27041962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1007 held on 27 April 1962.

 

27041962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 1007 held on 27 April 1962.

 

Before lunch this afternoon, my friend. Ambassador Jha, the representative of India, honoured me by conveying to me a message from the Defence Minister of India. He told me that the Defence Minister much regretted that, having regard to his heavy responsibilities and manifold preoccupations, he had not been able to reach New York in time to be present here this afternoon and that he hoped I would not consider this as any lack of courtesy on his part. Far from considering that the Defence Minister of India has in any way been lacking in courtesy, I would have considered it impertinent on my part to feel that he was under any obligation to be present here this afternoon or at any other time when it was not convenient for him. And I conveyed these sentiments to Mr. Jha, I further assured him that if the Minister had any feeling of embarrassment over the situation which had arisen owing to his being required at various places at the same time, I was quite willing to join him in making a request to the President that if it was not too inconvenient for the members of the Council and would not upset their arrangement, the meeting might be postponed to some date, at least next week, which might be convenient for the members of the Council. Mr. Jha, however, assured me that was not his desire and that he would feel perfectly happy, and he was quite sure that the Defence Minister would feel perfectly happy, if the Council proceeded, according to its schedule, with the meeting this afternoon. I therefore now feel that I am at liberty to address the Council despite the absence of the Defence Minister, and I am sure that in the circumstances the Defence Minister of India will not consider that I have in any manner, on my side, been lacking in consideration for him if he desired to be present to hear whatever I have question. say on the

 

I had the honour to make, having regard to the complicated nature of this problem, what I might describe as a somewhat summary presentation to the Council on 1 February [990th meeting]. I feared that on this occasion, when the adjourned discussion had to be resumed, I would be under the necessity of going into some detail at least on certain aspects of the problem which are crucial for the proper understanding of the differences that have arisen between India and Pakistan over this question. I did, I believe, make a brief reference to the position of the Indian States as distinguished from British India at the advent of independence in the summer of 1947.

 

The Security Council has heard a good deal and will hear a great deal more about the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan which is in question, but at this stage it is necessary to say something on this subject of accession itself. What was the origin of this idea? So far as the Independence Act of 1947, an enactment of the British Parliament, is concerned, it makes no reference to the accession of States to one Dominion or the other, as both India and Pakistan was to be at the start of independence. All that the Act says in that connexion is contained in section 7, which provides in effect that on the appointed date that is to say, on the date of independence-the suzerainty exercised by the British Crown over these States and treaties and engagements which subsisted between the British Crown, and the rulers of these States would come to an end.

 

What would then be the position? The Act does not define it and there are few precedents in constitutional history of any comparable situation which may have arisen before; as a matter of fact, there are hardly any. One clear indication that we have is from Mr. Ayyangar, the representative of India, when he addressed the Security Council, in the early days of the dispute, as to what would be the position with regard to the Indian States after they had become, as it were, independent under the Indian Independence Act. I will come to that in a moment.

 

I should have said that there is a clear indication in the White Paper issued by the Government of India on 10 August 1948, which states:

 

"The Government of India are firmly of the view that whatever sovereign rights reverted to these States on the lapse of paramountcy (that is to say when British sovereignty ceased to operate) they vest in the people, and conditions must be created in every State for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights."

 

Therefore, in this as I have said, the peculiar historical constitutional situation that arose, we start with the idea that the sovereign rights that reverted to these States on the displacement of British paramountcy vested in the people.

 

Now, how did the idea of accession come into the picture? The idea of accession, in a sense, already held the field. As members of the Security Council may recall if they are familiar with the constitutional history of India previous to the Indian Independence Act, there had been various attempts at settlement of this question between the main political parties on the one hand, and the British on the other. And the immediately preceding attempt to the one that culminated in the Indian Independence Act, was made by what was known as the British Cabinet Mission in the summer of 1946. The Cabinet Mission was sent to India by Prime Minister Attlee, and was composed of three distinguished members of the British Cabinet, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, who was Secretary of State for India; the brilliant statesman and politician, Sir Stafford Cripps, who, I believe, was either Lord Privy Seal or Lord President of the Council at the time: and Mr. A. N. Alexander, who was First Lord of the Admiralty.

 

It is not necessary to detail their achievement, which was indeed a very notable one. They brought about a settlement by agreement between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League which was accepted by both, as a result of which the political unity of India could have been preserved. That is a matter of history. But when they studied the problem, they were also faced with a question of what would happen to the Indian States under the scheme which they put forward and which was immediately accepted.

 

The memorandum of the Cabinet Mission on the question of Indian States, dated 12 May 1946, set forth this idea of accession. It said that the position of States would be strengthened during this formative period if the various Governments which had not already done so were to take active steps to place themselves in close and constant touch with public opinion in their States by means of representative institutions. Further on the memorandum stated that this meant that the rights of States which flowed from their relationship to the Crown would no longer exist and that all rights which had been surrendered by the States to the paramount Power would return to the States. The memorandum concluded:

 

"Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them."

 

At that time the future shape of the independent Government of India was to be federal, between three zones. Therefore, the idea of finding a place for these States to fill the void that would arise by the withdrawal of British paramountcy was that either the States should be willing to integrate themselves into the federal system or they must come to particular arrangements with the successor government or governments. This is how the idea of accession arose.

 

Thus far, then, according to the view firmly held by the Government of India, upon the lapse of paramountcy, such sovereignty as reverted to the States vested in the people and it was or is for the people to decide, in order to fill that void, what relationship, in the words of the Cabinet Mission, should be established with either of the two successor governments that emerged.

 

What were the principles which were to be kept in mind by these States in deciding the question of accession? In theory, each State was at liberty to accede to one Dominion or the other, but certain compulsive considerations had to be kept in mind.

 

These considerations were enunciated by Lord Mount batten in an address to the rulers of the States-and I shall, at a later point in my remarks, read to the Council the declaration which he then made. He stated the same principle to the Maharajah of Jodhpur, and this is recounted by Mr. V. P. Menon in his book The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, on page 117, as follows:

 

"Lord Mountbatten made it clear that from a purely legal standpoint there was no objection to the ruler of Jodhpur acceding to Pakistan: but the Maharajah should, he stressed, consider seriously the consequences of doing so, having regard to the fact that he himself was a Hindu that his State was populated predominantly by Hindus and that the same applied to the States surrounding Jodhpur. In the light of these considerations, if the Maharajah were to accede to Pakistan, his action would surely be in conflict with the principle underlying the partition of India on the basis of Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas: and serious communal trouble inside the State would be the inevitable consequence of such affiliation."

 

He had, in a general manner, in addressing a special full meeting of the Chamber of Princes in New Delhi on 25 July 1947, three weeks before the appointed date for independence, advised the princes as follows:

 

"It was necessary to set up two States Departments, one in each Government, because the States are theoretically free to link their future whichever Dominion they may care for. But when I say that they are at liberty to link up with other of the Dominions, may I point out that there are certain geographical compulsions which cannot be evaded....

 

"... You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible. Whatever may be your decision, I hope you feel that I have at least done my duty by the States."

 

Under this general principle and in application of this general principle to a particular case, as I have already informed of Jodhpur that, as the majority of his subjects were Hindus the Council, Lord Mountbatten pointed out to the Maharajah and as the principle of the partition of India was that contiguous majority areas of one religious community would form one of the independent States and contiguous majority areas of the other community would form the other State, if he acted contrary to that principle-although in theory he was free to do whatever he chose to do it would be contrary to the basis on which the partition had taken place, and he would run into serious trouble.

 

That, in brief, is the basic situation with regard to this question of accession. With the Council's indulgence, I shall return to this a little later, with regard to its application to Kashmir. However, two matters are clear: first, that it is for the people to decide; and, second, that if a decision is taken contrary to the wishes of the people, then serious trouble will result. As a matter of fact, the principle was later taken further by the Government of India: that any such action would not be valid, would not be recognized, and would have no operation. I shall come to that a little later.

 

At this stage, I would wish briefly to refer to the conditions under which the Kashmir question arose. For that, also, I am under the regrettable necessity of making a reference-I hope to make it very brief- to some of the extremely tragic happenings that accompanied the birth of India and Pakistan into independence. I am not seeking to lay blame; I am not seeking to excavate things which had better lie buried now. But, in order to understand the background of the question, a brief reference is necessary.

 

In some of the Indian States-I shall name three: Bharat pur, Patiala and Kapurthala- a serious attempt was made by the rulers to exterminate altogether the community to which the ruler himself did not belong. In two of them, it succeeded to a very large extent: and, in the third, it succeeded completely. The third one was Kapurthala, which also had these two special features of significance: first, that Kapurthala was cont guous to Muslim majority areas in the north-west: second, that in Kapurthala the majority of the population were Muslims. The Maharajah's action was so effective that within a few days only two Muslims were left alive in the Kapurthala State. In which they had formed a majority of the population.

 

That is part of the background. I am making no grievance. As I said, it is not my purpose to lay blame. But it is a direct introduction to the question of Kashmir. As you will see presently, these three States were named as having caused the apprehension which led to the disturbances in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

The Times of London of 10 October 1947 reported that the Maharajah of Kashmir had also undertaken a similar project of getting rid, if not altogether, at least to a large extent, of what he no doubt thought would be troublesome, and might prove to be unruly, Muslim elements in the State, as they did prove to be, and he put himself at the head of his own forces. This is the report of The Times of London, eleven or twelve days before any incursion of the tribesmen took place into the State. I would beg the Council to remember the juxtaposition of the dates, because the Council has already heard and will later hear a great deal about aggression committed against the Maharajah and against the State. This report of 10 October 1947 must have been referring to incidents of a day or two earlier, which would make those incidents a fortnight before the first incursion of tribesmen. The report is very brief, but it is very poignant:

 

"Two hundred and thirty-seven thousand Muslims were systematically exterminated, unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border, by all the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharajah in person."

 

It was this campaign of the Maharajah, undertaken by the ruler against his own people, in order to get rid of the majority of his people, or to reduce them to a state of insignificance, or at least to a state of abject terror, that started the whole of this trouble. The people rose, as they were bound to do, because that part of the State where this campaign was undertaken-it then used to be known as Poonch-was inhabited by people during a World War. They were not like the people of the valley itself, very large preponderance of whom were veterans of the Second who have been unaccustomed to bearing arms. These people had borne arms valiantly and were accustomed to their use.

 

So a liberation movement started in the State as a reaction to this very drastic action undertaken by the ruler of the State against his own people, whom he was there to defend and to protect, and for whose welfare he had to make provision. That is based on testimony which is incontrovertible. But that this kind of thing, together with what had happened in other Indian States-notably in the three that I have named-was the cause of all this trouble is borne out by the testimony of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, who, however much today he may be out of favour-and I may have to revert to that aspect also later, in another part of my address-was at that time regarded by the Prime Minister of India, and by Mr. Ayyangar, who addressed the Security Council on behalf of India, as the undisputed political leader of the people of Kashmir.

 

Sheikh Abdullah, who had been in considerable prominence in Kashmir since the early nineteen thirties, had, I believe before independence, through his political organization the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, set in motion a movement against the Maharajah. It was called "Quit Kashmir'' that is to say calling upon the Maharajah to quit Kashmir-and he had, I believe, the previous year, in 1946, been sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment by the State courts on account of sedition, that is, on account of his leading the "Quit Kashmir" movement. But when this trouble arose in Kashmir, he was released and he was presumably sent to Delhi. He certainly was in Delhi on 21 October 1947, again before the incursion of the tribesmen. But when the liberation movement inside Kashmir was already in full swing, he made a statement in Delhi with regard to the origin of this trouble, which was published. He made it, I believe, in a press conference. In the course of this he was quoted as saying:

 

"While Pakistan was very keen on its accession"-that is to say the accession of the State-"owing to the strategic position of Kashmir, if the State joined the Indian Dominion, Pakistan would be completely encircled." Then the report of his statement went on to say the

 

following: "Explaining the difficulties with which the people were beset in making up their minds without responsible government, Sheikh Abdullah said that the happenings in certain States, such as Patiala, Bharatpur, and Kapurthala and elsewhere"-and now the members of the Security Council will be able to appreciate the reference here in the statement of Sheikh Abdullah to these States, and what those happenings were "had naturally caused apprehension in the minds of the Muslims in Kashmir, who formed the majority of the population. They were afraid that the State's accession to India might portend danger to them. Sheikh Abdullah said that the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory area of Kashmir, were caused by the unwise policy adopted by this State. The people of Poonch who had suffered under their local ruler and again under the Kashmir Maharajah, the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal. The Kashmir State sent its troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch, he explained, were ex servicemen in the Indian Army"-they could be called veterans in this country-"which close connections with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi''-these are districts of Pakistan-"They evacuated their women and children," -that is to say they evacuated them into Pakistan, knowing that otherwise they would suffer the treatment which had been meted out to Muslims in other States "crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas."

 

The people who started the liberation movement drove out the State forces from the portions of the territory in which the movement had been started, and almost all Muslim personnel of the State forces joined them, so that the situation, so far as the State and the Maharajah were concerned, began to be precarious. Then the incursion of the tribesmen took place on 22 October. Within three days, that is to say, by 25 October, the Maharajah's position in Srinagar became, from the point of view of security, open to grave danger. He left the capital and went to Jammu.

 

Now, pausing here again for a moment, having regard to the principles to which I have already drawn attention and to which I shall again draw attention later, what was the position with regard to accession? The factual position was this. The Maharajah had embarked upon the project to which I have already alluded and in reaction, the people had risen against his authority. In certain areas they repudiated his authority and drove out his troops. They were, I believe, within six miles of Srinagar itself when the Maharajah found it necessary to flee the capital and, driving the whole night over difficult mountain passes, reached Jammu the next morning.

 

Now, Mr. V.P. Menon, who was then what I might describe as the political secretary of the Government of India in charge of its relationships with the Indian States, has given an account of the happenings from then onwards. Mr. Menon had first gone to Srinagar to meet the Maharajah while the Maharajah was still there. He returned to New Delhi to make his report and to hold consultations; and even then he reported that unless India was ready to help the Maharajah with troops, the Maharajah's authority and rule over the State would soon be brought to an end. He then went to Jammu when the Maharajah had arrived there and held consultations with him. The Maharajah no doubt expressed the desire that he should have military aid from India. Mr. Menon explained to him that the aid could be given to him only if he acceded to India, The Maharajah then wrote the application for accession and accompanied it with a long letter in the course of which he mentioned that, as he could not obtain military aid from India otherwise, he was offering accession to India.

 

Mr. Menon's account describes the situation. I have already given a reference to The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. I quote from pages 399 and 400:

 

"We left Srinagar in the first flight of the morning of 26 October and immediately on my arrival in Delhi I went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee. I reported my impressions of the situation and pointed out the supreme necessity of saving Kashmir from the raiders. Lord Mountbatten said that it would be improper to move Indian troops into what was at the moment an independent country, as Kashmir had not yet decided to accede to either India or Pakistan. If it were true that the Maharajah was now anxious to accede to India, then Jammu and Kashmir would become part of Indian territory. This was the only basis on which Indian troops could be sent to the rescue of the State from further pillaging by the aggressors. He further expressed the strong opinion that in view of the composition of the population accession should be conditional on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite."

 

I shall repeat that: "accession should be conditional"; this is the account given by the senior political officer of the Government of India who took part on behalf of the Government of India in these negotiations. He reports that Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, made it clear that accession should be conditional on the will of the people

 

being ascertained by a plebiscite : after the raiders had been driven out of the State and law and order had been restored. This was agreed to by Nehru and other ministers." was readily

 

put upon the actual situation. But here is a gentleman who Subsequently, various explanations and glosses have been was a principal actor in that situation and he gives us a first hand account of what happened. He says that Lord Mount batten said that acceptance of the accession "should be conditional on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite after the raiders had been driven out of the State" and that this was "readily agreed to by Nehru and other Ministers".

 

I continue to quote :

 

"Soon after the meeting of the Defence Committee I flew to Jammu, accompanied by Mahajan."-a retired judge of the Punjab High Court, who had been appointed by the Maharajah as his Prime Minister at that time-"On arrival at the place I found it in a state of utter turmoil with valuable articles strewn all over the place. The Maharajah was asleep; he had left Srinagar the previous evening and had been driving all night. I woke him up and told him of what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting. He was ready to accede at once, He then composed a letter to the Governor-General describing the pitiable plight of the State and reiterating his request for military help. He further informed the Governor-General that it was his intention to set up an interim government at once and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with Mehr Chand Mahajan, his Prime Minister."

 

This is the same Sheikh Abdullah who had previously been sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, and, as we shall see later, has now been undergoing a so-called trial for over three and a half years, and the trial is nowhere near taking place yet. As a result of this action by the Maharajah, Sheikh Abdullah would be associated with the Prime Minister and an assurance was to be carried to the Government of India, and principally to the Prime Minister of India, that the Maharajah was now surrendering authority to the representative of the people. I continue to quote:

 

"He concluded by saying that if the State was to be saved, immediate assistance Srinagar." must be available at

 

Before I continue to quote further, I want to stress this, The Maharajah's authority, in effect, had not only been repudiated in theory but was hanging by a very slender thread even at Jammu. He had already evacuated Srinagar. There are two very significant factors in this account itself which confirm that, One was the condition in which Mr. Menon found the place at Jammu when he arrived, with valuables strewn all over the place, a state of utter confusion, obviously indicating that preparations were being made for flight. But here is another not only very significant but rather poignant factor in the situation again I quote:

 

"He also signed the Instrument of Accession. Just as I was leaving he told me that before he went to sleep, he had left instructions with his ADC that. If I came back from Delhi, he was not to be disturbed as it would mean that the Government of India had decided to come to his rescue and he should therefore be allowed to sleep in peace; but that if I failed to return, it mean that everything was lost and, in that case, his ADC was to shoot him in his sleep."

 

That was the value of his remaining authority at that time,

 

I continue to quote:

 

"With the Instrument of Accession in the Maharajah's letter I flew back at once to Delhi. Sardar ''-meaning Sardar Patel, who was the Minister in Charge of Indian States "was waiting at the aerodrome and we both went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that evening. There was a long discussion, at the end of which it was decided that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso"-previously, it was "conditional upon". Here it is "subject to the proviso"-"that a plebiscite would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed. It was further decided that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day."

 

Now, that was the situation in which the so-called accession took place. The intimation of accession having been accepted was conveyed to the Maharajah by Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General; and he wrote a letter also to the Maharajah, which is not only relevant to the context upon which I am engaged at the moment, but is also significant. It reads as follows:

 

"Your Highness's letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon. In the special. circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute,"

 

And here not only the issue of accession was the subject of dispute, the State had well-nigh got rid of the Maharajah altogether. So here is the Governor-General, in a solemn State document, setting forth the policy of his Government, which is that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute

 

"the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

 

What could be more solemn, more binding, than that? I was told-and since then, I have confirmed it by looking at the record that it has been suggested, on behalf of India, that this was no undertaking of an obligation. "It is my Government's wish"-it was observed that this was the expression of a wish; and, unfortunately, many wishes remain unfulfilled.

 

With all respect, I will say that this is, to say the least, treating a very solemn matter with a lack of seriousness. In the first place, the expression of this wish must be read with the sentence which follows; and the previous sentence expounds the policy of the Government. The policy of the Government is that, where the question of accession is in dispute, it must be settled by the freely expressed wishes of the people. The wish of the Government is in accordance with that policy. As a matter of fact, even laying emphasis on it, as I have perforce to do at the moment, might be regarded as uncalled for; there is no need for that; there is no room for any other interpretation. But even if it is the wish of the Government, the wish of the Government is being conveyed in a solemn document by the head of the Government, the Governor-General, when he is accepting accession, provisionally and conditionally as the expressions have been used and he lays it down that the final decision can be made only through the plebiscite. I would reiterate: nothing could be more solemn than that; nothing could be more serious than that. How could anybody, anybody responsible for such an assurance, subsequently seek, as it were, to wipe it away or to explain it away by saying, "After all, it was only the expression of a wish; and how sad it is, in this life, that so many wishes remain unfulfilled."?

 

I continue to quote from Lord Mountbatten's letter: "Meanwhile, in response to your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir," they already were. there before this letter was signed-to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister."

 

I lay stress upon that also because subsequently, so-called elections have been repeatedly rigged and it is argued that the matter should now be considered as concluded.

 

We shall have to come to consider whether the matter can be concluded, even if the elections were free, and what was the character of those elections. In that connexion, it would be relevant to invite a comparison with regard to the administration of justice in this State, to see a solemn process in which the Government is never supposed to interfere, and then to decide how a political operation like an election, which can often be rigged-not only in the Indian States, or in India or Pakistan or other places, but even in the much more advanced countries can be regarded as having disposed of the question. Even a free election could not have disposed of the question, under the obligations of the parties. So then, accession having taken place, troops having been sent to the Maharajah's aid, they cleared the territory of the State of the invaders and of the raiders and those people who were in rebellion against the authority of the Maharajah-up to a certain point. Then, as this process began to appear to be a very lengthy one, the Government of India brought the whole question to the Security Council on 1 January 1948.

 

Now, in the Security Council, what was the position of India with regard to the accession that had taken place and with regard to the manner in which the question of accession should finally be decided? On that point there are many extracts to which one could draw attention. I shall, however, confine myself to three or four.

 

In his telegram of 27 October 1947, the Prime Minister of India had already conveyed the following assurance to the Prime Minister of Pakistan:

 

"I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India."

 

That was one Prime Minister to the other; it is a State document. Naturally, Pakistan was perturbed at the developments that had taken place and that were then taking place, and this was the assurance that the Prime Minister of India conveyed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I repeat:

 

"I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency"-that is to say, to get rid of the tribesmen and of the people that were in rebellion, and to put down the rebellion-"is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question. of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view."

 

Then, in a telegram of 31 October 1947, from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, it was. stated:

 

"Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored" nothing could be clearer-"and leave the decision regarding the further of the state to the people of the State is not merely a promise to your Government" - not that it is not a promise to that Government, but rather that it is more than a promise to that Government-"but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."

 

Today it is a "wish", and it is said, "unfortunately so many wishes remain unfulfilled." But here the words used are: "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision"-not the affirmation, but the decision-"regarding the future of the State to the people of the State, is not merely a promise to your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world". Then, in his broadcast over the All-India Radio on 2 November 1947, the Prime Minister said:

 

"We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge" there was the assurance there was the promise; now there is the pledge-"We have given not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are anxious to finalize anything in a moment of crisis, and without the fullest opportunity to be given to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It is for them ultimately to decide. And let me make it clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a State to either Dominion, the accession must be made by the people of that State." I repeat, "the accession must be made by the people of that State" "It is in accordance with this policy that we have added a provision to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir."

 

In other words, "We accept, provided that.."

 

Since then the representative of the Government of India here has said: "I have looked at the Instrument of Accession. I found only 'Accepted, Mountbatten'. I do not find any proviso". Is not the Prime Minister of India to be believed with regard to the actual transaction which took place and its legal interpretation, as against his own representative speaking here, however great may be the latter's position in that Government? The proviso was contained in the letter of the Governor-General. It must be read along with, and as a part of, the Instrument of Accession. The Instrument of Accession is a formal document, drawn up and printed, and it has gaps only here and there which have to be filled in while the rest of the wording is already there. But there was a letter accompanying it from the Maharajah and there was a letter accompanying the

acceptance from Lord Mountbatten which contained the proviso. Both must be read together. Under any canon of interpretation, the two documents must be taken together.

 

On 8 November 1947, in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nehru said:

 

"It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir's soil as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to UNO to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

 

Then the late Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, before the Security Council on 15 January 1948, in his very first address to the Council stated this :

 

"In accepting the accession they"-the Government of India-"refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by plebiscite as soon as peace has been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary under international auspices. [227th meeting, p. 20.]

 

Mr. Setalvad, who I believe is now the Attorney-General of the Government of India, was a member of the delegation which represented India when the question first came before the Security Council. He said:

 

"But I make bold to say that the conduct of my Government has been entirely above board in this matter. It was not until the Ruler of Kashmir and the popular leader of Kashmir'' that means Sheikh Abdullah “approached the Indian Government for assistance in the extremity which I have described, that the Indian Government stated-and I submit, rightly stated that it could not interfere in the matter of Kashmir unless the State was a part of Indian territory, which could come about only if Kashmir acceded to the Indian Union. On that under. standing, in the peril in which it found itself, Kashmir offered to accede to the Indian Union-not only the Ruler, but also the popular leader. The Indian Government was careful, even though the request came from both, to stipulate" there is the assurance, there is the pledge, there is the proviso, now it is the stipulation "that it was accepting the accession only on the condition"

 

This is the Attorney-General of India speaking, not the Attorney-General at that time, but a man certainly possessing authority on behalf of his Government because he came with credentials to speak to the Security Council. He is now the Attorney-General, a very eminent lawyer. I have had the honour of knowing him for a number of years and I had not, during my six years of office, which I had the honour to hold in India as judge of what is today the Supreme Court of India, heard anybody abler than Mr. Setalvad address the Court. He says that the Indian Government was careful, even though the request came from both, to stipulate that it was accepting the accession only on the condition

 

"...that later, when peace had been restored, the expression of the popular will should be ascertained in a proper manner. It was on the condition, and that condition alone, that the Indian Government accepted accession." (234th meeting, p. 217.]

 

On that condition and that condition alone. Today it is "the expression of a wish, and it is much to be regretted that so many human wishes go unfulfilled", Even with regard to the argument that the Maharajah had the sole authority, in law, and that when he had acceded and the Governor-General had said "Accepted," there was an end of the business, and that all the rest is the expression of a wish and it does not matter if it has or has not been fulfilled, this is what Mr. Ayyangar stated to the Security Council on 8 March 1948:

 

"No doubt the Ruler, as the head of State, has to take action in respect of accession."

 

Obviously it is not the whole population of any State that can sign the instrument of accession; somebody has to do it, who is to act as the instrument on behalf of the real authority.

 

"When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, he applies for accession to that Dominion. However, when he takes one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. That is our position" [264th meeting, p. 50.]

 

That has not yet happened.

 

Here again, it is perfectly clear that the Government of India takes the position that no doubt the ruler will sign the instrument of accession and no doubt a sort of de facto position will arise there from, but once a dispute with regard to accession has arisen, when the ruler takes one view and his people takes another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. Now here I must try to draw this distinction. It does not mean merely "subsequently ascertained and then some modification to be made", as it is now argued that the whole thing was complete. It is said: "Oh, yes, yes, if the people had expressed a wish to the contrary, well, perhaps constitutional matters could have been gone through and Kashmir could have been unlinked" and so on. Nothing of the kind. The wishes of the people have to be ascertained; and "When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people''. That is all. If there is no dispute, the action that the ruler takes is complete. When there is a dispute, the ruler must take some action but the action is not complete, it is incomplete. It leads to certain consequences as a de facto position, but in order to be legally complete and valid and binding, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained and when so ascertained, "the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people". This is in the record of the Security Council.

 

Curiously, even the application of these principles was insisted upon by India in a contrary case. A contrary case had arisen in the State of Junagadh, where again the position was that the ruler belonged to one community and the majority of the people belonged to the other community. The ruler acceded to Pakistan, but at a time when there was no dispute nor any expression of wishes on the part of his people regarding which of the two Dominions he should accede to. But let that go. Later there was a dispute; when his people came to know of it, quite a substantial number of them apparently did not like it. So a difference arose and therefore the question was disputed. What was the position taken up by the Government of India on that? The Governor-General of India in a telegram dated 22 September 1947, addressed to the Governor-General of Pakistan, said the following:

 

"The Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceeded to action which it was made plain the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce in."

 

First, kindly consider the implication that, in such a case, action should not have been unilateral- not unilateral in the sense that Pakistan declared that such and such a State had acceded to us without the consent of the ruler: the ruler had offered accession and accession had been accepted, the same as in the case of Kashmir, although this happened much earlier;

but unilateral and the sense that one Dominion could not unilaterally act without the concurrence of the other. "Such acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be

 

regarded by the Government of India as an encroachment on India's sovereignty and territory..."

 

Here the accession offered by the Maharajah of Kashmir, whose authority had been repudiated over almost the entire State, even if provisionally accepted, makes Kashmir the territory of India. In a contrary case also where Pakistan accepted the accession offered by a ruler of his State, the territory belongs to India. If you win, you win; if you lose, you win.

 

"... and is inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action of Pakistan is considered by the Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected."

 

"In utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected"-what were those principles ? That contiguous majority areas of one community were to constitute Pakistan and the contiguous majority areas of the other community were to constitute India. On that test alone, put forward by the Government of India itself, Kashmir is a contiguous Muslim majority area, contiguous to Pakistan - a Muslim area. The matter does not require further consideration, even with regard to whose sovereignty and whose territory is involved. I continue the quotation:

 

"The possibility of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan dominion, in the teeth of opposition from its Hindu population of over 80 per cent, has given rise to serious concern and apprehension on the parts of the local population and all surrounding States which have acceded to the Indian dominion."

 

Curiously, even the proportions in the population are almost the same. In Junagadh there was a Hindu majority of about 80 per cent and in the composite State of Jammu and Kashmir there is a Muslim majority of 79 per cent.

 

"Large-scale preparations in Junagadh and the supply of arms and ammunition to its Muslim subjects, with obvious intention of terrorizing the people of the State as well as the surrounding States, accentuated the uneasiness and the Government of India received appeals for suitable action, both from the people and these States. The Government of India have therefore sent a small force for troops to their own areas as a very natural counter measure, particularly as most of our acceding States in affected areas have on arms of their own."

 

Then these armed forces marched in and took possession of the State and that possession is still with India.

 

What view did the Security Council take of the Kashmir dispute when it was brought here? That is important from this point of view. It is not merely history which can simply be waved aside. The dispute was fresh; fighting was going on. It was imperative that the fighting be stopped, so that the question of the accession of the State could be decided and law and order restored. That was the first step. I shall trouble the Security Council with just a few extracts from what was said.

 

When the question was taken up on 15 January 1948 in the Security Council, the President of the Council was Mr. Langenhove of Belgium. He observed on 22 January 1948:

 

Both parties have admitted in principle that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by plebiscite. The communication from the Government of India to the President of the Council, dated I January, states that, in the final analysis, the people will be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum, which might be held under international auspices in order to ensure its complete impartiality. That declaration was confirmed in a statement by the representative of India on 15 January before the Council [227th meeting]. The same principle may be noted in the Pakistan representa tive's communication of 15 January to the Secretary General.``

 

"Such is the basis upon which the Security Council is to carry out the mission invested in it by the Charter in the matter that has been brought before it." [231st meeting, P. 165.]

 

Efforts were also made on behalf of India to persuade the Security Council that it should take action to have the raiders withdraw and the rebellion put down and to leave the rest to India. That is the position which, as will be shown, the Security Council repudiated entirely.

 

On 24 January 1948, Mr. Warren Austin said in the Council:

 

"It seems to me, in determining whether there is a situation which, if it were to continue, might lead to a dispute or to war, that we have before us an opportunity to make progress in the right direction, through the continuation of the entirely friendly and informal conferences under the guidance of the President of the Security Council. My country thinks that these conferences should be continued in the real spirit that animates India and Pakistan here, and that they should not be interfered with here by the necessary presentation of charges, counter charges, claims and so on that have to be recorded. "... It seems to me that our advice to the two parties should be and that is what they are asking for when they come here that the Kashmir matter, without prejudice to the other question;"-because the other question here also been raised in the documents which filed on behalf of Pakistan-complete the negotiations that are now pending; and, with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions in which a fair plebiscite can be held, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the smell of brimstone, as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries like India and Pakistan can make it, in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair." [235th meeting p. 261.]

 

Mr. Noel-Baker, since then a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Peace and at that time Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, representing the United Kingdom during the discussion of this question before the same meeting of the Security Council, said:

 

"Having heard the parties, I want, with, equal understanding, with equal friendship, and, if they will allow me to say so, with equal love for both, as a member of the Security Council, sharing our collective responsibility to mankind, to ask the question: What ought the Security Council now to do? I hope we shall fasten our attention on the constructive parts of what our colleagues from India and Pakistan have said.

 

The representative of Pakistan last week and again today, and the representative of India when he opened the matter and again yesterday, gave us their accounts of how the communal troubles happened over the last two years. I do not intend to discuss the tragic features to which they drew attention. To my mind the process of causation is still wrapped in mystery. No doubt these troubles came out of history, and I hope they will soon disappear into history again. The interest of everyone is to forget the past and to concentrate on the future.

 

"... Both parties have told us that they want peace with justice. Both have told us they want the will of the people of Kashmir to prevail. The representative of India stated this yesterday, and the representative of Pakistan stated it today. Our task is to formulate a plan by which that can be done. Let us press forward with that work." [Ibid., pp. 256 and 259.]

 

Mr. de la Tournelle, the representative of France said at the same meeting :

 

"I think that the Commission's first task should be to organize a plebiscite as soon as possible. In that connexion, I think that the speediest procedure would be to continue consultations between the two parties, under the President's auspices, in order to establish the conditions in which that plebiscite should take place.

 

"Personally, I would suggest three conditions:

 

"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir.

 

"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race-Hindu or Muslim-to their place of origin in that State."

 

"3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote." [Ibid, p. 263.]

 

On 28 January 1948, Mr. Noel-Baker said in the Council:

 

"The cause which is now in dispute here, the cause of the fighting in Kashmir, is the question: To which of the two Governments, India or Pakistan, shall Kashmir accede? In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their rights will be assured. In other words, as I remarked to the representative of India in our first talk after his arrival, in my profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as to the fighting, right up to the conduct of the plebiscite in the end, is all one problem. Only when the combatants know what the future holds for them, will they agree to stop." [236th meeting, p. 283.]

 

Mr. Warren Austin, speaking before the Security Council on 4 February 1948 said:

 

"In the first place, I would like to observe that the Security Council does not try, under the Charter, and is not trying, to decide between litigants, opponents, or parties to a situation or difficulty.

 

"It is my opinion that if and when the Security Council deals with this problem, it must consider it as a whole, because unless it does, there cannot be a cessation of hostilities. How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done, unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non-partisan. Only by that method could one hope to have that retirement on a peaceful basis.

 

"We know very well that the alternative is force, and force which has not necessarily been successful when the frontier is reached. The passage of the tribesmen across The frontier does not mean that hostilities have ended. On the contrary, I think that reason indicates that hostilities will have only just begun if an attempt is made to reach a separate solution of this matter and to have the troops get out of Jammu and Kashmir merely because we say so, without our having said to them that we are going to consider all sides of the question and that the plan involves not merely a retirement but also a plebiscite by which the people will register their own choice in the main issue, that plebiscite to be guaranteed to be impartial and just. Nothing short of that is conceivable as a peaceful means of accomplishing the withdrawal of these armed forces from Jammu and Kashmir.

 

"I wish to have one point definitely understood. The Security Council is not partial, it is not prejudging; it is not discriminating between the parties and their claims; it is not brushing aside the claims of any one." [240th meeting, pp. 367, 369 and 370.]

 

I intend-and I trust I will be able to do it when I come toward the close of my submission to the Security Council-to stress one aspect which was stressed here by the late Mr. Warren Austin: that nobody should deceive himself that, merely by covering over the question, it will be settled. If the Security Council does not want the elements in the State who started the liberation battle to start it again. if the Security Council does not desire that the tribesmen should get out of hand and pour into Kashmir again, if the Security Council does not desire that the people of Pakistan should get out of hand and-if I may mix the metaphor-take the bit between their teeth and run away with the whole system of ordered government, and if the Security Council does not desire that powerful neighbouring States should plunge into the vortex when it starts again, the Security Council had better take note of the realities of the situation.

 

What can be done? The problem is there. As I had the honour to submit the last time I spoke before the Security Council [990th meeting], so much has passed. Yes, fifteen years. But anybody who goes into Kashmir on either side, on the side occupied by India or on the "Azad'' Kashmir side, if he were to try to get in touch with the people without any representative of the authorities being present or being within earshot, would come away convinced, as everybody who has done that has come away convinced, that the question is as acute today as it was in the fall of 1947 and the spring of 1948-indeed, throughout the year 1948 until the cease-fire was arranged on 1 January 1949. And if it boils up again, it will not then be confined to where it was confined in those days-a local struggle in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

This is by no means, I beg to assure the Council, any kind. of threat whatsoever. Pakistan, from the bottom of its heart, does not desire any such development. But Pakistan is convinced that, unless the question is set toward settlement at a fairly early date, that is what is bound to happen.

 

Mr. Arce, representative of Argentina, also speaking on 4 February 1948 before the Security Council said:

 

"Now that the dispute between India and Pakistan have been submitted to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, the delegation of Argentina will not be able to vote in favour of any draft resolution which does not leave the solution of the problem to be decided by a plebiscite, freely prepared, freely conducted and freely scrutinized under the authority of the Security Council.

 

"Some discussion has taken place, in my opinion, mistakenly, on whether the order for cessation of hostilities and the order for the holding of the plebiscite should be issued successively or simultaneously. In order to solve a problem, and especially a problem of this nature, it is necessary to know the underlying causes. while remembering the Latin proverb, which says sublata It is worth causa, tollitur effects, or, in other words, remove the cause and the effects will disappear. In this case, the cause of all the disturbances, whether from India or Pakistan, or from the tribes, lies in the rebellion of the people of Kashmir against the absolute monarch who rules them as if he were running a farm and 4 million inhabitants were so many heads of cattle and not human beings." And that was the cause that brought about all this trouble "If therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter already quoted, we assure these human beings that they themselves will be able to decide their own fate freely and without pressure from any quarter, I am sure that they lay down their arms, I am sure that the tribes will withdraw to their own territories and I am sure that India and Pakistan, having submitted to the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Organization to which they both belong, will be able to come to understanding and an maintain the friendliest relations with one another, thus proving that they are really 'peace-loving people." [240th meeting. pp. 366 and 367.]

 

Now I shall quote from the statement of Mr. de la Tournelle of 5 February 1948:

 

"At the time of drafting the report of the Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and during the Security Council's discussions of that report, the French delegation maintained that the establishment of responsibility for the Balkan disturbances was relatively unimportant, and that the Council's only duty was to work out a plan of pacification which would assure that part of Europe of a peaceful future. It seems to me that this wise attitude should be followed in our study of the Kashmir question, and that the Security Council should try to put before the parties concerned, for their voluntary acceptance, a suitable solution to end the dispute which separates them...."My delegation thinks the organization of a free plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir would be the most effective and possibly the only means of stopping hostilities in those States, as it would give the population the assurance that they would be free to decide their own fate. Our main preoccupation, therefore, should be the organization of a plebiscite." [241st meeting, pp. 3 and 4.]

 

The late Mr. Faris El-Khouri, representing Syria, said the following on 5 February 1948, at the same meeting :

 

"It is quite clear, as I stated before, that recommendations with regard to the cessation of fighting are of no use if they are not connected with substantial assurances to the parties which will satisfy them and place them in the definite position of knowing that their demands will be fulfilled and consecrated by the processes recommended by the Security Council." [Ibid, p. 14.]

 

Now I have said enough, although one could have multiplied these statements. I beg to apologize to the Security Council and to my learned friends the representatives of India for, as it were, delving into history. I have done this to emphasize one point. There seems to be an attitude, which is not confined to India-and I shall be forgiven if I make bold to say that I have seen signs of it among the members around this table also to this effect: "Oh, fifteen years have passed and, after all, the fighting came to an end. So why not accept things as they are today ?"

 

I would again beg the forgiveness of the Council and of the representatives of India for asking if, in view of the declarations which I have read, you would not agree with me that it would amount to cheating the people of Kashmir ? Here was member after member of the Security Council-occupying the most responsible position in the international world which anybody can occupy today, representatives of eleven States, representing the whole of humanity-sitting here and solemnly assuring these people, who, like their ancestors, had endured a tyranny of the worst type ever witnessed in any part of the world, under which, as I believe I said on an earlier occasion. it was difficult for a Kashmiri to decide which was the greater misery, to be alive or dead. Having arisen under those conditions of misery to seek a way out and not to continue to be subjected to them any further, having had recourse to arms, having made all sacrifices, they brought the matter here. And here they were given solemn assurance after solemn assurance. They were assured, "The decision is in your hands' '. In placing their faith in those assurances, they stopped fighting. I say again, would you not agree with me that, to say the very least, it would be cheating those people to say that those assurances today have no meaning at all, in view of the glosses, the excuses, the legal documents put forward? And I shall come to them; I shall deal with them; I shall attempt to give a reply to everything which has been brought to my notice. I hope I can satisfy the Security Council that they have no substance.

 

But assume that I fail, or assume that I satisfy the Security Council or a majority of the Security Council, but fail to satisfy India, as appears likely to be the case, what then is the duty of the Security Council? It is to take into account all factors, to see whether they are valid, to see whether they really are the cause of obstructing the path towards a settlement, and, if they are, to determine whose fault it is. I say here and now, and I shall repeat it later when I have dealt with those matters, I say with full responsibility that if a fair and impartial determination-it does not matter what shape it takes- is made by the Security Council, if there is a pronouncement by the Security Council, or a determination and pronouncement by any individual of recognized international standing and integrity, or a pronouncement through a process of arbitration, or a pronouncement through judicial determination, if there is a pronouncement that in respect of the obligations undertaken by Pakistan, Pakistan is in default with regard to any matter, I have the authority of my Government to state that, in the speediest possible manner and within the shortest possible time, Pakistan will rectify that default, so that the matter shall be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people. I shall come to these matters one by one later, at least to the principal ones, and if others are cited I shall deal with them also and I shall be able to show, as I have said, what the situation is.

 

But you cannot have a position in any matter like this - and you have to look at the geography of the place to know what is the danger that threatens not only that area but every one of us here - which just covers it over as if it does not exist, and then say to both sides, "You'd better be content with what has happened". As I said, I shall come to that later; I shall now proceed with the story.

 

The Security Council, having taken that view, eventually. adopted a resolution at its 286th meeting, on 21 April 1948. I say "eventually" because first another text, in accordance with the principles enunciated by the members representing the various countries on the Security Council, was presented. After the six sponsors had spoken in support of it, the Indian delegation intimated to the Security Council that it had been asked to return home for consultation and that it would come back after those consultations to continue to participate in the discussions of the Council. So for a period the discussions were interrupted. It is therefore not of much relevance to hark back to that draft resolution. But that draft resolution complied with every one of the conditions that had been adumbrated in the statements of the members. Later on a text considerably wanted down presented and was adopted. That is the resolution which is now the subject matter of implementation.

 

According, so far as the Security Council is concerned, on 21 April 1948 it provided for the setting up of a Commission comprising five members. Two were to be nominated by the States concerned, one by Pakistan and one by India; two were to be nominated by the Security Council: and one was to be nominated by the last two members nominated by the Security Council. So eventually the Commission was set up. India nominated Czechoslovakia, Pakistan nominated Colombia and Belgium, and Colombia and Belgium agreed upon the United States. That is how the Commission was composed.

 

The matter was then put into the hands of the Commission, which went first to Geneva to take preliminary measures and study the whole fairly complicated question, the resolution and the debate of the Security Council and everything else. Eventually, on 7 July 1948, the Commission arrived in Karachi. I believe they had an interview with the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 8 July, and during their very first call on me I explained to them the change that had taken place in the situation. Since the Security Council would not countenance or encourage the Government of India in its desire to reach a military decision rather than one in accordance with the resolution that had been passed here, the Government of India, after the matter had been adjourned in the Security Council on 27 April 1948, had made preparations which where so complete that the report of the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey, was that an Indian Army offensive was imminent, threatening danger to Pakistan's system of irrigation and security. I will not wear the Council with the details, it was long ago, but it was absolutely necessary that Pakistan regular troops should be sent in to hold the line. They were sent in during the first week of May.

 

As soon as the Commission arrived in Karachi they were apprised of this situation. They have described that and have admitted that it was a serious change, or a new element, in the situation as compared with what had been contemplated by the Security Council. Indeed, after considering whether they should ask the Security Council for fresh directives or attempt to deal with the matter themselves, they decided to deal with it themselves. They travelled back and forth between Delhi and Karachi and produced a draft resolution which subsequently became known as the resolution of 13 August 1948. The Government of India signified its acceptance of this resolution, although with some clarifications and provisions. But the Government of Pakistan was not able to accept it because it stopped halfway to a plebiscite. I did not make any provision for the conditions of the plebiscite but only applied to demilitarization.

 

The Commission continued its activities and eventually produced a second resolution, which is technically dated 5 January 1949, but it was communicated to the Governments late in December 1948. The Council was then sitting in Paris because the General Assembly's third session was taking place here and the Commission found it convenient to carry on its discussions with the representatives of the two Governments in Paris instead of having to travel catch time to one capital or the other. Towards the end of December both Governments signified their acceptance of both the 18 August 1948 and the 5 January 1949 resolutions, and in consequence of the acceptance of those two resolutions dealing with demilitarization as well as the holding of a plebiscite it was possible to bring about a cease fire on 1 January 1949.

 

Later on, in March 1949, the Commission arrived in Delhi and began to hold meetings designed to secure the implementation of the resolutions. The first task was the demilitarization of the State. Now although India made repeated public declarations here that it would be prepared to withdraw its armed forces and co-operate in the holding of a plebiscite under international auspices, it raised several questions. Again, I am not laying blame; various things were taken into account by the Security Council such as the question of accession, the question of sovereignty, the question of the so called aggressions by Pakistan, the actual situation in the State all that, but the two resolutions were accepted by both sides and are binding on both sides. When the Commission arrived in Delhi and held a meeting in March, it called upon representatives of both Governments in order to settle the question of demilitarization. That is to get the armed forces of Pakistan in their entirety out of the "Azad" Kashmir area, or away from the "Azad" Kashmir side of the cease-fire line and, in accordance with the resolution, to get the Indian army out of the Indian occupied portion.

 

Each side was asked to propose a scheme, because obviously, as I shall show when I come to give you the reactions of India, it was a condition of any withdrawal that there should first be a truce scheme according to which the withdrawal of the troops would take place. Pakistan submitted one, but eventually when it submitted a scheme to the Commission for the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, laid down a condition that the Commission was not to disclose that scheme even to the Security Council and certainly not to Pakistan. Naturally any agreement with Pakistan in accordance with the terms of the resolution would have to be made public, but we do not know to this date what the Indian scheme was. However, the Commission, in its third report, observed that in its view, although it was not at liberty to disclose what the scheme presented by India was, it did not conform either qualitatively or quantitatively with the requirements of the resolution. There ensued a long period of efforts by the Commission and then the Commission was replaced by the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon, and afterwards by Mr. Graham. These efforts were devoted to bringing about an agreement on a scheme for the withdrawal of troops from both sides. At that time I want to say this here and now, although I shall have to refer to it again later-on no occasion was any question raised that the essential preliminary of the resolution had not been complied with and that therefore no occasion arose for the withdrawal of troops on either side. The essential preliminary was the cease-fire, and besides, even the tribesmen had withdrawn as soon as the fighting had come to an end. Why should they have continued? They went back to their homes; those who had come in from Pakistan, apart from the regular forces, had already gone out. The only question remaining was the withdrawal of the regular troops. Scheme after scheme was presented, and I might say that, by and large, Pakistan was ready to go forward. India was not. I repeat, India did not base its rejections on the ground that Pakistan had not complied with what it had to do before withdrawal; it was only that the schemes were not acceptable to it. In between, certain other things were tried. Again, I will not weary the Council by going into details. Sir Owen Dixon, after recording the finding, found that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was not willing to accept any conditions which, alone, would guarantee the freedom of the plebiscite. He had then to try to carry out his alternative directive from the Security Council-that is to say, to explore the possibility of some other method of resolving the dispute. He said he found himself obstructed all the time by India; and that was the first time that the matter was seriously pressed on the insistence of the Prime Minister of India-that Pakistan must be declared to be an aggressor.

 

Sir Owen Dixon points out in his report that he had no authority to do that, that the Security Council, although asked several times, had refused to deal with that question. What it concentrated upon was a settlement of the dispute, rather than a pronouncement on the legal questions of aggression or non aggression; but he was prepared to assume, for the purpose of taking the matter further, that the entry of the tribesmen into the State, and of the armed forces of Pakistan in May 1948, was not in accordance with the principles of international law, or was contrary to the principles of international law. It was a hypothetical assumption that he was prepared to make in order that the matter be carried further. That has since then been construed as a finding, by the Security Council, that Pakistan is in aggression. We will come later, also.

 

But at the time the objective was to remove all the obstructions and difficulties in the way of getting an agreement upon the scheme of withdrawal. As a matter of fact, right until the end of the efforts of Mr. Graham, the United Nations Representative or rather, until the last effort he made-that was the principal question. Certain general principles were formulated and were accepted by both sides; but on the proposals which related to the concrete matter there could be no agreement. I shall mention one or two matters.

 

By this time, it is quite clear, I hope, that, with regard to the main armies of both sides in Kashmir, the agreement in the resolution was that, when the scheme was agreed upon and I shall show later that that is the agreement Pakistan should begin the withdrawal of its regular forces from the "Azad" Kashmir side, and when a certain number of days had elapsed after that withdrawal had been commenced, India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. Thereafter, the process was to continue on both sides, in a synchronized fashion, so as not to give any advantage, or cause any fear, to either side until the whole of the Pakistan armed forces and the bulk of the Indian forces were withdrawn.

 

Now, one thing which has always given a great deal of trouble is this: what constitutes "bulk"? "Bulk" is not a term of art; but whatever it constitutes, it does not constitute a given position: it does mean the major portion. On one occasion, getting tired of this controversy with regard to what does or does not constitute bulk, I decided to take the plunge on behalf of my Government, and from this table I made an offer, I said: "This controversy has lasted long enough. What constitutes bulk? Bulk means the major portion. What the Indian Government says is the major portion, we do not know. The Commission says that what the Indian Government says is the major portion, which it is willing to withdraw, does not, qualitatively or quantitatively, conform to the resolution. Here is the quandary. How is it to be resolved? The Indian Government says: "We are willing to withdraw "X", because that constitutes the bulk; and we shall leave behind only''R ``. because that is the lesser part." I say, 'All right, let them withdraw "Y" and leave "X"; leave the bulk in, and withdraw the remainder and we will accept that as the withdrawal of the bulk." That offer was not accepted.

 

Later on, on one occasion, the Indian representative-who happened to be my very esteemed friend for whom I have always had deep affection, Mrs. Pandit-presented a proposal here which I thought was a very constructive proposal, but which involved, also, a later stage of the withdrawal of forces, That is to say the stage pertaining to the disbanding and disarming of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. You cannot withdraw them: they belong to the people of the country; they have to remain there. With regard to them the Commission's resolution to 3 January 1949 provided that, when the Plebiscite Administrator takes over, he can take such action in respect of the remaining troops as he considers necessary, having regard to the security of the State and the freedom of troops would be the whole of their troops minus the bulk which was withdrawn, and the State forces; and, on the "Azad'' Kashmir side, there would be the "Azad" Kashmir forces; the Pakistan troops would have gone, and he could then take such action as necessary. But it was the Indian position that the disbanding must be done as part of one process, at one stage. That proposal headed the field, and Mrs. Pandit put forth a solution which, I thought, offered some basis of an agreement, relating both to the regular forces of both sides, and also to the "Azad" Kashmir forces.

 

I said again: "I make this offer: here and now, on behalf of my Government, I accept the proposals made by Mrs. Pandit, in so far as they relate to the regular forces, the whole of the Pakistan forces, going out, and the bulk of the Indian forces, which now had been defined-what they would take out from their side. With regard to the disbanding of the rest and the disposal of the rest on the other side, let the United Nations Plebiscite Administrator, as soon as he takes over, take charge; it is his province, not our province."

 

The very next day, in the newspapers, the comments of Prime Minister Nehru appeared to the effect that my proposal was fantastic. The thing did not go forward.

 

In his last report, made on 28 March 1958, Mr. Graham, after summing up that no progress was possible, made the suggestion that the two Prime Ministers meet under his auspices to consider certain questions. That was acceptable to Pakistan. It was rejected by India. That meeting too could not take place. That is where the matter rested at the end of March 1958-that is to say, just over four years ago. In the meantime, when the present regime came into power in Pakistan, the President of Pakistan-who was extremely anxious that whatever disputes there were between India and Pakistan should be speedily settled-requested a meeting with the Prime Minister of India. He was flying from Karachi to Dacca, Dacca being the capital of East Pakistan. He tried to ascertain in advance whether the Prime Minister would do him the honour of meeting him at the airport while he was on the way, in which case he would stop at the Indian airport, and he then invited the Prime Minister of India to come later to Karachi, in September of 1960. The Prime Minister came to Karachi, they had conversations, and again no settlement could be reached, nor could any agreement be reached which would move the question toward a settlement. Before leaving Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India suggested to the President that the President might visit him in Delhi, where they might continue their conversations. The President said he would be very happy to go to Delhi at any time, provided, when they met next time, they would not repeat the same exercises in which the Prime Minister of India would tell him why no progress could be made, but would concentrate on making progress, in other words, provided the Prime Minister of India would either be prepared to tackle the whole question and try to come to a settlement, or be prepared at least to move the question toward settlement.

 

That is where the matter rested until my letter to the President of the Security Council in January requesting another meeting. Then the question of negotiations between the parties was revived.

 

But that position still holds. On the one side there have been suggestions: "Let us negotiate"; though there had been a public statement that their position is that they would like to see the parties accept the present position and talk only of adjustment. And on the other side, the position is: "There is no use in talking about adjustment in the present position. The present position is the consequence of the fighting that took place. It is a military position, and this is not a settlement of the question in dispute." However, we are quite willing at any time to enter into negotiations and to discuss matters, provided we discuss the resolving of the dispute, that is to say, the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to either Pakistan or India.

 

It seems that what has happened in this context is well known to the members of the Security Council. If the President and the members of the Council feel that it has been a sufficient strain for them for one afternoon to have had so much placed before them-namely the history of the dispute-I would request an adjournment until some time next week which may be convenient to the members of the Council, for I understand that, for one member, Monday may not be convenient, and for another member- as a matter of fact, the President for next month Tuesday may not be convenient. As far as we are concerned, any day the Council may wish will be convenient. If Wednesday is convenient to the Council, it is convenient to us. I will then go, by way of illustration, into the questions raised as I know them and so far as I know them, and I will select the principal ones on the other side-why progress cannot be made or could not be made on the basis of the agreement subsisting between the parties. After I have dealt with those, I will suggest one or two or three methods, any of which might possibly help to move the matter towards a settlement.

 

I will again repeat here that the desire of my Government, as I have said, is not to make debating points, is not to appor tion blame, is not to raise prejudice. Our effort is not what has been described in the Indian Press as agitational or propagandist. Whom would we want to agitate? What is the propaganda that we want to carry on, and how would it help the situation? The situation is getting extremely difficult. It has sometimes been so tense that one was not quite sure whether within the space of a week there might not be a resumption of the fighting. It is still a situation of the utmost gravity. It keeps apart two countries which are linked by their traditions, their common history and their common language. After all whatever language is spoken on one side by one community is also spoken by that community on the other side. As a matter of fact, the language of culture that we speak in West Pakistan is spoken much better by the Prime Minister of India than by any of us. Certainly he has a much better command of it than I have. Indeed, when, as often happens here in this country it happens almost every fortnight or so when I go to address some meeting or other; especially at the universities-I happen to meet some of my Sikh friends, who are now all domiciled in India, I can talk to them in a language which, unless an Indian comes from that part of the country, could not be understood by the rest of India. There are all these relations, and, in addition, we have to face common dangers, we have to resolve common problems. This problem of Kashmir is the main thing that is keeping us apart. If this could be put on the way towards a settlement-we know it will take some time to reach a settlement, for the question has been pending so long and there are so many things to consider-if it could be moved towards a settlement, even before the settlement could be reached, given the assurance that we were now likely to reach it in a fair and equitable manner, many other relationships between India and Pakistan would become closer and the two countries would begin to co-operate in many fields to the mutual advantage of everyone. That is our object.

 

I hope that as a result of the deliberations of the Security Council a settlement will ultimately be reached. I very much fear, however, in my own mind that this may be the last occasion when the Security Council may have that privilege. 'Again I hope that the Council will not feel it need be in a hurry, that it will not feel that it must come to a deadlock or that it must cover the situation somehow or other and then pretend that the matter has been settled. I hope rather that it will direct its wisdom and judgement and all the resources, intellectual and philosophical, that it commands in such abundance, to the intricacies of this problem and try to bring the parties together to face the realities of the situation and then try to come to a settlement. I hope that whatever time I have taken will be excused on the grounds that it is justified by our extreme anxiety that all aspects of the problem should be properly realized. Any over simplification, in this complicated matter, of any of the complex factors that enter into it will not facilitate or stimulate a solution but will bar progress towards that end.