with that situation : "1. To put an immediate stop to fighting the two Governors-General should be authorized and vested with full powers by both Dominion Governments to issue a proclamation forth with giving forty-eight hours' notice to the two opposing forces to cease fire. The Governor General of Pakistan had no control over the forces of the Provisional Government of Kashmir or tribesmen engaged in the fighting, but he will warn them in the clearest terms that if they do not obey the order to cease fire immediately the forces of both Dominions-that is to say Pakistan. and Indi-"will make war on them.

 

"2. Both the forces of the Indian Dominion and the tribesmen to withdraw simultaneously and with the utmost expedition from Jammu and Kashmir State territory"

 

"3. With the sanction of the Dominion Governments the two Governors General to be given full powers to restore peace, undertake the administration of Jammu Kashmir State and arrange for a plebiscite without delay under their joint control and supervision."

 

When, for two days no reply was received from Delhi, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a telegram directly to the Prime Minister of India in which he repeated these proposals and reminded him that he had sent them. In brief, the action that was suggested was that the Governors-General should be authorized by their respective Governments to act jointly in this matter. They would call upon both sides who were fighting for an immediate cease fire, and they would warn them that if, within forty-eight hours, there was not a cease fire the two armies-the army of India and the army of Pakistan-would drive the tribesmen out. And, after that had been done under the authority of the two Governments, the two Governors General would hold a plebiscite.

 

What could be fairer, and what more could be expected in the circumstances ? But there was no reply from the Government of India. Then we come to the Security Council resolution of 17

 

January 1948, which both sides accepted. That resolution :

 

"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to immediately take all measures. within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain. from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation;

 

"And further requests each of those Governments to inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the Council, and consult with the Council the Teon."

 

It may be recalled that the Council started the hearings of this question on 15 January. Two days later it passed this resolution addressed to both sides. But that time the Council must have realized that the debate would continue for a long time and that the members would have to take time for consideration and then propose some settlement of the dispute. In any case, the Council passed this resolution for the interim purpose of ensuring that things should more or less stay as they were or, at any rate, should get no worse. And it was part of that interim arrangement that while the matter was under consideration by the Council was to be notified and directions sought from it if any changes of that character took place. Both sides accepted this resolution.

 

Now, what happened? I think a couple of minutes will be necessary in order to tell you. I will not take any more time than is necessary. I think it will not be denied that India made an effort to have the Council direct Pakistan to take a very possible measure to drive the tribesmen out of Kashmir and leave every-thing else to be arranged by India itself. The Council refused to take that position. I believe I have drawn attention to that previously. The Council said that a military solution is not a solution that must come by agreement, through peaceful methods. When the first resolution was proposed, the Indian delegation withdrew. They went away to India for a few weeks and then came back. At that point, the original resolution was no longer being talked about, although the six sponsors had spoken in support of it. Then on 21 April 1948 the second proposed resolution was passed. India did not accept it but the Security Council adopted it anyway and set up a Commission in pursuance of it. The Commission went over there. I need not go further into the matter.

 

By the time that this latter resolution had been passed and that phase of the proceedings before the Security Council had come to an end, the application of this resolution had also come to an end, because the period had passed while the matter was under consideration by the Security Council.

 

India had made up its mind to achieve a military solution. of the problem. I shall quote the statement of no less a person than the then Defence Minister of India on 15 March 1948. I believe he was speaking in the Indian Constituent Assembly. He announced there that the Indian Army would clear out all resistance from Kashmir's soil in the next two or three months. Now, what did that indicate? That meant that a major military offensive was in the course of being prepared. The Times of 13 April 1948 reported from its special correspondent:

 

"The Indian Army has worked extremely hard during the winter months and its position has been much improved. In spite of snow-storms and rain and the resulting drifts, mud and landslides, it has doggedly moved up supplies and reinforcements, improved roads and airfields and intensified the training of its troops. Logistically, it has won a notable victory, but even now in April, traditionally the month for a spring offensive, this necessary phase has not completed. The road between Jammu and Srinagar, which winds over the Banihal Pass, is still snowy. covered and convoys are often snowbound. To improve communications a daily air service has been organized although weather conditions will make flying unsafe for at least two or three weeks. But the force has been considerably strengthened and it should soon be ready for a limited offensive. Already some units have advanced from Rajouri in Jammu and from Uri and some small successes have been reported. Fighting is bloody. Few prisoners are taken and acts of barbarism have been committed by both sides. Many Pathans have been decapitated by Sikh troops.

 

Again, I am not making a complaint, I am drawing attention to the situation that actually existed at that time. At that time, a week after this report in The Times, and more than a month after the statement of the Defence Minister in the Constituent Assembly, General Gracey the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to whom reference was made yesterday by the Defence Minister of India, made a report to the Government of Pakistan on 20 April 1948. The substance of it was that if the Government of Pakistan did not take action to ensure that a certain defensive line be held, further progress of Indian troops would not only put the "Azad" Kashmir area in danger, but also endanger one of our irrigation works on the Jhelum River, which at that point diverges over the mountains into the territory of Pakistan.

 

He also raised the question of the security of Pakistan itself. I will read only a brief passage of General Gracey's report:

 

Recommendations: 7. If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes: if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent: and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushera."

 

When the question was raised in the Security Council-it had been raised once or twice, but I thought I had better reply to it I made a statement to the Security Council on 8 February 1950, in which I stated:

 

"I put it to the representatives on the Security Council that if they, in their respective spheres, were charged with the responsibility of the defence and the security of their own countries, and they received this report from their Commander-in-Chief-and in this case it was not a Pakistan national who had made the report: the Commander-in-Chief was and is General Sir Douglas E. Gracey, a distinguished British officer-if they had received this report which everything else reinforced and supported: the reports of foreign observers to their newspapers, the speeches of Indian statesmen and their Defence Minister both in public and in the Constituent Assembly, and if they were convinced that this was the situation, what is the very least that they would have done in the circumstances? Pakistan did that very least and no

 

more. It sent in its troops to hold that line." I said a great deal more, but I need not repeat that to the Council here, since I am going to summarize it in my next observation.

 

Then it was said, "Why did you not, under the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, which places upon you the obligation to report any change of this character while the matter is under consideration by the Council, consult with them thereon?" The Council had, by that time, concluded its consideration of the case, had set up the Commission and the matter had been placed under the Commission's care. Moreover, did India inform the Council of all the preparations that it was making, of the decision which was announced to the Constituent Assembly by its Defence Minister that during the next two or three months they would clear the entire State of anybody who had entered? Did they inform the Security Council that they intended to do that? Then they said that we did not inform them that we were going to do it. so that is necessary. No answer

 

We, however, do something else. The resolution. setting up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was passed on 21 April. The Commission was organized in May and as soon as it was organized in Geneva, it studied the documents and determined the procedure that it would follow. We had no intimation of what its programme would be, except that a few days before its arrival in Karachi on 7 July, they asked to call on me on 8 July in order to make a courtesy visit. The moment they arrived, I presented the entire situation to them.

 

The Defence Minister said yesterday that I did this "in confidence". There was no question of doing it in confidence. I did not, like the Indian representatives in 1949, lay any embargo upon the Commission. I did not say: "I give you this information, but do not disclose it to anybody." I told them that this was the situation. In the meantime a change had occurred: we did not notify the Security Council because the Council had concluded its consideration of the case, and we had been waiting for the Commission to come. The Commission in its report has said that it had organized itself by a certain date, perhaps in May or June, implying-they do not say so in express words, but implying-that they could have been informed earlier. We did not know that they had organized themselves in Geneva and we did not know what time they would be coming. We did not know their programme. But, in any case, as soon as they arrived, the fullest possible information was given to them. I think I had the maps ready, and everything else, and it took me over an hour to explain the situation to them.

 

I repeat that twice the Defence Minister yesterday said "in confidence". Where he takes that from, I do not know. I did not give them any information in confidence. I informed them, as representatives of the Security Council who were dealing with this question, of the material change that had taken place in the situation, and I did not suggest, in word of gesture or tone, that it was only for their information. I knew that anything placed before the Commission was placed before them to consider in the context of the whole matter. Let me add that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Gracey, gave them a military appraisal of the whole situation.

 

The Defence Minister said that the Permanent Representative of Pakistan had stated that he would accept the determination of either side's default in the implementation of the resolutions as made by any outstanding authority, any fair and impartial authority. And then he quoted what Sir Owen Dixon said in his report to the Security Council.

 

In the first place, what I had said was: Let a fair and impartial determination be made of why implementation of the resolutions is held up, and if it is found that it is held owing to the default of Pakistan, then Pakistan will speedily and within the shortest possible time rectify the default.

 

The Defence Minister of India quoted Sir Owen Dixon and started his quotation in the middle of the sentence. He quoted from here: " I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier "But the whole sentence runs like this: "I took up the positions,"-when this matter was raised before him "first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration;"- a declaration that Pakistan was an aggressor "secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue:"-and he was held up as a great judicial authority who had come to this conclusion, and it is part of the same sentence which was quoted-"but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the subcontinent. I was prepared to adopt the view" that is, for the purpose of going on with the discussions with the Government of India-"that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law"-and that the entry of Pakistan troops was contrary to international law. But that is a hypothetical opinion: it is not a finding. And he said:

 

"I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the ceasefire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them to settle."

 

This was not accepted by India.

 

Then, in one of the concluding paragraphs of his report,

 

Sir Owen Dixon said:

 

"The question whether Pakistan had or had not been an aggressor had, to my mind, nothing to do with the results of a partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite. To agree that Pakistan should take under a partition part of the State must be to agree that, independently of any such question, it took not merely an interest in but sovereignty of the territory. Again, as I saw the matter, to agree that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan should pass to one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree to a text involving an equal interest in both countries in the result. Further it is to agree to the ascertainment of the will of the people by an independent authority because that authority will see that the plebiscite is freely and fairly conducted."

 

His general conclusion with regard to his conversations with the Prime Minister of India was:

 

"In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions. sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled."

 

That is his finding.

 

A reference was made to the so-called northern areas. As far as the northern areas are concerned, I can make this statement, which I think should satisfy the Council: that there has been no change on the "Azad" Kashmir side of the cease fire line. Those areas to which reference was made are all on the "Azad'' Kashmir side of the cease-fire line, and, with regard to the cease-fire line, there has been an assurance given by the Commission to Pakistan that no civil or military officer or personnel of the Maharajah's Government would be permitted to cross the cease-fire line into the "Azad" Kashmir side. How can there be a grievance that their authority has been repudiated? The whole of that area has been under the authority of "Azad'' Kashmir or of Pakistan. That is the situation. We have made no change since the cease-fire line was laid down. India never had any troops there.

 

I now come to a very important matter: the interpretation and the implementation of the resolutions. I was very sorry to hear the representative of the USSR, in his statement this morning, attribute to me something which I had not said, and then put an interpretation upon the relevant portion of the resolution which it cannot bear. He said that I had been insisting that the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from the "Azad" Kashmir side, and of the Indian forces from the Indian occupied side, should begin together. I have never said that, I have never asked for that. Each time, I have been careful to say-and if afterward I have spoken generally, it is always under that proviso-that the resolution provides, and therefore it obviously means, that, once a truce agreement has been reached and has been published, then, so far as this withdrawal is concerned, Pakistan is to begin the withdrawal: and, when it has been notified to the other side that Pakistan troops are being withdrawn, then the other side will begin the withdrawal of the bulk of their troops; but, from there onward, the whole operation will be synchronized. And that is exactly what the Commission has said, and the other side knew that was the position.

 

Yesterday, the Defence Minister of India also stated that since the first part of the resolution has not been complied with, how can you go to the second part ? And he said: True, the Commission has said the first part has been complied with, but at what date? They said it when so, and subsequently there has not been compliance.

 

In my opening submission to the Security Council on this matter [1008th meeting], I submitted that in his fifth report, the United Nations Representative had made the statement that the first part had been complied with; but in February 1953 he also stated further-and this is very important: "The representatives of India and Pakistan, assuming part I (Cease-fire order) of the UNCIP 13 August 1948 resolution had been implemented, began discussion of part II."

 

The representatives came before the United Nations Representative. Both sides stated that part I has been implemented. He said: All right, let us begin with part II. Now the question is raised that it has not been implemented. With regard to the portion upon which particular stress is laid in this respect and which relates to the augmentation of forces, that is a very technical matter, as I said yesterday. But there is a very easy way of determining whether augmentation has taken place. Ever since the cease-fire, United Nations observers have been posted along the cease-fire line. It is their business to ensure that the conditions of the cease-fire are observed. Their Com Mender, General Nimmo, has been incharge for many years. He knows the whole question inside out. The Security Council has only to request General Nimmo to report whether an augmentation of the forces on either side has or has not taken place. That is the report to be acted upon and that will show whether or not there has been compliance with that part of the resolution.

 

Now as to the question of synchronization, I wish to draw attention to a statement in the third report of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan:

 

"The Commission did take into account Pakistan's concern that the withdrawal should be synchronized." -This is not my expression; they have used it in their report "It repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the two Governments."

 

An agreement has to be drawn up. This morning I was told by the representative of the USSR that somehow. Pakistan was in default because it insisted that a truce agreement should be drawn up. But the resolution lays that down clearly and this is what the Commission goes on to explain :

 

"The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces, a part of that agreement, was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side."

 

This is plain English. There is nothing mysterious about this. My duty to begin to withdraw the Pakistan forces was to begin after the truce agreement had been published. The truce agreement would contain the timetable for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the other side. True, according to that plan I should have to begin to withdraw, but then when the other side had been notified that was being done, they were to have begun on their side and there-after the whole procedure was to have been synchronized. I have not invented this synchronization business.

 

Then the representative of the USSR went on to say that his reading is that Pakistan should withdraw its forces first from the whole of Kashmir. Where does he get it from? The same has been said by the Defence Minister of India. And I have said: All right, if still there is a mystery about it, if the plain meaning of the words still eludes the members of the Security Council, if the explanations given by the Commission are not clear, the let the Security Council appoint anybody of international standing and integrity to determine when the responsibility of Pakistan starts. If they say that it starts without the truce agreement, and that means to withdraw the whole of the army at once, I undertake, on behalf of my Government, to do so.

 

Now we say, and we contend, that words mean what words say. I am sorry to have to observe that, on the other side, the position is that words mean what the Government of India says. We say that words mean what the words say. They say the words mean what they say. And in that position one cannot agree on the meaning of any words at all. But this is not the first time it has happened.

 

I say, with all responsibility, that the partition of India took place as a result of an attitude of that kind on their side. The Cabinet Mission's plans had been accepted in the summer of 1946. Thereafter, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, was elected President of the Congress. Soon after his election, he made a public statement putting an interpretation on certain paragraphs of the Cabinet Mission's plan which those paragraphs could not bear. As the authors subsequently also intimated, in their opinion that interpretation could not be valid. There were all sorts of happenings in between, particularly the most regrettable happenings in Calcutta.

 

Thereafter, Lord Wavell, who was the Viceroy, reques Ted Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru to meet with him. In the course of that conversation-and I rely for this on The Last Days of the British Raj by Leonard Mosley,-page 42-he begged them to make a clear declaration that they accepted the Cabinet Mission plan, without any gloss upon it, or interpretation upon it. The conversation was somewhat prolonged. The book says the following:

 

"Wavell put the question frankly to Gandhi and Nehru : Will you give me the gruarantee the Muslim league is asking for ?""-that is to say that they accepted without any condition -"He was almost immediately plunged into the most difficult argument he had ever had with Gandhi, who chose this day to be at his most polemical and devious. Here was a saint who could in his ashram, dispense great wisdom and counsel tolerance, understanding and the necessity to give rather than take." We all equally revere Mahatma Gandhi-"But this evening he spoke purely and simply as a congress politician".

 

"Give me a simple guarantee that you accept the Cabinet Mission Plan,' asked Wavell.

 

""We have already said that we accept it,' replied Gandhi, 'but we are not prepared to guarantee that we accept it in the way that the Cabinet Mission set it out. We have our own interpretations of what they propose,"

 

"Said Wavell: 'Even if those interpretations differ from what the Cabinet Mission intended ?"

 

"Replied Gandhi: 'But of course. In any case, what the Cabinet Mission Plan really means is not what the Cabinet Mission thinks but what the interim Government thinks it means,"

 

And then the Conference went on.

 

It is the same here: they say that this something which the language is not capable of meaning, which the Com mission has explained in a contrary sense and in the sense that they themselves originally accepted. After all, they went to all these meetings held to discuss the plan of withdrawal so that a truce agreement might be reached and might be published. For years they did this. They attended the first meeting at the invitation of the Commission in Delhi, where our representatives also went and put in their plan. The other side's plan was not put in.

 

Subsequently, they forced the Commission to change the interpretation of the part we had accepted. We did not insist on taking part in all that discussion which consisted of being told during the discussions what the other side's plan was so that we might give our agreement to it. We said we would be satisfied if the Commission would guarantee that there would be a synchronized withdrawal, and if they were satisfied we would withdraw too. Very well; then they went on discussing it.

 

Now they say no, because all that paragraph comes first, all that must be complied with before the subsequent paragraphs must be complied with The Commission has explained quite clearly that these two paragraphs will take care of the complaint that India has made and the other paragraph will take care of apprehensions that Pakistan entertains, but the whole thing must form part of a truce agreement. You have to put some paragraphs first and some later even if the whole thing is to be synchronized.

 

Again on that, all that we can suggest is, let there be a determination. There is a charge that we have not complied with what we had to do, or rather that we have not complied with their interpretation of these paragraphs. Let us assume that it may turn out that, if someone makes a determination, he may hold that their interpretation is correct. accept that, but if it is determined that is not the meaning of We will the paragraphs, that is not the meaning of the assurances and clarifications of the Commission, that it is not the meaning of the viewed against the whole background, well then, Why has all the delay taken place, why has use not been made of the time that has passed? It is because of the default on the other side. Let us make a determination. You cannot make a very grave charge against the other side and then refuse to have a determination made. You cannot say, "These words mean what we want them to mean, not what anybody else thinks they mean, not what the resolution obviously said, not what the Commission said they mean". They say, "words mean what we say, because we want them to mean that." You cannot settle international disputes or any disputes on that basis.

 

Then with regard to the elections, I had better finish quickly now. It was said, well, it has happened before and what can you say, but one very amusing thing-if I may be forgiven for using the expression-one very amusing argument which slipped from the representative of India was this. He read out extracts from certain papers and said that he thought those papers were not of any importance. They included the Hindustan Times and The Statesmen of Delhi. He said they were not very friendly to India. It was surprising to see how many papers were unfriendly towards India. And he has my sympathy on that. Then he said that one of the papers had stated that one of the opposition parties had alleged that when the voters went in they saw the ballot box was placed upside down and they could not put the ballots inside the box but had to leave them on the top. He says, how can that be? These boxes were devised by the Election Commission; how can it be said that the bottom was at the top and the top was at the bottom? It doesn't matter who devised the ballot boxes, it is the polling officer who sees how it is to be placed. Their complaint was that the polling officer or whoever was in charge had allowed the opposition boxes to be placed with the top down and the bottom up and, therefore, the ballots could not be put inside and later they were all put into the ruling party's ballot boxes. Whether that true or not I cannot say what I am trying to say is that here are these allegations and the reply is that the boxes were devised by the Election Commission itself and that when they were asked to go and see what was happening they refused to go.

 

With regard to Sheikh Abdullah's trial it was said that the matter is sub judice. This man, who has been a judge of the Supreme Court of India and has subsequently been a judge of the International Court of Justice, ought to know that one does not discuss a matter which is sub judice. In the first place, the matter at the moment, strictly, is not sub judice, it is sub interim, A commitment order was made on 25 January and the trial has not yet begun. No trial is taking place at the moment.

 

Secondly, I did not discuss the merits of the evidence upon which the judge has to make up his mind; I commented only on the time it has taken, three-and-a-half years, to commit the accused for trial and on the three months that have elapsed since the committal and the trial has not yet begun. But anyhow, part of the charge is that Sheikh Abdullah conspired with a foreign Government for the forcible annexation of Kashmir to Pakistan. One of Lord Birdwood's books was referred to by the Defence Minister of India yesterday and here is a comment on that also. On pages 162 and 163 of Lord Birdwood's account of the removal of Sheikh Abullah into Nations and Kashmir but I will not go into that we read the following:

 

"After the arrest [of Sheikh Abdullah] the Pakistan Press told of Muslims being 'mown down' by Indian troops. The Indian Press retaliated with fantastic stories of an international plot. When I first heard of the rumours that Abdullah had been in league with a foreign imperialist Power, my reaction was that he had been caught out in negotiation with the Soviet."

 

the representative of the Soviet Union will forgive me, I am not saying this

 

"I rubbed my eyes when I read that the villain was Mr. Adlai Stevenson, alleged to be plotting on behalf of the United States of America !" Equally, I ask Governor Stevenson to forgive me : 1 am not saying this. This is the sort of allegation on which the trial is taking place.

 

Then there was a long account which I do not question of the improvements that have taken place in Kashmir, the rising standard of living, the rising investments. Some figures were quoted yesterday and, as I said, I accept them. It is said that there are civil liberties on the one side and none on the other; none in "Azad'' Kashmir. It is said there is a rising standard of living on one side, depression, misery, poverty and destitution. on the other hand. In other words, on the one side there is Paradise, on the other side the reverse of it. Well then, if from the other side people see the miserable conditions of the people in "Azad" Kashmir, and the people of "Azad" Kashmir look across into the valley and see the flourishing conditions, prosperity, civil liberties and so no that side, then why not hold a plebiscite ? Let it take place in "Azad '' Kashmir also if they want to go into this paradise on the other side, the whole dispute will come to an end.

 

Whether we are bound to it or not, whether on legalistic principles one thing or another this is right, it will put an end to the dispute between two neighbours and we shall be able to work together on a much more co-operative basis.

 

I shall not take up much more of the Security Council's time, and I am sorry I have taken about ten minutes more than I estimated. I have only one final word, and that is this yesterday some suggestion was made that I have claimed that Kashmir should come to Pakistan because the population was Muslim. I have replied to that. It was said that there are 60 million Muslims living in India who are very loyal subjects. We want them to be loyal. Every citizen of every State must be loyal. There are also ten or twelve million non Muslim, Hindus, living in Pakistan, and they are loyal subjects also. There are perhaps exceptions on both sides; there was for instance the story about somebody wishing to assassinate Prime Minister Nehru. On both sides we hold these loyal We are citizens in great respect and we consider their help very necessary for the integrity of the subcontinent and for its progress and welfare. I repudiate here and now on behalf of the Government any knowledge of anything of that sort, not people of that kind. I do not mean to say that they are. What I mean is that this kind of charge has no basis at all. Everybody knows that with very minor exceptions, apart from that first wave to which I do not want to have to refer too often, I do not want to have to undergo the kind of emotion through which we have all passed in seeing the suffering of those near and dear to us, but after that first wave was over and with very slight if any eruptions here and there which were immediately put down, on the Pakistan side the minorities have had a clear run and a clear slate.

 

In spite of the best efforts of the Government of India, on the Indian side, that condition has not yet been reached. There have recently been all sorts of occurrences. How to judge these things? There is an account of what had been happening at Malda in India in The New York Times today. Mr. Trumbull, who was quoted with regard to some matter yesterday by my friend across the table, reports from East Pakistan having seen these refugee camps of 1,000 people who came from Malda after all the horrors that have been practised, with 2,000 more that were expected, describing all the perils against them, and the condition in which they arrive. Against that, the Prime Minister's account in the Parliament is that three people have been killed. This statement says 1,000 Muslims were killed.

 

The Prime Minister said that five or six died; and the note that has been issued by the Indian Mission here says that it is absolutely untrue and fantastic that a large number of people have gone over to East Pakistan as refugees. But Mr. Trimbull who is there reports that he has seen these 2,000 refugees and 2,000 more are expected to come in. The Indian statement said that only three persons were killed-the Prime Minister said five or six but that makes no difference-in

religious distanances in the Malda district of West Bengal late last month, and there had not been any mass flight of refugees.

 

Now 4,000 people do not leave their homes just because nothing has happened or because two people or three people or five or six have been killed. But the charge continues. Here is a theocratic State; we are a secular State Everybody is happy with us; everybody is miserable with them. Well, if that is so, then, as I have repeated-and this is my last observation-I would submit that the best solution of that question is to admit everybody in Kashmir into that happy State. Hold the plebiscite and the whole question will be settled.