01021962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 990 held on 1 February 1962.
01021962 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 990 held on 1 February 1962.
I am very grateful to the President and the members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity of placing before the Council the present situation with regard to the dispute over the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India. It will be necessary, I fear, to sketch very broadly the factual situation behind the dispute; that is to say the figures and history not of the dispute so much as of the territory itself, before I place before the Council the situation which is causing acute apprehension to my Government and anxiety to the people of Pakistan.
The word "Kashmir", which is the eighteenth century, and even in the nineteenth century, used to be spelled "Cashmere", is a familiar word almost around the globe, and calls to mind a romantic land reputed for its art. In one word I might submit that in Kashmir there has been, at least from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of this century, a poignant conflict between the bounties of Providence and the misery as imposed upon man by man.
The expression which is used constantly in the seasons. before the Security Council is the State Governments and Kashmir". It is a composite State made up of two areas- Jammu, which is more or less plains and foothills, and Kashmir, which includes the beautiful Vale of Kashmir and other surrounding areas. The population of the composite State is just over 4 million. According to the last census, which was held in 1941, 77 percent of the population were Moslems. In the valley of Kashmir itself, the proportion of Moslems was very much higher-just over 93 per cent
The acute state of the miseries and tribulations of the people of Kashmir began early in the year 1846, the year in which the British defeated the Sikh rulers of the Punjab and took over the administration of the Punjab. This change from Sikh rule to British rule was embodied in the Treaty of Lahore of 9 March 1846, and the handing over of Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh was effected through the Treaty of Amritsar which was signed a week later on 16 March 1846.
It was a purely financial transaction. It is needless to recall to the members of the Council that the British at that time were represented in the subcontinent as agents of the East India Company, and, though the operations of the East India Company had for a long time gone much beyond mere commerce, the payment of dividends was still one of the principal duties of the directors of that company. Consequently, there was a financial aspect of the Treaty also. Gulab Singh was asked to contribute a sum of 7.5 million rupees to the expenses of the war that had just been concluded, and as the result of which the British occupied the Punjab. But they were "nanakshahi '' rupees, as they were then called I have ascertained. that the value of a "nanak shahi'' rupee today would be 15 cents, so that the total amount of the contribution was approximately $1,100,000. In return the British handed over to Maharaja Gulab Singh all the hill territory between the River Ravi and the River Indus. The word "Kashmir" is not mentioned and it is curious that one of the documents already referred to by me in the earlier debates of the Council states. that Gulab Singh stole the amount from the treasury of the defeated Sikh rulers of the Punjab. Nevertheless, as soon as he took possession of that territory a period of stark misery started for the people, so much so that within a year Lord Lawrence himself, then the Governor-General of India and a party to the Treaty of Amritsar of 16 March 1846, had to write quite a severe letter to the Maharajah calling to mind his duties as a ruler. And the Resident, as he used to be called, the agent of the Governor-General in the Punjab who conducted relations with the Indian States, was even severer in his letters and reminders to the Maharajah. This is not the occasion for me to go into details and to recall them all to the members of the Council. But facts like this are mentioned: "My dear friend, I understand that you have even proceeded to tax grass and other such articles in your territories." Anyway, those conditions continued more or less for 101 years.
During the nineteen thirties, quite an active movement for the assertion of elementary human rights and for the obtaining of representative institutions started in the State, a movement with which everybody outside the State was in complete and enthusiastic sympathy. In the forefront of this movement was the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became, even before partition, the head of the Provisional Government of India. This movement included the "Quit Kashmir Movement'', which called upon the late Maharaja Hari Singh, to call the State. This movement was led by Sheikh Abdulla, who had the full support of the present Prime Minister of India. For initiating this movement, Sheikh Abdulla was condemned to a long term of imprisonment. But when he was under trial for his alleged offence of treason-it would be of interest to the members of the Security Council to know-Jawaharlal Pandit Nehru, in his enthusiasm for the movement and also on account of his friendship with Sheikh Abdulla, went to Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and offered to defend Sheikh Abdulla as counsel in his trial. To the best of my knowledge, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had never been in legal practice, or he may have practiced a little, but he is a qualified and competent lawyer. But the Maharajah would not permit that, and the Pandit was sent back out of the State, though it had been announced that within a few days he would be the head of the Provisional Government of India.
After these preliminary facts of history, I might spend a few minutes on the geographical juxtaposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir vis-a-vis Pakistan. All the three main rivers of Kashmir, the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus, flow directly into Pakistan. Both the main roads (one of which later branched into two) which before the partition ran from Kashmir into India, still run from the State into Pakistan, though one of them the one out of Jammu-is not of much use now. The principal particle of export which originated in the forests of Kashmir was timber, which came down the two rivers, the Chenab and the Jhelum, into Pakistan, and came to the timber market at Wazirabad, Sialkot and Jhelum. Another principal item of income for Kashmir on account of its loveliness and the bounties to which I have already referred was tourist trade. The main tourist trade came from the areas which are today Pakistan. The principal port of export and import was Karachi. But much more than all this were the cultural affinities which bound and still bind the people of Kashmir to the neighbouring province of Pakistan, so much so that through thousands of families have been divided between Kashmir and West Pakistan, with some members living in Kashmir and others in Pakistan.
For all these reasons, when independence came there was an upsurge of longing among the people of Kashmir to participate in that full independence, to be rid of the rule of the Maharajah and to accede to Pakistan.
The scheme of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was that while what was known as the British provinces would become independent in the shape of Pakistan and India, contiguous Muslim majority areas in the north-west and the nort East forming Pakistan, and contiguous majority non-Muslim areas in the rest of India forming India. The problem of the Princely States, as they were called, was resolved through the machinery, the foundation of which was laid in section 7 of the Indian Independence Act; that is to say, Britain withdrew or renounced its suzerainty over the Princely States and left them free to accede either to India or to Pakistan, whichever they desired. But Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General and Viceroy of India, advised these States that in coming to their decision as to which of the two dominions they should accede, they should consider the geographical contiguity as well as to the wishes of their people. He said: "You can escape neither one nor the other.".
In spite of this advice, it appears that the Maharajah Hari Singh, whom I have already mentioned, had different designs. He did enter into a stand-still agreement with Pakistan in order that the matters which by treaty used to be looked after by Britain should still be looked after, and that there should be no gap or interruption. This provided for such matters as post and telegraph services, security and all the relationships that he had with Britain. Nevertheless he would not make up his mind with regard to accession one way or another. This caused deep anxiety among the people of the State, particularly the Muslims, and a freedom movement started at Poonch, that part of the State which had been a feudatory of the Maharajah, the rulers being the senior line of Maharaja Gulab Singh.
As I have said, I shall not go into too much detail, suffice it to say that this movement gathered force and the result was that the Maharajah in person took command of his forces to put it down. He proceeded to do so ruthlessly and, according to the account published by The Times of London of 10 October 1947, 237,000 Muslims were exterminated.
Members of the Council will realize that this would cause great inflammatory uprisings in those areas and would also up set and perturb people in the neighbouring areas of Pakistan, when they remember the close ties to which I have already alluded. This feeling continued and spread over into the tribal areas, from which tribesmen poured into the Vale of Kashmir to assist this freedom movement. Maharaja Hari Singh was repudiated over the greater part of the State and he left. Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, and went to Jammu. He naturally was trying to obtain help to stem this tide of the freedom movement, because his own forces had proved inadequate, and he turned to India for military assistance. He was advised by Mr. V.P. Menon, then Political Secretary in the Government of India of the same name but I believe, no connexion with the Defence Minister of India that he should offer accession to India, which he did. That accession was accepted by Lord Mountbatten, then the Governor-General-and I shall
say so advisedly just now but without going into further detail on condition that the question of the accession of the State to Pakistan or to India should be finally decided by the freely expressed wishes of the people. That is where this question of accession on the basis of the freely expressed wishes of the people originated.
As a side observation, I might submit that during recent years, it has been repeated more and more that India will negotiate the settlement of this dispute only on the basis of its sovereignty over the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Again I shall not go into detail but shall only say that the very question of sovereignty can be decided only by the freely expressed wishes of the people. After all, that is what accession means. The question of accession can be decided only by the freely expressed wishes of the people of the States. Therefore the question whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir adheres to the sovereignty of Pakistan or to the sovereignty of India can be decided only by the freely expressed wishes of the people of the State.
India's position over the accession appears very clearly from the several statements made before the Security Council. I shall refer to only one here. On 23 January 1948, Mr. Setalvad, representative of India on the Security Council, said:
"The Indian Government was careful, even though the request came from both," he means the Maharajah and the leader of the people, Sheikh Abdullah-"to stipulate that it was accepting the accession only on the condition that later, when peace had been restored, the expression of the popular will should be ascertained in a proper manner. It was on that condition, and that condition alone, that the Indian Government accepted accession."
As a matter of fact, even much earlier, in his telegrams to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India had said that very clearly. In his telegram of 27 October 1947 be had said:
"I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view."
In another telegram he was pleased to state that he ve this pledge not only to the Government of Pakistan but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world. That again is the basis of the whole effect of Pakistan; that those pledges shall be carried into effect.
It is true-it needs not even to be pointed out that these pledges, these declarations, these messages from one Government to the other, said: when the tribesmen have withdrawn and law and order have been restored, the wishes of the people shall be ascertained through a free and impartial plebiscite. Those two conditions also were inherent, and it is obvious that a plebiscite could be held only after the disturbances that were taking place had been quelled or got rid of, but those were the only two conditions.
On 1 January 1948 India brought the matter to the Security Council, where it has been pending during the last fourteen years. I will not again go into the history of what the Council did, the draft resolution that it first put forward and the resolution that was eventually passed on 21 April 1948. But suffice it to say that the Security Council set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan-composed of three members and later enlarged to five-and instructed it to study the matter and seek a settlement on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.
The Commission went over to the subcontinent in July 1948 and entered into negotiations with the two Governments. In the meantime a change has taken place in the situation in Kashmir itself. After the Security Council had concluded its consideration of the case, at that stage, it was found that India was preparing to mount an offensive in Kashmir, probably in accord with its wish, several times expressed in the Security Council, that the Council should concern itself only with the aspect of getting rid of the tribesmen from Kashmir and that the rest would be managed by India. Anyhow, when that military offensive was about to be launched the then Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan made a report to the Government of Pakistan of the very serious consequences that might result from that military offensive making progress, and Pakistan then put in its regular army to hold the line.
When the Commission arrived in Karachi, on the very first day that I had the honour to receive its members as I was then Foreign Minister-I brought the whole situation to their notice in detail, with the aid of maps and dispositions and so on. The Commission had referred to this matter in its first interim report as a material change in the situation; in consequence the Commission several times made changes in its proposals for a resolution in order to meet India's objections arising out of the presence of Pakistan troops on the Azad Kashmir side, which subsequently was divided between the two sides by the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.
I have referred to this matter in as much as it will be found, later on in the discussions, that a good deal of reference is made to this fact in order to build up the charge that Pakistan is an aggressor in "Azad" Kashmir. This question of aggression, this question of troops on both sides, was, as I have said, discussed backward and forward during the summer of 1948 between the Commission and the two Governments. Finally, the Commission proposed a resolution on 13 August 1948; as it could not be accepted at that stage, mainly by the Pakistan Government, the Commission elaborated part III of the resolution, which related to the holding of a plebiscite, and that elaboration took the shape of a second resolution, supplementary to the first, known as the resolution of 5 January 1949. Both these resolutions were accepted by both sides and became the international agreement between them, as they were recorded also by the Security Council, with reference to the settlement of the dispute.
In April 1949, the Commission called upon both sides to put forward a scheme called the "demilitarization of the State", in order to carry out those parts of the resolutions which related to the withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces from the Azad Kashmir side of the cease fire line of 1 January 1949 and the bulk of the Indian army from the Indian-occupied side of Kashmir. But no progress could be made with that as no plan. was agreed upon. And that is really where the matter got stuck. Again, this is not the stage to go into the question of whose default it was if there was default. But, as no plan of withdrawal could be agreed upon, Pakistan could not begin the withdrawal of its forces, as it was committed to do and is still committed to do under the resolutions of the Commission. Nor could the synchronized withdrawal later of the rest of the Pakistan forces and the bulk of the Indian forces be arranged. That is where the matter stands.
Again, a very brief observation: the representatives of India have said in the Security Council that Pakistan is in default with regard to these resolutions, both because it has augmented its forces in Azad Kashmir, and also because it has. not appealed to its people and the people under its control for the creation of conditions which would enable the plebiscite to be held. Both these allegations were contested by Pakistan. The United Nations representative was satisfied that part I of the resolution had been implemented.
Another allegation is that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has also not been complied with. With regard to certain clauses of this part, both the Commission and the United Nations representatives have affirmed that it has been complied with. The tribesmen had withdrawn long ago, and other people who had entered the territory of the State from outside, on the Azad Kashmir side, had withdrawn. The only question now is to know when the withdrawal of the troops is to begin. The Indian stand is that Pakistan was to begin the withdrawal and to withdraw its troops before India was under any obligation to do the same. On the other hand, Pakistan considers and it will be borne out by the explanations of the Commission and also the reports of the United Nations representative that a truce plan has first to be agreed upon under section C of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Once it is agreed upon, Pakistan is to begin the withdrawal, and then the withdrawal is to proceed in a synchronized manner until the whole of the Pakistan troops, on one side, and the bulk of the Indian troops, on the other, have been withdrawn.
That, again, is a necessary part of history. I have again not tried to apportion blame.
Given the situation, suggestions have been made that the questions in dispute, being more or less questions of fact, has Pakistan done or not done what it was bound to do under the resolutions?-might be settled by arbitration. For instance, in February 1957, Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring, representative of Sweden, when President of this Council, was requested by the Council to proceed to the subcontinent and to see whether he could move the matter toward a settlement. He found that the settlement was obstructed by this allegation on one side and its denial on the other side, and he aggregated that the question of whether Pakistan had or had not complied with its obligation might be settled by arbitration, in the sense that by arbitration it might be determined what the actual facts were, and if, in fact, there had been some default in compliance, what that default was, so that it might be repaired. Pakistan accepted that position; India did not accept that position.
The representatives of India generally said that acceptance of arbitration on any aspect of the dispute is somehow income partible with India's sovereignty. In that connexion, and again without entering into arguments, I would beg to draw the attention of the Council to Article 51 of the Constitution of India, where as one part of the directive principles of State policy it is laid down: "The State shall endeavour to encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration." Not only would it not be incompatible with the sovereignty of India, but it would be in absolute accord with the Indian Constitution and in compliance with it, if arbitration were accepted with regard to any aspect of these matters which may be in dispute. Nevertheless, there it stands.
The present position is this: the last resolution of the Security Council was adopted on 2 December 1957. Operative paragraph 2 reads as follows:
"The Security Council,
"Requests the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan to make any recommendations to the parties for further appropriate action with a view to making progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and toward a peaceful settlement."
Mr. Frank P. Graham, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, has made many diligent efforts and several wise proposals with regard to the achievement of the purpose that was laid down in this resolution. He again proceeded to the subcontinent and made a report on 28 March 1958, almost four years ago. I have no doubt myself that when the Security Council comes to start a consideration of the merits of the dispute, it would no doubt feel that it would be helped considerably if, in addition to his report, it also heard the views of the United Nations representative with regard to the present situation.
The United Nations representative had also recommended that parties should try to make progress toward the settlement of the dispute by negotiations between themselves. He had even suggested a meeting of the two sides under his auspices. That was not agreed to, but the recommendation remained that they should try to agree between themselves. Accordingly, several attempts at negotiations were made.
These attempts were made on 15 September 1959, when the President of Pakistan met the Prime Minister of India at the airport in Delhi and again, during May 1960, when both the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India were participating in the Prime Ministers' Conference in London and had several opportunities of getting together to see whether any progress could be made; then at Karachi and Rawalpindi in September 1960, when the Prime Minister of India, in response to an invitation extended to him by the President of Pakistan, visited West Pakistan and they had various meetings where attempts were made to move the matter towards a settlement. But unfortunately no progress was made.
At the end of these meetings the Prime Minister of India invited the President of Pakistan to visit him in Delhi where they would discuss the matter again. The President pointed out that their discussions in Karachi and Rawalpindi had failed to make any progress and if they were merely going to go over the same ground again there would not be much profit in their meeting together, but that if the Prime Minister of India under took that he would either settle the dispute or at least make a move towards the settlement of the dispute, the President would be very happy to go to Delhi and to meet him.
And there the matter rested. Within the last two or three days the Press has reported the statement of the Prime Minister of India that he has renewed his invitation to the President to visit him in Delhi.
The position of the President of Pakistan is still the same. He would be happy to go to Delni if there was any indication that during their meeting they would try to settle the dispute or at least agree upon some method which would be bound to result in a settlement.
At this stage I might also make a comment on the announcement made in the Press that the Prime Minister of India has renewed an offer of a no-war declaration between India and Pakistan, which he had also suggested to the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, the late Liaquat Ali Khan. I then had the honour of being the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, and I am fairly familiar with the somewhat lengthy correspondence that then ensued between the two Prime Ministers In response to the invitation of the Prime Minister of India that the two Prime Minister make a declaration of that kind, the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that the tension existing between the two countries-the two countries were in a state of tension at that time also-would not be eased merely by a declaration that there would be no war between the two countries. The tension had its origin in the disputes which were pending between the two countries and that so long as the disputes continued and no way could be found of settling them, the tension would continue. Merely saying that we would not fight over it would not help. The Prime Minister of Pakistan therefore made the following counter proposition: let us first make an effort at the settlement of our disputes. If we find that a prolonged effort is necessary, then let us agree upon a procedure for the settlement of our disputes through negotiations, through mediation, through any channel that may be acceptable to both sides, but finally provide that if any of these methods does not bring us to a settlement of the disputes then we shall have recourse to some procedure which would automatically bring a settlement like international arbitration or judicial settlement. Having agreed on this procedure, we could then made a no-war declaration and proceed to satisfy our people: "Do not worry over these things, do not get excited if time passes over these processes because ultimately if we cannot do it by agreement, by negotiation or by mediation, we shall settle these disputes through a process which will be automatic". That was not agreed to by India, and that is why the question of a no-war declaration hung fire and that is what still stands in the way of this declaration.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan pointed out that a mere verbal declaration would serve no purpose. For after all, we are both under obligation, being parties to the Charter, being Members of the United Nations, to seek peaceful settlements, a peaceful method for the settlement of our disputes. What would a no war declaration add to that? But if a no-war declaration is designed to bring peace to the minds of the peoples on both sides, and to bring co-operation in many matters over which we can usefully and beneficially co-operate both for ourselves and for the world at large, then we must agree upon some procedure which will take our disputes to a settlement. And that is the position as it stands.
Unfortunately, during the last month and a half or so, tensions have again mounted and they have mounted up to a dangerous degree, so much so that declarations of responsible people, leaders in India, people in official positions, though hedged and conditioned by certain general declarations, have created a sense of crisis in Pakistan, as apprehension, a foreboding that perhaps on this occasion it might be difficult to maintain peace between the two countries. In deference to my friend Mr. Jha, for whom I have great respect-I even have affection for him; our personal relations are extremely good-I might say (otherwise he would be forced to say it) "All right, the fault does not lie only on one side, it lies on both sides." Assume that on both sides things have been said or things have been done which have contributed toward the spiraling of the tension
But there is no denying the fact that tension exists, and the Security Council, being the organ of the United Nations carrying the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and for the resolving of situations and disputes that threaten the maintenance of peace, is now faced with a very grave and specific responsibility.
Let me now place before the Council some of these declarations which are part of the material that tends to show that the situation is of the kind that I have described. Before I do so, however, I should like to point out the reasons why these declarations raised apprehensions, even though, taken just generally and without any specific situation, they may not have amounted to a threat or raised any apprehensions.
The Indians now generally tell the Defence Minister of India that Pakistan is in forcible and illegal occupation of part of Kashmir, meaning thereby the Azad Kashmir area. Repeatedly it is said that Pakistan is an aggressor against India, that Pakistan has committed aggression, that Pakistan continues in aggression and that aggression must be vacated; if that aggression cannot be vacated through peaceful means, the area under the control of the Pakistan forces must be "liberated" and I use the word "liberated" within quotation marks, its significance having become different from the mere meaning of "making free".
When these declarations are read against that background, each one of them constitutes, in the eyes of the Government and the people of Pakistan, a threat to the maintenance of peace. I have given the preliminary explanation so that each time when I read something, I shall not have to explained that it means when in India they say, "We shall not stack," "We shall not go to war with Pakistan'', "The aggression must be vacated, and if not vacated, then the area should be liberated".
At the annual session of the Indian National Congress Party at Patna, on 4 January 1962, Mr. Sanjiva Reddy, the President of the Congress, during the flag hoisting ceremony, which is one of the most solemn occasions in these Party gatherings, asked the Congressmen - and I am quoting from a very well-known paper published in Delhi, The Times of India, of 5 January 1962-to take a pledge to get the Chinese and Pakistan aggressions vacated as had been done in the case of Goa:
"Under this flag, let us assure the Prime Minister and our Government that every one of us, in a disciplined way, is behind them in any step the Government may like to have these aggressions vacated.
"The whole country will be behind the Government in its efforts to liberate the part of Kashmir which is under the forcible occupation of Pakistan. Let us hope in a short period of course the Government has no choice at the appropriate moment-the Government will give relief to that part of Kashmir also."
This one extract alone would be enough to show what are the feelings being publicly expressed in India with regard to this situation.
Another member of the Congress Party, Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, who is a member of the Indian Parliament, and on that occasion - and this is taken from The Statesman of Delhi of
5 January 1962:
"...the time had come when Pakistan and Chinese aggression on Indian soil had also to be ended. Even though Pakistan was in military alliances like SEATO and CENTO, it was quite clear that India would not tolerate its aggression on Kashmir for long. It would be good if the Chinese also realized that their aggression in Ladakh and other areas would be vacated by armed forces if necessary."
And then these are the actual words used by Dr. Singh: "Both China and Pakistan should know that India would take steps to end their aggression on Indian soil just as it had ended Portuguese aggression in Goa."
The Statesman of 6 January 1962, under dateline of 5 January, reported from the headquarters of the Congress session:
"The resolution" that is to say, the resolution on international affairs at the Congress session to which I believe my friend Mr. Jha has made reference in his letter of 16 January addressed to the President of the Security Council [S. 5060]" bracketed. two neighbours-China and Pakistan-as aggressors 'who continue to be in illegal and forcible occupation of our territories'...An angry note can through most of the debate on the resolution.
"Member after member demanded immediate action by India to vacate the aggression by China and Pakistan, and more than one of them demanded action in three months...
"The even tenor of the debate was rudely shaken up by Mr. Radhananda Jha (Bihar), who angrily demanded, through an amendment, fixation of a three months period for the vacation of the aggression on India by China and Pakistan...
Also from The Statesman of 6 January, I read the following:
"Mr. Jagat Narain Lal was angry at the circuitous way of saying things, as was evident particularly in that part of the resolution which referred to the aggression in India. He demanded a declaration from this platform of the people of India' that the aggression on India by China and Pakistan would be vacated immediately. He said sandalwood gave a sweet and soothing smell, but if it was rubbed too hard it would also light fire. So he warned hostile countries that they should not try to take advantage of India's policy of non-violence and peaceful coexistence."
The weekly Blitz, in its issue of 6 January 1962, carried this front-page headline: "After Goa we clean up Nagaland to clear the decks for Pakistan and China." The report itself, first drawing attention to the situation in Nagaland and the action which should be taken against the Nagas to suppress their "rebellion"-an internal matter for India which I shall not enter into before the Council - concluded by saying:
"Elimination of the festering sore in the Naga area should be seen as the prelude to preparing the people to tackle effectively the two remaining problems, the Pakistani and Chinese aggression."
The Times of India, of 7 January 1962, in reporting the speech of the Defence Minister of 6 January, had this to say:
"An equally important declaration on Kashmir came from Mr. Krishna Menon who spoke on the international situation immediately after Mr. Nehru at the morning session. About 42,000 square miles of Indian territory was under the occupation of Pakistan. He said that Pakistan 'must vacate the aggression' if peace was to be established. India, he added, did not have an aggressive policy towards Pakistan and would for its part 'abide by its commitments to the United Nations'. But he hastened to add that we shall not have other people interpret these commitments as they wish'. Kashmir was an inalienable part of India."
I quote again from The Times of India of 7 January:
M. V.K. Krishna Menon, Union Defence Minister, speaking on the resolution on international affairs at the open session of the Congress here, said: "According to our agreement with the British and also according to the United Nations resolution, the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of India. Union as much as Bihar is a part of India'... Pakistan had no right to be on Indian territory and if peace had to be maintained 'we have no option but to safeguard our security"."
The meaning is clear. It is really begging the question when Mr. Menon says that according to the agreement with the British and also according to the United Nations resolution, the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir is a part of the Indian Union. I respectfully submit that there is no basis for this submission, but I shall not enter into their question at this stage.
The weekly newspaper Link of 14 January 1962, reporting the proceedings of the annual session of the Indian National Congress, said:
"Kashmir and the India-China border issue, which naturally came up for discussion at Patna, brought forth some clear affirmations of Ind policy. The Prime Minister did not speak much on these subjects. He left it to the Defence Minister to reiterate India's position. On Pakistan, the Defence Minister said: 'India would abide by its commitments, but it would not allow others to interpret them as they wished".
"The Defence Minister's reference to Kashmir and the Prime Minister's description of the recent utterances of the Pakistan dictator as betraying a diseased mind left many All-India Congress committee members wondering whether new developments were in the offing."
That kind of feeling does not exist only in Pakistan. It existed in the Congress session itself.
Under the dateline Bombay', 20 January, The Times of India of 21 January 1962, reports the following:
"Mr. Menon said that Pakistan should first vacate its aggression in Kashmir, withdraw the battalions of Azad Kashmir forces and the armed police in the area and stop the psychological warfare against this country as a prelude to negotiations. Addressing a public meeting under the joint auspices of the Bombay Pradesh Committee and the Bombay Kashmir Committee, the Defence Minister declared that if there was a 'serious breach' of the cease fire line by Pakistan, India would not hesitate to retaliate," I shall quote again from The Statesman of Delhi of 22 January 1962, dateline Bombay, 21 January:
"Mr. Menon said there was nothing foreign about India's foreign policy which was only an expression of her national sovereignty. If China or Pakistan, which had occupied 42,000 square miles of Indian territory, did not vacate, India would not take the initiative in any war-like action. But he said that did not mean that India was any less determined to repulse the aggressor. It could be done either by negotiation or through other methods, but when and how this would be done should be left to the Government because it could not be discussed in any public meeting, Mr. Menon added."
The Times of London of 25 January 1962, under dateline Delhi, 24 January reported the following with regard to the Prime Minister himself, who was speaking at Ferozepur just across the rivers in West Pakistan:
"An audience of 50,000 people in this frontier town heard Mr. Nehru say that India had to keep an army on the Punjab frontier because it did not trust the intentions of Pakistan. I still hope that the time will come when the rulers of Pakistan will see that they are following a useless course' he said-Sometimes you get fed up with this attitude of perpetual hatred and hostility of Pakistan towards India. We have repeatedly said we do not want war with Pakistan, but at the same time we are not to be cowed down through threats. The rulers of Pakistan have not understood this basic thing"."
said:
The editorial of The Times of India of 25 January 1962, "The Indian Government can never agree to a plebiscite which seeks to undo the accession of the State. Any peaceful settlement must be based on the premise that its accession to India is final and irrevocable,"
This is in face of the many declarations made by the representatives of India before the Security Council, that the choice is the free choice of the people of Kashmir and that even if this should entail the amendment of the Constitution of India, that amendment would be undertaken,
The Free Press Journal, in its issue of 29 January 1962, published a report alleging increased hostile activity--by Pakistan-both from across the cease fire line in Jammu and the State's regular borders. The report concludes: "Pakistan itself has doubled the number of infantry divisions in occupied Kashmir." I will not even discuss whether that is so or not, but assume for the moment-not that I am accepting it that what is alleged has happened, that adds to the tension, it does not ease it in any manner.
In the Hindu of Madras of 31 January 1962, under date line Bombay, 31 January 1962, the following is stated:
"Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, in a statement, ruled out a plebiscite as a solution for the Kashmir problem. He said: 'As long as there is a Government in the country worth its name, there will be no plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir'. He also said mediation of this issue was impossible, and there will be no negotiations on the motif of surrender of our sovereignty."
Now, when it is said repeatedly that the method of negotiations has not been exhausted, I would like to be told, in view of this declaration, what scope is there for negotiations ? What are the parties to negotiate on? "That no Government worth its name will ever agree to the plebiscite", "mediation on this issue is impossible", "there will be no negotiations on the motif of surrender of our sovereignty"-do these expressions hold out any promise for negotiations? And when that expression is used- "surrender of our sovereignty"-it means giving up, whether or not as the result of a plebiscite, of any portion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Hindustan Times of today states:
"The Defence Minister said in Delhi on 31 January that India had rejected Kennedy's mediation because there could be no arbitration on the country's sovereignty. "Nobody had suggested that "India has always been opposed to mediation because it would be tantamount to equating the aggressor with the victim". The aggressor being Pakistan and the victim being India-"Moreover, there was no country which could mediate the Kashmir issue without being india."
Finally, I would like to submit this to the Council. In the first place, though there is a dispute and a very serious dispute over the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India-between India and Pakistan-the primary people affected by this dispute are the people of Kashmir. The fundamental question involved here is the self determination of the people of Kashmir, their right to decide their own future freely without interference from one side or the other. Again, I will not go into the question of apportioning blame or praise, but assume for one moment, for the sake of argument, the propositions (we contest every aspect of it) that Pakistan is the aggressor, that India is the victim, that Pakistan is in forcible and illegal possession of parts of the State, that Pakistan has committed this default, that crime and is in contravention of resolutions, whatever you like. But does that mean that if Pakistan is to blame, that Pakistan had committed a default that Pakistan is an aggressor, the people of Kashmir have lost the right of self-determination? Even if there had been no agreement at all, that right remained.
But the agreement is contained first in Lord Mount batten's condition attached to the acceptance of aggression. It has been said that the acceptance of the accession is contained in the two words, "I accept" and signed "Mountbatten": it was only in an accompanying letter that a wish was expressed that the final decision would be through the freely expressed wishes of the people; unfortunately that wish cannot be fulfilled. There is no question that merely a wish was being expressed. Responsible ministers of India itself and its representative here, have stated that the acceptance of the accession was conditional on the final decision being made by the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir. Mr. V.P. Menon himself, who was in a sense the author of the Maharaja's accession, states it clearty in his book. That is the fundamental thing which must govern the situation.
It is sometimes said: "Well, the situation has continued. for fifteen years and is now more or less stabilized. It would be a pity to disturb it. Why uproot everything? Why not be content with what exists and then let us talk about adjustment." I do wish very solemnly to assure the members of the Council that not fifteen years, but if 150 years were to pass this dispute will not be settled except through the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir. That is their right and they are entitled to exercise that right.
It is said that the Pakistan representative has quoted from individual speeches in his letter of 11 January 1962 [S/5058]. Subsequently, I suppose, also regarding my letter of 29 January [S/5068] it will be not that I have quoted expressions of views by individuals but that the resolution adopted by the Congress was that through peaceful methods a settlement of disputes should be reached. It is true, but there are two answers to that the resolution itself cites the so-called aggression of Pakistan against India in respect of Kashmir; secondly, though the resolution talks of peaceful methods, yet both before and after, representatives of India, and ministers, in spite of their resolutions have gone on talking of getting the aggression vacated. If peaceful methods would not get it vacated early then, there would be a "liberation" through means which also have been hinted at quite plainly. In an official pamphlet issued on behalf of the Government of India in January 1962, entitled Kashmir and the United Nations it is stated quite clearly with respect to this so-called aggression, "India is prepared to be patient and tolerant...but it is obvious that there is a limit to patience and tolerance." If this is not a threat of the use of armed force, what would be clearer?
But the situation remains. I will say again, take it at its very least, that newspapers, individuals-both responsible and irresponsible leaders, even ministers on both sides have said things which contribute to this tension. But this tension has become very sharp against the background of the things which I have brought to the notice of the Security Council. Therefore, the first duty of the Security Council is take steps to ensure that no recourse shall be had to threat or the use of force for the purpose of a settlement of the dispute, and that this shall be made so clear that the tension would be eased and people will stop thinking that there may be a armed action, by one side or the other, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow or next week or the week after that.
I should respectfully draw the Security Council's attention to the geographical position of Kashmir. I have mentioned other factors in the beginning.
Kashmir, on its north-west corner. abuts on Afghanistan at least the territories that used to be included in Kashmir; across a very narrow strip of territory, on the USSR; then, over a whole stretch of territory, on China; and finally, with regard to its western, southern and eastern side, on Pakistan and on India. Sometimes expressions are used which say that India will not invade Pakistan, that India will not attack Pakistan, and if anything occurs of the kind not only hinted at but expressly stated in these extracts that I have read out to the Council with regard to the so-called vacation of aggression or liberation of the Azad Kashmir area, that technically may not be an attack by India against Pakistan. It might be claimed to be mere vacation of aggression and it might be said that if there is subsisting aggression, vacating aggression is not itself aggression but the right of self defence. However, it is not necessary for me to emphasize that the conflict that then might ensue would be bound to spread and would not be confined merely to Kashmir, as the earlier fighting was. And in view of the geographical juxtaposition of which I have just spoken-I will not sketch the picture any further members of the Council can easily conclude for themselves that if a configuration starts in that area it will not be confined the subcontinent or even to the whole continent of Asia,
I therefore submit that you gentlemen whose providence has placed you in a position of awesome responsibility-you often carry on your shoulders the responsibility not to let things slide into chaos and confusion and later into conflict, and to stop the rot in time and make every possible effort to resolve through. peaceful methods, situations and disputes that threaten the maintenance of peace-should take this very grave situation into consideration and do the utmost to discharge the responsibility you bear on behalf of the whole world.
Today the membership of the United Nations is composed of 104 sovereign States. The permanent members of the Security Council are there of their own right, the non-permanent members are the representative of the remaining Members of the United Nations. Together you represent the whole world and you are entirely responsible to the whole world. I shall not take up your time longer than to say that your first obligation is to ensure that nothing untoward of the kind that I have submitted happens. Your second responsibility is to take up the consideration of the dispute and bend all your earnest, zealous energies towards securing a settlement of it on the basis of justice and equity and to secure to the people of Kashmir the exercise of their right of self-determination in that respect I have no doubt that you will start, when you come to that consideration, with the latest report of the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, and, as I have already stated, I have no doubt that you will wish to see it representing the situation today and not merely the situation that subsisted four years ago.