13111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 801 held on 13 November 1957.

 

13111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 801 held on 13 November 1957.

 

I am grateful to the President and the other members of the Council for having adjourned the meeting on the last occasion.

 

Before I deal with the main subjects that are left over, I ask the indulgence of the Council to clear up a certain matter that came up at the 800th meeting. Recalling what was said on behalf of the Government of India in relation to the proposal of the Swedish Government, and considering that it might perhaps lead to some misunderstanding of what was said, I should like to make this statement clear. There was no suggestion at all that the representative of Sweden was doing anything but representing the views of the Swedish Government, nor was there any suggestion that a representative of the Security Council sent in a selective capacity and not as the representative of this country could not produce any views that were identical with his country's or otherwise All I sought to point out was with that Mr. Jarring had established, mainly, that the deadlock was centered in part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and that whole of this procedure was on the lines of the resolution, would not be identical with the other view, because that would involve challenging the sovereignty of the Union of India, which is the basis of the resolution.

 

On the subject matter itself, the Government of India has not turned down, out of hand, at any time any proposals which are comprised by the various remedies set out in the Charter. Then I went on to point out what would have to be considered and how the non-consideration of any part would be considered an admission on our side that part was not worth considering.

 

I hope that this explanation will bring about some satisfaction.

 

There is only small element that is left in the previous statements made by the representatives on the Security Council and that is the statement made by the representative of Iraq, who, I am sorry to say, said the following:

 

"We wonder, therefore, if the new stand of the Government of India regarding the non-implementation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is not on the one hand an afterthought, and on the other, an attempt to re-open issues which have long been closed." [797th meeting, para. 67.]

 

We regret a statement of this kind because, to a certain extent, it is an attribution of motives. But let that lie; we do not mind. However, I want to say that the facts are such that whatever we have said here is not an afterthought in substance. It is quite true that, each time one speaks on a subject, he may present a thing in a better or a worse way. But I invite the Government of Iraq to peruse the entire record in this matter, from the time that this question came here, on 1 January 1948, until whatever time it was. And it will be found that on every occasion when the Commission was appointed, during the whole of the discussions of the Commission from the time that Pakistan admitted the invasion of India in May 1948 until the time when the Commission became transformed into an individual, in the person of Sir Owen Dixon, and afterward in the person of Mr. Frank P. Graham-when this matter has come up, we have always said that there are letters from the Prime Minister of India to the Commission which are on record, there are the answers, there are statements made before this Council. These are all during the period when the Commission itself was continuing active negotiation. We also have the support in this matter of no less a person than Sir Pierson Dixon, on the last occasion, when he told us: "Augmentation makes removal or reduction more difficult." What more is required?

 

On 7 February 1950, Sir Benegal Rau said the following on behalf of India, which was then a member of the Security Council:

 

"India's case is that, just as the entry of the Pakistan troops into Kashmir was wrong and an act of aggression, equally wrong and aggressive was their building up of the subversive "Azad" Kashmir forces and their occupation of a large part of the State." [463rd meeting, p. 11.]

 

I do not want to elaborate on this matter, but it will be recalled that I pointed out in one of my previous interventions that the Commission had said in so many words that Pakistan had used the period in question in order to consolidate its position. Sir Benegal Rau continued :

 

"All these things must be completely undone before there can be a plebiscite." [Ibid.]

 

Thus, it is clear that our stand is not an afterthought. On 1 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau said the following to the Security Council:

 

"The Kashmir case has now been before the Security Council for more than three years. No solution has yet been found, because the root-cause of the trouble, namely, the unlawful occupation of nearly half the State and the creation of subversive forces and authorities therein by Pakistan, has been allowed to continue. [In other words, part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has not been implemented.]

 

... so long as the root-cause of the trouble continues. there can be no solution to the problem." [533rd meeting, para. 18.]

 

I would ask Mr. Jawad, not as President of the Security Council, but as representative of Iraq, to reconsider, in the light of the evidence that I have already placed before the Council and will now place before it, the statement that our stand is an afterthought.

 

Later, Mrs. Pandit said the following on behalf of India at the Security Council's 608th meeting that is, after Mr. Graham had been appointed:

 

"Despite Pakistan's denials and protestations of innocence,

 

The regular Pakistan army also invaded the State on 8 May 1948, according to the later admission of the Pakistan authorities themselves. This unprovoked aggression and invasion of the territory of a neighbour and a Member State is a gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations as well as of International law Until the Council is prepared, firmly and courageously, to face this central issue, no just and lasting solution can be found.

 

"The relative position and status of the parties in this dispute, and therefore the issue itself, will not be set in the proper facts...." unless they are related to these basics [608th meeting, paras. 4 and 5.]

 

The basic facts to which Mrs. Pandit was referring are the facts contained in part I of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75].

 

I therefore submit that I not only have answered the representative of Iraq as regards the facts, but also have shown that the reflection made in the statement of the delegation of

 

Iraq does not fit in with those facts of the case.

 

I shall deal now with an aspect of the subject which was only touched on in the debates at the previous series of the Council but which has taken on importance because of various statement made by members of the Council during the present series of meetings, because of conditions obtaining in India, and because of facts that are implied in, contained in, or behind Mr. Jarring's report. In my first intervention at this series of meetings, I merely referred to this aspect of the question. I have in mind what are called the northern areas.

 

The Security Council has heard a great deal about the "Azad" forces. It has been told the reason for the self-confessed invasion of India by Pakistan. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said to the Council: "Yes, we invaded the country; we marched troops into the country. Why? Because we wanted to protect our own frontiers." In other words, in order to protect Pakistan's frontiers, Pakistan marched troops into Kashmir: a part of India. But that statement referred to West Kashmir. Until recently, there was never any suggestion that there were any "Azad" forces in what are called the northern areas.

 

The Government of India first referred to this matter in August 1948. As I have repeatedly stated before the Council, it was the outs desire of the Government of India at that time as it was the desire of all concerned-to bring about a cease-fire and, in order that such a cease-fire might be achieved, to put on one side questions which could be discussed and decided subsequently. That was the reason why material other than the cessation of hostilities was brought into the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Government of India, however, referred specifically to the northern areas in August 1948. At that time negotiations were going on between the Commission and Pakistan, on the one hand, and the Commission and India, on the other, prior to the formulation of this resolution, which was accepted by India in August. In a letter dated 20 August 1948, the Prime Minister of India wrote the following:

 

"The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars or Pakistani troops.... We desire that, after Pakistani troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us.... We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen.... and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia." [S/1100, para. 80.]

 

That was the position taken by the Government of India at that time.

 

According to the Commission, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army informed it that:

 

"The purpose of sending Pakistan troops into the State [was] the holding of the general line Uri-Poonch Naoshera."

 

Now, the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushera is in West Kashmir, where these so-called "Azad" Kashmir forces now are. This line runs from north to south along western Kashmir. Thus, there was no suggestion in 1948, when the Commission's resolution was adopted, that the northern areas were occupied by Pakistan troops.

 

The fact that there might have been insurrections or even rebellions, discontent among the civilian population, if you like, or that there might have been internal disturbances, even granting there was any such state of affairs, would be no argument for a neighbouring, friendly State to take advantage of that situation and establish its authority. It would be even less of an argument for the Security Council to suggest that someone else can do it. The Commission therefore did not give particular consideration to the situation which would arise in the northern area, because it was considered as part of the whole State. In replying to the Prime Minister of India, the Chairman of the Commission stated:

 

"... due to the peculiar conditions of this area, [it being mountainous and sparsely populated] [the Commission] did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in the resolution of 13 August 1948. It believes, however, that the question raised.. could be considered in the implementation of the resolution." [S/1100, para. 81.]

 

Therefore, the whole question of the northern area was not decided in any other way except as being part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If it was not part of that State, whose State was it ?

 

On 28 March 1949 the Government of India proposed to the Commission that it should maintain garrisons at selected points in the northern area. That is referred to in paragraph 256 of document S/1430. The Commission replied that it had given "serious consideration to India's position, which was based on legal claims."

 

If the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. can afford to disregard the legal foundations of a State as would be a sad day. The Commission's first truce proposals of 15 April provided that:

 

"In the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir to the north, observers will be stationed want note to be taken of this paragraph because we have questions to ask of the Security Council.] who, in the event that the defence of this territory becomes necessary, will so advise the Commission. The Commission in this case, or [not "and"] at the request of the Government of India, may agree that the Government of India post garrisons at specified points of this area."

 

Now, are not the people of India and their Government entitled to inquire why it is that no observers were stationed and why it is that after the time of the negotiations after the appointment of the Commission, the advancing of the Pakistan army into this area came about? The Commission had undertaken the responsibility of saying "observers will be stationed". It did not say "observers may be stationed". There are no observers. Therefore, the effect of the resolution has been to permit the occupation and annexation of considerable parts of the State soon after the negotiations began. The Commission put forward this as a formula, and Mr. Lozano's correspondence on this matter is clear. I submit, with great respect, that the representative of Colombia has very grave responsibility in this matter because we undertook all these things on the assurances given to us by Mr. Lozano, and afterwards by Mr. Korbel and various others who were Chairmen of the Commission. They were not private assurances, they were assurances given on behalf of this Organization. Furthermore, The Commission has published the fact that all the assurances were made public, and that one side has not been told something that was concealed from the other.

 

Therefore, as I have stated, we were told that there would be observers and that India need not push its legal claims because, if it were necessary, the Commission would let us go there. That was a formula, not a settlement formula, but a formula which the Commission regarded as "an equitable compromise between the opposed views of the two Governments; it minimized the possibility of the renewal of fighting, yet took into consideration [these are the words of the Commission] India's claim to responsibility for the defence of the State." This is a claim which we have never forsworn and which is inseparable from the integrity and sovereignty of the

 

Union of India. In the third interim report of the Commission it is stated:

 

"In replying to the 15 April proposals the Government of India reaffirmed its request that it be allowed to maintain. garrisons at strategic points. It felt [again as a compromise] that the question of the administration of the area could be discussed separately."

 

The Commission informed us that the question of sovereignty, as such, was not in challenge. It said:

 

"The Commission did not ignore India's claim to the right to safeguard the security of the State nor did it put into question the legality of the Jammu and Kashmir Government."

 

I ask the members of the Council whether there is anything in the record of the Commission, anything in the practice of Governments or in international law about when, without any overt action, two States of Jammu and Kashmir came into being. It is conceivable that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir may be different tomorrow. Sovereignty may change.

 

The sovereignty of places has changed from time to time in various parts of the world, but at the time when this was being considered, when the matter came before us, there was only one State of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

The problem was dealt with in the Commission's truce terms of 28 April 1949. Those terms state that :

 

"Observers will advise the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator regarding development in the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Without prejudice to the provisions of point 8 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, should the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator conclude upon advice from the observers, [who were not stationed there] or upon reports from the Government of India, that it is necessary for the the defence of the area, the Commission and/or the Plebiscite Administrator may request the Government of India to post garrisons at specified points."

 

Ask members of the Security Council: would the representatives of this Council have called upon a foreign Government to retain garrisons in that area?

 

The Commission also stated that:

 

"in its reply to the truce terms on 18 May 1949 the Indian Government repeated that the principle that Indian troops should garrison important strategic points should be accepted. The Government of India suggested that the points to be so occupied be the subject of discussion. with the Commission, and again proposed that the question of the administration of this area be left over for the time being."

 

All along, the Government of India has tried in this matter not to press its rightful claims-even as it is doing now to the logical limits. We know that there has been trouble: we have come here to offer a conciliatory solution. There have been insurrections. We were quite prepared, provided our legal claims, our sovereignty, not were questioned, to try to find ways and means not to aggravate the situation. I ask the Council, does not that approach to a problem call from the Council for a far more responsive attitude in regard to the claims of the sovereignty and integrity of the Union than has been expressed in the various decisions or resolutions passed by the Council ?

 

A practical solution and a practical arrangement were what the Commission asked us to find. Even further, our military advisers told us then that the Indian garrison should be at least at fifteen strategic points to protect the caravan roads.

 

As a matter of compromise, we informed the Commission on 17 June 1949 that we would be willing to occupy only seven. points in the expectation that all regular and irregular Pakistan forces would be withdrawn from the State. And they are still there :

 

"Should this expectation not be realized [the Commission said, in its report] or should a threat to the security of the State or the maintenance of internal order arise from any other source, the Government of India desired to be free to garrison any or all of the fifteen points mentioned previously. India explained that it felt compelled to make this reservation because it believed that measures taken by Pakistan such as the construction of roads and the provision of arms and supplies to points like Skardu could, in the view of India mean only that Pakistan did not wish to withdraw from the territory or, after withdrawal, intended that those who stayed behind could create turmoil."

 

These are not afterthoughts; ships appears in the third interim report of the Commission for India and Pakistan.

 

Finally, the question arises: what was the status of these areas at the time when the resolutions were passed by which the Security Council and the parties were engaged? What was the status of these territories? I take courage to think that any party, any Member State whose approach to this problem, or understanding of the facts of the case are very different from ours, will admit that the Security Council had laid down-and it should be a part of international practice that the period of negotiation should not be used for further conquest and further consolidation. This is a point that is relevant to what has been said in the Council. Therefore, it is worth, in view of the present position of Pakistan, to consider what was the status of this territory in 1948. The Commission says that the northern areas were not, "in the autumn of 1948, under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command." When the 13 August resolution was passed, according to the Commission, these areas were not under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command "in the sense that the Commission understood the term "effective control". The report continues: "The Pakistan Government stated that no Pakistan regular troops at any stage were employed in the operations which took place between May December 1948."

 

I would request the Council to note those dates. Let us accept this statement as it stands. If there were no troops between May and December 1948, then it was not an occupied area. If it was not an occupied area, it could not become an evacuated area. It was still an integral part of the Union in fact and in law. But, says the Commission, therefore it could not be regarded as evacuated territory. The Commission says :

 

"...It was precisely because the Commission underwood 'evacuated territory' to mean that territory in Western. Kashmir [that is, in the Uri-Poonch area] where regular. forces of the Pakistan army were operating and assisting the "Azad'' Kashmir forces that the Commission in August stated to the Prime Minister of India that the question of the military aspect of the territories in the north of the State had not been dealt with in the resolution of 13 August."

 

That is to say, if a certain military position in relation to a territory which is part of the Union, according to the resolutions, changes, does it mean that it belongs to somebody else ?

 

The paragraph continues :

 

The Commission was informed that it was for the defence of the Western area that the Pakistan regular forces had entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

In other words, if there was any justification, not from a legal point of view, but from the point of view of Pakistan, it was in regard to Western Kashmir. Pakistan had not emerged at all in the northern area at this time.

 

The Commission states further :

 

"When it drafted the 13 August resolution the Commission did not consider the northern area in the same light as it did western Kashmir...."

 

In other words, no question of local authorities, no question of "Azad" troops, no question of anything but the sovereignty of the Union of India, arises in regard to the northern territories. If there was insurrection, if we have internal difficulties, if there is resistance from local forces, no country is free from this, least of all Pakistan. That would be no argument for removing the territory from the sovereignty of the Dominion. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, in our submission, is in no doubt about this matter.

 

I would ask Council to take note of the next paragraph, which I, frankly, had not seen until relatively recently. It is a paragraph that leaves no room for doubt. On 27 August 1948, the Czechoslovak Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Korbel wrote a memorandum in reply to the letter and memorandum of August 1948 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. He says:

 

"Surveillance of territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir other than those now occupied by the Pakistan Army and forces under its control is not provided for in the resolution [This only applies to what is now wrongly called Azad Kashmir.] "The administration of such areas[that is, the areas other than those occupied by Pakistan] remain under the jurisdiction of the Government of the State." [S/1100, annex 27, appendix, para. 8.]

 

Therefore, if this is true, if this memorandum of 27 August 1948 is a communication from the Security Council, then it means that any other position taken thereafter would be a violation of the resolution, not only a violation of sovereignty.

 

But all this very soon changed in fact. The Pakistan Government said that no regular troops were in this area from May to December 1948. By January 1949 what had happened? The Commission says:

 

"However, by January 1949 Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas; the area was administered by local authorities, not those of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, with the assistance of Pakistan officials."

 

I ask every member of the Council, particularly the representative of the United Kingdom, whether there can be any justification in international law and equity for arguing the case or putting forward the point of view that he has done, and that has been advanced all along in this matter, when the period of negotiations and resolutions and the period immediately following the period of trying to establish a cease-fire line has been used for consolidation-because from May to December 1948 there were no troops in there, according to the Pakistan statement.

 

The Commission says:

 

"... by January 1949, Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas; the areas were administered by local authorities, not those of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, with the assistance of Pakistan officials."

 

If it were only local authorities, one could understand. There was a civil war and you could not do anything about it. But when another country comes into a sovereign State, it is a different proposition. That is what happened, and you will find this corroborated afterwards by no less a person than Sir Owen Dixon.

 

On 15 April 1949, the Commission repeated their assurances to us when they said :

 

"In the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north, observers will be stationed who, in the event that the defence of this territory becomes necessary, will advise the Commission. The Commission, in this case, or at the request of the Government of India, may agree that the Government of India post garrisons at specified points of this area."

 

This was not only written to us, but also to the Minister for Kashmir Affairs in the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan had then been informed that if necessary Indian garrisons would take over. The United States Vice-Chairman of the Commission, in a

 

letter of 16 April 1949 to the Pakistan Ministry for Kashmir

 

Affairs-whatever that may be-writes the same month:

 

"I understand the intention of the Commission to be that it may agree to the stationing of Indian troops at specified points should it be convinced, in the light of all the circumstances, that it is necessary for the defence of that territory."

 

This is the position as we see it in regard to the northern areas. These northern areas were differently administered at different times under British rule. But at no time did they have a separate sovereignty. When the British withdrew from India, when paramountcy lapsed, when the British power was withdrawn, the British did not as a matter of law leave any authority behind in these places. Whether they were called residents, agencies, administered areas, whatever they might have been, they were all under the suzerainty of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, there was no other territory there except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. So I submit that Pakistan's occupation of these northern areas is part of the annexation and therefore a violation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, a violation which makes any further progress impossible.

 

More than that: Since the appeal has come from the most friendly quarter of all both privately and publicly, namely, from the United Kingdom, how can the United Kingdom address an appeal to us for any further progress in the way of what they call truce negotiations when, not out of our suspicion but by the facts established, every negotiation is used for the spoliation of our territories ? It is not a question of how we can trust them because our minds are distrustful, but here are the facts before you. First of all, there is concealment in the Security Council. Then, there is this spurious explanation that the Council was not informed that there was an invasion because the Commission had not been set up, which is contradicted by the facts. Even if the Commission had not been set up, the Council could have been informed. But the Commission had been set up. Further, the whole of that period has been taken up by a further consolidation both in the north and in the west. What is more, there is the self-confessed admission of Pakistan that a sister State, a neighbouring country, which has taken no small part in historical terms in the emergence of Pakistan itself, had been invaded, not because there was invasion from side, but as a protective operation. That is the position.

 

The reasons, if any, given to Mr. Lozano, the Chairman of the Commission, about the Pakistan attitude in regard to a part of these northern areas, namely, the Gilgit Agency, are not without interest. I hope the representative of the United Kingdom, with all the expert knowledge that he will have available at his disposal, will try to look at the evidence. On 18 July 1948, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan said to Mr. Lozano:

 

"In late October 1947, representatives of the Gilgit Agency had requested accession to Pakistan, but the Pakistan Government had not taken any decision at that time." [S/1100, annex 8.]

 

If true, it is a very correct position. How could they make any decision? The Gilgit Agency could have no more access than a subdistrict in India or anywhere else. So it is quite correct. But he goes on to say:

 

"There had been frequent requests from the Gilgit Agency which had clearly indicated that, if no action were taken by Pakistan, it would seek accession to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." [Ibid.]

 

We have had no communication about this either from the Gilgit Agency people-if they are entitled to do so-or from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Even if they had wanted to accede to anybody, I do not see what that had to do with the matter at all. Therefore, you can see there is an attempt to put before Mr. Lozano, Chairman of the Commission, what would happen if these people did not take over the Gilgit Agency.

 

On 26 April 1949, Mr. Gurmani, who was then the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and a member of the Pakistan Government-not now, I believe in a letter to the Chairman of the Commission, disclosed that these areas were firmly under "Azad '' control. Now, how can that be? We were told by Pakistan itself that between May and December 1948, there were neither troops nor anybody there and that Pakistan had nothing to do with it. Four months later, in 1949, the responsible Minister of the Government informed the Commission that these areas are firmly under "Azad" control. If "Azad '' control means a government that is part of the Government of West Kashmir, it is even now not true. In any case, there can be no other control there except what may arise out of local insurrection or out of our willingness to stay out, or out of the Com mission's appeal not to do anything that might lead to a renewal of conflict.

 

As I pointed out before: "Azad" control means, according to them, local authorities under the direction of the Pakistan Government. But Mr. Gurmani, the Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan, enlightens the Commission on 26 April 1949, only four months after they had said there was nobody there, as follows in a letter to the Commission:

 

"Efforts are being made to make the route Gilgit (Bunji) -Skardu also jeepable within a short period. [This is supposed to be territory over which we have no jurisdiction whatsoever.]... There exists: a good all-weather Dakota strip at Gilgit; a good-weather Dakota strip at Skardu; a Dakota strip at Chilas."

 

We will hear more about Chilas if this matter comes up again in a few months.

 

That these airstrips were constructed under Pakistan occupation is also clear from the following-and that is my statement: In addition to all that is necessary for living there such as the usual consumer goods, these strips and roads have been built in these areas. We are not objecting to progress, but the question is: Who has the authority to build these places? Is it suggested that a handful of people living out there could build airstrips and could construct these roads and so on? Even if it is so suggested, it will be denied by the Pakistan Minister himself who says that they have built it. What is more, you can find items relating to this expenditure in the Pakistan budget. The Pakistan budget for 1957-58 makes a provision under demand No. 30 of capital outlay on civil aviation for the construction of runways and terminal buildings at Gilgit.

 

There are two or three matters to be considered. First of all, that comes out of the Pakistan budget. I have not examined carefully what demand No. 30 is, under what heading it comes.

Let us assume that it comes under civilian demand. What right does Pakistan have to build these things in somebody else's territory? Secondly, under the cease-fire agreement they are not permitted to do these things, even assuming that this was an evacuated territory. Then we come to the constitutional aspect of it on which I had some respectful differences with my colleague, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, the other day, with regard to the constitutional aspects arising from the Pakistan Constitution. The Establishment of the West Pakistan Act of 1955 includes some of the northern areas in its territory. The annexation of other areas is covered by section I, clause 2, sub clause (c) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which refers to territories under the administration of the Federation but not included in either Province; that is to say, either the Pakistan Government takes any territory under its administration, and then even if it is not one of its Provinces it becomes part of Pakistan. That means annexation.

 

What my Government is trying to convey to the Security Council as best as it can is that you have before you the fact that part of the territory of the Union of India has been annexed by Pakistan which has no status whatsoever in this matter except that of a defendant, and whatever arrangements have been made with Pakistan have been in order to stop the fighting, in order to obtain the evacuation of the territory and so on. I could give you more evidence from the statement of the present Foreign Minister of the direct nature of the administration of these territories, but it would not be necessary.

 

Finally, I would like to say on this subject that I have already pointed out Pakistan's stated position as to why they had entered. I have also pointed out that they have said that they were not in the northern areas between May and December 1948. Now we come to January 1949, when Pakistan held military control. Therefore, it is clear that either Pakistan concealed the presence of its troops in this area, which I think is not an uncharitable or mischievous inference to make, but a realistic one from the facts of the case, because it has always done so-either Pakistan concealed the presence of its troops in this area, as it did in regard to the first entry of the troops and the build-up of the "Azad '' Kashmir forces, or this area was occupied by Pakistan troops after the cease-fire of 1 January 1949. Even if it entered there between the period of May to December 1948, which it says it did not, then it acted by way of concealment, and the result is concealment of facts from the Security Council. The resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were passed, as has been implied several times and pointed out by the Commission, without the knowledge of these facts, and several times material change have taken place. If the Commission had known that, it would have not that in; if it had known that, it would have done something else. Either that was concealed or the entry of the Pakistan army and its administration of this area came after the cease-fire, in which case it is a violation of part I-a further violation of part I-of the resolution of 13 August 1948. The whole territory, comprising several tens of thousands of square miles, was annexed, occupied and military administered. That is a gross violation of part I of the resolution and goes further to strengthen the position established by Mr. Jarring in his report.

 

Further, what I have read out sets out in the Com mission's own language the legal position of India in regard to the sovereignty of its territory, its right to security, to establish garrisons and how important it is from the point of view of geography, the international lay-out of this place, the trade routes of Central Asia and how all along, in the interests of the interests of the cessation of hostilities, the Government of India has played itself down in regard to pressing its claims. It only asks for the minimum assertion and exercise of its rights in order to protect its own territory. That is the position with regard to the northern areas. It may well be that further observations on this subject may come up which may require answers, in which case the Government of India reserves its position.

 

Now we come to the observations made mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom followed up by the others who all say, "If everybody agrees, we have no objection." That is a topic which Sir Pierson Dixon. I think it was, in the first instance, called "demilitarization". I personally cannot find fault with him for using the word "demilitarization"; even if I could, I would not want to. But it must be understood that the word "demilitarization" in connexion with Jammu and Kashmir is used only in the context of the resolution, namely, by agreement to diminish the number of troops and the quantum of equipment, not demilitarization in the sense of neutralizing a territory or anything of that kind. In the course of the negotiations we ourselves have casually used this phrase, but not in the sense of any abrogation of sovereignty. I am not going to start from the various statements made before the Council with regard to demilitarization, but let us take the problem by itself. What is meant by demilitarization? We are for demilitarization in the sense that if Pakistan will take away the troops, take away the equipment, take away the organization, take away everything that they are not entitled to retain there in term of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 that would be progress towards the implementation of part I and, if it were succeeded by a continuous period of the observation of paragraph E and no threat to the security of the Union, a new situation would arise. Therefore, demilitarization cannot refer to the Union of India.

 

Since you, Sir, come from a new sovereign State yourself, may I say this with great respect. This Security Council, or indeed any part of the United Nations, has no right under the Charter, under no resolution of the United Nations so far, even apart from this subject, to call upon one individual country to demilitarize itself for no reason. We all want demilitarization of the whole world, and I wish that some of the statements made, for example, by my colleague, Mr. Walker of Australia, had been made in some other place. We were told by Mr. Walker that :

 

"... the need for all possible progress to rapid economic development of India and Pakistan renders made in the maintenance of armed forces on the present scale in relation to the Kashmir situation an increasing handicap. There is also the view, which has been so widely expressed in the United Nations, that balanced reductions in armed forces can contribute, perhaps more than anything else, to an increase in mutual confidence between countries suspicious of each other's intentions." [798th meeting, para. 12.]

 

We are all looking forward to seeing how Mr. Walker will vote tomorrow, but why the problem of disarmament should be singled out in its application to us we do not understand. S0₁ to a sovereign State there can be no demand for demilitarization. We are entitled to maintain what troops we can afford. If they violate international law the consequences will fall upon us, but no appeal can be addressed to any country in the form of a unilateral injunction to demilitarize. And, if I may say so, I am rather surprised at the wording used in some of the resolutions which Dr. Graham has carried to India where the Security Council asked Dr. Graham to affect the demilitarization. How Dr. Graham can effect demilitarization I do not know. He can recommend demilitarization to us, but he cannot affect it. It is impossible. Therefore, any request to any sovereign State for demilitarization, without any other circumstances binding it, would, I submit, not be in consonance with the present state of affairs in the world or with any provision of the United Nations Charter or with any resolution. But if any country has made a specific agreement with regard to its troops, the situation is different. Suppose we made a proclamation by an instrument that we wanted to be treated as an international instrument-shall we say as in the case of the Egyptian Declaration on the Suez Canal of 24 April 1957 [S/3818]-we would have an international obligation to do whatever was in that instrument.

 

Therefore, it comes to this. The so-called demilitarization --that is, any problem affecting either the quantum, the weight, the quality, the augmentation or whatever it may be of military strength-is, as far as we are concerned, strictly bounded by any undertakings that we may have given. And that is what We have been discussing it for a long time. What are the undertakings of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and where do they take us? And if Mr. Jarring's position is to be taken as being that he has established that a deadlock has been reached with regard to the implementation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, then the question of demilitarization applies only to our friends from Pakistan. It is a question that ought to be addressed to only one place, and to nobody else.

 

There is no title resting anywhere to call upon a sovereign State to demilitarize-however weak it may be, however humble, however poor or however backward. We are still all Member States of the United Nations. But if any State, however powerful, has given an undertaking, then that undertaking has to be carried out, and in this particular case the undertaking-so-called and if any-can only be by the engagement of these resolutions. So we come back to resolutions, and when we come back to the resolutions one cannot read the resolutions from the top upwards. The resolutions are so constructed that certain things happen, and then a new situation arises. When that new situation arises, some other action is performed. Then something else happens. India has undertaken, on its side, to carry out some undertakings.

 

So, at the present moment, this question of so-called demilitarization, in the sense of dehydrating troops anywhere, can apply only to our friends across the border who have their troops inside our borders. The appeal cannot be addressed to us. If, on the other hand, the position taken up by the representative of the United Kingdom, followed by the representatives of the United States and Australia, relates to part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948-and if, what is more, the latter part of part II of the resolution has to be performed before the initial part and before part I-I think we have given our answer at length.

 

Not only have we given our answer at length. We, as a people, whatever our position may be as a State in the world, have the obligation and the natural desire of a nation to maintain our independence and our integrity, and we cannot be called upon to permit the security of our territory to be violated. I have said all along, and even at the risk of repetition I say again, that the purpose of the other side has been to make use, for the purpose of military consolidation of every act of negotiation and everything that is done to send someone to make any request. Therefore, when we are asked for demilitarization, at the present moment my Government does not desire to go into this proposition any further than is necessary out of courtesy to the Security Council and to enable it to acquaint itself with the facts of the position, because there are no proposals before us. When those proposals come it will be time for my Government to take them into account, in the light of what I am saying today.

 

What would demilitarization mean, and when will it take place? One hundred per cent of the demilitarization is in the territory of India. Whether it be on this side of the cease-fire line or on that side, the demilitarization is in India and the militarization is in Pakistan. And let us not forget that even Mr. Jarring, a neutral observer, has been obliged to point out to the Council-I do not remember his exact words now-that the changing situation in the world and the various political alignments, relationships and so on in South-East Asia all have to be taken into account.

 

I have no desire, on the one hand, to repeat what I have said in order not to touch upon any factor on which other countries are sensitive with regard to the augmentation of the military strength of Pakistan-but when a country is called upon to take down its defences, well, the Security Council takes a very grave responsibility. And I say that we see no basis for it whatsoever. In the terms of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, all we have before us is first, paragraph E and then paragraph B of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948-because, knowing our friends as we do, we would first like at least to see some difference of behaviour in regard to words and psychological warfare, even before guns are removed.

 

We regret that with one or two exceptions notably Sir Pierson Dixon-very little notice has been taken by members of the Security Council in their public statements of the fact that a new phase of aggression has begun, even on the territory within the cease-fire line. Are we to put ourselves in a position to be able to tell our people that the discussions in the Security Council are to be used again as a facade or an opportunity for violating the integrity of our territory and creating upset and trouble in the country? Is it suggested that a country like the United Kingdom seriously thinks that an accredited representative of the Government of India, speaking under instructions, would place before the Council-with its intimate knowledge of our administration and with its member's knowledge of the facts about what is going on-facts and matters of this kind if they were not so ?

 

Would we come here and point out that a new phase of this war had begun? Are we not entitled-to put it at its lowest to have legitimate suspicions, which in this case are something more than suspicions, in view of the facts of the past? Therefore, when it comes to demilitarization, my Government would like to say, first of all, that as an ad hoc or de novo proposition by itself it cannot be addressed to any single country. In the context of Kashmir, if it is to be addressed to anybody in the interests of international peace and security and the interests of international good behaviour, it ought to be addressed to our neighbours, asking them to remove the accoutrements of war from the territory of a neighbour State.

 

If it is to be addressed in terms of the resolution, then we are to pursue the line Mr. Jarring pursued, so far as you are concerned, strictly to confine yourself to that and come to the position where you find a deadlock-the report is a report in our favour-the deadlock in relation to part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948. How can there be the taking down of our defences when the period of the twelve months or so that followed the negotiations, the establishment of the Commission, has, according to Pakistan's admissions, been used to invade our country- not even to protect what they regarded as their co-religionists but in order to protect their own frontiers-that is to say, for the alleged protection of their territory, to come and invade ours? Well, that belongs to a century that has long been left behind. No country in the world would be safe, if the Security Council subscribed to that proposition.

 

Therefore, we would beg the Security Council to take into account the political, the moral, the psychological results of pronouncements it makes. Obviously, if both parties do not agree to a resolution, that resolution remains where it is so far as the facts are concerned. That has been so with many resolutions. But that is not the whole of the story. Is it right that a great many peoples in the world-our own people, for example-should come to the belief that, irrespective of performances in the past, we are called upon to throw the consideration of the defence of our motherland to the winds, open the floodgates of invasion to marauding peoples on our frontiers. That request, however well-intentioned, is not justified by previous history. This problem will come up, no doubt-and I am instructed to deal with this matter only when we have a definite proposition before us-but, out of courtesy to the Council and my desire not to hold anything up our sleeve, we have put our position before you.

 

References have been made to Mr. Graham. We are told that various commissions have in the past tried to look at the demilitarization-that is to say, tried to reduce the military strength on either side in order to make a plebiscite possible this, that and the other-starting from the time of Sir Owen Dixon. I stand subject to correction. And I do not want to rely on this statement as part of any procedures which may have to be taken in the future. But if you read Sir Owen Dixon's report [S/1791], the main impression you get is that he was not pursuing that resolution as such; he was trying to see in his own way whether anything could be done about it for a conciliatory settlement. And that is why Sir Owen Dixon said that there had been a violation of international law.

 

But it is true that the Government of India did agree, without any prejudice to any other positions, to explore the possibilities of the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It did agree to explore the possibilities. Is that wrong? Because a Government, in spite of what it considers well established rights, which are easily proved by the documents before you, is prepared to facilitate the process of conciliation-is it to be penalized for that reason? You cannot penalize us, because we have not at any time abandoned anything in this matter. What is more, we have been very careful, in view of all the circumstances and of the general necessities of political discussion, to state our position.

 

When Mr. Graham was first coming to India, we participated in some discussions, and the Prime Minister wrote to Mr. Graham-to whose courtesy and kindness and general friendliness toward all concerned we are only too ready to bear witness-a letter dated 11 September 1951, in which he said:

 

"As you are aware, we were glad to meet you and your associates, as we are eager to find a way to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. We made it clear to you, however, at the very outset of our discussions, which were informal, that for the reasons explained by aur permanent representative to the Security Council, Sir Benegal N. Rau, we have found ourselves unable to accept the Council's resolution dated 30 March 1951, and that our discussions were without prejudice to this stand of the Government of India. The views that my Government is submitting now on your proposals are similarly without prejudice to that stand." [S/2375, annex 3, para. 2.]

 

That is to say, anything we have said to Mr. Graham at any time, any memorandum we might have exchanged at any time, any memorandum we might have exchanged, any consideration of any problem, is purely exploratory.

 

What is more, in municipal law, in international law-not so much perhaps in international law, because it is not nearly so formal-an agreement means the consensus of minds. And those minds must meet not on the periphery of the proposition but on the core of the proposition. Although it has not been put in those legal terms, it appears in Mr. Graham's report. Unless there is essential agreement, a meeting of minds on the core of a proposition, there is no agreement. Mr. Jules Moch, a distinguished representative-with whom, I am sorry to say, one is not always in agreement - speaking on 22 October 1957 in the first Committee of the General Assembly on disarmament, said: "In building a bridge, unless the whole thing is complete, there is no bridge." No international negotiation-indeed, no private negotiation-would be possible, if it were thought that to say "Yes, that is all right" about any part of it would be regarded as a binding contract. And, what is more, in this particular case of the five reports of Mr. Graham, the same story runs. I submit that you cannot judge these things merely by placing proposals as points 1 to 12 and then arguing that all facts are free and equal. There is no disagreement on eleven and a half points, and there is no agreement on half a point, but it is the half point that is important. That is how it is.

 

But that is not the only position. The Council is somewhat allergic, I think, to our disadvantage, when we quote legal authorities. But the Council cannot disregard the findings of the Permanent Court of International Justice on these matters. There are scores of cases, but the majority of them-or a good many of them-would be cases in which either the United Kingdom or the United States of America is involved. They have contributed so much, by case law, to the establishment of principles of international law. Therefore, we have avoided quoting them and we have tried to find a case which does not, for once, apply to these two countries. In its judgement in the case concerning the factory at Chorzow-a case brought by Germany against Poland-this is what the Court said :

 

"Before proceeding to set out the reasons for which it must overrule the preliminary objection taken by Poland to its jurisdiction to deal with these submissions, the Court would observe that, for the purposes of this statement of reasons, as also for the purposes of its future judgement on the merits, it cannot take account of declarations, admissions or proposals which the Parties may have made in the course of direct negotiations which I have taken place between them, declarations which, moreover, have been made without prejudice in the event of the points under discussion forming the subject of judicial proceedings. For the negotiations in question have not, as acknowledged by the representatives before the Court of the Parties themselves, led to an agreement between them.``

 

If the whole of the Graham proposals had been agreed to by the two parties and then if either party went back on them, there would be a breach of agreement. But what has happened in this matter is this. An attempt was made to find some method of passing over to part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Part II, therefore, was interpreted as-and, for the purpose of exploration, we did not object-contrary even to the Commission's findings. The Commission had definitely laid down that there could be neither simultaneity nor synchronization. The resolution definitely placed the responsibility for non-augmentation, and so on, on both sides - which now rests only on the other side-and the removal of troops in two stages in Pakistan before a single Indian soldier is removed. It does not anywhere call upon us to agree to the arming in any way of what have been called "Azad '' forces. The Pakistan Government refused to recognize the "Azad" Government. I do not know whether it does now or not. The Security Council has never done so.

 

We did all this by way of exploration, but there has been in the five reports at no time any agreement on the crucial matters. In fact, Dr. Graham has, with great integrity and a great deal of painstaking, set out an exposition of the two points of view-I am only concerned with that of my Government-which makes it impossible for there to be a bridging on that basis. In fact, what Mr. Graham's fifth report does point out the impossibility of proceeding to part II. Further, if I may say so with respect, but for the overwhelming emotional feeling inside Dr. Graham for finding a settlement by conciliation, the logical conclusion to be drawn from his reports is that part II cannot be implemented except by resolving the block in part I.

 

In his fifth report, Dr. Graham concluded:

 

"After thorough consideration of these communications and further conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan, the United Nations representative felt that there was no ground left at that stage on which to continue the conference and therefore, with the agreement with the two representatives, he decided to conclude it." [S/2967, para. 52].

 

That is merely an abandonment of that procedure. If you like to be courteous, he suggested postponement sine die.

 

On 15 February 1957, under instructions-it is not necessary for me to say "under instructions", because it cannot be anything else, but in this case under specific instructions -from the Government of India, I made the following statement:

 

"While I am on this point [that is, the Graham discussions] I might deal with one other matter, because my Government is very anxious and very concerned that no statement of ours or any errors of omission or commission should afterwards be charged up to us as a commitment. We have suffered by moderation. We have suffered by: reasonableness in our proceedings before this Council. Every time we have considered a hypothetical proposition and every time we have agreed to embark upon an exploration, it has been charged up against us as a commitment. Therefore, I want to say here and now. that whatever mathematical calculations were made with regard to 6,000 or 3,000 or 12,000 or 21,000 in the various previous negotiations, these no longer hold true, because no offer that is not accepted is a binding contract, either in the case of individuals or in the case of nations. Otherwise we should have a number of floating commitments, and no country would know where it stood. In the course of long negotiations, all kinds of offers are made. If the Secretary-General were to be committed to the many suggestions which he must have made in the past sixty days then he would be in an awkward position. [That was during the Middle East troubles.] The same thing is true with respect to a government.

 

"Therefore, I want to say here and now, Mr. President, that if you were to go to India [that was when Jarring's visit was mooted] or if anyone else were to go, it would be no use telling us that we agreed to this and that at the time and that 'now therefore you are committed to it. We agree to nothing-we discuss all these proposals. They must all be considered, with any problem, in the context of the time. We agree to things to which we are parties." [769th meeting, paras. 70 and 71.]

 

On 20 February 1957 the same matter was raised again. The Government of India desired this to be placed on the record, and I stated:

 

"What is more important-and we want to put this into the record-the Government of India is no longer committed by any intermediate discussions that have taken place, by any hypothetical propositions that have been put to them, or by any mathematical calculations made by Mr. Graham at various times. All these things were part of the procedures to find a settlement.

 

"If the margin had been closed, we would be bound by it. We have been bitten so many times (especially when we just heard the representative of the Philippines, on whose statement I shall comment in a moment) we have no desire at all for the Security Council to misunderstand our position. It is wrong to say that some advance has been made in regard to demilitarization. The only advance that has been made in regard to demilitarization -and it would be useful for the Council to know it-is the voluntary withdrawal of the Government of India of large numbers of troops from Kashmir since cessation of hostilities for which the Council has not been gracious enough to say one word of appreciation-without any conditions whatsoever.

 

"With regard to these references to a single and continuous process, simultaneous withdrawals, synchronized arrangements, all these things and all these words have been differently interpreted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, by the United Nations representatives afterwards; and whatever discussions may have taken place, either in New York, Geneva, New Delhi, Karachi, Paris or anywhere, they are all today only part of historical material; they do not commit the Government of India to anything, because there was no closing of any bargains, and it should not be said afterwards that where it is advantageous to one side that is taken as a commitment, and where it is not advantageous, it is pointed out against us.

 

"Therefore, the only engagements from which we can proceed, insofar as we can do so, are the engagements to which we are parties, in the context of all the circumstances submitted. Therefore, I would like this particular factor to be written into the record so that in the event of the matter coming up again [as it has now] or having anyone else intervening, whether it is your distinguished self, Mr. President, it should not be thought that now we have gone back on something else, because unless this attitude is taken, it is impossible to discuss anything, any pro tem proposition, any exploration; any thinking aloud becomes dangerous because at that moment we will be pinned to it. What is more, the whole surrounding circumstances have to be taken into account." [773rd meeting, paras. 60 to 63].

That was the position that was stated by the Prime Minister to Dr. Graham, both orally and afterwards in writing, in September 1951, and that is our position today.

 

What is more, these reports refer to the situation five years ago. I have no desire to pursue this matter further, because if there is no progress along these lines there is no necessity for me to weary the Council with more detail. On the other hand, if the countries usually associated with this venture are going to bring up proposals, that will be the time for them and for us to speak about it.

 

I want to say here and now that, before we can state a final position on any proposal that may come before this Council, we shall have to see the proposal in writing, we shall have to hear the arguments for or against them, and we shall have to submit them to the Government of India for its views. That, I think, is an extremely reasonable position. This problem has been before the Security Council for ten years. To the Security Council it is probably only one of the many problems in the world To us, however, it is a problem that vitally concerns the integrity, the honour and the self-respect of our people. It is a problem that recalls to our mind the spoliation of our territory and the plunder that has been committed by our neighbours-in the first instance, without admitting it and, afterwards, admitting it. Today, to our knowledge, members of the Pakistan Government are inviting rebellion in our country. Are we to be told by the Security Council, that, owing to some mistaken conception of commitment which we have not made, we should pull down our fences and throw away the hard-won independence of our people? I am sure that is not a proposition which the nations of the world would address to us.

 

The position of the Government of India is put very faithfully by Mr. Graham. He says in his fourth report:

 

"Constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India, and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. India maintains that this is the only position consistent with the assurance given by the Commission and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India," [S/2783 and Corr. 1, para. 25.]

 

In other words, if we were to be asked to carry out any contrary decision, we should be scrapping our entire Constitution.

 

We also read the following in Mr. Graham's report:

 

"The Government of India maintains that the administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the case-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to-troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force." [S/2783 and Corr. 1, para. 22.]

 

Later, the Government of India said in a memorandum forwarded to Mr. Graham :

 

"The Government of India is unable to agree to the retention of any military force in the so-called "Azad" Kashmir territory. Not only would this be contrary to the assurance given by UNCIP. India that the resolution of 13 August should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as to-bring into question the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of

their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops, or to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State, but the presence of such a force which, by reason ion with the Pakistan Army, constitutes a link with that Army, would be a threat to the security of the State. its associate

 

"...the Government of India considers that the question of local authorities has to be dealt with in the light of the assurances given to the Government of India by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan." [S/2967, annex VI, paras. 2 and 3.]

 

We regard the proposals, the assurances and the commitments made by the Commission-and these are not secret; they are part of the documents of this case-as proposals, assurances and commitments made by the Security Council.

 

I continue to quote from the Government of India's memorandum :

 

"For this purpose it is essential that local authorities should not be so evolved, nor so function in practice, as to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the evacuated territory or to let it be consolidated in any way to the disadvantage of the State. In the opinion of the Government of India this makes it necessary: (i) that the so-called "Azad'' Kashmir Government shall not be allowed to function in this area either collectively or individually through their Ministers; (ii) that all officials appointed by the Pakistan Government shall cease to function; (iii) that no connexion shall be maintained between the local authorities and the Pakistan Government...." [ibid. para. 3]

 

All of these quotations are part of the record of this case and much of the position reflected therein is still the same today, Since this series of Security Council meetings began, evidence has not been lacking that responsible Ministers in Pakistan have been making provocative statements. Fortunately for us, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan is here in New York so he cannot be making speeches in Karachi. The following report appeared in the Hindustan Times on 5 November 1957:

 

"Mr. Yusuf Haroon, Pakistan's Minister for Kashmir Affairs, is reported to have told a public meeting on Saturday [I believe that was 2 November] that Pakistan itself 'has lost the spirit and the warmth which it had at the time of independence (partition) for getting Kashmir'...

 

"Kashmir could not be got for Pakistan Mr. Haroon said [at a Muslim League ward meeting] through the help of foreign countries. Only if the people were prepared for action and sacrifices could it be had. If people are determined to get Kashmir there is no reason why they cannot succeed, as the example of the creation of Pakistan is very much before their eyes'.."

 

Meanwhile Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, former head of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, said in a statement :

 

"The only alternative left for the Government of Pakistan. would be to either go to war with India or withdraw its international commitments to maintain the cease-fire line and maintain order in 'Azad' territory..."

 

Thus, I have dealt with this question of demilitarization. Perhaps some specific proposals will be forthcoming here. We have heard some references to such proposals in private conversations and in lobby talk, and we have no doubt that there are numbers of draft resolutions in various people's pockets. No doubt, we shall be given some precise information in this regard.

 

I would like to conclude my statement today by summarizing the observations I have made.

 

First, I would request the President very earnestly to take into account the facts that I have set forth, because it is a matter of real hurt to our people that on behalf of the people of Iraq, it should be stated that we would produce before this Council afterthoughts, spurious arguments, which have no foundation in fact. We would request the President to convey to the people of Iraq that the reflection which was made was an attribution of motives. We are quite prepared to recognize the fact of military alliances, but we would ask to be allowed the freedom and luxury of believing in other international relations.

 

Our position is that the only engagements by which we are committed are the general rules of international law, our obligations under the United Nations Charter to defend the sovereignty of our country, not to interfere in other people's affairs and not to brook any interference in ours; and the obligations arising from the resolutions of 17 January 1948, 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. If we wished to be punctilious and very logical, it would not even be necessary to refer to the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Morally speaking, it would be entirely correct for us to base ourselves on the resolution of 17 January 1948. For if neither we nor Pakistan is willing to carry out the very strict instructions and fervent appeals of the Security Council, the demands of human conscience and international law, not to commit aggression, then there is no value in any other commitments. If we wished to be strictly logical and punctilious-some people might use the word "obstreperous"-we really could base ourselves only on the resolution of 17 January 1948.

 

Even without sticking to that resolution, we are entitled to beg of each one of you whether you are going to remain members of the Security Council or not-to see to it that the appeals made by the Security Council are not made a cover, a cloak or an instrument for further aggression. But if we turn to the position taken by Mr. Jarring, that what he is considering is the situation as arising from the engagements entered into -and I purposely use the word "engagements" because commitments arise only when commitments have been made by Pakistan in the resolutions of 17 January 1948 and the supplementary resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949, this last resolution has no existence whatsoever except in the context of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It is not an independent resolution, the Commission definitely says so. It is supplementary, subsidiary to the other resolutions, according to the Commission. Part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has never seen the light of day, although we tried to make it see the light of day, and when, in view of the kind of approach made to us from the other side, to the non-imple mentation of these things made it possible after three or four years for us to do something, we did not think it right to withhold from the peoples of Kashmir the benefits of economic, political or moral development, as far as it was possible for us to extend them. So it is that free elections take place, parliament sits, debates go on, newspapers function, universities exist and economic development goes on. Seventy thousand people went into Kashmir in the last holiday season, of whom at least 10 per cent were Europeans or Americans. No country which is shut off from civilization permits that. It is our position that these resolutions must be considered.

 

So, if we want to repeat the facts, today it is not only a question of removing what was put in there after 25 December 1948, when Pakistan agreed to the resolutions we agreed to the resolutions we agreed to long before-it is also a question of not adding to it. I was surprised to hear my friend Sir Pierson Dixon say that the army is being modernized and that new equipment is coming in, but in the circumstances that obtain, unless we are to accept the implied proposition-which is inseparable in some minds-that we are two peas in a pod, we are self-respecting nation who obeys the dictates of international law. We have committed no aggression on any country we have dishonoured no bond, we owe no money to the British or anybody else which we will not pay, we have honoured every obligation, but on the other side is a country that invaded our territory and what is more stood up in this Council and told everyone that it had committed aggression and had invaded the territory of India to protect its frontiers.

 

Are we to be told that we are the aggressors? We, who are the victims of aggression and who have responded to the appeals that have been made, we, who have carried out the principles of self-determination in the context exists, we, who above anybody else have carried the situation to extremes in respect of the vulnerability of our frontiers, in spite of the imperative necessity to protect our limited trade in the north ? Are we to be told we are to be placed on the same footing as the defendant as the country that has committed repine and plunder, the country that has violated international law, the country which according to Sir Owen Dixon committed a breach of international law when it crossed the frontier? It is not necessary to go so far back as Sir Owen Dixon. The resolution of 13 August 1948 lays down the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

 

All of us here are sufficiently familiar with the idea of the integrity of States to know that sovereignty in regard to a neighbouring territory is excluded except in the context of international authority. There was never any question here of two States disputing on the same territory. There were not two Jammu and Kashmir Governments to come before the Security Council; it was the Government of India which came here with a complaint that aggression had been committed on the territory of the Union in the area of Jammu and Kashmir and requested the Security Council to use its good offices to prevent bloodshed and to find a conciliatory settlement. Willy nilly we have moved on to the position of agreeing that the ceasefire line exists, but it has been stated very many times in Commission's reports that the line is not a political boundary otherwise we would not have gone in there. It was merely a matter of convenience, for the purpose of carrying on negotiations, that we spoke of the Pakistan side of Kashmir. There is no Pakistan side of Kashmir; the Pakistan side of Kashmir is on our side of the international frontier. As I said the other today, although I think my statement was misunderstood, we have no military forces and are carrying on no military operations of any kind there; we have only armed police in the whole place. After these ten years of going forwards and backwards, the Government of India appeals to the Security Council in the interests of the Charter, and in the interests of convincing the vast majority of peoples in India and in every other country in the world that what President Eisenhower said the other day about aggression is true about India as it is about any other country. After all, great countries have committed aggression and the United Nations has come down heavily on them. Why should there be any difference with another country?

 

We seek the way of conciliation, the way of understanding, the way to a settlement of relations with our neighbour. I do not say a settlement of the Kashmir problem, because there is no problem. We seek greater stability in our area and the avoidance of unnecessary misunderstandings arising from such statements as those I have quoted which were made by the Ambassadors of Turkey and Iraq to their Governments. All that calls for the vacation of aggression in Kashmir. Ten years is a long time for a country to be invaded and still to rest content in the faith that law will assert itself. The only thing that can destroy the force of law is a disregard of law, for the sake of expediency, by those in power. I am sure that will not be the case with members of the Security Council.

 

After we have submitted to you the circumstances in Kashmir I think I am entitled to say to you as a responsible Minister that I was in the place myself before I came here and we are interested in internal order, we are interested in good India-Pakistan relations and in communal harmony and more than all, strange as it may seem, we are anxious not to arouse in our people any kind of warlike feelings, because though we I have an army we do not want to encourage it. We have played down the whole of this business of this new aggression in Kashmir. I have been in Kashmir, in the different parts of the State where these things have happened, and I am familiar with the investigations which have been made, and I would ask the Security Council to accept, as from a responsible representative of an accredited State, that we have used the utmost restraint. I wish to convey to the members of the Security Council who are close to us and to the Council as a whole that action taken without taking these matters into account may well be playing with fire.

 

Terrorism, incitement to violence, the use of money from another Government to create subversion, the use of its intelligence services, some of whose members are in our hands-and proceedings are being taken against them in public trials in India, and since we have separated the executive from the judicial, there is no direction from the Government itself-all these facts have to be taken into account. Therefore, we beg of the Security Council to take into account that this is not one of those routine discussions about a matter that, like a hardy annual, comes up every time. We are dealing with a problem concerning a country with a considerable population, with no desire either to proclaim or to assert its strength by the quantum of its arms or by talking in military terms, that does not believe that finally any settlements can be brought about by war, either short-term or long-term, because no country, however powerful, can be sure of the consequences of war.

 

We are also anxious that these developments should not lead to a deterioration in our relations with our close neighbours, such as our friends across the water a few miles of it in Australia or here or in other places. We are anxious that the peoples of Kashmir, only half of whom today have political rights, educational opportunities, the opportunity of a better way of living and of industrial development, should, people, be enabled to have all this. What is preventing that is the occupation and annexation. Therefore, it is not merely the performance of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, not as a whole merely the removal of the guns, not merely the removal of the "Azad'' forces, and not merely the removal of the Pakistan army-because Pakistan can go forty to sixty miles across the frontier and come back again but it is the process of de annexation that would change the situation. Under what title, under what right, under what law, under what conception does Pakistan have any de facto or de jure authority in the territory it has taken from India and conquered by force? What answer are we to give to our people, what answer are we to give to ourselves in defence of the Charter?

 

Let us take for the sake of argument that we are a tyrannical or bad Government. If that were the case, we would not be the only ones in the world. Let us say, for argument's sake, that we are an undemocratic Government. Let us say we are an inefficient Government. But there is nothing in the resolution that ever speaks about the question of sovereignty. At best, it is where future sovereignty should lie. Sovereignty means authority, nothing else.

 

There may be arguments as to how the future may be. settled, but there has been no argument about the present state of affairs, which has its origin in possession, and out of possession, dispoliation has taken place. Therefore, de-annexation must take place. Part I, paragraph E of the resolution of 13 August 1948 must be implemented, there must be no more cries of "Jehad'', no more cries of holy war, no more proclamations that the military alliances of other parts of the world are intended against us or on account of us, and no more threats to us from that quarter.

 

In this connexion, I have repeatedly stated about the military aid given by the United States of America to Pakistan, whatever its consequences may be and the consequences are very onerous and very heavy for us-that we have accepted the motives so far as the United States is concerned. We are not challenging its motives. We accept the statement on the motives, not the correctness or otherwise, but the facts are that the weight of these arr are a potent quantity in the impending development of our country. It is also a potent factor, if I may say so without impertinence, in the impending of the development of Pakistan itself, which is very necessary for us. It stands in the way of the resolving of large numbers of problems which inherently have difficulties apart from any obstreperousness either they or we may possess.

 

Therefore, in the consideration of this question at the next stage, the Security Council, in its wisdom, will take what steps it wishes to take, but it would not expect a country to come here as to Canossa and to surrender. No Government in India could surrender the sovereignty of any part of its territory. No argument can argue people into bondage, and that phrase must be familiar to my friend from the United Kingdom. We shall not be wanting in any step that does not sully our honour, does not touch our integrity, does not place us in the same position as the invader, and which does not call upon us to break faith with the peoples of India and the world.

 

I ask anyone-I do not use any stronger word than "ask" friend or otherwise, to look into any of these documents, statements, assurances and memorandum submitted by the Government of India, its Prime Minister or anyone else, and say whether each one of these documents does not breathe this sentiment, even up to the last day. Are you going to dismiss these as hypocritical? If that is so, then compare these statements with the performances on the other side.

 

It gives us no pleasure periodically to come before the Security Council at the behest of Pakistan. We have neither the energy nor the people to do this. It does not help at the other end, because it only creates unsettlement. There is no other problem-I say this in all conscience-not even any of those stomach-touching problems of our economic development, which so deeply touches the population of India from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. Every class of society is deeply concerned and, I dislike saying this because much has been said about religion, no religious section of India is more disturbed by this business than are the Moslem populations of India, because they are patriotic Indians who have taken their part and who carry their burden and their responsibility for economic and political developments, and who have suffered imprisonment and suffered whatever there was to be suffered in the past. On looking back, the British Government was a comparatively liberal Government, even though it Was unpleasant at times.

 

Therefore, there is no problem that so deeply touches our people. That is no excuse for breaking any kind of international law. We would not ask the Security Council to do so. We only seek that the complaints we have brought, the commitments made by the Security Council, the aggression by Pakistan, which is the reverse of the assertion of our sovereignty in the resolutions, shall be dealt with and that the assurancess shall be implemented, and that step by step we shall not be inched along into a position of subservience to aggression. I beg the Security Council not to be deflected from this path by the inability of the representative of the Government of India to present a case which should need no argument with the strength, the facility or the finesse that is required.

 

If, in the course of these submissions, I have made any observations relating to any other country, not one of them has any reference to their domestic policies, not one of them has any reference to the peculiar character of Governments or of individuals. Wherever we have been able to express our appreciation, we have done so.

 

We are sometimes a little rough with the United Kingdom -that is the only way we get on-but we are not half as rough as they are with us. We agree with a great part of Sir Pierson Dixon's statement, and a great part of it is animated by a desire that somehow or other, by a magic wand, this thing will be resolved. But I ask him, in the name of all his country's history and traditions, is it a solution if it has no justice in it, if it is a violation of the Charter, if it is something where we accept the assurances given on behalf of this Council through Mr. Lozano, Mr. Korbel, or the American gentleman who was the Vice-Chairman? We did not look at their nationalities; to us they were the Security Council. They were honourable gentlemen performing international duties, and they made no reservations. And where an attempt has been made to establish that something was said to us that was different from what was said to Pakistan, I say that is a very sad thing to say, because that was not the case. In one matter, with regard to the disbanding and disarming of the "Azad" forces, there have been some contradictions, but those contradictions are easily solved because one must look at the last assurances. The assurances were given by the same people, and the last assurances are those given to the Government of India and communicated to Pakistan. What is more, in many cases, assurances were asked for by the other side which were not given.

 

If the Security Council really desires, as with this matter with justice, in consonance with its own principles, it will be necessary for it to go into the documents point by point. It is not as though, as the representative of Iraq said, we are reopening closed issues. In all respect, I submit that those who are reopening closed issues are those who try to justify annexation, because the issue of sovereignty is a closed issue. The resolutions are based on that. The right of defence is a closed issue. The fact that Pakistan has no place in Kashmir is a closed issue. That there are no two States of Jammu and Kashmir is a closed issue. We are not reopening them. It is those who by lack of knowledge or because they have been wrongly briefed are reopening closed issues, who are creating new issues out of going back on what are closed issues. does, to deal

 

I should like someone not merely to say: We agree to a plebiscite, or to this or that or the other. Under what conditions ? What about the sequence? We live in a world of time, and someone has said: If you analyses time it becomes a sequence in duration. You must take into account sequence: when a party is told that if so and so does something, then you have to do so and so, and if that party agrees, you cannot read a resolution upside down.

 

What is more, we have a lot of floods in Kashmir and the rest of India. In the early part of this year there were certain estimates with regard to the height of flood control arrangements. They came to X feet. These were calculations made over an average of twelve years ending three years ago. This is pertinent; this is not an anecdote. But the floods have been heavy. We have made new calculations on the averages of more recent years. It would be very foolish for us to try to stop those floods, basing the heights of our barriers on the calculations of the flood waters that are likely to come.

 

In 1947, Pakistan relied upon irregulars. Today, it does not have to rely on irregulars. In 1947, Pakistan had not taken the attitude that we were not to exist in peace and friendship. In 1947, Pakistan had not for seven years continuously refused to enter into agreement with India that all problems should be settled without war. In 1947, Pakistan had a different approach to the whole of this problem.

 

We think that, if the Security Council will use its good offices, will step back a little and throw its weight fully-as it desires to do, as it always does - on the side of commitments, of morality, of international law and of the Charter, it will find a solution. But no solution by which a country is called upon to disgorge its sovereign territory can be a solution. The mistake arises entirely from thinking that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is some foreign State that we have sought to annex. If we had gone to Jammu and Kashmir without accession, at the request of Sheikh Abdullah, under international law our position would have been morally, politically and legally indefensible. But we have not argued that. What applies to Kashmir appears to 560 other places in India which today have lost their identity in the mainland of another country. We are not going to unscramble these eggs. It may be a sin, but a pardonable sin, but, being a young country, there probably exists an expression of feelings in this way. All of you have a great deal to give away. We have very little. After all, I make this final appeal to you at this stage that the progress on this matter must proceed on the basis of the full vacation of aggression, which means de-annexation, the removal of everything that has come there from 20 August 1948, the stoppage of hostile propaganda, and some assurance which you or I can accept that this will continue.

 

Finally, there should be assurance that our relations are going to be settled on the basis of the United Nations Charter, and that the Security Council is concerned with the complaint That is before it, the complaint of aggression committed by Pakistan, which has been denied here totally but which, after all, is found in fact to be true. We do not ask for any condemnation; we do not ask for any strictures; we do not ask for any commendation. We do not even say: Leave us alone and we will fight it out.

 

I submitted to this Council on behalf of my Government the other day, irrespective of moral, legal, political and every right with regard to the cease-fire line, that our Government as at present constituted, our people, are not likely to be moved into any action which, however justifiable the assertion of a right, might lead to conflict-and conflict in any part of the world can lead to conflict in other parts of the world. We have had great patience with regard both to the cease-fire line and to the interior of our territory-I have not said anything about the rest of it because that is not before the Council and, with its experience, it is not necessary for us to bring it here. We are not, as a people, in a hurry to pursue mere logic and law at the expense of peace, and the appeal which we make to the Security Council in this matter is not a beginning appeal, is not an argument for mercy, for special treatment, for a partisan approach or anything of that kind, but for sheer justice, the application of agreements and what is necessary in the interests of stability, peace and order in our part of the world.

 

Mr. JARRING (Sweden): In my statement on the India Pakistan question at the 798th meeting of the Council, I indicated that, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, certain legal aspects of this question might usefully and at an appropriate time be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. I also said that my Government would be interested to learn the attitudes, in principle, of the parties to this suggestion. In his statement at the 800th meeting of the Council, the representative of India has asked me to let him know what these certain legal aspects are.

 

My Government has two questions in mind for an advisory opinion by the Court.

 

The first question deals with the legality of the accession and is divided into three parts:

 

(1) Did the accession of the Princedom of Jammu and Kashmir to India become legally valid in virtue of the declaration of accession signed by the Maharaja in 1947?

 

(2) If this declaration did not constitute a definite accession, did it have the import of a legally valid, conditional accession?

 

(3) In the latter case, is the accession, as a result of the declaration by India on accepting the accession or for other reasons, conditioned by being confirmed through a plebiscite ?

 

The second question is the following: If a confirming plebiscite is a condition for the accession, to what extent have India and Pakistan assumed precise obligations in respect to the manner in which the plebiscite should be arranged and to the prerequisites for a plebiscite?

 

Mr. NOON (Pakistan): I have listened with close attention to the statements of the members of the Security Council, as well as to the lengthy dissertations made by the Defence. Minister of India. There is little, if anything, that he has said that he has not said before and which has not already been answered. His interventions this afternoon and at the previous meetings of the Security Council seem to me to constitute a major attempt to confuse the issues in the Kashmir dispute. The precise issue before the Security Council is the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in order that a free and fair plebiscite may be held under the auspices of the United Nations, in compliance of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1949, which guarantee the right of self-determination to the people of the State to determine their own future.

 

The representative of India has tried to confound world opinion, both in regard to facts, as well as law. He has tried to deflect attention from the central issue before the Security Council by raising controversies over matters which have nothing whatsoever to do with the questions of demilitarization and plebiscite. I shall refrain, at this stage, from being drawn further into a wordy warfare by arguing with the representative of India about his interpretation of international law on arbitration, sovereignty, paramountcy, accession and the question of succession, which have been argued ad nauseam and answered many times before. Nor will I enter into the comparative merits of the Pakistan and Indian Constitutions and the treatment by our two countries of religious minorities. I will not take up the time of the Council by trying at this stage to set the record straight on the many errors of fact and interpretation with which the representative of India has attempted to cloud the whole question. My reply to the various contentions made by the Indian representative is ready, but, as I have said, I shall refrain from making it now since it is my desire that the Security Council should proceed with considerations of the case. I reserve the right to do so later at the appropriate time.

 

My Government has a right to expect that the Security Council will not permit the reopening on any pretext of issues that are already closed. It is my Government's hope that the Security Council will proceed in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity to ensure that the obligations incurred by India under an international agreement are fully and speedily implemented and that the people of Kashmir are enabled to exercise their inalienable right of free expression of their will without fear and without further obstruction from any quarters.

 

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): If there are no other members of the Council who wish to speak, I would like to make a brief observation in reply to the representative of Sweden.

 

The PRESIDENT: I have no more speakers on my list, so the representative of India may proceed with his reply.

 

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): There have been two sets of observations since I finished speaking, one from the representative of Sweden and the other from my friend from Pakistan. This is not the time to answer or to speak further on the statements made by the representative of Pakistan. As for trying to confound, I plead not guilty. My observations were addressed to the members of the Security Council. They are not easily confused.

 

My main purpose in speaking is to answer the representative of Sweden. As I said the other day, the Government of India does not turn down or turn a deaf ear to any counsel of conciliation, which is not affected by what I said before. We have today a slight collaboration of what was in the mind of the Government of Sweden. We shall communicate this to the Government of India and, if it should so happen that the Government of Sweden considers that the appropriate time has arrived, we will give the answer.

 

I am sure that Mr. Jarring, the representative of Sweden, would least expect us to speak at an inappropriate time. Therefore, when the appropriate time arrives, we will be willing to answer the question. But I wanted to place on record that we have not said that an advisory opinion may not be sought. But there are certain conditions attached to it which I referred to last time, but for the present I would like him to communicate to his Government that the details that he has put before the Security Council were faith fully communicated; and so far as Sweden is concerned, it will hear about it through diplomatic sources or otherwise immediately or soon. At the appropriate time, so far as the Security Council is concerned, we will be prepared to answer.