05111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 799 held on 5 Nov. 1957.

 

05111957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 799 held on 5 Nov. 1957.

 

Although India is not a member of the Security Council, the President has, under the terms of the Charter and on behalf of the Council, invited my delegation to appear here and to participate in these proceedings. I therefore consider it an honour and a privilege to offer him my country's felicitations on his assumption of the office of President of the Security Council for this month.

 

This group of meetings of the Council was originally called at the request of Pakistan for the purpose, as we understand it, of considering the report made to the Security Council by the representative of Sweden [S/3821]. On 24 September, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan made a statement before the Council [791st meeting]. At the end of that statement, we asked for time to consider it. In accordance with its usual practice, the Council decided that both the members of the Council and the parties concerned should have the necessary time to consider the propositions or ideas put forward.

 

When the Council again convened on this subject, on 9 October [795th meeting). I submitted on behalf of the Government of India what we regarded as relevant information, replies to questions which had been posed, denials of affirmations which we regarded as incorrect or misstatements of fact, and points of view which we considered to be legitimate and necessary in view of the duty resting upon us as a sovereign nation and on this Council to defend the Charter.

 

On 9 October, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan made a brief reply (796th meeting]. So far as I could comprehend it, the purpose of that reply was to state that the remarks made on behalf of India consisted largely of misstatements of facts and to inform the Council that it could expect a fuller reply from Pakistan later. We had hoped that we should have the benefit of that fuller reply so that we could give the Council our own complete responses to it. Unfortunately for us, however, that is not the position today. We make no complaints about this. It is open both to members of the Security Council and to those who are called before it to choose the time for their statements.

 

I wish only to submit to the Council that the remarks which we shall make today on behalf of India are governed by the basic conditions which brought this issue before the Council; by more immediately, the Jarring report; by the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, so far as it has gone; and by the statements of the members of the Council who have participated in the debate, If there should be any further statements which call for elucidation, we shall not only be willing but shall feel it our duty to place such information as we have at the Council's disposal..

 

At the Council's meeting of 29 October, when the representative of France was presiding, I stated the following on behalf of the Government of India :

 

"We have now heard the statement by the representative of Pakistan and the statements of members of the Security Council, as far as they are willing to make them now." [798th meeting. para. 53]

 

I also said that we had listened to the suggestions-or what purported to be suggestions-which had been made. I assured the Council that, in accordance with the usual practice of the Government of India-and, I would hope, of all Governments we would of course give consideration to any suggestions made in the Security Council. I stated that my delegation wished to reserve its right, in view of the remarks that had been made in the Council, to make detailed replies.

 

Here, I wish to say that we are well aware of the different points of view and different interpretations of Governments as to factors of time or space or political conditions. We are even well aware of the views that one Government or another might hold concerning the capacity or the willingness of other Governments to perform. So far as we are concerned, however, we wish to assure the Council that any expression of opinion by any representative of any Government which is a member of this Council is listened to by the Government of India not only with courtesy but with a desire to understand its purposes. Nevertheless, we do not seek to attribute any motives.

 

In some of the speeches addressed partly to us the hope has been expressed that the parties concerned would take this, that, or the other in good faith. May I say with great respect that this particular remark is not really necessary in our case. We do not question the motives of the Governments which have expressed themselves strongly in one way or another or which fundamentally disagree with the basic views we hold. At the same time, we would be failing in our duty not only to our people and not only to the future of our country, in which we are deeply interested, but even to the Security Council, if we did not even make what might be spoken of in other places as repetitions or speeches that take up too much time of the members of the Council. After all, the complaint is ours. We are the party most affected. We came here because we were affected. We came here because we placed our reliance upon the United Nations Charter and, therefore, we have to give this matter the fullest consideration that it deserves, at the same time trying to conserve both the time of the United Nations as a whole and the patience and energies of the Security Council.

 

I referred at that time to certain speeches by certain countries in particular. That may have created the impression that some of the representatives were being singled out or that it was a bilateral difference of opinion, or something of that kind. I should elaborate on that a little later.

 

In the meanwhile, even though it has been said before, after all this matter has been here for ten years, and each time it has reappeared in a different context. Each time, though the parties who take the initiative may be the same, though our basic position has not altered, nor our willingness to accede to counsels of conciliation or our insistence upon what we consider to be basic, namely, the integrity and independence of our Union, the circumstances in which we meet, the factors that are pin-pointed, their bearing upon the situations as they occur in our country and the world at the time, are different. All the same, that basic position has a fundamental bearing upon the whole of this so-called problem. Let me therefore briefly state what it is.

 

First of all, we came here with a complaint under Chapter VI of the Charter. We are the complainants in this matter, if you want to put it that way. We do not ourselves want to put it that way. The party on the other side is not in a position of equality. From our point of view, the party on the other side is the defendant whose action stands to be corrected, and that correction is required has been stated so many times by the Security Council and not least in the resolution of 13 August 1948 to which both Pakistan and India gave their assent at that time and, within the limitations and in the circumstances I have enumerated several times before this Council, by which we stand engaged. The preamble of that resolution stated:

 

"Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential..." [S/1100, para. 75).

 

Those conditions still remain, but we came here, as I have said, to seek a correction of those conditions. the "we" who came here ? Kashmir did not prefer a compl Who is aint before the Security Council. Kashmir has no international existence. India is a Member State of the United Nations. India is a nation-State, and Kashmir is a constituent part of India. We came here to complain about aggression, acts of aggression, or the aiding and abetting of aggression in the Union of India. Therefore, the position is, and my Government wants this to be made quite plain, as it was made plain to Mr. Jarring in India, that it is a great mistake to regard this as a dispute over a little bit of earth somewhere.

 

Where we are concerned is the integrity and independence of the Union and, therefore, the complaint in this matter is the Government of India. All the requests, admonitions, injunctions, have been addressed to the Government of India. Even when, in certain parts, an appeal had to be made to the local population, it was the Government of India that was called upon to make this appeal; it was no other Government. Therefore, the complainant in this matter is the Government of India, and how does the Government of India appear?

 

The Government of India does not appear as a protector State. It has not declared that all territories in such and such a latitude are under its protection. The Government of India does not appear here as amicus curiae, as though Kashmir had an independent, national entity but was not represented here, and that India was speaking for it in the way that some of us have done in the case of countries which were not at that time Members of the United Nations. We did not come here with a brief on behalf of a country that is outside the United Nations. We came here with a complaint by India on behalf of India in respect of that territory of India which is called Jammu and Kashmir. That vital difference has to be brought home because several misconceptions arise from this.

 

We came here because we did not want the conflict that had taken place in regard to Kashmir to expand, to become more intensive, or to spread into what might be larger and larger and more continued acts of war. Therefore, in 1947, when the first statement was made before this Council, the representative who occupied the place I now occupy said that India wanted to avoid any action that might lead to it having to set foot on Pakistan territory or that might lead to invasion. It was there to protest its own territory, and he called upon the Security Council to lend its strength and its purposes, not in defence of India only, although we have the right to do that as one of eighty-two Members, but in defence of the Charter and in defence of all those things that all of us regard as very I m important and very vital to the continuance of freedom in this world.

 

We came here, therefore, because of our faith in the Charter. We did not come here looking around to see what was the composition of the Security Council. And I say this, because today it is not even possible to ask about a barrel of flour without saying: "Was this grown in this or that part of the world? Does it belong to this bloc or to that bloc? If it is from that bloc it smells bad; if it is from this bloc it smells good." We did not come here as part of one of the rival power blocs. We did not bring this as a cold war issue of any kind. We did not enlist sympathy and support in that way, and while, for a long time, we have been in the company of nations which, in other contexts, are differently aligned, we are in the position of not having an ally in the world. While we have many friends-I hope that all the nations are our friends. -we have no allies, military or other. We came here, therefore, on the merit of this complaint, having faith in the Charter and in the responses that independent countries would make, and also believing that whatever decisions were taken, whatever approaches made, would be in terms of Chapter VI of the Charter, under which we came and, what is more, that they would be both extended and bounded-both these points are important to us-by the decisions that are taken. What is more, we have not at any time assurances lightly given. regarded any half of the Security Council to us as When we came here our first and foremost consideration was to stop bloodshed in Kashmir. Here were people who, only a few months ago, a few weeks ago almost, belonged although as subject people-to the same country which political vicissitudes had cut into two separate States, people whose families lived on both sides of the frontier where, in the name of religion, or something else, there were fratricidal strife, killings of various kinds, violence in all kinds of ways. Therefore, our first concern when we came here was the cessation of hostilities. Those who, as permanent members of the Council, have been here for a long time will recollect that in the early days of this debate much time was taken in discussing what should come first; the terms of a political settlement, the terms of a further settlement, or the stoppage of bloodshed. I am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom will not mind my saying so, but the representative of the United Kingdom at that time placed less insistence on the stoppage of the fighting, and it was only the earnest pleadings of India, assisted by others-including at that time the delegation of China who regarded it as vitally important that fighting must stop so that further efforts could be made. When we came, our dominant desire was a peaceful settlement. India was a large country, its peoples of Kashmir were solidly behind the fighting forces-indeed it was their resistance that was able to turn back the treacherous invasion of that country which I have described to the Council several times before. But we did not think that a decision in that way was preferable to some arrangement that could be made in accordance with the Charter, an arrangement which did not militate against our sovereignty, which did not violate the integrity of our Union and, what is more, which did not place a premium upon aggression.

 

On this last point, in any decision that is made about Kashmir, or rather, since decisions cannot be made, because this must be done by agreement; in any view that is taken. about Kashmir, none of us, whether members of the Council or not, can afford to forget the fact that such a view cannot in any way proclaim that the gains of aggression can be capitalized. Although we are still trying to define aggression as we have been for the last ten years-and have almost given up the attempt, I think there is general consensus that aggression is an international crime. We have had instances in recent times where close friends have fallen apart on this issue. On 25 October 1957, the representative of the United States, speaking in the General Assembly, came out absolutely without qualifications and without reserve in saying that aggression, wherever it might happen, would not find his country on the side of the aggressor. The President of the United States, speaking on a previous occasion, said that it did not matter who the aggressor was, it did not matter how close the aggressor was to his own country, it did not matter in what part of the world the aggression took place. President Eisenhower said that in 1956.

 

That is our position with regard to aggression and, therefore, if we take the time of the Council in dealing not with principles, not with slogans, but with facts that are contained in recorded decisions of the Council-and we do not ask anybody to draw inferences; we ask you to look at the decision of the Council as made, or the basis on which the Council has made certain decisions in going into this question of aggression and the nature of this problem before the Council-I hope that the Council will bear with me in accepting the fact that we do regard it as basic to the whole position.

 

We have all along-and my own recollections ever since I have been before this Council to present the views of India bear this out-registered our caveat against the description of this issue as a "dispute"; and this was not a legal quibble of any kind. Kashmir is not no-man's land. It was not a territory that was discovered; nor has the Security Council at any time had the power to adjudicate on those issues. As I said, we came here in regard to a situation that has arisen concerning a part of the Union. And the only resolutions by which we are in any way engaged are the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1848, and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. In none of those resolutions does the word "dispute" ever occur. It is quite true that the word "dispute" does occur in certain resolutions of the Security Council to which we are not a party and which have been taken subsequently. The resolution of 13 August 1948 states the following:

 

"The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,

 

"Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan. regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir..." [S/1100, para. 75].

 

It speaks about assisting the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation.

 

Therefore, any idea that a dispute-if it is a dispute exists is not right. It is possible to speak in certain terms, which particularly the representative of the United Kingdom has used. One cannot compound a felony; it is not right to ask us to do so. It is possible for a country to give up its own sovereign territory by its own sovereign will. That is another matter, but no independent nation, no Member State here expects to be called upon or asked to say: "Well, you have been invaded; that is the fact of today." That may well be; we have all been invaded at times-we no more than any other people. But I do not think that this invasion is sufficiently ancient to be historic. What is more, there has been no relinquishment of sovereignty, nor has there been any questioning of sovereignty and the right of the Union of India to the maintenance of law and order and the defence of the frontiers of the whole of the Union, by this Council. And this is a basic fact. That is to say that, in the whole of these resolutions, there has been no such questioning, not even reading back from these words as to what they may mean and how they can be construed.

 

I tried, in my feeble way perhaps, to point out to the Council before that these long resolutions, on which are based our present considerations, are the result of long deliberations in which the members of the Commission, particularly Mr. Lozano of Colombia, and others went through various phases of conversation, of give and take, and it is on the basis of the assurances given-not assurances given privately; they are part of the documents, but assurances given at the time and made public and in that context that the resolutions were adopted. It is not a question of this or that being implied-unless "implied" means that it is inherent in the meaning of the thing and is not contradicted. The sovereignty of India, the right of the Union, as in the case of all its constituent States, and the duty of the Union with regard to defence and the maintenance of law and order in certain circumstances, and of representation in international contexts-these are secure and safeguarded. I shall come to this at a later stage.

 

Therefore, any further approach to this matter as though it were a territorial dispute, a boundary dispute or a frontier problem would be a fundamental fallacy. There is no one more anxious and more desirous and more willing to co-operate in finding the end of this trouble than the Government of India itself. But it is not possible to find the ending of the trouble by basing that solution on trouble itself. We have made protests to the Department of Public Information of the United Nations with regard to the approach to this problem as though it were a problem of a disputed territory, because Kashmir is not a disputed territory. Even supposing for argument's sake that we take into this question the interpretation put now-not always-on certain paragraphs of the resolution of 5 January 1949 and in other places that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be decided through the method of a free and impartial plebiscite and so on-first of all, these are principles about which we are talking and which are supplemented in the Commission's report. I am not going to analyse that; I have done it before. What is important is that any changes that might come about are about the future status, even in argument. So far as the situation at present is concerned, the sovereignty, the total authority, the right of defence and the right to speak for the territory of Kashmir lies in the Union of India.

 

The basis of our present discussion was well set out by the representative of the United States on 25 October, when he said:

 

"It may be useful at the outset to recapitulate the main lines of Ambassador Jarring's report because it is from that report that our current sessions start." (797th meeting, para. 28.)

 

We have had the advantage this time of listening to a very brief intervention by the representative of Sweden [798th meeting, para. 38 to 42]. May I say with great respect that when we asked whether we could hear his interpretation on certain other interpretations he naturally took the view that if he chose to do so he would do it later. In any case, the report stood by itself.

 

In this connexion, since we are meeting in the context of the Jarring report and especially in view of the fact that the discussions and the debates have tried to take other turns, for reasons which are not easily fathomable, I wish to say that we did not ask for the appointment of Mr. Jarring to go to India. We said that we would welcome him in India, as indeed we would welcome any nominee of the United Nations at any time in accordance with the traditional hospitality of our country. We offered him all the co-operation and all the friendliness we could. We gave him whatever information he asked for. I think I am correct in saying that few reports received by the Security Council have had more and greater unanimity of praise than the report of Mr, Jarring. We are not called upon, and it would not be proper for us, either to offer praise or blame except to deal with the substance of the matter as it stands and where we stand in relation to it.

 

I would like to bring out three facts in this connexion. First of all, there is no beer, in our submission, in the analysis of the Jarring report by members of the Council the same degree of attention given to certain parts of the report as to other parts. But that is as it may be, because it is not for us to say how a delegation should treat any document that is before it.

 

I have analysed the Jarring report and I gave our approach to it on the last occasion. [795th meeting, paras. 2 to 69]. Therefore, it is not my intention to repeat that process. However, from the observations made by delegations, apart from the general tribute made to the sacrifice by Mr. Jarring of his time and energy, they all expressed views in regard to what it might mean and what its place was in the whole context of this business.

 

My friend and colleague, Sir Pierson Dixon, said:

 

"...I hope that his report will prove to have a special significance in marking the beginning of a new phase of constructive progress..." (797th meeting, para. 2.)

 

Therefore we must assume that the constructive progress which we all seek is going to be rooted for the present time in this report. So it is the same thing. The representative of the United States cannot help the Council to decide how best it can aid in finding a settlement acceptable to both sides.

 

The same kind of observation has come from the representative of France who, with characteristic caution, said:

 

"The report of Mr. Jarring has the merit of stressing the complexity of the question." [798th meeting, para. 48].

 

When we come to the study of the report by the Council, we find that the main attention is paid to that part of the report which deals with a solution which, with great respect to Mr. Jarring, was the solution we did not think should have been submitted to us-the issue of arbitration-because this has all the appearance of a country declining to accept good advice or the counsels of conciliation. There are certain things that are arbitrable; there are certain things that are not arbitrable. But in this particular case it goes further than that. This question of arbitrating on certain aspects of this problem has been before the Security Council from 1948 onwards, ever since we came here. At each stage, the representative of the Government of India who was before this Council declined to accept arbitration, because the independence of countries can not be put into the hands of political delegations to decide one way or another. Last time, I made a brief reference to this and I pointed out that no country in the world-and least of all Mr. Jarring's country-had accepted arbitration in a similar issue. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to this matter. The name of the United Kingdom appears small, perhaps less than that of the United States, in the case law on this point where the United Kingdom refused to accept arbitration. At the 795th meeting. I quoted to you the reasons put forward by Henry John Temple at one time. We do not take that position. But even as late as the Jay Treaty, concluded in 1794 between the United States of America and Great Britain, the British refused to arbitrate on these matters.

 

Anyway, I am instructed by the Government of India to make our position very clear on this matter. We do not want world public opinion-and not only the members of the Council to be under the impression that the Indian people or the Government of India reject arbitration in toto on every issue. In fact, we are in favour of either arbitration or mediation or conciliation or good offices on so many problems. But this problem concerns the vital interests of a country and, what is more, issues on which this Council has already pronounced itself. To make an arbitral tribunal of what in our opinion would be a court of appeal or a court of review would not be correct. Therefore, we made it very clear that it was not possible at that time.

 

The other day [795th meeting, paras, 57 to 59], I cited the most recent instance where, in what is called the Interhandel case, the United States refused to go to arbitration with a Swiss concern for the same reasons. The same thing applies to the United States-Panama disputes. It is necessary for me to say this because a country like mine does not want to place itself in the position of not listening to counsels of conciliation and of good offices.

 

But all problems have to be judged in the context of their vital implications. Where our security and what is more, where the terms of reference of Mr. Jarring's visit are affected, then we think that arbitration was the inappropriate method to pose to us.

 

Mr. Jarring very frankly and helpfully told us that he was going to proceed on the basis of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Those were the tracks that As far as he had set and he was not going to move from it. We are concerned, all the discussions have taken place on that basis, and we take the view that we are entitled, if that is the position, whatever may happen in the far future, that the decisions made by the Council cannot be thrown into the melting pot of an arbitrator. And the facts-in this particular case one fact, whether part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 had been completed or not-in our submission, have been established by the Commission, both explicitly and implicitly. They appear in many ways, in many parts of the resolution; they appear in the various records submitted by the Commission; and what is more, they appear in the board fact-which not even the darkness of nights can conceal-of the annexation of our sovereign territory by an external Power. For now, it is not necessary to arbitrate on that. There

 

A fact which we would like to stress is the reference to the grave problems, made not at our instance, because we made no appeal to Mr. Jarring, we expressed our point of view. I hope I am not disclosing any private conversations. Our position was that he had come as a well-known neutral at the behest of the Security Council and we understood that his loyalties were to the Security Council, that is, to the Charter and to the merits of the problem. But in his own observation he points to some of the grave aspects of the problem and Mr. Jarring says in his report:

 

"...I was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of..." (S/3821, para. 10.)

 

This is a phrase which was required by Sir Pierson Dixon in his address to the Council. [797th meeting, para. 11].

 

Secondly and I will return to this later when I deal with it in full there has been much play made of the statement of Mr. Jarring in paragraph 13 of his report where says:

 

"...the Government of India...felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question of what in the Indian view was aggression committed by Pakistan on India. In the Indian Government's view, it was incumbent on the Council to express itself on this question and equally incumbent on Pakistan 'to vacate the aggression." [S/3821, para. 13].

 

This has been interpreted by some-ot by Mr. Jarring, for Mr. Jarring has been content to leave it for other people to understand-as to say that this question is no longer under consideration, that it has gone into the limbo of history, whatever it was, and that in any case, there was no view expressed by the Security Council in this matter. No procedures that have been followed are based on one view or another. That is

 

not our position, as I shall make clear when we go on. The third aspect, and this is important, is that Mr. Jarring, in addressing the Council the other day, said:

 

"In my report, I established that a deadlock had been reached between India and Pakistan on part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and in particular on paragraphs B and E of that part". [798th meeting, para. 40).

 

Therefore, as far as we are concerned, there is a deadlock in the sense of proceeding with whatever resolutions we are engaged by. But there is no deadlock in relation to the title or in relation to the sovereignty of the country. But that deadlock is centred on part I.

 

Therefore, if this statement of Mr. Jarring has to have any value, it rules out any discussion of part II before part I is disposed of; that is, it has narrowed considerably. If the statement of the representative of the United States is to be entertained when he says "it is from that report that our current sessions start." (797th meeting, para. 28.) I do not say it should end there. But it appears to us that the deadlock has been reached. This is where it is deadlocked and unless and until we are able to resolve it, it is not possible, according to Mr. Jarring's own interpretation, to proceed on the rails that he has set.

 

Mr. Jarring says:

 

"...I established that a deadlock had been reached between India and Pakistan on part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and in particular on paragraphs B and E of that part." [798th meeting. para. 40.)

 

It is very important because certain delegations, like your own, Mr. President, have gathered the mistaken impression, if I may submit, that this view of ours is an afterthought. But I will come to that at an appropriate time.

 

The usual Part I is not implemented because, contrary to conception, part I is not just a cease-fire order. If one looks at the resolution of 13 August 1948, one will find that this resolution is divided into three parts. The cease-fire order relates only to paragraph A of part I. It is usually mistakenly construed that the whole of part I is the cease-fire part. The cease-fire order is paragraph A of part I. That cease-fire order, thanks to the wisdom of the Pakistan and India Governments and people, has been carried out, and despite such vicissitudes as might have occurred, is maintained. Therefore, the cease-fire order is only section A of part I. But when we say that part I has not been carried out, it is in regard to the remainder. In regard to the remainder, paragraphs B and E are the more important parts. I find it difficult to deal with the whole of this problem in the context of the present status of this discussion in the Council, because there are seven or eight members who have spoken from different points of view and laid different emphasis, and almost led us to think in one direction or another. As far as we are concerned, we regard it as our duty to consider each of these statements, and not to say that this comes from this country and that comes from that country; as far as we are concerned, they all come from members of the Security Council. Therefore, when I come to that, I will deal with it in detail.

 

Our position has been that of part I, paragraph B of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has not been implemented Paragraph B says:

 

"The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

Here, may I draw the attention of the representative of the United Kingdom, in view of what he has told us, to the fact that this resolution goes on to put in brackets these words:

 

"(For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control' shall be considered to include 1 forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides)"-"respective sides" meaning the invaded and the invader.

 

Therefore, the augmentation for which the key date is the date of the acceptance of the resolution goes back to this date. Now I should like to ask what would happen if the Security Council had on a certain date called upon the parties concerned not to augment the strength of their forces or to do anything that might worsen the situation and if the parties did accept that resolution, as was the case with the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948.

 

The Security Council called upon India and Pakistan to refrain from making statements or doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation. On 17 January 1948 the Council passed this resolution. It is not necessary in order to understand the position of the Government of India even to into what is the present position in regard to the augmentation, because on 15 January 1948 the Pakistan Government sent its reply to the Council in which it said that a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons in Pakistan were helping the azad Kashmir Government in their struggle for liberty as volunteers, but that it was wrong to say that Pakistan territory was being used as a base of military operations and that it was also incorrect to say that the Pakistan Government was supplying military equipment, transport and supplies to the invaders or that Pakistan officers were training, guiding and otherwise helping them. That communication was made to the Security Council on 15 January 1948. [S/110, annex 6, document I ]

 

On 17 January 1948 the resolution was passed and both countries accepted it. From that day onwards to now, that injunction stands violated. I ask my friend from the United Kingdom: If a country comes here with a complaint and the defendant says, "I am not guilty of this offence and/or these charges levelled against me are not correct." and if those statements are then taken at their face value, which we should rightly do, and afterwards the obvious facts known to everybody disprove this denial, then is it necessary to bring in any other facts of augmentation ? That is to say, there was augmentation even in contradiction of the 17 January resolution, even before we come to 13 August.

 

But since we have taken the view that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has not been completed, we are content for the moment to rest on that resolution itself. In this connexion, Sir Pierson Dixon has dealt with this matter at some length. [797th meeting. para. 5 to 20.] I find it difficult to answer the speech and to deal with these items separately without duplication, so if I overlap a little, I hope you will forgive me.

 

First of all, I want to mention the contribution made by the United Kingdom in this debate, parts of which arouse responses in us which are of an appreciative character; that is to say, we do not condemn them. It is not our right to do so. The United Kingdom has a responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council, as it told us, and it is its duty to say what it wants to say. We are not here to attack this speech nor to say that it springs from motives that are mala fide or that there is an ulterior purpose in them. We are able to understand part of it, to appreciate it even if we cannot accept it. We are unable to agree with part of it, and there are parts of it with which we are in profound disagreement. Some of it springs from misconceptions which are fundamental to the appreciation of this problem. We think that some parts of it are tragic because they do so much to take away from the other parts which are useful for a constructive solution. So I hope my colleague from the United Kingdom will accept it from me that any observations I make are entirely centered on the merits of this matter. We do not take the view that the contribution it has made is either an attempt merely to find fault or to reject proper conclusions, but it is the view of the United Kingdom, and it has been put to us.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon tells us-and I do not know on what authority

 

"I am glad that the representative of India, in his speech. at the 795th meeting. accepted this resolution as engaging India, together with the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan." [797th meeting, para. 4.]

 

This is in reference to the resolution of 17 January 1948. I would like the representative of the United Kingdom to point out to me one instance, not more than one, where a representative of the Government of India at this Council or anywhere else and at any time repudiated that we had accepted that resolution of 17 January 1948. What is more, it is our submission, not our contention, to this Council as a matter of fact that we have scrupulously and religiously observed this. There was never a time when a complaint was made against the augmentation of our forces that we did not immediately take the necessary steps, not for a withdrawal of the augmentation because we had not done anything of that kind, but for further elucidation.

 

There has been no augmentation of the armed forces in India either of the militia or of the regular Indian army or other State forces in the region of India which is Jammu and Kashmir, since we engaged ourselves by this resolution on 17 January 1948. We have done nothing to augment the forces there since we accepted the resolution on 13 August 1948. It is not necessary for me to go into the exact number of forces there are on the territory. It is known to the United Nations observers. It is not possible in a system of government like ours to augment troops or equipment without public debate. Therefore when the United Kingdom representative says that we accepted that resolution at the 795th meeting-unless I am mistaken and as it may be a bad reading of English, if means that it is only at the 795th meeting that we had accepted it-I should like this to be accepted as a request to modify his view on this question. We have always accepted it and we have always followed it. That is why during the period from 17 January 1948 until the time of the cease-fire we have struggled hard not only in regard to the letter of this resolution but also in terms of the spirit of the resolution to carry it out. That is regarding augmentation.

 

But the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 relates to both paragraphs B and E of part I of the Commis sion's resolution of 13 August 1948. It is no exaggeration to say that no countries today have closer and more friendly relations - not alliances-than the United Kingdom and my own. We have been through times of conflict, not of armed conflict but conflict of opinion, conflict of positions, and such arrangements as we have in our relations are based upon mutual confidence. And the very fact is that even on this vital issue- and I must say it here-India is the successor to the British Empire in India, as I shall point out later on; it is not a new State, and it has taken over the responsibility, the assets and liabilities of the British Empire in India, and this is a relevant matter because of the statements made at this table.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say:

 

.. we attach the greatest importance to both the letter and the spirit of part I, paragraph E of the resolution of 13 August 1948." (797th meeting, para. 5.]

 

That is the part that asks people not to aggravate the situation, by the propaganda war of hatred; it does not relate to the augmentation of military potential.

 

Mr. Jarring reported that:

 

"...the Government of India laid particular emphasis on the fact that, in its view, two factors stood in the way of the implementation of the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan." [S/3821, para. 13.]

 

With regard to the attitude of the other party concerning this matter-not an equal party, but the defendant in this action there has been conduct of threatening even in this Security Council, while today, after the last series of meetings, financial aid is given and intelligence officers and personnel are sent to Kashmir to stir up trouble. And when sabotage and violence are being carried out in our country, then it is not right for us not to complain.

 

However, where we join the issue with our distinguished friend is in this matter of making an appeal for what one might call good manners, if nothing else. I do not doubt justice can be even-handed; but everything need not be even-handed. I think it is sent to the wrong address as far as we are concerned. We ask the representative of the United Kingdom this-as we have a right to ask, because we are members of a political family and we exchange information and tell them when we disagree. We would like to know what responsible person in India, what responsible authority in India, what responsible decision in India militates against paragraph E of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948. We have cited instance after instance. What is more, we do not have to cite instances. There are threats of violence, even in this Council itself, of what would happen to us if this or that were not done. Therefore, I am saying all this because we cannot entertain an approach to this problem as if there were two parties equally guilty-a plaintiff and a defendant to be regarded in the same manner. Therefore, that is our position when the representative of the United Kingdom, followed by the representative of Australia, tries to find fault with us equally-although I am afraid that in the case of the representative of Australia he finds it very difficult to give an instance, so that he has put his foot in it.

 

Then comes the question of paragraph E. I am not saying that some newspapersmen have not written here or there something that was irresponsible. I am not admitting it, but it may well be. I ask where either a representative volume of public opinion, representative statement or persons in public life and authority, or any institution such as Parliament or the Government of India have sought to violate this, and where, if any odd person has done so, that has ever been condoned by the Government of India.

 

If we had not always worked for the maintenance of the atmosphere that is necessary for the conduct of negotiations, how would we complain? How would we place so much insistence on this matter, if we ourselves were guilty ? If we were always shouting at them, if we were also carrying on psychological war, if we also believed in hatred, if we believed in jehad and if we believed in taking the law into our Own bands, it would be very unwise on our part to make complaints because we would then be living in glass house. We do not do that.

 

We want to ask the representative of the United Kingdom to take that request of ours into account and one hand, what makes him think that it is only at the 795th o tell us, on the meeting that we accepted the resolution of 17 January 1948 and also, on the other hand, what makes him think that we are in the same position with regard to part I, paragraph E of the resolution of 13 August 1948. This is one of the many factors that make further progress difficult. But Sir Pierson Dixon says, "But in my view paragraph E must be interpreted even more widely than that". [797th meeting para 5] Now we entirely agree. That is why, even as five or six years ago, my Prime Minister asked the then Prime Minister of Pakistan that what even our difficulties were as between our two countries we should not settle them by war. Every time we have brought that forward, the answer has been, "Do something else " If something else is done, however, the declaration does not become necessary. Thus our position with regard to this is that paragraph E must be widely interpreted, as was suggested by the representative of the United Kingdom. And he himself gives the reasons. He gives examples.

 

We have been charged in the Council-and until now we have not bothered to protest about it because it is a wild charge -with genocide. The Convention on Genocide is one that the Pakistan Government ratified a few weeks ago. It should have done so long ago. We are charged with genocide, and representative of Australia, in order to be fair to each of us, says that it is wrong for Pakistan to charge India with genocide. [798th meeting, para 3.] It does not help. But it is equally wrong. he says, for the representative of India speak about what happened on the frontier.

 

Now what did I say happened on the frontier ? I said. that on the international frontier between India and Pakistan there is no regular army on our side. There are only armed police. If there are small incidents, they are not taken much notice of, but are settled some way or other. But if there is a big one, sometimes you have to resist it. But I said nothing about what happens on the frontier. We have no frontier dispute. It would be wrong on our part to bring a frontier dispute to the security Council. We are not going to get entangled in the Security Council on a question of frontier disputes.

 

The representative of Australia say, "We deplore charges of genocide, and we deplore the other charges". Well, there are several ways of being fair, but to attribute to us something that we have not said, something that would put us in the same category as the other party, does not help the situation. If they want to get a better atmosphere, they must make a distinction between the party that contributes to worsening the atmosphere and the party that does not. I would like the representative of Australia to tell us some time, publicly or privately, what we have said about the frontier which upsets him.

 

If the reference is to our giving facts and figures with regard to sabotage and murder, the use conspiratory intelligence. men, some of whom we have got, or to spend the Pakistan taxpayer's money-which is their sovereign right-in trying to corrupt our people, well, that is inside our country and not on the frontier. If the reference is to the frontier in the sense of the cease-fire line, under the agreement reached by the Security Council, no one who belongs to the army or anything of that character can go within 500 yards. There is a 500-yard margin. on either side of the cease-fire in which no forces either of Pakistan or of India can come, at least publicly, and so far as we are concerned we do not go there. Furthermore, the United Nations observers are there. Therefore, with great respect, I would like to ask our colleague from Australia to exempt us from this charge.

 

I can quite understand that both the United Kingdom and Australia do not want this issue to be regarded as finding fault with anyone, and one way of finding fault with one person is to find fault with both. If you abuse both sides you are usually regarded as impartial. But impartiality must be com bind with a relation to facts. That is my submission.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon continnes :

 

"I would wish to appeal to both India and Pakistan to do their utmost, in the words to part I, paragraph E, of the resolution, to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." [797th meeting para. 7.]

 

I am quite at liberty to say-I speak on behalf of my Government and of the people of India in fully responding to this appeal-that we want, not only in this matter, but generally to live in terms of friendship and amity with our neighbours. We do not feel that they are a strange people or that it is our business to be in competition with them. Their prosperity is our prosperity, but it requires two to make it possible. We have done a great deal in other spheres, whatever we can, to bring this about, but we cannot do so at the expense of our sovereignty and the self-respect of our people.

 

Therefore, so far as the appeal is concerned, I will not say that it was unnecessary, because you can always appeal for good things. There can be no limit to the doing of good. Therefore, we do not object to the appeal. We will only say that we have done the best we can. We keep on trying to do it, and we accept advice.

 

Now Sir Pierson Dixon continues, and this is where the trouble comes. He asks:

 

"What other impediments to progress did Mr. Jarring report? He said that the Government of India felt. aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question of what in its view was aggression committed by Pakistan on India". [Ibid., para. 8]

 

Then he goes on to speak of the view of the United Kingdom as expressed by Sir Alexander Cadogan and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, which I do not want to go into, because that itself would lead to a long argument as to what exactly they did say.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon goes on to say:

 

"I do not feel that it would contribute to progress if we were to go over this ground again... Since neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Security Council has felt able to pronounce on the Indian case on this aspect of the question, and since this is, so to speak, the major premise in the Indian argument as developed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it follows that we are unable to accept many of the deduction which have been drawn, however logically they might seem to ensue if the major premise were accepted." [Ibid., para. 10.]

 

That is the way a very cultivated English scholar tells you: "I don't want to listen to you. What you say may be very sensible-if it made sense. It doesn't make sense, so I don't want it." I am accustomed to that: I lived with them for twenty eight years,

 

We regard this major premise as not only true but as basic and fundamental. On behalf of the Government of India, I wish to state that our position is not that the Security Council has not pronounced itself on aggression, because the resolutions are based upon sovereignty of India over its territory. These resolutions do not make any reference to Pakistan. India had to do publicity, India had to make the appeal, India had to keep law and order. All these matters will come up later on. Therefore the resolutions that we speak of do put this issue in cold storage. It is quite true that Pakistan has not been branded as an aggressor. Perhaps it is our fault; we did not ask for it at that time. We said that we did not want any name-calling, that we wanted them to call off the aggression. That is all we ask even today.

 

Therefore, it is not our position that aggression has to be proved. It is our position that the resolutions by which we are engaged-the resolutions which, will all their conditions and with all their sequences, which are important in this matter, were formulated and accepted-are built upon the basis that India had made a complaint of the violation of its territory. India was the complainant. It was, I think, Mr. Warren Austin, who was then the representative of the United States, who said that India was here because the external sovereignty of Kashmir had been handed over by the Maharaja to India, and Pakistan was here and had the rights of a defendant, because it was a sovereign State. Pakistan is a sovereign State, but has no sovereignty over Kashmir.

 

Therefore, the question is not that this is a side issue. This is the basic issue, and it is the major premise. If the representative of the United Kingdom does not accept that major premise, I am afraid that he is straying aways from the principles of the United Nations Charter. And I am sure that, with the close relationships we have with them there is nothing private about it-we have another bone to pick in this matter. In regard to other members of the Security Council, this may be only a matter of the Charter. But the United Kingdom is a party to a party to these boundaries, The United Kingdom is not only bound by the Charter, but is bound by the tripartite agreement in regard to the settlement in India. Therefore, for the United Kingdom, especially in the context of the time, to take up this view would be a wrong one. We are not therefore prepared to admit that there has been no aggression.

 

From there, let us proceed to the facts of the case. I will not go into an analysis of the resolutions of 13 August 1919. I did that early this year at great length and, if the representative of the United Kingdom will give us the assistance of going to them again, he will see our point of view.

 

Part II, section B (3) of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

 

"The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed " [S/1100, para. 75.]

 

I would like to ask the representative of the United Kingdom how the Government of India guarantees human and political rights inside a territory in which it is not sovereign. How does it make it publicly known that peace, law and order must be safeguarded? It is because it is its responsibility. The Security Council is saying that "You must keep your house in this way, you must keep your people in this way." The resolution reads: "The Government of India will undertake We give an undertaking in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. There is no reference, in any of the Security Council records, to two States of Jammu and Kashmir. There is only one State of Jammu and Kashmir. And what is more, the Security Council proceedings speak expressly about the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government in the sense of its full authority.

 

On an earlier occasion, I pointed out that in this resolution the Commission had placed upon India the responsibility of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order-not the local authorities on that side of the cease fire line in which there is full administration by India, but in the whole place. And the whole reference to local authority is an indication that there is only one governing authority in the whole place, and that is Jammu and Kashmir. On account of the invasion, control having disappeared, there were some local agencies which were not able to maintain law and order. It was agreed at that time-and the correspondence between Mr. Lozano and the Prime Minister of India, which is part of the documents, may be read in this connexion-that within the lines then existing (not the cease-fire line, but the lines then existing) these local authorities were to be assisted in their task by India. That could only be possible because there was no other authority there. Therefore, if India was sovereign over the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the 84,000 square miles of it, then, if 42,000 square miles are annexed by someone else and foreign troops are there, if they are kept as part of the army of the other side, if they enter into agreements like the one on the Mangla Dam which they are not competent to enter into, then you have aggression.

 

If the territory was not sovereign, if it was a disputed territory, that would be a different question. But this resolution refers to the whole of Jammu and Kashmir as being one place It recognizes the sovereignty of the Government of India; it recognizes its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. And, what is more, as I pointed out to the Security Council on an earlier occasion, India told the Commission at that time that she would have to protect the caravan routes, the trade routes leading out of India on her frontiers. And it was agreed that when the Government of India made a representation of that kind, it was time to go-in fact, the various posts to which they should be sent, and so on, were discussed at that time.

 

So it is not as though there were two countries and the sovereignty of the Union did not run into this place. Our position is that the whole of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir is part of the Union of India, and half of it is under foreign occupation. It is in that area that there has been augmentation, and it is kept under foreign occupation by the use of these forces.

 

Then we come to a distinguished jurist who is now, I believe, a Judge of the Supreme Court of Australia-Sir Owen Dioxn. These are part of the Security Council documents, so I do not have to ask anybody's permission to read them. Sir Owen Dixon said:

 

"... when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed on, I believe, 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and [that] when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law." [S/1791, para. 21].

 

There is, if it is argued that the first had to do merely with marauders, irregular whom they could not stop, then there was the next one, when the regular army crossed the frontier.

 

It is not for me to go into the past history of this; it is not necessary. What we are concerned with is who has sovereignty at this particular moment-whatever may happen tomorrow. And that sovereignty cannot be altered by an act of force. And that act of force is a violation of international law.

 

It is not correct, if I may say so, to argue before the Security Council that Sir Owen did not believe this but merely said this, as has been implied. There is no doubt that when the frontiers of a sovereign State are crossed, when the territory of a sovereign State is trampled upon in this way, there is strictly a violation.

 

What is more, we have the evidence of Mr. Korbel, who was a member, and for a time even Chairman, of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. After he left the Commission, he wrote a book entitled Danger in Kashmir. This is not a partisan book in any way; it does not plead our case, Mr. Korbel states in that book :

 

"Then came the first bombshell. Sir Zafrulla Khan informed the Commission that three Pakistani brigades had been in Kashmir territory since May."

 

Thus, after having told the Council that Pakistan troops. were not in Kashmir, after having denied that there was any aggression, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan told the Commission that three brigades of Pakistan troops had been in Kashmir since May 1948. The explanation given by the Pakistan Government was that, when this matter had been raised before the Security Council and the representative of Pakistan had said that there were no Pakistan troops in Kashmir, the Commission was not in existence and, therefore, the Commission could not be informed. Mr. Korbel states in his book that the Commission:

 

"... explained to the Pakistans that the movement of these troops into foreign territory without the invitation of that territory's Government was a violation of international law."

 

Thus, Mr. Korbel, who was at one time Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, given the facts of the movement of troops in this territory; he gives the facts of this aggression; and, what is more, he states that was the opinion of the Commission. I would therefore like to know what basis there is for arguing that the Security Council has not pronounced itself on this matter.

 

We are anxious to concede that the representative of Australia meant well when he said that he did not regard the Indian complaint as unworthy of examination. We must, however, place this limitation on that appreciation: we cannot accept any statement that the Security Council has not pronounced itself on India's complaint. What we can say is that the vacation of aggression-the action which should follow the Council's pronouncement on India's complaint-has been delayed.

 

Since the question whether or not there has been aggression is the major part of the case, it is my duty to place before the Council, at least for the purposes of the record, what the exact facts are.

 

This is what the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan said in its third interim report:

 

"At the time that the Commission adopted the resolution of 13 August 1948 it had reason to believe that the 'Azad' forces did not constitute a properly organized and equipped military force and that consequently their disposal, once the Pakistan Army had withdrawn from the State, would not constitute a major difficulty."

 

I read that out because, for some reason which I am unable to understand, Sir Pierson Dixon made the following statement :

 

"If I understood Mr. Krishna Menon aright, he was concerned with what is in the resolution-the principle that forces should not be augmented after the cease-fire [that is quite correct] and with something that is not in the resolution; that is, the question of Azad Kashmir forces. The Commission did not explicitly deal with this latter point." [797th meeting, para. 14].

 

If Sir Pierson Dixon is adhering strictly to the letter of this resolution and is saying that the resolution does not ask for the vacation of the "Azad" Kashmir forces, I would like to submit two observations. In the first place, we find the following sentence in part I. paragraph B of the resolution of 13 August 1948;

 

"(For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)"

 

At that time, the Pakistanis denied that they knew anything about these forces or had anything to do with them. It was only afterwards that they admitted that all these forces thirty-two battalions-were in Kashmir. If, therefore, the United Kingdom representative desires to adhere to the position that "the Commission did not explicitly deal with this latter not deal with "this latter point", And the answer is because the Com mission was not told; because the facts were concealed from it. At that time, the Commission thought that these were irregular forces, which presented no difficulty.

 

At a later point of its third interim report, the Commission gives another version of the situation, as follows:

 

"There is, indeed, no doubt that the azad forces now have a strength which changes the military situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies. Although it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the azad Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces. who have since then been working in close co-operation with the Pakistan regular Army and who have been trained and offered by that Army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that, if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with

This question is part II of the resolution of 13 August."

 

I made a present to the United Kingdom representative of that paragraph from the report. What is the answer? It is that the Pakistan side used the period in question to consolidate its position in the azad territory. If that is not augmentation, in sheer violation of the resolution of 13 August 1948, I would like to know what it is. In the face of the concealment of these facts from the Commission, how can it be argued that we have brought extraneous matters into this discussion ?

 

In the second place, before Mr. When Jarring went to India and Pakistan, we told the Council that these resolutions could not be taken outside of the assurances and explanations and guarantees publicly given by the Commission, and thus by the Council. Hence, whatever the Commission has stated as a finding of fact does not have to go to arbitrators. The Commission has found that these forces are there and, what is more, that Pakistan used the truce period to consolidate its position.

 

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan thought fit to say in his brief reply that I had suggested that there had been some reduction of the azad forces-from thirty-two battalions to twenty battalions. Of course, that depends on how many men are in a battalion. The fact is that there are more troops in the territory now than there were before, even though the number of battalions have been reduced owing to a reorganization.

 

Then, there was a minority report by the Commission, which was not contradicted by the majority. The minority report of the Commission comments as follows on this violation :

 

"The azad forces meanwhile grew by the spring of 1949 into thirty-two disciplined and fully armed battalions, which, according to an evaluation of the military adviser of the Commission, represent a 'formidable force'. Owing to this fact, which is at variance with part 1, section B of the said resolution, forbidding both parties any Increasing their military potential, the situation has materially undergone an absolute change and so a new problem was created as to what, within the meaning of the resolution, represents the "bulk' of the Indian army in Kashmir. From this have arisen logically further difficulties concerning the disarming of the azad forces."

 

I do not want, in view of Mr. Jarring's position that the deadlock relates to part I of the resolution, to go into the question of the withdrawal of the bulk of the forces or into the various other problems to which reference has been made. How ever, the existence of these azad forces, the fact that they have been consolidated, their presence in the territory after the adoption of the resolution, the concealment of the facts from the Commission and the Security Council, the statement by the Commission itself that if it had known the facts it would have included a reference to them in the resolution: all these are relevant points which emphatically repudiate the position taken. by the United Kingdom representative-if he means by his statement that "the Commission did not explicitly deal with this latter point" that we have introduced extraneous matters into the resolution. If, however, he means that this is not so and if he asks us to infer that the reasons why it is not so are the reasons which I have put forward, then I am grateful to him.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon then said:

 

"Now these are very real problems; and the Security Council must be deeply concerned at any augmentation of military potential on either side." [797th meeting, para. 14.]

 

As a general proposition, no one can quarrel with that. But we have not augmented the military potential, and the United Kingdom knows that is true. I shall not go into the question of how the United Kingdom knows that we have not augmented the military potential. Sir Pierson Dixon's advisers are in full possession of the facts. If it came to a challenge. I would disclose the facts.

We refuse to be put into the position of being in the same book with others who are trying to conceal facts from the Security Council. The Government of India has not one instance gone back on any international obligation. In fact, we inherited from the British the idea of paying our debts. We honour our international obligations.

 

The problem of augmentation is a real problem, but the complaint must be sent to the right address-not to us. We have not done any augmenting. In fact, the forces in the area over which we have effective control are not today beyond the limits set at the time in question; there has been no violation of the resolution in any way.

 

We regret that Mr. Jarring was unable to suggest a means accessible to both sides, that is, to find a solution to this matter, but our answer to that is that the facts were proved when the Council said that the azad forces were there, when we had been told that they were not there. What makes the more vicious part of it is that the Commission's third interim report said that had they known that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate, that is, to perpetrate further aggression, then they would have included that in the resolution. How much planer can it be put that this was a case of aggression ?

 

After all, this is not a debating society, and what we say we say for a purpose, and we would request the representative of the United Kingdom to re-examine this matter and to verify the sources of his information. A man in his position must act on advice or, at least, must tend to act on advice. Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say:

 

"But we must do more than try to ascertain the facts; we must try to find some method of reducing the state of tension, of reducing the burden of armaments and of dealing effectively with a situation which has become crystallized in a form never contemplated when the resolutions were passed." [797th meeting, para. 15.]

 

Is it sufficient for a representative of a great Power, who is a common friend of both sides and who, in this particular matter, owes us a moral obligation because we obeyed the law, to make this statement as an obiter dictum ? Is it sufficient for them to say things of that kind ?

 

Sir Pierson Dixon said that we must do more than try to ascertain the facts, we must try to find some method of reducing the state of tension, but how does one reduce the state of tension between an invaded country and an invader, unless the moral weight of the United Kingdom is thrown against invasion ? The United Kingdom should come forward and say that, irrespective of what may be the future solution, irrespective of the various other factors or of any difficulties thereof, wrongs cannot be righted by the wrong method. Invasion is invasion, even if it is invasion of India. After all, the whole of history. has not yet been written. Sir Pierson Dixon says that we must do more than ascertain the facts, but the facts have been ascertained. They have been ascertained by the Commission, and we are nor willing to put that in the melting pot.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon said that we must try to find some method of reducing the state of tension. Well, to reduce the state of tension is what Mr. Jarring referred to in connexion with paragraphs E and B, and so far as paragraph B is concerned, we have fully responded to the suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom. We understand the spirit in which it was made. We do not regard it as an admonition or as patronizing. We accept it, and if in any way we can further the spirit of conciliation in that way, if there are any errors committed on our side- I do not know of any, because we have been very meticulous in this-we are quite prepared to accept information, not dictation, from the United Kingdom.

 

The United Kingdom, of all countries, is aware that we have tried to reduce the state of tension. The state of tension is not only in regard to Kashmir, the reference made was to the two States. India is a country in which the influx of refugees from the other side and the various other factors that are taking place is creating a lot of public feeling, but in spite of that we have tried to reduce the tension. With regard to reducing the burden of armaments, one way would be not to supply more armaments to an invading country. Therefore, we entirely agree with this and, what is more, we accept the spirit in which it was made. We share the view that the situation should not be crystallized, because the cease-fire line was never intended as a political boundary. We withdrew an advancing army in order to stop the fighting and because it was considered as a temporary expedient. The situation has become crystallized in a form never contemplated when the resolutions were passed. Therefore, we beg the United Kingdom to seek to implement its own dictum in this matter, and if we can in any way be helpful, we shall be willing to cooperate.

 

Therefore, the summary of the argument of the representative of the United Kingdom is that there must be a withdrawal of troops, starting from the Pakistan side, and that he appealed to both sides to do the utmost to create an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. It is difficult to carry on negotiations when there are large armaments facing us, when the security-this is not a territorial dispute over Kashmir-of India is in danger. No one knows better than the United Kingdom that there have been a great number of invasions into India from the north-west.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon also said that "there is no question here of interfering with national sovereignty" [797th meeting, para. 21]. That relates to another problem altogether; it refers to problems raised by some other countries, and therefore I shall have to leave part of the other suggestion made by Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Wadsworth till that particular subject comes up.

 

I will try to prove that it is not just a question of aggression, but a violation of India's sovereignty, violation of the decisions of the Security Council, both in spirit and in law, and a continuing and cumulative violation, that does not require a microscopic examination. These violations have been investigated, and they have been found to be true by different people, whether of Colombian, Czech or Australian nationality. Their cases may have been in different contexts, it may be that they I have not wanted to pronounce myself on another aspect, but the fact that the territory has been violated, the fact that foreigners-foreigners in an international sense have come into the territory of India, has been proved. It does not require any further examination. The facts have been found and, therefore, it lies now in the lap of the Security Council to defend the principles of the Charter and to do justice.

 

Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States, told the Council that an equitable solution must be found (797th meeting, para. 26] Happily for us, the American ideas of equity are those which we have been educated to understand. Equity is the method of implementing justice. Those who want to receive equity must give equity. One cannot give equity to an invader. We do not want anything inequitable to be done to us.

 

There was a reference which we inferred-we may be wrong-to be oblique support for the position taken by Sir Pierson Dixon that all these matters are past history and that we cannot go into all that. Sometimes it is a good thing to forget the past. Sometimes it is convenient, but in this case the past lives in the present.

 

The representative of China made the observation that the Security Council had heard very elaborate arguments on the Constitution of India. He spoke of the law and on the backing of law, but these have no meaning, and, not only for the purpose of Kashmir, we as a country cannot allow a statement of this kind made before the Security Council, irrespective of its source, to pass unanswered. Mr. Tsiang said:

 

"All colonial empires have the backing of law. All of them have been fortified with treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements and what not. The British empire in India had ample legal foundation, [I will confess that this is the first time I have heard that] In the face of India's claim to self-determination, all British legal claims were swept aside. These claims were solidly based on treaties duly signed and ratified, and even sanctified by time and tradition. When the Indian people demanded self-determination, the legal documents in the hands of the United Kingdom seemed to have no moral or political relevance. What the Indian peoples demanded and won from the United Kingdom should, I hope, be granted to the people of Kashmir." [797th meeting para. 51.]

 

Let me first deal with this. First of all, we did not demand self-determination of the British. We asked for the independence of our country and with this, in the maturity and course of time, the United Kingdom came into agreement. Therefore the arrangements that were made were arrangements not of self determination but by an Act of the British Parliament, the Indian Independence Act. No question of self-determination was involved in this matter; certain ad hoc arrangements were made and power was transferred to the new authority. There was no plebiscite or anything of that kind. Self-determination only came in regard to the fashioning of the Constitution, which we, as a self-governing Dominion, fashioned later ourselves. To suggest that Indian independence is based upon the conception that is now being worked out in the wrong way here would not be in accordance with history.

 

To suggest that the laws and legal systems, the contracts, treaties, obligations and rights vested in the British Empire disappeared with transfer of power would be a very serious thing for us. For one thing, we should not now be a Member of the United Nations. India is a successor State.

 

I have no desire to weary the Council with our domestic legislation which concerns mainly the United Kingdom and ourselves, but the position of the Dominion of Indian Independence Act of 1947. All those territories which were formerly British India and which were duly constituted into the Dominion of India are set out in it and therefore India is the successor State. Whatever obligations rested on the British Empire, either by statute, convention, law, international practice or common custom, devolved upon India. In that way we have taken on obligations which we otherwise would not have taken on, and the representative of the United Kingdom knows well

that we have not gone back on that position, even though the responsibilities have sometimes been onerous.

 

To suggest, therefore, that when the British went away whatever treaties or agreements there were in regard to these matters have disappeared, is a suggestion the purpose of which I do not know. The foundation of the constituent relationship of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India arises not from any treaty made by the British with somebody else but is part of the agreement to which Pakistan, India and the United Kingdom were parties, and even if it were true that previous foreign treaties-lapsed, no agreement of this particular purpose no tripartite agreement between those parties such as the agreement for the transfer of power, could possibly be washed out.

 

We want to place it on record that we do not accept the position stated here to the effect that because British power was withdrawn from India all legal obligations and legal rights and everything else that flows from the position of a successor State departed with them.

 

From that, the representative of China goes on to say that India refuses to grant fellow Asian people, the people of Kashmir, the same right which it demanded from the British. Not only is the fact erroneous in more than one particular way, because India has not refused to grant anything to fellow Asian people. The people of Kashmir are Indians like everybody else and have the same rights as other Indians, whether Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains or whatever else they may be. There is no question therefore of making discrimination and there is nothing for us to reconsider in the matter. What has been conferred upon the people of Kashmir has been extended by the Union as a whole not in conferment of a gift but as the right of a constituent State. All those arrangements that come from the Indian Constitution and from the accession agreements, for example, are included. It is for a State, when acceding, to decide for itself what it is willing to hand over to the Central Government and it is only in regard to defence, communications and external affairs that there is any obligation. That is the position of Kashmir as it is that of every other constituent State. I therefore submit that this statement is historically

in error and that is what we want to put on record in order that there may be no question of challenging the position of the Government of India. We cannot ignore observations coming from our very esteemed friend, General Romulo, the Philippine representative, in regard to this problem. General Romulo tells the Council:

 

"It is clear that any claim by one party or the other that any portion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian or Pakistan territory would be highly prejudicial to the implementation of the two resolutions previously accepted by the two parties." [798th meeting, para. 311.

 

I submit that this is completely contrary to the resolutions as they were passed, contrary to the Commission's findings and a contradiction even in respect of the resolutions. As I have pointed out so many times, there is no reference to Pakistan in these resolutions. The obligation is all placed upon India and has been based upon the thesis that sovereignty rests there together with the rights of defence and the maintenance of order. I think this must have come from some misconception of the situation. When the question of the Azad Kashmir Government came under discussion the Commission expressly informed the Government of India that there would be no change in sovereignty or status and that is one of the reasons why the Azad Government was not recognized. We did not recognize it, and even the Government of Pakistan said at the time that it did not recognize it. So it seems to me quite clear that recognition of the local authorities, that is to say recognition that the local authorities were a fact, in no way changes the sovereignty of India. It is therefore entirely incorrect from the point of view of the Security Council resolutions and the documents of the United Commission for India and Pakistan, which are plentiful in this matter. Even if a different view is held, these facts can not be changed. It is not a question of the whole territory it is, whether it is Indian or Pakistan territory. It is Indian territory, part of which is effectively under Indian occupation and the rest of it is under invasion-illegally annexed by Pakistan.

 

The representative of Iraq made certain references which call for some clucidation. Here again we do not regard any observation made by any member of the Council, whatever its political or military relations with us, as anything but a representation of their own views. The representative of Iraq said:

 

"The representative of India saw fit to enter into a discussion of the purposes and objective of alliances and pacts, and he made a point of mentioning several times during his statement the Baghdad Pact, in which my country is a participant." [797th meeting, para, 76].

 

We have always said, and did so in the case of United States military aid to Pakistan, as in the case of the latter's membership of the Baghdad Pact, that as sovereign countries it is up to them to join this pact or the other. But also as a sovereign State it is for us to express how the pacts affect us. That is all we have said and whatever statements I have made here have had no other object. In any case, what we said was that Pakistani statement have stated their purpose in joining the Baghdad Pact was different from what was intended: We made no reference to Iraq policy in this matter and we made no reference at that time to the Baghdad Pact countries having anything to do with the Kashmir question, but now that this has been raised by Iraq, I propose at the appropriate time to produce official statements as to the views of certain Baghdad Pact members on this question.

 

The representative of Iraq said:

 

"To accuse Pakistan of trying to involve other peoples of the Middle East in what the representative of India termed Pakistan's aggressive intentions against India is contrary to the facts of the situation and surely a reflection on the intentions and intelligence of other members [797th meeting, para. 78]. of the Pact."

 

I leave it to the Council to say whether that is the kind of statement that ought to be made about us in regard to any strictly political submissions which we may make to the Council. We do not insult the intelligence of other people, because we do not like our own intelligence insulted.

 

The Government of Iraq handed over at New Delhi an aide-memoire on 26 June 1956 in which it said:

 

"The Government of Iraq desires to point out that the Kashmir question is a factor of restlessness and tension and it has its effects on the security of this area, and Iraq being a Member of the United Nations and the Baghdad Pact, feels that it cannot but be interested in anything that upsets the security of this area, which is on the whole linked with the security world"

 

By implication the suggestion is that we have been threatening somebody's security. Nobody has suggested that we have been guilty of acts of aggression. I stated here in this Council, on behalf of the Government of India, that, as at present constituted and for present considerations, our rights across the cease-fire line in the occupied area are legally, politically, morally, internationally, and every way justified and any step which we take to restore our authority will be justified. What is more, it is assured in these resolutions that the Commission itself agreed to having a force on the frontier to protect our land under certain conditions.

 

Besides, the Commission has set out that in regard to this area on the other side of the cease-fire line, these local authorities were to function under the surveillance of the Commission where necessary. They were on our sovereign territory. Therefore, when the representative of Iraq says that there is no relation between this and that I did not intend to bring this up, but since the statement has been made, which is none too friendly, I thought that the Council might have the facts. This was not a mild statement made in a newspaper, but a formal protest in a statement by the Iraqi ambassador in New Delhi on 26 June 1956. It is not as though the Iraqi ambassador said anything against us; it is part of the Baghdad Pact view. This Brattish cannot tell us, because they are friends of ours. I am not saying the Iraqis are not, but the British are particular about what they say. They do not like to be put in the wrong. They do not like to be put in the wrong. They do not tell us these things, but the Turkish Government did. The Turkish Government did. The Turkish Government's aide-memoire on 4 May 1956-not very far from 26 June 1956-said:

 

"Since the Kashmir problem is causing anxiety in a country that is a member of the Baghdad Pact [Now what more evidence is required that these things are connected?] it concerns the other members of the Pact and, consequently, Turkey."

 

If this is not a military pronouncement, what else is it? The aide-memoire continues :

 

"Since the Kashmir problem is creating unrest in the Middle East [I have not heard that the Kashmir problem was creating unrest in the Middle East. There are many other problems that are creating unrest in the Middle East about which the Baghdad Pact was able to do nothing] it concerns the Baghdad Pact, which was set up for defence of that area and which consequently concerns Turkey as well."

 

I would like to ask both the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom some time whether this last statement is correct in regard to all the members of the Pact. Is that statement a defence against us, or do they challenge it? Do they subscribe to this statement because it is spoken on behalf of the members of the Baghdad Pact? I do not hold the United Kingdom responsible for what the Turkish and Iraqi Governments say, but here is a public statement handed over as an aide memoire on 4 May.

 

We had no intention of bringing all this out and, in fact, we should like to confine this problem to its narrow Kashmir limits except insofar as we are engaged by these resolutions. Before I leave this question of aggression: it has been said that there has been no aggression by Pakistan. It was so stated in the beginning and, apparently, if the view is to be entertained -as the Council has not pronounced itself on this-then I think it is better to go to a first-hand source; and that is Pakistan itself.

 

Pakistan told this Council that its armies entered territory of India for the protection of its frontiers. Pakistan informed the Commission that its regular forces had entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir in self defence. One of the reasons stated by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan to the Commission for the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir was the "protection of the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by India forces" [S/1100, para. 51].

 

When we have come to this Council and said that we do not want to deal with this aggression by the invasion of Pakistan: when we have called back troops that had advanced; when we have placed the stress on the suspension of hostility; when we were making all these efforts, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said that he entered what, as I have pointed out, is the sovereignty of the Union of India for the purpose-not because they were attacked-of making a protective arrangement. If this is not expansionism, then what is expansionism? To protect the frontier of one's country, one enters the other fellow's country. While we did not, even by invasion, go on to the other side, the entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir by forces was for the "protection of the territory of Pakistan from possible aggression by Indian forces". What country is safe in this world? if another country, because of possible aggression, is going to lead its troops there? There will be no frontiers because, to protect a frontier, there will have to be another frontier, and so on. This is what the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, called expanding the frontier.

 

If any final proof were necessary, then, it is the statement made to this Council by no less a person than the former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who is now a Judge of the International Court of Justice, that the Pakistan army entered the territory of Jammu and Kashmir not only to protect co religionists, but in order that the Pakistan frontier might not be invaded by us.

 

We do not wish for the time being to go into the next phase, but if it should become necessary we would be prepared to produce evidence for the Council showing what plans for the invasion of India were prepared at that time and by whom. We are anxious that this debate, however much we may be in our rights, in presenting facts, does not bring about facts that create more friction between countries and, as I said, we wish to inform the Council-not because the United Kingdom representative needs to know it he knows it, and our relations with the United Kingdom are so close, and while we may disagree with it, we have no desire to cause irritation, and we are honestly convinced that a great many people in England want to see an end of this question but they want to see it end in their way that the invasion of India was calculated. What is more, it was calculated for the purpose of the protection of Pakistan and it was an attempt at forestalling at pushing away the invading force coming from the Uri-Poonch-Naoshera area, which was part of the sovereign territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

Finally, when we continue this debate, I would like to deal with the suggestions which have been made and to which I come in a moment.

 

Both Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Wadsworth, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, have said, as would be expected from them, that we must proceed from the easy positions to tackle the difficult ones; must accept areas of agreement and make use of them before further progress can be made.

 

If I may say so with great respect to Sir Pierson Dixon, this reference to "areas of agreement" is a classical British phrase in connexion with the Kashmir dispute which was first used by Mr. Noel-Baker of Corfu fame. Sir Pierson Dixon said that we should determine those points ``where there is some area of agreement between the parties and to see whether progress can be made from those points." [797th meeting, para. 11).

 

What areas of agreement? We do not agree and Pakistan does not agree with regard to aggression. How can a country that is invaded agree in this way ? There are no areas of agreement except that we are engaged by these resolutions. What these resolutions mean, however, is a matter which must be decided on its merits. We are not prepared to accept an interpretation of these resolutions which is not consistent with the facts or which has not been accepted at a previous time. We are not prepared to say that because exploratory discussions may have taken place at any time, that is the way. We shall deal with that under demilitarization.

 

While it is always nice to approach a problem from an agreeable and a peaceful point of view-and that is the only approach we can make-we may not just get lost in these words, "there is some area of agreement between the parties". There is always some area of agreement. But to suggest that all that is required is some small matter is not sufficient.

 

The representative of the United States stated :

 

"The present case is different from that of many problems which are brought before the Security Council. We are fortunate in having an area of agreement and a large one-between the parties and with the Council." [797th meeting, para. 31].

 

But I am afraid that there is a large area where there is no agreement-the 42,000 square miles of our territory that is under occupation. It is a very considerable area. I am not comparing this State to the United States, but I believe it is a pretty large place. Therefore the areas of agreement in stricter political terms must be confined to our engagement by these resolutions.

 

The Government of India stands committed by the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948. We shall do nothing unless attacked to move from the positions that existed at the time either to augment our forces or to take any action. We shall at no time indulge in hate propaganda or psychology call warfare. But we object to psychological warfare, to the introduction of religious fanaticism in these things, to the stirring up of people on various grounds. Assuming for argument's sake that sabotage and destruction were going on inside Kashmir by terrorists or whoever it may be, when we may have got those facts for the information of the Council to show the complicity of the other side in this matter and see another phase of what was going on, what was the response of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan ? His response was, "Well, if they have trouble, it is because the people are discontented." Is that the answer of one orderly Government to another, to say that if there is sabotage or distress in one country, they deserve it because they are not well governed ? It is surely the distress of the people. I have produced evidence and, what is more, the evidence is being given in the law courts. The approver in this story was received by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and called as evidence.

 

To suggest, therefore, that there is an area of agreement when there is promotion of this sort in our country is an attempt at underground rebellion. There is no answer from Sir Pierson Dixon-while we welcome it-when he says that he is. very sorry to hear about this matter. So are we. We regret it. Terrorism does not get anybody anywhere. What is more, it is only when there is no mass support of a movement by individuals that there is sporadic violence. If there is mass support, then small efforts at violence are not necessary. Killing off people here; putting a bomb in a mosque and saying a Hindu did it; putting a bomb in a Hindu temple and saying a Moslem put it there-this sort of thing is done only because there is no mass support in order to create mischief.

 

To say that this represents areas of agreement is far from true. The only areas of agreement are the engagements in these resolutions-by the Security Council resolution, which we have accepted fully, and in regard to the two resolutions of the Commission, having full regard for the sequence, the assurances that have gone with them and the conditions under which they were adopted and, what is more all the other submissions that we made the other day. India has no desire to back out of any international obligation. But equally it would be rather inappropriate, in my submission, to hold that something is an international commitment when it is not so. The commitments such arise in regard to the resolution of 13 August 1948. Unless part I is performed, part II does not exist. Unless part II is performed, part III does not come in. What does part III say ?

 

"The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the of the State of Jammu and Kashmir [I would tell my friend from the Philippines that there is no reference to the present status of Jammu and Kashmir being anything else] shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions...". [S/1100 para. 75.]

 

So it has nothing to do with discussing the present status at all. It is a matter of a peace arrangement to determine what can be done about the future.

 

Whatever that may be, I would like to ask the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to bring some realism into this talk about areas of agreement. And the way to begin is with the vacation of aggression. We do not say that part I is the whole of the resolution. In view of what has been going on in the last ten years, the peoples of India and the world are able to believe that part I will remain unperformed, for it is not sufficient for these armies to march nine miles and for hate propaganda to cease for a week. It is necessary for us to feel safe and secure in our own lands. We have no desire to go anywhere else.

 

In my statement of 9 October [795th meeting] I remarked on the meaning of the contents of this expression "vacating of aggression". It means vacating annexation. I would like to ask the representative of the United Kingdom: How can it be said on behalf of the United Kingdom that there has been no violation of the spirit or the letter of the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 when great parts of this territory -nearly half of it-have been annexed to Pakistan, ruled by it? What is more, I have produced before the Council the budget estimates of the Pakistan Government showing allocations. I cited documents which show that even the very information centre in this country of the so-called Azad Government is run by the Pakistan Embassy. Therefore, when there is an annexation of this kind, how can the United Kingdom tell us, "We will forget the past and see where we are." That is to say, the vacation of aggression, the removal of this cause, the removal of the violation of our sovereignty. Trying to determine these matters by force, taking the law into one's own hands and invoking the Security Council-that is not the position a self respecting country can accept. Nor can we in fairness to our people and the security of our territory accept that situation.

 

The first step, therefore, in order to bring about this atmosphere of areas of agreement is to perform part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 according to the construction of this resolution, according to the whole history that has gone behind it, according to the written assurance for the various Chairmen of the Commission, Mr. Lozano most of all. These are not individual assurances. They are documents which are based on these adopted resolutions.

 

Unless part I of the resolution is performed, part II does not come alive. It is just latent. It has no meaning. Part I is performed by the total vacation of aggression. We are not talking about Part II now or the forces that come under it, but the forces that have come to the State since the passing of this resolution, their removal, the de-annexation of the territory, the stoppage of psychological warfare and of the encouragement of subversive activities inside our country. I do not mean the expression of political opinion. We do not object to that. I mean either the financial or physical aid to subversive activity that needs to be found out. Unless these things cease, part I is not operative. And if Mr. Jarring has said one thing, it is the statement without a doubt that he has established that part I is the cause of the deadlock. That is the position.

 

At the next session of the Security Council, with your permission, Mr. President, and while we do not accept any of the statements that have been made on its behalf by the United Kingdom or by others, we will deal with the problem of what is called "demilitarization" and the Graham reports.

 

It will be very inappropriate for us to take this piecemeal. It is a very large problem by itself. But I would like to say here and now that we cannot agree with the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom that demilitarization fares so well in all these resolutions that have been spoken of. In fact, the expression "demilitarization" does not occur anywhere in the resolutions. There are some arrangements the effect of which would be to lessen the military potential in two different places.

 

But the suggestion that is given that the key to this is all based on demilitarization, and so on, is not correct. Anyway, I would not like to deal with this piecement. What is more, I would like to submit that while our position is that part I is not performed, and part II is not worth debating, we feel that the debate in the past has been fluctuant. What is more, we have learned by experience that any constructive suggestion one makes is likely to be gotten hold of and used against us. Therefore we have to proceed in this matter with the necessary caution.

 

In view of the sources of the suggestion at this moment the United States, the United Kingdom and others-and what is more, in view of the fact that the Security Council is being treated to this, it is our duty to express our opinion on that matter. Furthermore, we would not like to show any personal disrespect to Dr. Graham, but we are prepared to deal with these matters of Mr. Wadsworth's statement, that this session proceeds from the Jarring repo.t, added to which is Dr. Jarrings own statement that the deadlock is centred on the part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

 

But if the permanent members of the Security Council make a proposal of this kind, who are we just to ignore them ? Therefore, we are quite prepared to express our position in regard to this matter. However, I would like to say that there are no proposals before the Security Council. Neither we nor Pakistan, under the Charter, are entitled to make proposals, and we have no desire to make any. The Council has been called, at the instance of Pakistan, for the consideration of this question. At the present moment, therefore, when we next meet, we would be in a position only to deal with the issues posed in this matter by the United Kingdom and the United States, and supported by one or two others; not quite fully, but if something is being done, they will not object to it.

 

It will be our submission that it is only fair to the Government of India that the background of this toil-and, what is more, we say this in all seriousness to the United Kingdom the security of India and its integrity, and the condition of its people, are of great consequence to our two countries. Therefore, when these problems are tackled, it would not merely be an academic exercise; we would submit all the considerations that go with them, even on the assumption that we are doing this because the suggestion has been made, not because there is any change in our position in regard to the augmentation of forces, the defiance, the cumulation of aggression and augmentation that has gone on since the invasion began, in defiance of Security Council resolutions.

 

I am sorry that it has taken so long, but there are some members of the Security Council who have views different from ours, as is to be expected, and I am here to represent the views of the Government of India and the Indian people on a case that is getting somewhat ancient with the result that facts which were fresh in people's minds seem easily to be forgotten.

 

That alone can explain my good friend General Romulo saying that neither Pakistan or India can have any sovereignty in this territory. We are weighing matters which were commonplace, which were not regarded within the realms of question by the Commission. Now that is forgotten and something new is brought about. Therefore, when the delegation of India, whether represented by me or by anyone else, has to remind the Security Council of things that are established, it is not possible, in a matter of this kind to proceed if at each sitting we are going to scrap what has been done by way of gains. Therefore, we have submitted this to you.

 

We will make the submissions at your convenience, Mr. President, at the next meeting of the Security Council. It has just been put before me that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army informed the Commission in 1948 that the purpose of sending Pakistan troops into the State was to hold the general line of Uri-Poonch-Naoshera. This line runs north along Western Kashmir.

 

Therefore, there is no question to us about the invading army. I also read the statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. I would like to conclude by saying that while some of these facts are unpleasant and they have the effect which was hinted at, though in the wrong instance, by my friend, Mr. Walker, the representative of Australia, it is only when, as in the case of the Baghdad Pact, we are pushed into doing so, that we produce them.