21111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 805 held on 21 November 1957.
21111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 805 held on 21 November 1957.
At the 802nd meeting of the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan made a great many observations which purported to be in reply to what had been said on behalf of the Government of India. These deliberations have dragged on so long that it is not my intention to go into this seriatim. There have been contradictions time after time; they are in the records. And, obviously, contradictions are of no value. Therefore, I propose to deal with these matters in very brief form.
The first point that was made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was that there had been no augmentation. We have dealt with this not only in the present series of meetings of the Council, but also at previous sessions; however, in case members of the Council are interested in the facts, we refer them to paragraphs 201 and 225 of the third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
In this connexion, may I say that the representative of the United Kingdom) has been good enough to say that each representative quotes part of the report and not the other. I have never heard the representative of the United Kingdom quote the whole of a report. It is not possible. We have not quoted anything out of context. If we have quoted anything out of context or anything that would distort the meaning of the Commission's report we are prepared to make the necessary corrections; and we deeply regret that a statement of this kind should have been made, not with malice aforethought or after thought, but just casually.
A reference to paragraphs 204 and 225 of the Commission's third interim report will show that there had been augmentation-not augmentation by one per cent or two per cent, but, in fact, it said that the whole of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75] had been vitiated by the fact that material changes had taken place. Further, there is a minority report of the Commission which refers to the violation of part I, paragraph B, which also has been referred to, I do not propose to go into any great detail because I think it is only right that I should not tax the patience of the Council any further, and so I shall make this as brief as possible and come to the draft resolution.
This is what the Commission said:
"At the time that the Commission adopted the resolution of 13 August 1948 it had reason to believe that the "Azad" forces did not constitute a properly organized and equipped military force...."
"There is, indeed, no doubt that the 'Azad' forces now have a strength which changes the military situation.... It is reasonable to suppose that if the Commission had been able to foresee [this is the important part] that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the 'Azad' territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in part II of the resolution of 13 August." I do not wish to weary the Council with more details of this. We have not, in previous submissions before the Security Council, given the details with regard to what are called "the northern areas. These areas are not a separate state; these are part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and, what is more, the Commission expressly said so and stated that the security of the whole of the territory was the responsibility of India.
We have dealt with this in detail, and since it is now admitted that the forces in the northern areas have been considerably increased I am not going into the history of who handed over the northern areas-even during recent years, I do not propose to deal with them. The northern areas are an integral part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and at the time of the adoption of the resolution there was no question of the "Azad" forces there.
There are many references in the Commission's report which definitely state-and I am sure the representative of the United Kingdom will be able to find this out for himself that the Commission did not think at that time that there were any Pakistani forces there.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has charged me with inaccuracy and contradiction in regard to the "Azad" forces. It is quite true that some time during last year I did refer to forty-two battalions instead of thirty-five battalions. That was our information at that time, which was immediately corrected, and we have always said that it was thirty-five battalions.
Now if the battalions are smaller in number, it is because there has been a reorganization of these forces and not because their fighting strength or their personnel has decreased. It is possible to have battalions of 800 or 500 or 1,000, and today if the battalions are fewer, it does not mean that there has been any de-augmentation or any withdrawal, or anything of that kind. I would like the Council to refer to my statement on 9 October [795th meeting, para. 91], where I said that it is only a matter of the number of divisions, and not a contraction of the aggregate of forces. This is the kind of Hensarling which does not go to the substance of anything.
Now we come to a very important part which concerns Mr. Frank P. Graham. Mr. Graham is not a member of the Council and we have no responsibility for criticizing him or defending him. But the Foreign Minister of Pakistan tells the Council (804th meeting, para. 33] that the implementation of part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has been certified by Mr. Graham in paragraph 29 of his third report and in paragraph 44 the fifth report. I have been in great pain to find out where it is.
First of all, if I may say so, Mr. Graham has not been authorized by the Council to certify anything. The authority of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan is to report to the respective Governments, mainly to the Government of India. But anyway, we will leave that alone. There has been no certification of any kind. In the third report, the discussions with Mr. Graham proceeded as I told the Council beforehand. All these discussions were of an exploratory character, and when they are of an exploratory character you take certain things as assumptions, taking for argument this, that and the other. That is all. The question of the augmentation had not arisen. As regards any idea that Mr. Graham had certified the implementation of part I, first of all, Mr. Graham does not have the authority to certify, and secondly, he has not certified, and thirdly, they are contrary to the facts which are established in the Commission's report itself. What he said was: Assuming that part I had been implemented, then we may do this, that or the other. That was what was said. There was no question of certification at any time, and the Council was misled if it took into account the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that there was any certification in this way.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan again goes on to say, to quote from Mr. Jarring, probably not in literal terms, that India had caused a deadlock. So far as I remember, what Mr. Jarring said was: "I established that a deadlock...on part I..." [798th meeting, para. 40.] But the Foreign Minister of Pakistan says that India has created the deadlock. As far as we know from the report here, unless there is a change of mind, there is nothing in the report to warrant this statement. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said: "An artificial deadlock has arisen because it suits the Government of India to create it-and for no other reason." [802nd meeting, para. 9.] This is what Mr. Firoz Khan Noon attributes to Mr. Jarring, and we deny that. What Mr. Jarring said in the Council was :
"In my report, I established that a deadlock had been reached between India and Pakistan on part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and in particular on paragraph B and E of that part." [798th meeting para, 40].
Then the Foreign Minister goes on to contradict himself. He says that some members of the Security Council have expressed doubts about the implementation of part of the resolution. If some members have expressed doubts, surely India alone is not in doubt. We have produced before this Council which I do not propose to go into now; it will take time-extensive evidence, which has not been contradicted, in regard to the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere; that is, part I, paragraph E. We have produced extensive evidence not only today but over the ten years, and what is more, it is a matter of deep regret to my Government that the attempts at subversion, at sabotage, at blowing up bridges, mosques and temples inside Kashmir have attracted so little attention on the part of certain members of the Council.
I propose to skip over a large number of these criticisms because there is a limit to which one can answer repetitive and irrelevant statements.
My good friend, General Romulo, the Philippine representative, with great zeal apparently has referred to his obligations in regard to my country. At the time when the instruments establishing the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were signed, protests were made to all the countries concerned, particularly to the United State and the United Kingdom, that they had no business to take under protection certain territories under Certain Powers. The day of protectorates is over. If the Philippines wants to protect India-well, it may have a very good motive. What we are told, unless I am mistaken -and I cannot make a mistake because I have the text-s that they wish "to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." [804th meeting, para. 16.] How they uphold this, I do not know. Our people are free, as free as any people in the world.
In this discussion, we have made no criticism of countries joining defensive pacts. What we have said is this: When those defensive pacts are used by the party in question against us, then we have a right to point that out. That is a very different question. That is a very different issue. What use one of the parties makes of a compact is different from criticizing the compact itself. We do not propose to address any questions either to the United Kingdom or to the United States as to whether they subscribe to this statement. It is a fantastic statement, it is a surprising statement made by one of the members of the SEATO Pact in regard to its object, namely, to establish self-determination in our country. We do not enter into it because the question is too absurd. We would not ask the United Kingdom a question of that kind. They happen to be good friends of ours. We would not ask the United States a question of that kind. We have no right to question the actions of sovereign Governments, right or wrong. If they are wrong actions, either they take the consequences of these actions, if the other Government is powerful enough in the modern circumstances of the world, or they get away with it. But we can express our opinions. We regret that all this war apparatus is now part of the area.
That is another question altogether. As far as the issue before us is concerned, I did not read from the newspapers, I read from statements of Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, responsible Ministers of Pakistan as to the purposes for which they entered the Pact.
Is there any evidence whatsoever that we violated the territory of Pakistan? We have refrained from placing before the Council the number of instances where Pakistan has tried to probe our frontiers. We have no intention of publishing the information, because it will only create irritation. In spite of the serious nature of these actions, we still maintain only an armed police force on the international frontier.
The time will come when the great countries which are permanent members of this Council and have a very great responsibility will regret encouraging banditry of this kind. I mean political banditry; I do not mean anything else that is to say, the disregard of ordinary canons of justice, as happened a year or two ago. If it becomes very serious or if it is necessary to convince those who are the aggressors that we are capable of turning back aggression, then we may do something. But we do not go about inflicting casualties, and that is that.
This reference by General Romulo has hurt us very much. While we differ totally from the politics and the approach that the Philippine Government follows, we always regarded it as an extremely friendly country. For the Philippines to tell us that it is going to interfere in our internal affairs-that is a bit thick.
The representative of the United Kingdom, in the usual English way, has uttered his warning with regard to bomb explosions that he does not approve of them, that terrorism does not take anybody anywhere and so on. We are grateful for that and we hope that in view of the considerable influence that the United Kingdom has over Pakistan that will have some effect. But we have to take care of our own safety.
In this Council, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has denied the categorical statements I made before it, not out of nowhere but supported by documentary evidence; our trials, he said, are stage managed, I do not think that any of the members of this Council believe that in India law is stage-managed for political purposes. If anything, since the transfer of power to Indian hands, we have removed, as I said to you, the judiciary from the executive. There is no stage-managing of any kind of trials. The trials are public. The Pakistan paper stated that they were held secretly. That is not true. Therefore, I would request the Security Council not to accept this statement. It is like all other denials. You do not have to go very far. Did not Pakistan come here and deny that it had invaded us? And did not the Foreign Minister come a few months afterwards and say, "We did invade them" ? Therefore, if they can make a serious denial once and afterwards go back on it, then where do they stand?
We were told that the elections in Kashmir are rigged. We owe no responsibility to the outside world as to how we conduct our elections. But we are anxious that the truth be known that we are genuinely interested in decent elections. The New York Times has been quoted. I have no desire for the character of any paper, local or otherwise. In the 795th meeting of the Security Council, I gave you the details of the election figures [795th meeling, paras. 77 and 78]. We cannot put up puppet oppositions. That is worse than not having an opposition. Are we to organize an opposition? There were large numbers of seats that were contested. There were election petitions being circulated. There were by-elections being contested. Many seats were won by very narrow margins. There was more than one party fighting in these elections.
Since newspapers have been read, you will permit me to read a very short extract from a paper which is not always friendly to India on the Kashmir question or on the question of the cotton trade or anything of that kind, namely, the Manchester Guardian. On 20 April 1957, this newspaper expressed the view that :
"The Jammu elections are a great and quite a genuine victory for the National Conference. Elections in Kashmir are over. In Jammu, the National Conference was given a tough fight and all but five of the seats were contested. After strenuous canvassing and an election fever equalled. only in India, the most advanced parts, the National Conference won two-thirds of the seats."
We know how we had to work to win these elections.
The paper continues :
"Over 70% of the electorate turned out, women, men and elders, in spite of battering rains."
That was in Jammu. It may be argued that the Jammu majority is Hindu, but it goes on :
"In the Kashmir Valley elections are over too except for two seats. [This was on 20 April.] Of the eight seats that were contested the National Conference won seven and the tnrn-out was as high as 50 per cent in spite of the icy rains and slushy mud The National Conference would have probably won most of the seats in the Valley had there been a contest....
"What has surprised everyone in India is the large number of people who have taken part in the elections both in Jammu and in Kashmir."
It is possible for me to quote Swedish newspapers, German newspapers and United States newspapers-not The New York Times. Their correspondents were there, because there was no restriction on any newspaper correspondent going into Kashmir. They had to get a permit from the Defence Ministry, which is very largely a formality, and they were there. The elections were open. Elections are conducted, under the law of India, under an election commissioner who, as the representative of the United Kingdom will easily understand, is above the executive. The executive cannot give any orders and this does not happen in Britain-to our election commissioner. Election petitions are contested. The Prime Minister has been elected to Parliament, but his seat is being contested in a court today. In the same way, those elections were contested. So that is that.
There is one matter which concerns the United Kingdom as much as it concerns us. It might cost them a little money if they took the other standpoint. India is a successor State to Britain, and this has been internationally recognized and, what is more, recognized by the United Nations.
Here is the memorandum of the United Nations Secretariat on the membership status of India and Pakistan [Press release No. PM/473], dated 12 August 1947. I should like to read this into the record, because I should not expect Pakistan to contest this-not that it matters. It does not matter at all whether they have understood it or not. The memorandum says:
"The Indian Independence Act provides that on the fifteenth day of August, 1947, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India to be known respectively as India and Pakistan. Under this Act, the new Dominion of India will consist of all the territories of British India except certain designated territories which will constitute Pakistan.
"What is the effect of this development on membership and representation of India in the United Nation?
"From the legal standpoint, the Indian Independence Act may be analysed as effecting two separate and distinct changes :
"From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a part of an existing State"-that is, the whole of the Indian empire-"breaks off and becomes a new State." (I would request Sir Pierson Dixon to read the debates of the time and the archives of the time and to read all the conversations that went on between 21 May and 1 June 1947 in London.) "On this analysis, there is no change in the international status of India." this is from the United Nations-"it continues as a State with all treaty rights and obligations, and consequently with all the rights and obligations of membership in the United Nations. The territory which breaks off, Pakistan, will be a new State;-we were one of those who wanted them as a new State here-"it will not have the treaty rights and obligations of the old State, and it will not, of course, have membership in the United Nations.
"In international law, the situation is analogous to the separation of the Irish Free State from Great Britain, and of Belgium from the Netherlands. In these cases, the portion which separated was considered a new State; the remaining portion continued as an existing State with all of the rights and duties which it had before."
I shall not read the remainder, except the last part; and may I say, in view of what has been said, that I am not reading selectively the papers are available to everybody :
"In conclusion, the effect of the Independence Act may be summarized as follows: 1. The new Dominion of India continues as an original Member State of the United Nations with all rights and obligations of membership. 2. Pakistan will be a new non-member State. In order for it to become a Member of the United Nations, it would have to apply for admission pursuant to Article 4 of the Charter, and its application would be handled under the pertinent rules of procedure of the General Assembly and the Security Council."
I think that clears up that matter. It really has not much relevance to this. I have decided that there is not much point in placing a great many facts before you at this stage, while we have the draft resolution and we know how it will be voted upon, I shall not go into the much disputed question of paramountcy. Whatever rights there are, they remain in effect.
Then we are told that because we made a complaint that does not give us any precedence. That would be true if that complaint was not bona fide; but when that complaint was made it was a complaint of aggression, and that aggression was denied. We do not argue that just because somebody comes here with a complaint he is therefore the innocent party and the other is the guilty party. It depends on the merits of the case. I invite the Security Council to look at the complaint by India and look at the answer by Pakistan. May I remind you that there is only one paragraph in the answer by Pakistan that deals with Kashmir, and that paragraph is a total denial of aggression, but aggression was afterwards proved.
It is not necessary to go into all the questions of double standards and say that it is far better to have a double standard than no standard at all. Still we are quite content for the world to form its own opinions. We do not claim any high moral standards for ourselves. We do the best we can to govern our lives according to the United Nations Charter and according to the rules of the game. In spite of what is done to us, we keep our friendship with the countries that are military allies of the other side. Sir Pierson Dixon, quite rightly, feels hurt when I refer to partisan attitudes. There is nothing personal about this. Obviously, from our point of view, it is a partisan attitude, because the facts to which we refer are in the book. We are not introducing anything new. I shall come to that in a minute.
Some play was made of the use of the words "a mere scroll", and reference was made to something being a mere scrap of paper. The law books state that a deed may be delivered as a scroll, that is as a simple writing, not to become a deed of the party expressed to be bound thereby until some conditions shall have been performed. That is the position of the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948.
Now with regard to the northern areas, we have placed before the Council the facts of the case. If the resolution of 13 August 1948 is to observed, then it is necessary to withdraw all Pakistan forces from this area. At one time we had asked for fifteen points to be garrisoned in order to protect trade routes. It would be necessary to negotiate with representatives of the Commission as to how many points we should want now. Therefore, this involves a very grave violation of part I, paragraph B of the resolution, because the Security Council was never informed of this question. I am not introducing a new one. matter because we do not want to prolong the discussion. Pakistan informed the Commission that it had no troops in the northern areas between May and December 1948. I read all of this before.
There are various allegations of genocide, and so on, which are too frivolous to be dealt with, and we have no desire to deal with this matter at all. If there are any points of the Pakistan statement which have not been read into the record on this particular occasion, it is because I do not want to take the time of the Council and also because, to the best of my belief, they will be found either in the reports of the Commission or in the statements which I have previously made.
With the President's permission, I shall proceed to deal with the draft resolution before the Council [S/3911]. The representative of Colombia appeared to feel aggrieved [803rd meeting, para. 36] that we had not mentioned that the draft resolution was sponsored by them. All we said was that the main architect of the draft resolution on Kashmir had always been the United Kingdom [ibld, para. 1]. There has never been any secret about it. They know more about it. Then more recently it has been the United States and the United Kingdom together. That does not mean that other countries just put down their names. I did not state anything of the kind. What is more, I did not want further to create what I would regard as a situation of embarrassment in view of the fact that it was the Colombian representative, Mr. Lozano, who was largely responsible for our agreeing to the resolution of 13 August 1948 on the assurances which were given. The end of history has not come, and I feel that the time will come when a more objective view will be taken of this matter, when the question of the security of the country will be taken into account. Therefore, I apologize to the representative of Colombia. If he feels hurt in any way, it was not meant in that way at all.
As regards the draft resolution before the Council, first of all we have a certain objection to being pushed or moved from one position to another. There is no resolution which has been accepted which refers to disputes or commitments. What I said was that we are engaged in these resolutions, meaning thereby that once one commitment is performed another commitment arises. I do not know how you translate that into French or Spanish or whether there is some difference in this matter. However, just to slip it in this way, not with any bad motive, is against us.
Then we come to the question of the dispute. There has been on this occasion, particularly from some of the delegations, a great deal of argument about territorial disputes. You will notice that neither in the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 nor in the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75] and of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15] is there any reference to a dispute. It is a situation which was created. If this means the same thing, we have no objection, but if the idea is a territorial dispute, then we must join the issue.
We would like to point out, not because the draft resolution is not ours nor Pakistan's-under the rules of the Security Council only its members can omit resolutions that while there is a reference to the resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, there is a significant omission, namely, that of the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, which is a most important document. That is what we are here about. If the resolution of 17 January 1948 had been observed, then there would be no augmentation, there would not have been the complaint by the Commission that Pakistan had used that period for building up its forces. I did not say this, this is in the Commission's report.
Therefore, if there is no reference to the resolution of 17 January 1948, which is a most important resolution, then the other resolutions have no effect. If the 17 January resolution were observed, then it would be easier to proceed. This resolution was accepted by both parties. I would like to say that although both Ambassador Wadsworth and Sir Pierson Dixon specifically mentioned this in their statements, I do not find any mention of it in the draft resolution. Therefore, it could not be that there was an emission. I do not know how it is in other parts of the world, but the representative of the United Kingdom will agree that the speeches on a resolution, bill or statute have little meaning; they are inoperative. It is what is in the text that is important. Could this omission have been made because of special reasons ?
I have already referred to two changes. One is the changing of engagements to commitments; the second is the omission of the 17 January resolution. We come now to the third. The sponsors again, as I have said before, have tried to introduce the working appropriate to a territorial dispute. A territorial dispute does not come under Chapter VI of the Charter.
Then we come to the sixth preambular paragraph. There is no reference here to the annexation of part of the territory. The Government of India has laid a great deal of stress on the fact that there must be de-annexation. Unless there is de annexation there is no fulfilment of part I, paragraph B of the resolution of 13 August 1948. There is no adequate reference to paragraph E except as a general appeal to both sides which really kills the thing because one side makes the difficulties. They are not considered important enough for inclusion. The whole of the draft resolution is centred on what the sponsors have chosen to call demilitarization. I will come to that in a minute.
Operative paragraph 1 reads:
"Requests the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation and to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations."
We have already had the statement of Pakistan that they have made an appeal. Is that sufficient ? Does that answer the campaign of hatred, does that answer the appeal to jehad, does that answer the statement of Mr. Daultana the other day, does it answer the statements of previous Prime Ministers, does that answer the whole campaign that goes on in Pakistan for the invasion and the destruction of India ?
Then we come to operative paragraph 2. Here again, I would like to draw the attention of the Council, and particularly of the representative of the United Kingdom, to the word used in this paragraph, the word "desirable". Does he think it is desirable or essential? The paragraph reads:
"Requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to make any recommendations to the parties for further action which he considers desirable in connexion with part I of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948"
Sir Pierson Dixon has been good enough to say in various other places, and I do not propose to quote his words, that one part is to succeed the others. There is a difference in sequence between succession and taking place at the same time. But here it merely says that it is "desirable", that is to say, we can talk about part I if you want to, but what is important is part II It is not part II that they are talking about, it is the later part of part II, that is to say, to lay the frontiers of India open to invasion from the other side. That is a position which no sovereign State can be asked to accept.
I have already referred to Mr. Jarring's report where he says that the deadlock is in part I, in which case it should not be "desirable" but something else. This is what Sir Person Dixon said: "It was originally contemplated that the three parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 should be implemented in quick succession." [797th meeting, para. 13.] "Succession". He did not say the last part first and the second part afterwards. He said "in quick succession", and we are grateful to Sir Pierson Dixon for saying so. There is interdependence between the parts. We do not deny that, but interdependence will only arise when the parts are performed as they are laid down in the resolution.
The representative of the United States stated: "Over the past years there have been extensive efforts to implement part II" [803rd meeting, para. 32]. I think I have answered that. If exploration is to be penalized, then there can be no talks at all. The fact that we talked to Mr. Graham and his successors and his predecessors about various matters does not mean that we have committed ourselves to do anything. I am not aware that "over the past years there have been extensive efforts to implement part II". Both India and Pakistan have previously consulted the United Nations Representative to bring this about. We have talked as part of the technique we employ; that is to say, we were always willing to listen to counsels of conciliation; that is why I came here.
There is little purpose in going into the details of the conversations that took place for several years here in Geneva or in Paris or elsewhere with regard to part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Our position in this matter is that at present we are engaged by the resolutions. I submit that willy nilly the attempt is to alter these resolutions. We are not willing for those resolutions to be altered because if any of these things are done or any of the other things that are said in the speeches or what Pakistan demands, then you will have changed the resolutions.
Mr. Jarring told us that he is proceeding on the basis of the resolutions. If those resolutions are there, than they have to be carried out in that way. What really happens is the alteration of these resolutions by first of all calling upon India to withdraw its troops from its own sovereign territory in the present conditions, which I have no desire to detail, but which I have set out in some detail beforehand, and to refer to the duty of a territory to defend its own integrity; we cannot do that especially in conditions of subversion and especially in the condition where another country is poised for hostility against us. We are prepared. We do not go away from the engagements of these resolutions, but first the resolution of 17 January 1948 and then the resolution of 13 August 1948, without any alterations and with the assurances that go with them. Sir Pierson Dixon had been good enough to say that there had been assurances given to the two sides. There are no contradictory assurances, because the Commission, in the course of negotiations to get a settlement, probably told one side and the other side one thing and to come back. You have to look at the last date. It is the last date of those assurances that counts.
The whole of the draft resolution deals with part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It says :
"Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to cooperate with the United Nations Representative in order to formulate an early agreement on demilitarization procedures
Thus, presumably, is a reference to part II. Part I is completely forgotten.
This draft resolution is a repudiation of the Jarring report. It does not say so in terms; it gets out of it by paying Mr. Jarring a lot of compliments, and in various other ways. But when it says "to formulate an early agreement on demilitarization procedures, which should be implemented within three months of such an agreement being reached" this is simply a reference to part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and, to judge from the speeches, to the later part of part II.
There is only one final observation I desire to make at present. The Government of India authorizes me to say that we are totally opposed to this draft resolution-although not, of course, to the part that pays tribute to Mr. Jarring. We came here under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. We will remain here under Chapter VI. Under Chapter VI no resolutions have any value that do not contain the element of conciliation. There must be either agreement between the parties or hope of agreement between the parties. We must, with great respect, seriously draw the Council's attention to the fact that, willy-nilly, it is sought to change the resolution further. We are net willing to accept this change.
We are prepared to honour our commitments. When Pakistan fulfils the first part-namely, when Pakistan takes away the troops and equipment brought in after the acceptance of the resolution and de-annexes the place when we enter into the security of our territory, and when various other things to which I referred the other day take place and we are assured that this is not just a twenty-four hour affair but one that will continue, the next step will be for Pakistan to withdraw its remaining troops under part II. Then comes our obligation. It is a purely voluntary obligation which we assumed, but we are prepared to carry it out, although only on those conditions.
This draft resolution, we are sorry to say, is cast in a mould which is regressive. It goes farther back than the previous Security Council meetings; it goes farther back than Mr. Jarring. It does not take into account the appeal we made to the Security Council. Any country has the right to come here and inform the Council-inform, not complain that there is an attempt to subvert, to destroy. And it is not at that time that any moral support should be given to the aggressor. We submit, with great respect, that the draft resolution gives moral support to the aggressor. If military alliances, if the conditions in the world, if various other factors or such positions as we have in the world are inimical to the position of other countries, well, there are other steps to be taken; but here we have to go by the resolutions. And I submit that any moral support that is given to the aggressor in this business will result in greater trouble in Kashmir.
We are not committing aggression against anybody. Even when our frontiers are penetrated, we are not taking the logical action. We shall continue to behave in this way. If sometimes, in the heat of debate, we have said anything to hurt anybody's feelings, we are sorry. But so far as we are concerned, I tell the Council categorically that the Government of India has instructed me to say that we are totally against this draft resolution. This draft resolution is an incitement-not in terms and not in intention, but its effect is an incitement to subversion. When the intelligence people in Pakistan, when Pakistan money and when Pakistan ammunition are being used to blow up our territory, how can you gentlemen subscribe to a draft resolution of this kind? Surely, this has gone on for years. It is time now to give some attention to a country that has been invaded but which for nine years has possessed its soul in patience and will continue to do so. I am not guaranteeing that it will do so forever, but so long as the present Government and the present state of the country lasts, it will refrain from the use of force even in asserting its legal and moral rights. We will carry out the dictates of the United Nations Charter in every way, but we cannot accept resolutions of this kind. How many resolutions have been passed? Have they had any effect? No.
The only resolutions which took us a little further were the resolutions that we agreed to. But once they have been agreed to, we cannot separate them from the assurances or from the meaning, or try to alter them. The Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 follows that adopted by the Security Council on 17 January 1948, and the Government of India, irrespective of whatever accusations may have been made, and irrespective of anything other people may expect of otherwise, will carry out its international obligations. But international obligations cannot supersede the text of those obligations or their spirit. Moreover, this cannot be used as it has been used in the past. It is all in the records of the Commission for India and Pakistan. It cannot be used as part of the invasion of our country.
Are we to turn to the members of the Security Council when our country is invaded? We have to establish, first of all, that we were invaded, because here is the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan making the fantastic suggestion that we are aggressors. How can we be aggressors if we are the successor State when the territory has acceded to us? We are precluded from producing documents in this connexion, and before I close I should like to say that we have not turned down or said a negative to the suggestion thrown out by the representative of Sweden because we respect the law. We like to see it in proper shape, and we like, as he has said, to see it put forward at the proper time.
Therefore, we regret the general line-up, the general majority of members of the Security Council. Just because a majority takes a view, it is not necessarily right. We do not ask for any consideration outside the law. We do not ask for any special treatment. We came here with faith in the Charter, without taking sides in the cold war and with the faith that aggression would not be tolerated. And even assuming-and I trust that those who are taking my speech down will be careful to include this word "assuming" for the sake of argument that there are mistakes on our side, no mistake is greater than the crime of aggression, and the Security Council cannot ask a country to compound aggression.
Therefore, our request is that this draft resolution should not be passed. If it is passed, it is supporting aggression. That may be regarded by some people as theoretical. But it will create trouble in India, over in Kashmir. It will encourage those forces which, during the last few months, have been fomenting trouble-and I have myself seen some of the results. This is not a war by Pakistan on one front. The Security Council is only a part of it. This goes on here as the
propaganda platform. And, on the other side, trouble is created, as I told you, largely relying upon the fact that we go easy on these things.
I have nothing more to say at the present moment, except that I hope that this resolution, well meant perhaps, with the names of the sponsors who, though they are not military allies of ours, are old friends and are all committed to the United Nations Charter. It must be assumed that their position is one which tries to carry out the Charter.
I want to repeat once again that we are not going back on any engagements of ours. But we are not prepared to go into any position where aggression has to be recognized. Who in the world can say, when a country has been annexed, when half of the country has been occupied, that there has been no annexation? This is the first time that we have heard about Pakistan's right to be there, because, in the older records, they refused to recognize the Government over there.
This is all I have to say. We cannot oppose the resolution, we cannot support the resolution, because we are not members of the Security Council. It is your wisdom - and the world will regard it as wisdom because you are the Security Council. But it is our country, and, strange as it may seem, we have considerations for its security. And this talk about the solution of a problem is not a problem when a country is invaded. Why has nobody told Pakistan: "By what right do you annex this territory?"
I am not going into the Pakistan Constitution, which has been misquoted and misrepresented in this place. I invite the representative of the United Kingdom to read it for himself. How dare a country annex another territory over which it has no sovereignty and come to arguments ? here and then make these