11111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 800 held on 11 November 1957.

11111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 800 held on 11 November 1957.

 

In my last intervention a few days ago before the Security Council [799th meeting], I dealt with part of the observations that had made by the members of the Security Council and by the representative of Pakistan in regard to this question which, as was rightly pointed out by the representative of the United States, arises from the report of your predecessor, Mr. President, a past President of the Security Council.

 

In recalling the submissions I have made to the Security Council, and also reminding myself of my undertaking that so far as we are concerned, whether the observations were made by the permanent members or by the non-permanent members, they were all members of the Security Council, and that it was our bounden duty, therefore, to reply to each of these observations, I find that there have been two substantial omissions in First of all, the representative of Cuba, with the very understandable insistence on what he speaks of as "self-determination", spent the greater part of his argument on this question (798th meeting). I have no desire to weary the Council with the legal or the international precedents on this question which are largely derived from the experience of the United Kingdom and the gruesome experience of the United States. We as signatories of the United Nations Charter subscribe to the main principle of self- determination where it applies. In regard to the issue before us, in answer to one of the representatives who spoke before and who argued that India had established its independence on the basis of its justified demand for self-determination, we repudiate that. Our relations with the former imperial authority were not established on the grounds of self-determination. It was an ad hoc agreement and, whatever our troubles in the past have been, at a later stage we decided in the mutual interest in the interest of the United Kingdom as well as of India-that it was better to have the transfer of political power in the way in which it was accomplished. This was purely an ad hoc arrangement which was not based on religion or upon the principle of self-determination. If it had been so, then the British would have stayed there until our Constituent Assembly had finished; that is to say, the representative of Cuba would regard, which he may not, the Constituent Assembly as self-determination or that there had been some process of self-determination. I have no desire to refer back to those arguments. However, in regard to this issue before us, we are dealing with a constituent part of a federal union. It may not affect Cuba, which, if I am not mistaken, is a unitary State. I may be wrong about this, but any federal State, the Constitution of which provides for the right of withdrawal of its constituent units at any time would have a Damocles sword of dismemberment hanging over its head for all time.

 

The members of the Security Council may remember that during the series of meetings held in January and February 1957, when this matter came up, while we were quite sure of this matter, I dealt with one of the observations only in part. the substance of this matter, we wanted to make ourselves doubly sure that the position was substantiated by the law app pertaining to the three parties. And one of the three parties is Her Britannic Majesty. I am quite aware of the diversity of constitutions in Her Britannic Majesty's realms, but there are two or three subservient considerations. One is the rule of law; the other is the sovereignty of the State and the third, which should be put first, as I would like it-not that I need to remind my colleagues-is the sanctity of agreements. Therefore, on the last occasion, when a comparatively new State-not a new people, because they came from the British Isles-on account of internal circumstances, when Western Australia decided to secede by a majority-I believe, speaking from memory, 130,000 or 133,000, or something of that kind-the matter went up before the House of Lords and any question of secession was [put on one side.

 

I want to say here and now that unless we of our own free will decide to have a different Constitution in the future, the peoples of India are determined to defend the federal unity of their Constitution. For years we have resisted the attempt of reactionary people in our own country, those who did not wish us so well in other countries, and those who misunderstand our situation, notably the Canadian authority who spoke about the balkanization of our country. Therefore, we are not prepared to go back on that question. There is no issue.

 

What I want to emphasize is that self-determination is a nice word; it is a very nice principle. It ought to be applied to all those countries where, by force of arms, by the vicissitudes of history, people of different culture, different interests and different territories are held under by a colonial Power. If Cuba were under the domination of Spain-which we are glad it is not at present-its demand for self-determination would be quite correct. But without making any irrelevant references to the internal affairs of Cuba, any disturbance, any kind of discontent against the existing authority in Cuba, whether the form of government is one of which any particular member of the Security Council approves or not, we would not think that in terms of the Charter-and we would be the first to resist it -there is a case for self-determination. This can only be applied to the dependent territories governed by a colonial Power. This expression cannot be used in regard to a constituent unit like Minnesota, which forms part of a federal Union.

 

Our country is one and, weak as we may be, and unacceptable as some of our ideas may be to some of you, we have an obligation to defend the unity and the integrity of our territory. This was the reason why, with great pain and with some trepidation, after Sir Pierson Dixon had spoken at the 797th meeting, I expressed the view, on behalf of the Government of India (799th meeting, para. 63 et seq.), that while we agreed to some of the arguments that have been put forward, others affected the integrity of the Union, which is as much the creation of the British people, their Parliament in Lords and Common assembled and with the imprimatur of the Royal Seal, based upon the consent of our people, by negotiation.

 

Therefore, we would have passed this over. But knowing the Security Council as we do, I am aware that it is always possible to put forward a slogan, a phrase, an idea, especially when, and I say this with great respect, it is quite impossible for the members of the Security Council to have meticulously followed, all the debates that have gone on here, going into volumes, the materials that have been submitted and what is more, part of the material which are assurances, guarantees, all on behalf of the Security Council, though it happens to be by the representative of a Latin country. I would like to request the Security Council not to be misled by this rather facile, plausible argumentation, pleasant to at least half the members of the Security Council (I do not say which half) over the principle which we have involved in many circumstances.

 

We say that it is an established principle, so far as India is concerned, that the ruler in an Indian State is the Head of a State. Why an Indian State? Whatever may be the factual position, today, in law, in formality, in the completion of action, Sir Pierson Dixon would be the first to admit that no action can be taken on behalf of his country except through the Head of the State. It is a well-established principle that the ruler of the Indian State represents the people, for these purposes, to the outside world, not to themselves; there may be any amount of trouble with the people. For a hundred years the United Kingdom has disregarded a great many considerations which they cherish in their own country, in order to defend the rights of other principles. I could quote if it were so needed I do not propose to do so-scores of instances proceeding from the time of the Marquis of Wellesley who afterwards became the Duke of Wellington; I could quote large numbers of instances where British blood was shed in order to defend this principle.

 

I am free to confess that while in some cases it might have been nineteenth-century imperialism, in a large number of cases it was the defence of a principle. When the Cabinet Mission visited India-and the Cabinet Mission was not a private picnic party-it was a negotiating body on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, having the support of the entire Parliament and of both Parties and, what is more, whose agreements became afterwards the basis of the transfer of power to India. We, at that time, were not versed in the niceties of the constitution. We were a rough and ready popular movement, and when the Cabinet Mission, composed of men who believed in the same ideas as the representative of Cuba advocates, were told that any agreement of the States could not be an agreement with the ruling princes only, that the states' peoples' organization, which corresponded at that time to the national movement in British India, had to be taken into account-not privately consulted-as one of the plenipotentiaries negotiating, this proposal was turned down flat, and two of the strongest opponents of it were those for whom the representative of the United Kingdom speaks and the founder of Pakistan.

 

Therefore, from the very beginning, when it suited them, there was no question of the people's organization, because the Princely States were not independent States. They had no international existence. From the time of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, or whenever it was, and when the original of the Covenant of the League of Nations was signed,

This matter, as Sir Pierson Dixon will recall, has been the subject of much discussion. That discussion continued through the inter war years. It was embodied in a statute in 1935 (the Government of India Act, 1935). What is more, when his country, along with the rest of the world, was involved in the throes of Hitlerite aggression and the British Cabinet had to be made more representative of the countries of the British Empire, which was emerging into the state of freedom, this was not done on the basis of self-determination. It was not to the people's leaders, who were rotting goals at that in the States, that the British Government looked; it was to the rulers of the States And that part of the British Dominion in India. comprising the Indian States was represented in the Imperial Cabinet by a ruling prince not selected by the people.

 

So, while we do not in any way advocate a divine right of kings, we are dealing here with a political issue. Even if every single person in Jammu and Kashmir, or somewhere else, had signed an instrument of accession, it would have no value. This instrument of accession was not our device. We accepted it; we are glad we accepted it. But it was a device forged by the genius of the British people long before we became independent. Even in conditions of semi-independence the British Government of the day, or at least it's more far sighted members-being concerned with the maintenance of the unity of all the territory that lies at the foot of the Himalayas and is in the lap of the Indian Ocean and was under British suzerainty-minus that which had been cut off in 1935 -provided for machinery whereby the States would accede in this way. Therefore, an instrument of accession, if accepted by the Governor-General, was not only sufficient : its competence was exclusive. We could not go any further to affect the Union. The people of India were represented by the Governor-General, who had ceased to be the Viceroy, to whom the power of the Indian people had passed, and that was how this happened.

 

Now let me proceed to something else. Supposing the proposition of the representative of Cuba was accepted. This I would apply to somewhere about 350 units of the present Union of India, and we are in no position, even if we had the energy and were prepared to countenance it, to accept a pro position which means the factionalization, the balkanization of India for what the representative of Cuba regards as an abstract principle which does not exist.

 

The British Government always recognized the rulers of the States as the legitimate authority. Because we were a popular movement, and because we were faced with resistance from two sides, from Pakistan on the one hand and from the United Kingdom on the other, for all formal purposes we accept their position, and for all factual purposes we obtained the best we could-for there was no parliament in those areas; they were feudal areas, thanks to the protection afforded by the British Crown.

 

Then, it may be asked, why this whole question of this plebiscite figure. In the whole of this controversy this is purely an ad hoc suggestion-not an arrangement arising out of the resolution of 13 August 1948-for the purpose of terminating bloodshed. It was not an abstract principle. It might even have been that, instead of that one, we might have agreed to a division of the State into one hundred parts-or into two parts, as, indeed, Pakistan has done. But so far as the consultation of the wishes of the people is concerned it has only the significance of a domestic election. That was an obligation that a democratic and freedom-loving country like ours undertook towards the people of India, and it has been carried out.

 

Even assuming that it was called a plebiscite, that plebis must take place under the sovereignty of the Kashmir Government and under the authority of the Government of India, as I have repeatedly pointed out in the earlier discussions of this year-not from my mind and not from anywhere but the documents to which the members of the Security Council are parties, taking the Security Council as a body and having regard to the fact that its permanent members are individual parties because they do not change. Time after time it has been said in the resolution of 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15) that any of these arrangements must, as I say, take place under the sovereignty of the Kashmir Government and the authority of the Government of India. I request the representative of Cuba-and perhaps he can consult his colleague from Colombia-to show me one place, not in the resolution, but in the large number of documents, where the Security Council departed from this position. It is quite true that certain resolutions were passed, but, in any of the findings, in any of the arguments, in the agreements with us, there is no mention of any other country-be it the United Kingdom, be it Pakistan, be it the Security Council-that has the authority in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is the Government of India to which the Security Council turns in order that part 1; paragraph E, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para. 75) may be implemented.

 

I ask my friend from the United Kingdom: Has not the time come to put partisanship on one side in this matter and deal with this in the traditional British way and with common sense ? After all, the Commission agreed that "part III, as formulated, does not in any way recognize the right of Pakistan to have any part in the plebiscite". (S/1100, para. 78.)

 

Now, if Pakistan has no part in the plebiscite, it really becomes a domestic matter. And, while the Government of India could have turned around and said "We have changed our minds; it is a domestic matter", we did not do so. We waited impatiently for three years, hoping that the Security Council, in its wisdom, and all the talent assembled around it and all the issues involved-would find some way of resolving it. And, when that was no longer possible, we consulted the wishes of the people. We did not consult them privately; we did not consult them by selecting the people who were to be consulted. We consulted them by a normal process of democratic election-not even for a parliament which we established, or the existing Government of Kashmir established, but for a Constituent Assembly.

 

This will become a little more significant when you refer to the correspondence or, rather, the assurances given by Mr. Lozano, and I would particularly invite my colleague from the Philippines, whose addiction to the truth and the correctness is well known, to look into these documents. I mean no disrespect. The Security Council deals with large numbers of problems-Syria, or the Israeli-Egyptian border, or I do not know how many questions. You will not find anywhere anything contrary to what I have said.

 

Now let us go further. In the resolution of 5 January 1949, (S/1196, para. 15), which has to be read, as all documents, are read, in the context of events, in the context of international law, and, what is more, in the express statement of the Commission itself that this is not a separate resolution. This resolution of 5 January 1949, was produced, and we acquiesced in it, in order to get Pakistan to agree to a cease fire, because their whole position was: no cease fire. And it is expressly stated that this resolution is subsidiary. I am sure my friend, the Australian representative, will explain what "subsidiary" means in historical terms. A subsidiary problem has no existence outside the principal problem. If the principal problem does not emerge, the subsidiary one does not emerge. A subsidiary has only a satellite existence-oh, I must not use that term. If we do not reach the stage of considering part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948 then the resolution of 5 January 1949 will be no more than an interesting document for future historians. I dare say that in a hundred years people who have greater experience than ourselves -not because they are superior human beings but because they will have the advantage of our mistakes and our achievements -will discover that this is not an isolated document. It may be that the first sentence should have been put last. But, you know, our people have been, in this matter as in all other matters, willing to sacrifice unnecessary punctiliousness for the purpose of agreement.

 

Now, what does the resolution of 5 January 1949 say? The Plebiscite Administrator, if a plebiscite ever came about and we then hoped it would-and if there was any chance of an honest plebiscite, knowing the conditions in Pakistan and knowing world conditions to which Mr. Jarring has referred we must put that at one side-but the document says: "shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite, and for ensuring the freedom and the impartiality of the plebiscite". So there was only one authority, whether it be in the northern areas, to which I will come soon, or whether it be in the other area in regard to which the predecessor of the present representative of Pakistan stated before the Council with, I am sorry to say, a degree of lack of that reservation which he should have had, that our country was attacked by the Pakistan troops, in order to protect, not Kashmir, but the frontiers of Pakistan. Now, if any of you gentlemen around here were faced with the situation that, in order to protect the integrity of some other country, it was necessary to lead aggressive armies of your own, we would not accept it. But that is by the way. So the resolution definitely said: "shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite..."

 

Now, I hope I will not be accused of departing from punctiliousness if I say to my friend Sir Pierson Dixon and his advisers that this was not as though this thing was put there casually, without consideration. This particular paragraph of the resolution had been resisted by the gentlemen of Pakistan. The Commission had gone into it, and at no time had the Commission ever departed from the position that nobody could give any authority to a plebiscite commissioner except the constituted Government of Jammu and Kashmir, a Government in the Union of India, established by Act of British Parliament, which received royal assent in July 1947, long before any accession issue arose.

 

We have great respect for Pakistan. We have great affection for the people of Pakistan. I am not saying this is a patronizing way. We wish the people of Pakistan well; I hope that they wish us well, But the fact is that no condominium is involved in this matter. This becomes significant because the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom is credited with saying-I refuse to believe this, because he is an intelligent person, a person of integrity-that

Some sort of condominium is possible in this area. That would be a violation of our sovereignty, and I would be amazed if it were true that a member of Her Majesty's Government had made such a suggestion.

 

In the early days of the Second World War, when it seemed to some people-but not to me or to Sir Pierson Dixon -that there was a possibility of defeat and annihilation, a proposal, which afterwards proved to be propaganda, was made that the French and the British should unit as one kingdom. I lived in the United Kingdom at that time, and, although that proposal received a certain amount of support, I could not find any group of British people who were prepared to sacrifice their sovereignty.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon has referred very kindly, very generously and with deep feeling to the events of 1947. I can say that despite the extremities with which we were confronted at that time, despite the fact that we were facing famine, we would never have agreed to any resolution which violated the integrity of our territory. This is all in the record.

 

This Council, Mr. Jarring and Mr. Graham and all their predecessors, the Commission for India and Pakistan-in fact, everyone connected with this case have limited the consideration of the problem to three resolutions. Pakistan conveniently or, rather, I would hope, inconveniently-ignores one of those resolutions.

 

During these discussions in the Security Council, there have been repeated references which, in a very nice way, give the implication of a degree of moral pressure upon us. These references have come particularly from the representative of Australia, but other representatives have also said that we should carry out whatever we profess, whatever we advocate, whatever we have fought for and sacrificed for.

 

I say here and now that the Union of India, as constituted, is not a confederation. We do not believe in the thesis of the Soviet Constitution, which permits every constituent State to walk out. On the contrary our Constitution is based upon the principle which was sanctified by the blood of so many Americans on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line-the principle, which has now become part of history, that a Union is inviolable. Anyone wishing to cut our Union asunder will have to reckon with 367 million of our people. No Government in India can sacrifice the unity of our territory, can open the doors to India's disintegration, and can make our country a happy hunting ground. Our unity to a certain extent makes up for our lack of strength in the economic and other spheres. No Government in India could survive if it sacrificed our unity. And I would say to the members of the Security Council that if there is no stable Government in India it is extremely doubtful whether there will be stability of administration anywhere else in that part of the world. We happen to be a stable administration, I do not wish to hurt anyone, but we are probably the most stable administration in a large part of Southeast Asia. I therefore beg the Security Council not to address to us an agreement which, in effect, implies the dismemberment of our country.

 

Unlike the Constitution of Australia ours is not a con federal constitution. No referendum is required in the case of our constituent States. As a matter of courtesy, there is a provision about discussing matters in the local assemblies. We are free-in fact, this freedom has been exercised-even to change the boundaries of acceding States. The British Government recognized that fact even before it left India, and during the last five or six years, when some acceding States have become parts of other areas, I have heard no adverse comments from distinguished people in the United Kingdom itself; quite the contrary.

 

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, except insofar as the Constitution decides, is in no way bound by any external authority. We are bound by international law and by international practice. There cannot, however, be a separate international law for us. It has been laid down by scholars from the time of Grotius-and, today, the most outstanding exponents of this principle are a United States citizen, Professor Hyde, and a United Kingdom citizen, Sir Arnold McNair-that, whatever be the nature of the treaty, every the treaty must be observed and carried out by a country with primary and primordial reference to its own security. No country can carry out a treaty in any other way.

 

I have taken somewhat more time on this aspect of the matter than I had intended to take, because I know the feeling that prevails with regard to the question of self-determination.

 

In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, where the United Kingdom meets with us, there have been many arguments about this. These words cannot be abstracted from their context. We shall come to that in a moment.

 

The next grave omission that I made was with regard to the representative of Sweden, not to the past President of the Security Council. The representative of Sweden made a suggestion, though I do not know whether or not it was a suggestion, but we have no desire to avoid any idea that is put forward. That has been our position for the last ten years, and I request Sir Piarson Dixon and, even more, his advisers to give us some credit for this fact. Nowhere more than in the United Kingdom is the free exploration of ways of settlement more rampant, more prevalent, or more practised in good faith. But, as I shall point out later when I come to the second part of my intervention, we have taken pretty good care, not because we were trying to set the ground for a future battle, but because it arose in the circumstances of the time as to why, how, in what circumstances and with what limitations. We went into the speeches of Mr. Graham.

 

Mr. Jarring, as representative of Sweden, has made certain "suggestions". I call them "suggestions" in inverted commas because, reading the text, they do not look like suggestions. As representative of Sweden not in presenting the Jarring report, Mr. Jarring said :

 

"Before I proceed, I should like to recall that the Swedish Government, [not the past President of the Security Council, not the author of the Jarring report] as other members of the Council well know, has during the current year suggested that certain legal aspects [the emphasis was on "certain") of the question might be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. My Government still maintains that this suggestion should, at an appropriate moment, be carefully considered. Although such a moment can hardly be said to exist today, (I suppose this comes from the Jarring report) my Government would nevertheless be interested to learn the attitudes, in principle, of the parties to this suggestion." [798th meeting, para. 41]

 

I will not complicate this matter by going back into Swedish history, but what are we asked to do? We are asked to address ourselves to "certain legal aspects". Is it possible -I do not say it is not correct because we speak here very freely-for any Government to answer a question on what are called "certain" legal aspects ? "Certain" is one of those Anglo-Saxon words which have contradictory meanings. "Certain" in one sense means definite, precise, without doubt, and in the other it means exactly the opposite. Only in English does one find that. I leave it to the United Kingdom representative, who, though he is a classical scholar, probably knows enough English, to tell me what this means, that "certain legal aspects of the question might be referred to the International Court of Justice".

 

I want to say that my Government does not throw out of the window the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. We have to examine whether the reference to an advisory opinion, though not in terms but in spirit, is covered by the Commonwealth agreements in regard to compulsory jurisdiction, because, strange as it may seem, our ties with the people across our international broder are very deep and we do not want our relations to be those of two foreign countries. Therefore, I want to say here and now that we do not make any categorical rejection of any suggestion, but we should like to know what these "certain legal aspects" are.

 

If they refer to the issue of accession, it is a part of municipal law which only the United Kingdom, Pakistan and ourselves are familiar that with a concluded contract, not a mere scroll like the resolution of 13 August 1948, there is an offer and there is an acceptance. If there is a return deed, no memorandum, no oral evidence, no unwritten terms can be produced as an amendment. Consequently, we are in this difficult position. There are the parties to the accession, the Head of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Head of the then State of India, in 1947, the Governor-General. It is expressly provided in the Constitution, which we adopted from what was given by the British Parliament, that a ruler, not us, may vary the terms of the accession. The ruler may, but we cannot, vary the terms of the accession, but we could accept or reject it. There is no provision for a conditional acceptance. Nothing that we may express in the way of a wish can alter the sanctity, the completeness, the overall character, the legally binding nature of a contract. And the United Kingdom Government, ever since it was a democratic country after the Industrial Revolution, has had a great record, with unfortunate exceptions, of maintaining its international obligations.

 

We cannot, therefore, without further looking into this matter go further than we have done, but we want to inform the Swedish Government that we have not rejected this. However, certain conditions exist. First of all, it is for the Swedish Government to produce before the Security Council assurances from the Government of Pakistan that it will abide by the advisory opinion and that the person who is a Pakistan national, who was formerly Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who is a partisan in this matter and a fanatic, who is now a member of the International Court of Justice, will disqualify himself, legally and in spirit, in any argument on this matter, for, after all, it is known that in any court, strange as it may seem, the judges call each other brothers, and while a judge may not sit, the impact of his opinion is always there. That is why we do not rule that out.

 

Second, if there is a reference to an advisory opinion, then my Government has carefully to examine what are the questions to be referred-not because we want to pose any conundrums, not because we want to pose instructions, but because, under the general rule of both municipal and international law, when a general proposition is referred, if anything is accepted, then it is assumed that we agree to accept that. Those of you-if there are any-who are not familiar with this have only to look into whatever corresponds in your legal systems to what is called a "general process act". Whenever we make an exception, whenever anything is specifically mentioned, unless there is a saving clause, whatever is not specifically mentioned is out. The problem has not arisen, because the representative of Sweden said: 'Although such a moment can hardly be said to exist today.... "But we are most anxious to meet you. Therefore, it is not sufficient to pick an issue on which the Security Council is least competent. That is the second point.

 

Now for the third point. If, according to private information-and, naturally, conversations must take place-the reference is on the one issue on which the Security Council has pronounced itself, the Security Council has pronounced itself on the sovereignty of the union, on the so-called sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir. The Council has never spoken of Jammu and Kashmir as a no man's land, as a land of the Russians, or of the Chinese, or of the British, to which, going back to their relations with Pratap Singh, they can lay claim, or their successors, or the spiritual successors of the Emperor Asoka in Ceylon or in Siam or, in a minor way, in Japan, can lay claim because Kashmir was part of his Kingdom, of which Srinagar was the capital.

 

So, with regard to this matter, the resolution of 13 August 1948, supplemented by the resolution of 5 January 1949, places the whole question of sovereignty out of the debate. I freely concede-in fact, we have seen it in the last ten years where foreign bases have been established in some countries that there can be abrogation of sovereignty. Some countries argue that there are no bases, but where foreign bases are quite openly and, from the point of view of the countries concerned, quite legitimately accepted, there has been an abrogation of sovereignty. Therefore, we are not prepared at this moment to disregard-I will not say "to go beyond" -the engagements-I deliberately use the word "engage means' ' of the resolution of 13 August 1948 or the supplementary resolution of 5 January 1949 and the binding Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948. In fact, if I may submit with great respect, but for various circumstances to which I have no reason to refer, the whole of this debate ought to take place under the resolution of 17 January 1948, so that this question of referring the legality of the accession to the International Court would only arise, if we were prepared to have this matter referred, in the case of 560 states, some of which are no larger than this room-some of them have disappeared in the general process of industrial and economic expansion and what not-and if the Pakistan Government were willing to subscribe to it and have it applied to those States that have acceded to Pakistan.

 

Secondly, I am sure that the representative of Sweden would agree that it is more pertinent, more relevant, morally more correct, if you are referring to the International Court of Justice, to determine whether there have been violations. Does a violation not hit you more in the eye than whether something or other was incorrect? We have the dictum, albeit an obiter dictum, it is true, of Sir Owen Dixon that when these troops crossed the frontier they perpetrated a violation of international law. But I tell Sir Pierson Dixon: do not go further than that. Is he prepared on this day, 11 November 1957, when the world looks to him as one of the great moral custodians of international law, to say that a country is entitled, because it subjectively thinks that its neighbour is going to invade it, immediately to lead its armies into the Uri-Poonch area? The resistance offered by the local people against rapine and plunder, the kind of thing that is now being practised by Pakistan on the people, has not been put out in the Pakistan Press as something inside a jail or in camera, but in the full blare of publicity Would the Pakistan Press, would the British Press, would the American Press, would the Soviet Press, would the Foreign Minister of Pakistan-as one of the parties who promoted the sabotage and, what is more, the dismemberment of constituent authority--approve? Can the Pakistan Government produce one shred of evidence that will stand examination that the Government of India, or any the responsible body of people in India, has done anything at any time to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, or even in the administration that goes on in Jammu and Kashmir, which is our sovereign territory, but is on the other side of the cease-fire line ? Therefore, that is our answer to Mr. Jarring.

 

Only one point remains. My Government desires to know whether the Swedish Government, represented by Mr. Jarring, is in agreement or disagreement with him, because Mr. Jarring has told the Security Council that he has established these are his words, not mine-that you proceed from the resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and on 5 January 1949; and then he has established that the deadlock now exists in regard to part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Does this issue that it is to be referred to the Court come under part I or not? Assuming for the purpose of argument-please, will the verbatim reporters be so careful as to put down the word "assuming'? We are the victims, partly because of my bad voice and my bad enunciation, of the dropping of words that have to be corrected afterwards-assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the accession was amenable to examination. Mr. Jarring, by his own choice, by his interpretation of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1957 (S/3793), by his understanding of the facts of the situation, expressly deliberately and repeatedly denied himself any privilege, any opportunity, any leeway, any facility, any of the things we offered, to go beyond the track set by the resolution.

 

One thing has been categorically stated by the past President of the Security Council, Mr. Jarring:

 

"In my report, I established that a deadlock had been reached between India and Pakistan on part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and in particular on paragraphs B and E of that part." [798th meeting, para. 40].

 

I have no desire to create any embarrassment for any representative who sits here in behalf of his Government; but, You will not deny that we are dealing with a problem of vast importance to e our country, and some people say of vast importance to the world. In our relations with Sweden, knowing the Government of Sweden, particularly its Foreign Minister, and knowing that these suggestions are entirely bona fide, we are entitled to answer, we are called upon to answer this.

 

The last time, partly because of the pressure of time and because of the crowding of other events, and perhaps subconsciously because I wanted to avoid the issue which would make for difficulties, we did not deal with this matter. So, our submission to the Government of Sweden is: first, has the Government of Sweden departed from Mr. Jarring's statement reproduced in paragraph 41 of the verbatim record of the Council's 798th meeting ? Second, whether the Government of Sweden is prepared to ask the Government of Pakistan and the members of the Security Council, privately if you like, whether there is any use in committing us, whether they would bind themselves to a proposition of this kind? Thirdly, whether it is right that on the one question on which under Chapter VI of the Charter, indeed of the whole of the Charter of the United Nations, the Assembly and the Security Council have no jurisdiction.

 

If that alone is to be referred, then what is the significance of our not insisting upon the gross, the cruel and the outrageous violations of international law that have taken place, which are not implicit-which are contained in the resolution of 13 August 1948, which according to the resolution itself constitute a material change. Those words "material change" are not just put in there as an anguish of the heart. Material change is the phrase that is drawn from the previous injunction to the parties. That is, there is a material change. that ought to be reported. In all the years that have gone by there has been no charge against us for creating "material changes''. There was an allegation that we have augmented our troops. We immediately asked our command for information. They were horrified. We put the facts before you. We

 

had no objection to disclosing this information. We heard no more about it. We had, apart from all the supernumeraries, 135,000 combatants at the time of the cease-fire. Have we got them there now?

 

The Pakistan delegation has picked out of context some thing alleged to be from Dr. Graham's report. Pakistan. delegation, to the best of my recollection-I was not going to reply to them today-has said somewhere-and I will be happy to stand corrected-that Dr. Graham has said that the Indians have augmented troops. I am not prepared to lay this allegation at the door of Dr. Graham, because whatever might have been the situation in February last, when I came here-and I do not say this in an egoistic way-I have some idea where our troops are, where they have been, and it is my business to know it. We have not used the full information about the deployment of Pakistan troops and the use of their logistics.

 

Your colleague, Sir, who spoke for Iraq on 25 October (797th meeting) forced us into an unfortunate and to us a very disagreeable position by a speech that was so partisan-I will not quote evidence, not from my memory-and was addressed on behalf of the Government of Iraq to the Government of India.

 

Now, that for the moment deals with the latter part of the discussion. I have no desire to impede the progress of the proceedings of the Council. Therefore, unless you are willing to have a five-minute recess, I will go on with the subject. I am entirely in your hands. I ask for no mercy from you.