09101957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 795 held on 9 October 1957.

09101957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 795 held on 9 October 1957.

 

Although my country is not a member of this august body and we are here under the appropriate provisions of the Charter in view of the subject matter we are discussing, I hope, Mr. President, you will allow me the liberty of offering you the felicitations of my delegation upon your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council. We know that it is a matter of monthly rotation, but since this is the first meeting at which you have presided and we have the honour of attending this meeting. I would like to express our appreciation.

 

Today, the Council is once again considering a matter. which has been before it for several years, but as a citizen of India and as a representative of its Government, I cannot open this question without referring to the extensive damage that has been caused in Kashmir by the recent floods In Jammu and Kashmir nearly seventy square miles of agricultural land were under water and 717 villages were destroyed. Large numbers of cattle have been lost and bridges have been washed away. But once again, the determination and the unity of the people of Srinagar and the Indian Army saved the city of Srinagar from being destroyed. The city has been restored from man-made havoc, and now it has been saved from natural havoc.

 

We meet here today in virtue of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 February 1957 [S/3793] As the Council knows, we are no parties to this resolution. It is a resolution of the Council requesting one of its members to go out to India and Pakistan and inviting our respective Governments to cooperate with him. When this resolution was adopted, I stated before you, on behalf of the Government of India, that as far as the President of the Security Council is concerned, he is welcome in our country at any time, but his terms of reference have to be examined in a political context (774th meeting, para. 37). The President of the Security

Councils will always be welcome in India. The hospitality of our land and the courtesies of our Government are at his disposal.

 

We have carried out our promise: to the best of our ability they made the stay of Mr. Jarring in our country was as comfortable as possible and we were available to him whenever he wanted us. As far as I remember, he saw us two or three times, and Pakistan officials four times. I myself had the privilege of meeting him on several occasions, and we made no proposals in regard to the problems discussed. We heard him; we answered the questions that were asked and we placed no impediments in the way of conversations with anyone in our country or of visiting any part of it, including Kashmir.

 

The genesis of our meeting here is the resolution and the report from the President of the Security Council [S/3821) containing his observations and what he considers should be his purposes in that visit as under Security Council mandate. The terms of reference to which I have referred are not matters for us, but merely a matter for the representative of Sweden who, so far as we are concerned, is the sole interpreter of the resolution of 21 February 1957. But the Government of India has said before and will repeat on every possible occasion, that the genesis of our presence here is the complaint made before the Security Council of the aggression committed by Pakistan on our territory by allowing, first, irregulars to pass over 500 miles of Pakistan territory, where international obligations in law and honour obliges them to intern them and put them into prison. What is more, we come here to seek, not adjudication but the offices of the Council under Chapter VI of the Charter in order to have this aggression vacated.

 

Therefore, we are here today, in the main, on the basis of our complaint, in the background of the whole of the situation from which it arises, and more immediately under the context of this resolution. My Government would not have desired to analyse or to interpret the report of the representative of Sweden, which is a report to the Security Council. It is largely a matter for them to discuss. But as it happens, my colleague the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his statement at the 791st meeting, treated the Council to what he regarded as the interpretation.

 

I do not propose to answer the various misinterpretations, as we see them but in the course of my approach to this document, some of our views which are different from his would naturally come forward. Perhaps it will help the Security Council if I try to indicate this morning the way in which I propose to deal with this matter and, if at all possible, finish it at this session. If I am not able to finish it this morning, I hope that I will be allowed to go over into the afternoon.

 

I intend, as far as I can, to deal with the report of the representative of Sweden and then to deal with the statements. and allegations made against my Government and my country by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, and afterwards to deal with situations that have arisen since the last meeting of the Security Council in regard to the furtherance of the aggression by our neighbour, whom we still do not call a foreign country, and finally, to state our own position in regard to this situation.

 

May I also say that since the Security Council has not discussed this matter, any observations I make today cannot be regarded as final in regard even to this session of the Security Council. We would like to hear the members of the Council on the report which they have requested. We have no right to ask them to express themselves, but we can express our liking in this respect. Therefore, I reserve regard to any further statements that may come from the position in Foreign Minister of Pakistan or from the members of the Council.

 

Mr. Jarring states in his report that he arrived in Karachi on 14 March 1957. Therefore, the Jarring mission began in Pakistan and not with us. Thus, when he came to India, he was presumably seized of their views. I can only say "presumably" because, as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said, these conversations were not subject to report, they were regarded as confidential between him and the representatives of Governments, and I have no desire to quote any from them, though we have full records of our talks with him.

 

After staying in Karachi for three days, he came over to us and spent four days in India. They were rather hot days, but we made him as comfortable as we could. He returned to Karachi after 28 March and at that time asked the Government of India-this was public-whether, if it be considered fit, he could come back again. We said the same thing: "You are always welcome". We were happy to see him back in April. Then he went back to Pakistan and, finally, he left Karachi on 11 April. The report says that there were participants on both sides in the conversations.

 

Now we come to the subject matter of the report, and I refer to paragraph 6. We are grateful to Mr. Jarring for having recorded in this report that he had cooperation from the Government of India that was complete in all respects and that our conversations with him took place in an atmosphere of complete frankness and cordiality.

 

In those conversations, Mr. Jarring informed us that he regarded his starting point, the rails on which he was moving, to be the resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. This matter is of some importance in regard to some other observations that come later. We also had the advantage not of having discussions but of meeting with Mr. Engers of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs who, with characteristic propriety in this matter, expressed no views whatsoever and I was not able to fathom what went on in his mind. We were also glad to have the assistance of a representative of the Office of the Secretary-General. The Director of the United Nations Information Centre at New Delhi, a Cuban gentleman, was also available to make our relations more smooth.

 

We come now to the text of the report. Paragraph 8 refers to Pakistan. In paragraph 9, Mr. Jarring says:

 

"My efforts were, therefore, from the beginning directed towards the finding of a solution for the problems that had arisen in connexion with these two resolutions." [S/3821, para 9].

 

There is a reference to these two resolutions in para garbh 8, where Mr. Jarring says:

 

"For his part, the representative of India declared that these two resolutions were the only ones which bound his Government.". (Ibid., para. 8.)

 

The reference for that is the verbatim record of the 768rd meeting, paragraph 77.

 

I hope the Council will not think that I have been too. punctilious about words because, in view of our experience of the last ten years, we cannot be too careful about words in this matter. What I repeatedly said, whatever may have been the verbatim text, is that the Government of India stood engaged by these resolutions. In that engagement, there is a commitment which has to be made initially by Pakistan. When that commitment is carried out, other commitments may arise if circumstances remain the same. Therefore, when you talk about commitments, they must be regarded as contingent commitments. I would like to read what I said on 23 January 1957:

 

"The only things that bind us in regard to Kashmir so far as the Security Council and the world are concerned are these resolutions with all the conditions I have mentioned". [763rd meeting, para. 77].

 

Those last words are very important because in the several statements I made before the Security Council during the last series of meetings I took the view that in the Council's resolutions the assurances given to us by the Council on the basis of which we reached these agreements are matters binding upon the Security Council, and these resolutions cannot be read except in the context of the time and also along with the solemn assurances given on behalf of the Commission. Therefore; we have not resulted from that position. We stand engaged by these resolutions in the back-ground of the time and the assurances that I have given.

 

But no resolutions-either these or the ones that we have not accepted or anything that the Council may pass hereafter will shift my country from the position that we are here on the basis of a complaint about aggression. We are appealing to the Security Council to do its minimum and its elementary duty in pronouncing on this matter and asking the other parties to vacate the aggression. Because under the United Nations. Charter, under which we are here, there cannot be any gains for any country arising from aggression, and no claims can be based upon that.

 

The last time I spoke here, I referred to the fact that whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the very many aspects of this case there is one basic question: How does Pakistan come into Kashmir either physically or politically ? What is the locus standi? Fortunately for me, in his statement, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has a paragraph in which he refers to the locus standi. He says that the locus standi of Pakistan in Kashmir is these two resolutions. At least he limited it to that extent. If it is these two resolutions, they definitely laid down the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the whole State, the right and obligation of India for the external defences and the maintenance of internal order of Jammu and Kashmir and the exclusion of Pakistan from any operation under these resolutions. The Plebiscite Administrator, even if there was a plebiscite, was to have reported to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the Security Council. All Pakistan had to do was to hear the results. It had no place whatsoever in this matter, as was repeated in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan ever so many times and there cannot be any question of the violation or any infringement of the issue of sovereignty either in regard to the Government or the Union as a whole. That is paragraph 8.

 

We come to paragraph 9, where Mr. Jarring says: "My efforts were, therefore, from the beginning directed towards the finding of a solution for the problems that had arisen in connexion with these two resolutions." "The problems that had arisen in connexion with these two resolutions"-these are very carefully chosen words. Those problems are subsequent to the resolutions and, therefore, if necessary, taking all those conditions into account, they are problems that have arisen in connexion with these two resolutions. We shall deal with them, whether it is in connexion with these two resolutions, the accentuation of the aggression and not only the perpetuation of it, the annexation of territory, the rule of terror that goes on in the part of India which is under Pakistan occupation, the denial of civil or any kind of liberty there, the economic degradation the exploitation that goes on on the other side. Those are the conditions that have arisen in connexion with these two resolutions.

 

Then in paragraph 10, Mr. Jarring states: "...I was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite". Again, this is an extremely carefully worded sentence. "I was aware of the grave problems' ' does not say that the Government of India informed him about the grave problems. Awareness is a matter of cognition; it is not necessarily a matter of a stimulus being given to one's brain. Therefore, he speaks of his own knowledge in this matter. We have "that might arise in connexion with", that is alongside, and also "as a result of a plebiscite". I hope the Council will take these words fully into account and deal with this question not merely as a matter of whatever resolutions may have been passed but as a matter involving a big social and political problem affecting the integrity and the unity of a country 376 million people in India and 80 million people in Pakistan, and, what is more, with all the other concomitant circumstances that go with it.

 

In paragraph 11 Mr. Jarring states: "I therefore felt incumbent on me to devise ways and means by which these difficulties could be met or at least be substantially mitigated." Now the last part of this is important, because there is an implication here that these difficulties may be insurmountable; otherwise, why should he say "be substantially mitigated".

 

Paragraph 12 deals not only with Mr. Jarring but with my colleague from Pakistan. Mr. Jarring states here: "Consequently, I made a number of suggestions to this end to both Governments which, for different reasons, however, did not prove to be mutually acceptable." Now my colleague from Pakistan says that Pakistan accepted every suggestion and that once again we rejected everything. This is plain English. It states even as it stands-I am not going into the question of whether we accepted or rejected question that the suggestions. were not mutually acceptable; that is to say, what might have been acceptable to us was not acceptable to them and what might have been acceptable to them was not acceptable to us. Therefore, there is no responsibility or blame laid on one side in this matter. What he means to say is that his attempts at mediation met with failure because he could not find a common ground. There is nothing in this report which lays at the door of the Government of India any intractability of any kind or the rejection of everything that was said. This takes us perhaps to the crux of the present situation in paragraph 12.

 

I do not want any detailed analysis to take away from the general picture which we want to convey in regard to this report. The general picture that emerges from it is that the past President of the Security Council realized-and according to the report so treated the matter-that the first part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 was the place where we stood. Though he has said that the two countries have different views, he indicates that there have been no further movements from that point, The position of the Government of India has always been that part III of the resolution is contingent on part II, and that II is contingent on part I-the whole of the resolution is contingent on all the conditions to which both countries gave adherence at that time and which Pakistan violated at the time and continues to violate now. Therefore, the report before you deals with part I, and we have no intention of travelling beyond that point. No person can come to a tribunal or to a body of this kind and ask for conciliation or equitable treatment until his hands are clean. You cannot demand equity when you cannot give equity. So long as part is not performed, so long as the Pakistan military potential as not been dealt with in terms of part I paragraph B and so long as the campaign of holy war, substantiated and supported by all the nice things which the Foreign Minister said about our people and our Government the other day, is not changed, part I is not performed.

 

In support of the position of Pakistan, Mr. Frank P. Graham has been quoted. First of all, let me say that in connexion with the reports of Mr. Graham, the position of my Government is that they were exploratory. I said so in the beginning, and I shall come back to it a bit later. But however that may be, you will find in Mr. Graham's report mentioned the cease-fire part of it having been implemented. Therefore, if you read the report in its context, what it says is not. that part I has been implemented, but that a cease-fire has been implemented; that is, that a part of part I has been implemented, thanks largely to the desire of the Government of India and of their people not to carry on the bloody war. Therefore, that is all that is implemented. We are today on part I of the resolution, with paragraphs B and E of part I grossly violated.

 

Mr. Jarring refers to our basic position on this matter. This was expressed as recently as yesterday in Tokyo by my Prime Minister. The invasion of our country is not an issue of Kashmir or of Jammu or of any other place, the invasion of our country is the issue of India: the invasion of the Union of India by Pakistan. Mr. Jarring refers to that and quite accurately transmits to the Council that we have said to him that it is incumbent on Pakistan "to vacate the aggression". That is what we told him.

 

However, in paragraph 14 he states: :"the Security Council had properly taken cognizance of the original Indian complaint, and that it was not for me to express myself on the question whether its resolutions on the matter had been adequate or not." This sentence has been interpreted by my colleague as though Mr. Jarring was informing the Council that he had told us that this aggression question had been disposed of. It is nothing of the kind, "Taking cognizance" is a well-known judicial procedure; that is to say, the Council is seized of that fact, the complaint is before it. Until this item is withdrawn from the Security Council, Pakistan still stands charged with the invasion of India. All that this says, therefore, is that cognizance of that complaint had been taken. Mr. Jarring, having limited his terms of reference to the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, did not want to go any further than the texts of those resolutions and the various provisions contained therein.

 

However, we go further and say that anyone who strictly and fully adheres to those resolutions would not only by implication but by logical sequence have to admit the fact of aggression. I do not want to cover the ground which I covered last time about what the resolutions say. If the members of the Security Council will refresh their memories on what has been said in the past, they will see that this resolution, if it says anything at all, accepts the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, not of the State, but of the Government, and also of the right and the obligation of India to defend her external frontiers and to assist the local authorities. What is more, we shall not do anything which alters this question of sovereignty, either in favour of Pakistan or of anybody else. Everywhere the reference is only to the Government of India or to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, which has to appoint the plebiscite administrator-nobody else can appoint him. It is India which is still responsible for law and order. We alone can be called upon to arrange for the guarding of the trade routes and the garrisoning of the frontiers, which are under Pakistan occupation. Therefore, the whole of this resolution is based on the integrity of Kashmir as part of the Union, and the acceptance by implication of a violation of Union territory,. Therefore, when he says it had "taken cognizance", I am entitled quite legitimately to interpret this to mean that the Security Council knows that a country has been invaded, and that it was not for him" to sars hither the remedies which the Council has prescribed or the course of action which it has followed "had been adequate or not''. Therefore, it is not merely a question of another interpretation: I think it is the natural interpretation of this resolution. It is an ordinary rule of law that when you have a document, you interpret it in its natural meaning. Therefore, we totally deny that this report contains anything to justify the interpretation of my colleague from Pakistan that the past President of the Security Council told the India Government that the question of invasion had been disposed of-now they have gone further and I will come to that in a moment-and that we were the aggressors and the occupies of this territory. It reminds me of a story in my part of the world when I was a child. A burglar entered a house, and the neighbours and householders tried to catch him. He resorted to a stratagem. They were all running after the burglar and he burar joined the crowd and cried "Stop. thief". That is the way, to call the other person the aggressor, is the best way to deal with this business. I have never heard anything so fantastic. It has never been suggested in the whole course of our discussions here in the last ten years that the Government of India, its troops, its authority or the State Government of Kashmir-which is part of the federal structure of India-were there on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir by anything in the way either of aggressive or occupational action.

 

It has been argued that other determinations and certain ratifications will be necessary. There have been explorations in this way. In fact, the Commission says in one place that the whole of this question has been considered by the Security Council with the knowledge and with the circumstance that Indian troops were in Kashmir, and I hope that no member of the Security Council, least of all the representative of the United Kingdom, would say in view of its own past history that it was not the bounden duty of the Government of India to go to the State of Jammu and Kashmir when it was invaded, even if it had dot acceded. That has been the practice for the last 150 years, since the time of Lord Dalhousie, when that gentleman sent over what were called four regiments of Indian troops to the State of Hyderabad under a system called

"subsidiary arrangement", which we were foolish enough to withdraw too quickly. It was laid down at that time that if any part of the Indian territory which was then ruled by the Asian Princes, were ever subject either to internal difficulties or external aggression, then the Government of India would at once go to their rescue.

 

We have tried to avoid unnecessary legal and constitutional issues in this way. There is a difference between India and Pakistan in relation to the Indian Independence Act. are the successor State, the Government of India. We are the successors of "Bharat-Desha". The British authority in India was derived from the Mogul Emperor on the one hand, when it succeeded, and from acts of the British Parliament and by right of conquest on the other. We became the inheritors of the right of conquest; having brought the conquest to a termination, we took over all the obligations arising from the statutory position stated by the British Parliament and well took over all those common laws and personal rights arising both from the Diwani of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa and the successor to the Mogul Empire. We are the legitimate successor of British authority in India. We have taken over all the liabilities. We are bound by the treaties, including the treaties signed with certain sultanates of the Persian Gulf by the British Government. So if you must take the rough you must take the smooth as well. We are the successor State, and therefore, even without any accession, we had the obligation to go to the rescue of these people whose lands were being pillaged and plundered and whose women were being raped and earned off to slave markets. At that time, a report says, neither property nor young women were left to Baramulla after it was sacked.

 

That takes us to the position that the past President of the Security Council says that he finds himself on our side, saying that part I had not been implemented, and he made this point presumably by inference. I am not starting a private conversation with Pakistan, which says it has been implemented- We have stated our case here, and what is more Pakistan has quoted part of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan out of context, to say that it has been implemented, and also part of the resolution to suggest that the Government of India has more forces there than at the time of the cease-fire. In this connexion, the Commission made the allegation that it could not be said that either side has complied with the letter of Part 1, paragraph B of the resolution of 13 August 1948. We at once took up this matter with the Commission through the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations. We explained our position and we have heard no more about it afterwards. The rest of the Commission's report from that time onward is all about the further occupation of Pakistan and the question. of the accentuation of troops. From the day since we sent that telegram, we have never heard from any organ of the Security Council about the accentuation of our troops. I am the Defence Minister of my country, and I happen to know what troops we have there. We are far below our strength. permitted even under this arrangement.

 

The telegram we sent to them said that the General Staff had categorically denied that the military potential of the forces had in any way been increased since the cease-fire. That was the British Commander in India there at that time. On the contrary, it had been reduced, inasmuch as all combat aircraft of the Royal Indian Air Force, as it was then, had been withdrawn from the State. The Commission's view was apparently based on the allegation made on 7 July 1949 by the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army to United Nations observers. This allegation was passed on to the Headquarters of the Fifth Corps which on 15 October 1949 communicated a correct statement of the strength to United Nations observers in Headquarters. The Westin Commander also sent a copy of the statement on the same date to the Headquarters of the observer team. We would say, therefore, that so far as we are concerned this was the end of the matter. In its report, the Commission gave no evidence to show any violation of part 1 by India, woile there is a definite charge against Pakistan. That is contained in paragraph 225 of the Commission's third interim report.

 

Therefore, to suggest that there is an equal amount of violation is entirely wrong. First of all, we cannot violate our own territory. We cannot be foreigners in our own country. If we station troops in our own land, that is not a violation of our territory. The basic mistake in this is that my colleague from Pakistan appears, after having agreed to what is locus and, to proceed from the position that he has hereby some rights and that other people do not have them, or that Kashmir is a kind of no-man's land to be adjudicated upon or to be seized upon by marauders either from Pakistan or Trans-Pakistan. That is not the position. But anyway, the past President of the Security Council, with the neutrality that is built into him, said that he had heard both sides, one contending that part I of the resolution had not been carried out while the other affirmed that it had. Part I, in so far as the extension of military potential is concerned-and here, when we speak about the accentuation of military potential the key day. It is 20 August 1948, the date when we accepted the resolution of 13 August 1948. We received assurances from the Commission at that time that it was on that basis, and it is all in the resolution. The key date is 20 August 1948. If there has been an accentuation of strength either since 13 August 1948, there is a violation of part I, paragraph B, of the Commission's resolution.

 

Thus Mr. Jarring appeared to call this a deadlock. We do not regard this as a deadlock. When your country is invaded from outside, we do not call it a deadlock. It is an invasion. But probably the deadlock was in the process which he was following, and therefore it was suggested that now I am dealing only with part 1, paragraph B of the resolution; I had better finish the whole of that, before I come to the question of arbitration in regard to paragraph B-what we have to see is either more troops, more equipment, more political organization and more of all those things that are in excess of what existed on 20 August 1948, even which, by legal rights, should not be there. Our answer to that will come out when we deal with arbitration..

 

Then there is paragraph E of part I of this resolution in regard to what we call the "hatred campaign". In that We have always paragraphs, the parties are asked to create the condition whereby further negotiation is made possible. maintained in this Council since 1949, when Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar argued this case after the Attorney-General of India did so, then Sir Benegal Rau and then Mrs. Pandit did so, that there has been a continuous and inveterate campaign of holy war, hatred propaganda against us, and what is more, the representatives of Pakistan on none of these occasions have refrained from uttering threats even in this Council and calling us names, But since they were our countrymen ten years ago and the majority of the people are still friends of ours, we take it as it comes.

 

The answer from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan is that all we were asked to do under part I. paragraph E is to make an appeal. Now surely that cannot be taken seriously. Does it mean that the Pakistan press, or the Pakistan Prime Minister, or the public security office, had to say: "Now, you should stop fighting-but do what you like" ? Is that the idea-that they only had to make an appeal? Apart from the fact that that contention does not stand on its merits, there are many resolutions of the Security Council-some of which we have not accepted-which indicate the contrary.

 

Thus, in operative paragraph 8 of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, the Council called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan:

 

"to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement." [S/2017/Rev. 1.]

 

Therefore, the injunction of the Security Council was not merely that the Governments express a desire, but that they take active measures in this matter. And it is our contention indeed, these are the facts-that not only have those measures not been taken but that, as I shall show in the course of the day and as I have shown before, there have been a great many statements by responsible persons in Pakistan, there have been military efforts and there has been psychological warfare all contrary to this injunction.

 

In a resolution on 10 November 1951, the Security Council also expressed its gratification with :

 

"the declared agreement of the two parties to those parts of Mr. Graham's proposals which reaffirm their determination to work for a peaceful settlement (and) their will to observe the cease-fire agreement." [S/2392.]

 

It is paragraph 28 of Mr. Graham's third report that has been cited as part of the evidence that Part I has been performed. And it may, on the surface of it, be taken to mean that Part I has been performed. But I would ask the Security Council to read this very carefully. This is what paragraph 28 says:

 

"Part I deals with the cease-fire. The primary objective of the UNCIP during the first stage of its activities was to obtain a suspension of hostilities." That is entirely true. "The cease-fire was agreed upon between the two parties and made effective on 1 January 1949 and, as a completion of this part of the resolution"-it does not say Part I of the resolution, but the cease-fire element of the resolution, and it is made clear by the subsequent words "a cease-fire line was agreed upon between the two Governments under the auspices of the UNCIP in the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. The line was demarcated subsequently on the ground." [S/2611 and Corr. I, para. 28.]

 

Mr. Graham's mention of part I is qualified by two or three phrases here. First of all, there is the reference to the Karachi Agreement. That Agreement concerned the cease-fire lines, the suspension of hostilities-not paragraphs E and B, of part I of the resolution, which are now in convention. Therefore, we say that it is very wrong to cite paragraph 28 of Mr. Graham's third report as evidence of performance Mr. Graham never informed us at any time that part I had been performing. It is quite true that there were exploratory conversations. We had always discussed parts I and II together. because part II could not be performed without part I. But Mr. Graham, who succeeded the Commission, and, to all intents and purposes, was the Commission, never informed the Government of India that part I had been performing. If he had so informed the Government of India, we would have placed before him the evidence of the Commission itself, because no subsequent Commissioner can repudiate the findings of fact of the Commission without producing new evidence and convincing us. Therefore, paragraph 28 of Mr. Graham's report refers only to the silencing of the guns and we have carried that out as faithfully as we can.

 

Mr. Jarring has suggested that, in view of the differences that exist in regard to whether part I has or has not been performed, it might be possible to break the deadlock by submitting it to "arbitration". I use the word "arbitration" in quotes because that is a very important matter from our point of view-not only with regard to Kashmir but with regard to our whole standing in the world of a nation.

 

But I would like the Council to read paragraphs 17 and 18 of Mr. Jarring's report (S/3281), and see exactly what they mean. Paragraph 17 reads:

 

"In substance my suggestion to the two Governments did not envisage simple arbitration"-now, is it arbitration or is it not arbitration ?-"but the arbitrator or arbitrators would also be empowered, in case they found that the implementation had been incomplete, to indicate to the parties which measures should be taken to arrive at a full implementation."

 

This may be arbitrage, it may be mediation, it may be an award-but it is not arbitration.

 

Paragraph 17 then continues: "It was also envisaged that in the latter case after a given time-limit the arbitrator or arbitrators would determine whether the given indications had been followed and implementation did obtain."

 

Therefore, on the one hand, it says that it is not simple arbitration, it does not go so far; but, on the other hand, it asks this body whoever it is-to prescribe measures, to inspect, to judge whether performance has taken place, to prescribe the time, the remedial methods, all of which goes far beyond what any arbitral tribunal can do in a case of fact-finding.

 

The next paragraph is the only place where I have any complaint about Mr. Jarring. He says:

 

"Being aware of the earlier negative attitude of the Government of India on the question of arbitration with relation to the Kashmir problem as a whole..."

 

Our attitude in regard to arbitration on this issue has never been negative. It is extremely positive: that this is not amenable to arbitration. And I think it is unjust, so far as we are concerned, to regard the matter in this way-and I will give you the reason why, on very good authority. (I have left one empty seat, it will be noted, between Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, and myself, because we are going to quote a good many American sources) I repeat that our attitude on this matter has been very positive: we have not at any time agreed to arbitration on this issue. And I will give you the reasons why. It was not because of any objection to arbitration as a procedure where it was applicable.

 

In paragraph 18 of his report, after the words I have already quoted. Mr. Jarring goes on :

 

"I made it a point to explain to it that I was not suggesting anything of that nature"-that is, anything of the nature of arbitration-"and that what I was proposing, while termed arbitration, in all likelihood would be more in the nature of a determination of certain facts which, in the Indian view, were incontrovertible," I respectfully suggest that there is some difficulty about reconciling paragraphs 17 and 8 because, while paragraph 17 says that there should not be "simple arbitration", it says that the fact-finder should find out the facts and find out why implementation has not taken place, prescribe a time to start the procedures, and give an award. That is paragraph 17. says. It goes further than arbitration. Paragraph 18 pulls it back and says: Not so much arbitration let somebody go and find out whether it is true or not. Therefore, there is a slight contradiction, arising from the general complexities of this case, which itself shows that this matter cannot be referred to arbitration. Even the terms of reference cannot be put down.

 

Paragraph 18 of Mr. Jarrings report continues:

 

"In addition, the procedure suggested might lead to an improvement in India-Pakistan relations in general, a development which I assumed could not be unwelcome. to either of the two countries".

 

The latter part of that sentence is correct as far as we are concerned, but the first part must be judged by the facts.

 

It is said that this arbitration proposal was put to us when Mr. Jarring came to India-well, perhaps I should not go into that-obviously it was put to us, on the face of it, after consultation with Pakistan, and from the very beginning we had explained our position in regard to this: there was no question of our agreeing to arbitration on this issue. And the reasons have been set out. In paragraph 19, Mr. Jarring says that the Government of India felt that:

 

"...the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration, because such procedure would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory". May I halt here and deal with this question of arbitration in full ? One arbitrates normally on things that are not obvious; one does not arbitrate on the obvious. It was obvious to anybody who came to India at that time and stayed for three weeks that there was a campaign of hatred going on against us. But why go to India? The speech of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. at the very meeting from which this resolution arose, was full of threats of violence, of threats of invasion, of what would befall us from the tribal people, and things of that character. There can be no doubt, then, with regard to the hatred propaganda that has been going on. What is more, while during the last ten years we have cited facts and made complaints about this at every meeting, Pakistan has made no complaints about our carrying on psychological warfare against them. It might be said to their credit that in this matter they have stuck to the facts. The first point, therefore, is that one does not arbitrate on the obvious.

 

I come now to the second point. Mr. Gunnar Jarring has told us, quite rightly, that he proceeded in this matter on the basis of the resolutions, which are the common ground. Now, the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 lay down specific machinery for the determination of the facts. The Commission, under these resolutions, must report to the parties whether or not implementation has taken place. Therefore, if the Government of India had agreed to any other machinery-arbitration, mediation, good offices, a prayer meeting, or anything else that would have meant going outside the terms of the resolutions. The Government of India had no intention of committing itself any further on any of these matters, beyond the commitments already undertaken. What we were asked to do was to accept a procedure which was outside the terms of the resolutions.

 

It is a rule of international law that when there is a specific agreement with regard to the resolving of disputes, on any other issue, between countries, then general international law cannot be applied. Pakistan is a party to that rule, just as the United Kingdom, France and other countries are parties. There has been a declaration to the effect that when there is a specific agreement with regard to the way in which a particular problem shall be dealt with, a general rule of law cannot be invoked.

 

That is the second reason why we would not wish to go beyond the confines of these two resolutions. They provide the machinery-and, what is more, that machinery has performed its function; in various reports, the Commission for India and Pakistan has pointed out, as I shall show in a moment, that there has been an increase of potential, that the necessary atmosphere does not prevail, and so forth. Thus, the Commission has already made findings on this matter. Our submission is that these facts are self-evident, from the written word of the Commission, from the facts that obtain in India, from statements made here in the Security Council, from the record of the entire Pakistan Press, and from declarations made by Pakistan officials in positions of responsibility.

 

I now turn to the position of countries in the United Nations with regard to arbitration. Mr. Jarring has said that arbitration might lead to an improvement in India-Pakistan relations. But we have tried arbitration on various matters and our experience has been that we are pushed from pillar to post and we get nowhere. We make a concession, but that is regarded as only a jumping-off ground for further concessions. I might say here that all the very good civil servants we train in India are available for this purpose.

 

The fourth reason why we could not accept arbitration is the reason of principle. In this connexion, may I say with great respect to the United Kingdom representative that my Government does not accept the view on arbitration expressed by a gentleman named Henry John Temple-later the third Viscount Palmerston-who was Secretary of State in 1846. His views on arbitration are very refreshing but we do not adopt them; he lived in the days of rough and ready methods. This is what is said in this respect:

 

"Even with control of the choice of arbitrators, a British Foreign Secretary was found to observe in Parliament in 1849 that arbitration was a very dangerous course for his country to take, in view of the envy and jealousy of British possessions and commerce, which would make it very difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters".

 

Now, I have said that I do not accept this position: I think that there are people in the world who can be enlisted for arbitration purposes, and this must have been true in that time as well. I do, however, take the view which, as recently as 1948, the United States took in what is called the interhandel Case. This was a case between the Swiss Government and the United States Government in respect of a company registered in Baltimore. There were articles of registration, and so forth. On the face of it, the Swiss had a good case for arbitration, but the United States Government stood solidly on the ground that arbitration was not permissible because the matter concerned the honour and integrity of the United States and nothing concerning the honour and integrity of the United States was capable of arbitration. In addition, certain legal principles and principles of international behaviour were brought out in that case. The United States also put forward the view that, apart from the question of honour and integrity, no State could, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States to mediation, arbitration or any other kind of specific settlement.

 

Furthermore, the United States said that its vital interests were involved in the case, and anything concerning a State's vital interests was not subject to arbitration. Now, when we examine this matter of vital interests, we again come to an American authority, the great international lawyer, Professor Hyde. This is what Professor Hyde says:

 

"Vital interests are a term of diplomacy: they are not a term of law. Laws know no vital interests: they know only legal interests. The term 'vital interests', however current in diplomacy, has no special significance in law. Doubtless its use in arbitration conventions is for the purpose of excluding generally from their operation controversies involving matters of grave national concern"-and what can be graver for us than the integrity of our country and its violation by a neighbour?-"Those of seemingly political aspect, regardless of whether they are really susceptible to adjustment by arbitration by reason of their inherent character, are likely to be regarded as of such a kind."

 

There is another instance where the United States. Government was involved with the Government of Colombia, but, while the argument may be in my favour, I do not wish to qnote that case.

 

In the Interchange case, the United States summarized its position as follows:

 

"If the subject matter of the dispute is very clear and not at all obscure"-and that is certainly the case in the present situation"-and the views of the Government concerned are conveyed fully to that effect, resort to conciliation would be unproductive".

 

There are various other reasons why arbitration would not be permissible in the present matter. Once we entered this field, we would be allowing the sovereignty of our country to be determined by arbitrators-who knew very little about it and what is more, would be arbitrating on a matter which was not arbitrable. That takes me to the basic position on arbitration.

 

Under an international practice which has been subscribed to by many countries presented here-such as the United States, Australia, Sweden and France-and by many other countries not represented here, such as Norway, only juridical questions can be subjected to arbitration. In view of the provisions concerning the implementation of parts I and II of the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948, the submission of the question to arbitration could not by custom be agreed to by a State. That is the main point, and I have raised it before. Now, what Mr. Jarring suggests in paragraph 17 of his report is arbitration. the appointment of an arbitrator-although, under paragraph 18 the arbitrator is called only a fact-finder. A time limit is even established for the arbitration. There is no case in the whole gamut of international law-and I have carefully looked into this question where a matter so wide and so intimately connected with a country's integrity, a matter involving so much complexity, has been subjected to arbitration.

 

I think the definition of this is well set out in the General Treaty Inter-American Arbitration (1929). It definitely lays down what is clear to everybody, that arbitration is merely a process of judicial settlement. The difference between arbitration and court procedure is that the procedure of arbitration is less formal. Only a justiciable or juridical matter can be subject to arbitration, as was stated in the Treaty arbitration 1929. The same thing came out in the proceedings of The Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907 when, speaking about international arbitration, it was stated :

 

"A method of solving international conflicts by the application of the rule of law-a veritable judicial institution between States-arbitration is a juridical instrument of peace and progress since it gives an effective sanction to the existing law and by the establishment of jurisprudence contributes to the formulation of the law of the future."

 

I read this out because arbitration is possible only if there are rules. If it is a judicial matter, then rules are laid down and only then can one arbitrate; otherwise it would be a gamble, it would not be arbitration. If the Council should decide to discuss this matter further, it is the intention of my Government to present the full case on arbitration, Just because it sounds nice and a party concerned, for very good, sound and historical reasons, refuses to go into it, it should not be regarded as taking a non possumus or an uncooperative attitude. It goes against the whole conception of the rule of law and all the principles of international law.

 

What is more, it sets this question out of its context. We came here under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. We did not come here to ask the Security Council to decide who has the title to Kashmir. The Security Council is not competent under the Charter to judge any legal or political question. We came here for conciliation in order to get an aggression vacated. The Security Council is not seized of this matter under any other section of the Charter, and no other section provides for the adjudication of a territory or for a decision on legal questions. Therefore, since it concerns our sovereignty, our honour, our integrity, our vital interests and our having to go beyond commitments which we have already undertaken a course which, in our experience of the other party concerned, would not lead anywhere, and, what is more, since it merely draws a red herring across the whole of this. business creates unsettlement in a country for no reason, we could not, much as we would have liked to, accept what Mr. Jarring said. We could not accept it and we regarded the matter as closed. That is our position, because it is fundamental to arbitration that the two sides must agree. If one side does not agree, there cannot be arbitration.

 

This is not the first time this has been brought up. The question of arbitration has come before the Security Council time after time since 1950. The Commission tried it, and various other people have tried it, and we gave the same answers every time. That is our position with regard to arbitration.

 

That concludes for the present, unless a new matter should be raised, our observations regarding the Jarring report, except to refer to paragraph 20 to 22, in which Mr. Jarring, not after any probing from us, but naturally after looking at the situation in the light of the proceedings of the Security Council, stated:

 

"In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as I have during the period just ended, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connexion with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia". (S/3821, para. 20.)

 

It is not the intention of my Government to drag in other international approaches and questions in this matter so as to create more difficulties, but the paragraph is pregnant with meaning, and that is one of the main parts of the argument we have presented to the Security Council on previous occasions. While we did not argue that part of it too much at the time, it is quite apparent that there have been changed conditions, and while it is not necessary to quote legal doctrines in this matter; the doctrine of law that makes all obligations, even treaty obligations, dependent upon changed conditions has held good ever since the time of the ancient international mores when mariners sailing the seas had no written law, but only custom. Changed conditions are always taken into account.

 

Paragraph 21 relates to the large number of instances I gave to the Security Council at the last series of meetings; remedies of this kind had been proposed, but in only one case did they succeed, a rather regrettable case because the time had lapsed.

 

We are happy that Mr. Jarring's report, so far as we are concerned that is all I can speak about-states that we have been co-operative and that we have always told him that we are open to settle any matter peacefully and by negotiation. But the sovereignty and the unity of a country, its integrity, its security under present conditions are not matters that are arguable. With the reservation that I made some time ago, namely, that we can return to this matter if, as a result of the Council's discussions, any further issues should arise, or if we have in any way misinterpreted Mr. Jarring-which we may have done-we are open to conviction.

 

Now I come to the second part of the statement I wished to make. I had hoped that I would be able to finish at this meeting, but I shall not be able to. The second part of my presentation today deals, much to my sadness, with the allegations and the misstatements by my colleague from Pakistan. I want to assure you, Mr. President, that I do not intend to use the same kind of phraseology. It is not usually expected at this table that two countries, in diplomatic relationship with each other, sister States of the Commonwealth, and where, ten years ago, the citizens were citizens of the same country, would accuse each other of bad faith and dishonesty, of mala fide intentions and, what is more, of point-blank dishonesty. That is not our record with Pakistan and I think that in their private minds they know it.

 

We deeply regret this matter because I have read in the Indian newspapers of the amount of disappointment felt in some quarters, the amount of ill feeling that Mr. Noon's phraseology has created in India, and it has been a matter of great sorrow to us because we do not want, even in Kashmir, to aggravate the difficulties. We have to live together on the same continent.

 

The first obvious statement of bad faith was that the Government of India in its so-called tactics, from the time Commission was appointed, has been dominated by one idea, that is the avoidance of a plebiscite. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan himself stated that until 1953. when we were discussing mathematics and when we were going into all these explorations of various kinds, there was no impediment to a plebiscite except the determination of the quantum of forces; that is to say, that we were at that time, provided that the conditions were satisfied, prepared to go on with it. Therefore, whatever will be done in the interests of our country, in the interests of truth and the pursuance of these resolutions, should not be interpreted as an exhibition of bad faith. If we wanted to avoid a plebiscite under the terms that have been referred to, it would not be necessary for us to go roundabout in that way. After all, a country that is a sovereign State can perform certain actions or not, and it is not necessary to put all the members of the Security Council to all this trouble for that simple process. All through the years we have had many conferences and we have many concessions. What is more, when the resolution of 13 August 1948 was passed, there was no question of there being any number of troops remaining in the territory now occupied by Pakistan. The whole place was to be vacated.

 

We were told the following:

 

"The rejection of this suggestion for arbitration, not on the future of Kashmir, but even on the limited question of the past or present fulfilment of an existing agreement, clearly exposes India's bad faith." para. 40.) (791st meeting,

 

I think it was Lord Acton who said: "The thought of man is not triable, nor are motives of nations", I very deeply regret that there should have been, in the presence of all of you, without any protest whatsoever, this accusation of the bad faith of a country which, to the best of its ability, tries to discharge its international obligations in spite of very grave responsibilities.

 

The statement goes on :

 

"When I compare these professed adherences to the international agreements with the practical and continued defiance of these agreements by a responsible Government, I am left astonned." [Ibid., para 42.]

 

There again, I have no desire to enter into rhetorical repartee against another State, which can only create irritation and nothing else. The Government of India stands by its record, carries out its international obligations and, what is more, carries more international burdens than a good many other countries. Therefore, there is nothing here that we have defied. The defiance is on the part of Pakistan, and if it were defiance alone, it would not be so bad, but the deliance has arisen from concealment. And I say that no country which has concealed facts, which has misled the Security Council, which is guilty of improper misstatements, has the right to ask for remedies. Because where does this all begin from? We came here and said that we were

invaded. And the answer was: "We are not there". The Commission says that in June or so the Pakistan Foreign Minister said: "We have sent some troops over there in order to protect our Eastern borders and to prevent them. from coming to the Punjab area"-and that is the first time. they heard about it.

 

But the troops were there, before the Commission was appointed. The troops were there, when the complaint was here. The troops were there when the Pakistan Foreign Minister or other representative denied they were there. On the one hand, we have the statement of the position taken up. that they are there by right, and the other statement that they were not there. Here is a country which has concealed facts. in that way, and the whole of the case has been vitiated by concealment. In the first instance there has been the admission. of aggression or a claim that they have the right to go there. There was no claim by Pakistan that they had a right to go there with their armies. I believe that Mr. Jinnah at one time ordered the British Commander-in-Chief to wage war against us. The latter had more common sense than to do it.

 

Then there is another statement which we deeply regret:

 

"The people of Kashmir are being cheated of the fruits of freedom promised to them by the Security Council. through India being continuously allowed to dishonour its agreements," (79st meeting, para. 46.)

 

Who is cheated of the fruits of freedom? There have been two elections in Kashmir, the last one only a few months ago. It is easy enough, without any facts, to speak of a police state, of rigged elections and what not. These elections are conducted in India under rules and conditions which would do honour to any country..

 

What are the facts? In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, there are two provinces. In Jammu there are thirty seats and in Kashmir there are forty-five seats. Out of the seventy-five seats, thirty-two seats were contested. Out of the contested seats, twenty-eight were won. The number of uncontested seats was forty-three. For twenty-one seats no other party candidates came forward. The candidates of All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference have nursed their constituencies for years, and nobody else had a ghost of a chance. In ten constituencies the opposition withdrew. No constituencies the opposition withdrew. No constitutional party can put up a puppet opposition and say "you fight me", like a shadow boxer. In twelve cases the nomination papers were rejected by the Election Commissioners mostly because people. were under age or did not come under the constitutional procedures that were necessary.

 

But it is not sufficient to say that they were conteste 1. Although the National Conference won twenty-eight or thirty two seats, they had to fight very hard for it. I do not want to wear the Council with the figures, but I have them here. The polling figures show that they were very narrow victories. There were very hard contested battles and, what is more, where there was any dispute about any legal procedures in this matter, it went before an election tribunal. There were these contests and a number of opposition parties, and a free Press in Kashmir; what is more, last year 70,000 visitors went into Kashmir, of whom 7,00 were non-Indians. You cannot shut a country like that.

 

Therefore, it is not a question of our denying any freedom to anybody. Freedom is denied on the other side, where there are no elections, where there is no freedom, where there is no free Press, and where a large number of people are in prison. We have twenty-three people under detention in Kashmir today under the security laws. They are being released fast and I hope that all of them will be released soon. We have made no secret of it and it is largely because of the security of the State. But there is no police rule in our part of the world, while in Pakistan as a whole there have been no general elections, and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir there is no freedom of expression of any kind.

 

Who is preventing these people from having elections? They have their place in the Parliament of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of which is the only sovereign body recognized by the Security Council. But they are not able to fight for those seats because they are held down under occupation. Therefore, the real suppression does not come from us, but it comes from the other side. We are not cheating them of the fruits of freedom. The fruits of freedom can be seen in the part of Kashmir where it is possible for a free Government to function and to have the benefits of the larger organization of the Union of India by the development of the five-year plan, by greater supply of food and of irrigation, by advancement of education, by the building of universities and schools and colleges, and by people enlisting in social service in a large way. There is no unemployment in our part of that State, and therefore fruits of freedom are quite apparent to any visitor that goes to Kashmir.

 

But on the other hand, in "Azad', Kashmir during the last three years, fifteen newspapers have been suppressed; the entry of some others has been banned; police censorship is imposed. New charges are levelled; no cases are launched in court and no sections of any Act, emergency or ordinary, substantiate any action. Had such a thing happened in Pakistan, these orders could have been challenged in a court of law. But it has not been possible in so-called "Azad '' Kashmir. For this purpose "Azad" Kashmir is not part of Pakistan. There is no legislative assembly in "Azad'' Kashmir; no one can criticize the Government; there have been various changes and whenever the puppet administrator is not suitable, he gets pushed out and another man is brought in.

 

There are a large number of statements by people who are responsible men and who have held responsible positions in "Azad'' Kashmir. Some of them have now escaped to India under conditions of terror; two of them because they dared to speak to two members of the British Parliament who are avowedly pro-Pakistan. They still spoke the truth when they came over to India and after some time we allowed them to stay there. I will not beary the Council with all the statements. We have not deprived anybody of any freedom.

 

Now we come to the substance of the matter, and that is with regard to the present position. There is another serious charge that is made and that is with regard to a military adventure. The impression is sought to be presented that we are a country which is arming against Pakistan. We could not arm against Pakistan if we wished, because Pakistan is part of big military alliances. There is no such sentiment in India, and the Indian Parliament would not agree to large scale military adventure. It keeps its army more or less in good condition.

 

But we are told that the defense expenditure of India is over 140 percent of Pakistan's expenditure (791st meeting, para. 45). Fortunately, the United Nations publishes these figures. The Pakistan budget in 1957-58, capital expenditure and current expenditure, comes to 3,500 million. Pakistan rupees, which comes to about $700 million. Pakistan defence expenditure is 1,120 millions rupees, or $221 million. That is from the Pakistan budget itself. Add to that the United States aid. The United States aid, as spoken of by Pakistan, is 40 percent of the Pakistan budget.

 

Accepting that as a statement, the total would come to very much more than the defence expenditure of India. The expenditure of India for this year's defence budget, which is higher than last year's on account of replenishments, is 2,520 million rupees or $504 million. Our defence expenditure is 38 percent of our national budget, if you do not include the railway budget of India. But if you do include the railway budget of India, it is 29 per cent. The railway budget is 10 percent of the national expenditure, taking the State of Jammu and Kashmir as well.

 

So for a country which is five times the size of Pakistan with a population nearly five times that of Pakistan we have an army which is relatively very much smaller than that of Pakistan. Our defence expenditure is not comparable to that of Pakistan. The latest figures I saw show that United States military aid from January to June of 1956 came to $97 million. Anyway, there is Pakistan's statement that it amounts to 40 percent of their budget. If those figures are to be taken, then we get a figure which is very much higher.

 

Therefore the aggregate military expenditure, in addition to what goes in kind, which cannot always be calculated in the case of military aid, is considerably higher than that of India. Now, it is not the function of the Security Council-it may not be even of the Disarmament Commission-to go into the question of the relative armaments of these countries except in so far as it bears on this proposition: Are we preparing for war or are we a threat to anybody? A large corpus like the body of India, with a small army, with means of communication being what they are and with our considerable preoccupation with our countryside-that is our main interest, not international or military affairs-does not find it possible to do this.

 

That takes us to the question of part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948. I have argued that paragraph B has not been honoured by Pakistan. I would like the Security Council to be seized of the problem, as it is part of the Council records.

 

When the Commission passed these resolutions and afterwards talked to us about them, it was not aware of the strength of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. It was not aware of the Azad Kashmir armies. The Commission assured us that there could be no recognition of the "Azad'' Kashmir Government. They were to be called local authorities. There were not to be armed bands of any kind in the territory evacuated. by Pakistan. At the time the resolution was passed, Pakistan denied that these vast armies existed. The Commission said that, if it had known that these "Azad '' Kashmir armies existed, it would have taken a different view on the matter.. Indeed, the Commission goes on to say:

 

"There is, indeed, no doubt that the "Azad" forces now have a strength which changes the military situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies."

 

Any idea that those "Azad" forces are just boy scouts in uniform or something like that is a great mistake. They rank with the front-line forces of the Pakistan army. Thanks. to foreign aid, they are able to displace a considerable amount of former British equipment.

 

These "Azad" forces, which formerly consisted of thirty five battalions and are now streamlined to twenty battalions. I have all the details of them here-have artillery, tanks and armoured regiments of various kinds. They are really first class troops. They have had compliments paid to them by the Prime Minister of Pakistan himself. The streamlining of the thirty-five "Azad" battalions to twenty battalions was only a matter of division, not a contradiction of the aggregate force. These forces are a violation of the resolution, that is to say, the resolution was passed in the context that the territory of India had been invaded and the Pakistan forces had to withdraw. It definitely says here that by Pakistan forces are meant not only the army, but forces regular and irregular, Pakistan nationals of all kinds. That is with regard to "Azad" Kashmir.

 

The Security Council has heard a great deal about "Azad" Kashmir, which is near the Punjab area of Kashmir. It is well populated. But there is another part of Kashmir which is under Pakistan occupation. It is roughly called the northern areas. Here new airfields and new roads are being built and all the panoply of military preparations takes place.

 

This matter was raised by Mr. Logano, the Chairman of the Commission. At that time, the view of the Commission was that Pakistan had no hold on this area at all. It had no troops. Therefore, not having any, they said this matter could be discussed afterwards. But the question of the sovereignty of India in regard to those places was not challenged at all.

 

At that time, Pakistan had no armies in the Northern areas, either in Gilgit or in Baltistan. Now, in all the north western areas, including Chitral, there are the Northern troops, the Gilgit Scouts, the irregulars of various kinds, and this place is terribly well armed.

 

There is no constitutional or legal reason of any kind for this part of the territory to be the territory of Pakistan. In regard to "Azad'' Kashmir, the Foreign Minister has stated that it does not come under section 203 of the Pakistan Constitution (791st meeting para. 59). Well, this is not a court of law, otherwise I could argue the other way. But so far as the northern areas are concerned, there has been no denial. What is more, Sir Owen Dixon, who in no way can be considered as biased in favour of India, said that in this place the whole administration was appointed by Pakistan, and there is no question of it being anything different. Therefore, contrary to all undertakings behind the back of the Security Council, and disregarding every consideration of honesty and international law, Pakistan raised these troops, annexed these territories and, we are sorry to say, accepted accession from a local commander who was not a Kashmiri or an Indian of any kind, but who was in charge of the Gilgit Scouts. He was a military adventurer who made haste to offer accession. That accession is no accession, because Gilgit is not a State. The only State is Jammu and Kashmir. So in all these Pakistan occupied areas today there are vast numbers of troops and all the military accoutrements of airfields. There is no answer to say that it was intended to take the quotas off, because even with the quotas off, the airfields were not permitted, and all that was to exist were local authorities and nothing else. Therefore, in regard to the increase of military potential, we not only say, but we state as a matter of fact that the enormous military potential that exists in "Azad'' Kashmir is a threat not only to the part of Kashmir which we still are able to administer, but to the whole of India. These are our frontiers, and we are in no way disposed to trifle with this matter. There are these twenty battalions, equipped with the most modern weapons, including the latest of the anti-tank weapons that have been supplied to the Pakistan army. I do not want to go into the details because I have no desire to complicate this matter.

 

In dealing with this military business, I would assure the representative of the United States that the Government of India accepts the statement of the United States that the military aid given to Pakistan is not for the purpose of hostile action towards India and is unconnected with Indo-Pakistan relations. We fully accept that so far as the donor is concerned. But so far as the done is concerned, we cannot accept it because of a large number of statements by the present Pakistan Prime Minister, the previous Prime Minister and other statesmen which definitely and categorically say that the membership of Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact, the military arrangements, the aid promised by Turkey as against India and the relations between Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan are all intended to deal with India. This is what a former Prime Minister, Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, said ;

 

"The hope of resolving the Kashmir tangle to Pakistan's satisfaction through the acquisition of military strength by joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO is the very raison d'etre for Pakistan to remain a member of these Pacts"

 

So there is no ambiguity about it. This is in no way to impugn the motives of the other parties to the Pact, but after all, when there is a contract, there are two parties and there really should be a common intention, even if each party goes in for a different reason.

 

The present Prime Minister of Pakistan said in December 1956 that Pakistan.

 

"Will continue to seek alliances, military or otherwise, so long as there is a remote danger from India to the country's safety and territorial integrity."

 

And that to a country which for years has asked them to outlaw war as a means of settling disputes between us and, What is more, it stopped its victorious army on the cease-fire line at the behest of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in order to stop bloodshed. These are the people whose motives are regarded as mala fides. Defending the Baghdad Pact, the Pakistan Prime Minister said:

 

"Even if there is a 5 percent chance of attack from India, I must be strong enough to see that chance should be a zero chance."

 

There is no objection to Pakistan defending itself against India or against the noon, but here is a suggestion, here in fact is a definite statement, that the purpose of involvement in these defensive pacts is not what was proposed by the other parties-whether that right or wrong-but is really aimed at India.

 

This year the Prime Minister said:

 

"Have you ever had such a forthright statement on Kashmir as was issued by the Prime Minister of Turkey? Have you ever before in the whole course of the dispute had so many friends behind you as you now have in Turkey, Iraq and Iran?"

 

With all respect to the Security Council, this is a reaction.

 

to the comparatively soft attitude which the Security Council takes towards aggression and threats to the peace in that part of the world and towards the stimulation of aggression. It gives the feeling that behind the aggressors is a large volume of international opinion.

 

Addressing a public meeting on 3 March 1957, the Prime

 

Minister again :

 

"The Baghdad Pact is a defensive alliance which has for its members Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Britain,

 

which is the real strength behind it." Very embarrassing for the United Kingdom.

 

"Under the terms of that alliance other members will be bound to help Pakistan."

 

The people understood him very well.

 

Then their Foreign Minister, speaking to the National Assembly on 26 March 1956 said :

 

"The most notable achievement of SEATO is the joint reaffirmation by the members of our stand on Kashmir."

 

We had at that time made our views known to other members of SEATO and even in terms of the SEATO establishment there is nothing to do with the internal affairs of India or the aggression on Indian territory, because we are not part of those defensive pacts and we have not accepted them This statement about a reaffirmation by the members at the meeting in Bangkok was put in. I suppose, to get an agreed resolution. They made some reference to Kashmir and capitalized upon it in this way.

 

All these statements I have quoted have two meanings. One is to show that the intention of Pakistan is quite clear and the other is to involve other people. The present Pakistan Prime Minister made a speech of thanks and gratitude to the United Kingdom for all the assistance he had received against India, thinking that in that way he would create bad blood. Blood costs more than that.

 

Now we come to our distinguished friend opposite who tells us that there was only one country in the world similar to Pakistan on account of its intransigent policy in Kashmir. This is said by a son of former India. "We should not forget the inimical attitude of our neighbouring country and we must find friends who will help us in the hour of aggression." That is to say, it is not a question of defending themselves, it is a question of getting other people to join their side. His speech was all against aggression, but we are not coming aggression -the aggression is upon us, and what is more we have asked for an agreement to abandon war altogether.

 

Mr. Khan Noon went on to say in October 1956 that "a powerful neighbouring country inimical to Pakistan has in fact forced us to seek friendships elsewhere". Therefore, if the United States or France thinks that Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact or SEATO for some other reason, here is the reason. That is the reason, they did not go in to assist in whatever the cause was, right or wrong, but in order to work against us-"has in fact forced us to seek friends elsewhere". The "two Pacts have enabled Pakistan to ensure its defences against aggression".

 

A further statement was "Our first duty is to strengthen our defences, particularly against India, no matter what others. might say" There has been no question of India violating the international frontier between Pakistan and India; in fact we have no troops on the international frontier. There are a few armed policemen who are normally able to deal with such incidents, but there have been one or two cases where Pakistan tried to put military strength into our country and has suffered considerable losses. We are not spoiling for war; as I said our main preoccupation is our countryside. Again, "Pakistan will not agree to commit suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact, which is our defense against India." The real foundation of the Baghdad Pact is revealed there for you.

 

Then comes the Pakistan Minister in Syria and I must say in fairness that he was repudiated by his Foreign Office who said, "Pakistan will fight to rescue Kashmir when Pakistan has completed the building up of her strength". This is the kind of thing that is said in pursuance of Part I, paragraph E of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

 

Another senior official of the Pakistan Government who spoke in September of the same year, said "This country joined the Baghdad Alliance only because of the Kashmir dispute with India". There are some interesting United States views on this subject-although I usually hate quoting Press reports in this matter; they have become a commonplace here. An American from Chicago who was in Kashmir some time ago said:

 

"Pakistan is taking the United States for a ride. This is evident from your report and from my observation in that country where I worked until recently. Pakistan. thinks it did us a favour by joining SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. They do not worry about the danger of Russian aggression. Pakistani leaders merely humour. our concern about Communist expansion in order to get economic and military Pakistan and to strengthen their hand against India."

 

Another American, Mr. Steele, of the New York Herald Tribune, said that Pakistan hostility is towards India rather than towards the Soviet Union. In fact the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, I am glad to say, has repeatedly said that they enjoy relations with the Soviet Union-and we are happy they do-but his hostility is towards India and in the event of a showdown with India, American military supplies will be drawn upon.

 

"Pakistan is trying to use the Baghdad Past as a trump card in its dispute with India", says Ulus, a Turkish newspaper Pakistan has no dispute with India, it has only committed aggression, has no dispute.

 

The Economist of London, a paper which is hardly favourable to India at all, says "Mr. Suhrawardy, who feels that he now has the initiative over Kashmir''-he may feel it "can only be greatly glad that Britain is functioning again in the Baghdad Pact, the membership of which endows Pakistan with a bargaining power which it would not otherwise have". There are those who try to argue that these pacts come under Article 51 of the Charter, and I make them a present of this. There are similar observations by journalists and authors from New Zealand and Australia who have been on the spot and who are in no way biased in our favour. We have no machinery in Kashmir for shepherding journalists about; in fact, they complain we do not look after them well enough. But if we look after them, someone will say we are conditioning them. All we do is to give them a permit to go there, and we give it to everybody who asks.

 

Another statement of the Pakistan Prime Minister is this "The people may rest assured that our soldiers are prepared to go to any extreme"-it is not only soldiers, as I shall show this afternoon-"to go to any extreme to see that the people of Kashmir are liberated. Our cause in Kashmir is so just that one soldier from our side will be able to stand against ten from the enemy's side." There is no harm in the Prime Minister indulging in bluff, but this seems to be a statement of policy.

 

There was another announcement: "Kashmir is a matter of life or death for Pakistan", and many people would deny they have committed aggression. "We must have Kashmir, or we die." In May 1957, he said at Bangkok: "Kashmir is and must be part of Pakistan, and that will be the ultimate result'. They did not say that when they were before the Security Council.

 

A great deal of play has been made with the fact that the accession of Kashmir to the Union of India under the arrangements with the United Kingdom to which we and Pakistan are parties is being recognized under international law, although Pakistan was not recognized this accession. It does not require Pakistan's recognition. The accession is complete when it is made by the Head of the State. That is where we get all the play on self-determination which I shall deal with later on. Then come the threats, veiled ones, from the present Foreign Minister.

 

"There is a general clamour among the Kashmir refugees to launch a peace movement aimed at crossing the cease fire line and starting a mass movement inside the State with a view to winning for the Kashmiris the right to self-determination...".

 

"These tribesmen have shown remarkable patience but the cup is now full. It is no longer possible to feed them on mere promises." That is quite true; you must take some action, in order to keep things quiet.

 

"India has chosen a path which was contrary to peace and happiness and likely to lead to war between the two countries." We have not said this at any time. "Pakistan does not want there to be any upheaval in Kashmir; otherwise it would be very easy to create one there."

 

There is a gentleman in this Kashmir picture by the name of Tariq, who promoted himself to the rank of General in the Pakistan army. He was a kind of out-of-uniform General who conducted the invasion at the beginning. Our people know him -they were members of the same army and they talked to each other. He is well educated and speaks with an accent. However he got into trouble. He was convicted and sentenced for treason, or whatever it may have been. He has now come out and has become a great political leader. putting out political manifestos. I have no intention of circu He has been laying them, because I am not going to do his propaganda. The idea is that there should be infiltration into India, that there should be sabotage and destruction, to which I shall refer later. Political parties are formed, and the Pakistani Government is not to prevent them from going and doing what they want. Then comes the best part of it. "We must force India's hand, so we can tell the world she has committed aggression". That is to say, our country has only soldiers in uniform: we have no "irregulars"-if we have to resist anything we must resist it with our armed forces and, therefore, it can be said that the aggression began from our side.

 

We are quite aware of this fact and we are proceeding with extreme reticence and patience in this matter. But the responsibility for preventing further aggression, even apart from the legitimate rights which we might have of liquidating the previous aggression, is one that lies heavily upon us, both nationally and internally. The whole tactic at the present time is to put forward these ex-generals, civil servants off duty and others in order to promote a nefarious revolution. will not happen in our part of the world, because it will receive very little assistance from the population. They will get some stooge of some kind, and the poor devil will get paid heavily for it.

 

Incidentally, the Pakistan Foreign Minister may be interested to know that the Government of India has some of his money. We intercepted it in passage, and we proposed to keep it.

 

Apart from a handful here and there, there is no mass support for anything of this kind, and we do not intend to retaliate in the same way. We have no intention of starting maquis movements in the occupied areas. We believe the people in the Pakistan occupied areas themselves will throw off the yoke, assisted by the good offices of the Security Council, on which lies the heavy responsibility of liquidating the aggression. That is the issue. Is anybody capitalizing on aggression ? Whatever may be our sins, the sin of aggression is much greater than anything else; No country in the world is safe, if this body does nothing. My friend always says that we must look at facts. What are the facts ? The facts resulting from aggression are facts which must not merely be looked at; they must be removed. That is our position,

 

Then we are told about the relative strength. There has been an increase in military potential in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to the extent which I have mentioned. There has been the occupation of these northern areas. Over and above this there are 200,000 "irregulars" who, under the promise of loot and in other ways, have been available in the past.

 

I should like you, Mr. President, and the other members of this Council to look at this present picture and at what I shall have to say this afternoon in the light of what happened ten years ago. We were told that a few co-religionists were upset and it was added, "how could we stop them? We are not behind them". It starts in this way by infiltration, blowing up bridges, killing people, seducing others in various ways and creating disorder. Then there is the movement from Pakistan of discontented people and of people in search of adventure there are foreign legions in every country-who are pushed on into the mainland of India, and the invasion begins.

 

We have had the experience of this. We still think of men like Brigadier Rajendra Singh, who paid dearly with their own lives in order to protect others. A small band of 200 people tried to stop the enormous invasion in 1947, and every one of them was cut to pieces. The Kashmiris do not easily forget these things. We lost some of the most brilliant officers during the initial attacks in Kashmir. The surprise attack was like the one which took place at Pearl Harbor. What is more, we were foolish enough to believe what Pakistan's statesmen said; we thought that there might be an element of truth in it, that they really desired to liquidate this invasion. There is this vast military potential that exists in the shape of troops, equipment, the offering of units by Pakistan officers and the existence of the machinery of administration in Pakistan occupied Kashmir itself.

 

If you look at the Security Council records or at any of the records on any side, you will see that there is no justification whatsoever for Pakistan authority of a juridical, legal or administrative character in these areas.

 

I shall now go to a Pakistan publication in the attempt to get an analysis of the Pakistan budget. This publication cites figures of the Pakistan budget, which include items of administration in regard to these areas. Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, page 71: This is Demand No. 79

 

"Secretariat-7.85 lacs of rupees; Offices of the Chief Adviser and Political Resident-.70 lac of rupees; Directorate of Public Relations-3.18 lacs of rupees Office of the Political Resident for Gilgit Agency-.58 lac of rupees " "The increase in the revised estimate and the next budget is mainly due to the creation, during the current year, of the Adviser for Kashmir Affairs, and additional posts in the Office of the Political Resident for the Gilgit Agency..."

 

We have in our hands certain documents, which should interest the representative of the United States, to show that the so-called Information Agency for Free Kashmir-whatever it is called-which is functioning Washington is financed by the Pakistan Embassy. We have correspondence to show where it takes orders from and how it is to be run. We regard this as an action that is not consonant with the friendly relations that exist between the United States and ourselves; that is, to carry on the office of a rebel group financed by a country that is accredited to Washington. We are prepared to produce the evidence.

 

That is only one instance. Now we come to the political aspects. These places, the whole of "Azad" Kashmir which is in the Punjab area with nearly 1 million people, are under the Pakistan Government. There is a puppet Government there. There have been seven Governments in the last ten years and they keep on changing. Sometimes when you are outside the Government you get one view and when you are inside the Government you get another. I suppose that is characteristic of all Governments. There were other areas: Gilgit, Baltistan, Chitral-the whole of that area which formerly came under the sovereignty of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

That is the territory of India, and those territories today have been de facto or de jure-and we say under the Pakistan Constitution illegally de jure-incorporated in the Pakistan territory. If the Security Council were to return a blind eye to this act of annexation. I say with great respect the United Nations Charter stands violated. We have no intention of laying any blame at the door of any member of the Security Council. It may be the complexity of this matter, it may be the fact that some people say that if you do not look at hard facts probably things will get settled, that if you do not do anything for some time, then something happens. But here is India, from which certain parts were taken by agreement; under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 the Dominion of Pakistan was constituted, and we were left free to accept accession from the remaining States.

 

The Government of India at that time very clearly impressed upon the Cabinet Mission and everybody else that, so far as we were concerned, these territories in India must accede either to Pakistan or to India and/or make other arrangements, which is what is meant by independence. Princely States were in no sense internationally independent, because they were all parts of the same territory. The question simply does not arise. We have the authority of the first Governor-General of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah himself, that the accession of these States can only be by the head of the State. Self-determination took place at the time when accession took place. Maybe it was not democratic self-determination. But some of the things that have been suggested here are not democratic. Many countries that sit around the United Nations table are not necessarily democratic. It was self-determination, the "self" of the State at that time as it existed under the arrangements originally fashioned by the British Parliament which we afterwards accepted. By that they became part of the Union of India. I quoted sufficient British, American, Australian and other precedents last time to the effect that under our system of government a unit of federation cannot walk out. There is no method of doing it, though there is a right of secession in a union like the Commonwealth, for example. The United States waged a war to establish this principle. We intend to protect the integrity of our country in that way, and therefore there is no question of the Security Council or Pakistan or anyone else having to pronounce on the question of accession. Accession is a fact and a legal fact. It is part of the international agreements to which Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom, functioning through her Government; the Government of India, functioning through its national leaders; the Government of Pakistan as at present constituted formerly the leaders of Pakistan-are all equally parties. What is more, that accession has been made permanent; it obtains in the case of several hundred States, and if it were at all possible to make a change in this, it would affect the whole structure of the Federal Union of India. Therefore, the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including what is occupied, is part of the Union of India. That is the position with regard to us.

 

I shall now deal with one of the main parts of the Foreign Minister's observations which calls Mr. Graham into the witness box [791st meeting, paras, 29 to 36]. I have no doubt that Mr. Graham can speak for himself. I do not know what he will say, but so far as I am concerned the record speaks.

 

I would like to state the position of the Government of India in regard to all the negotiations that have gone on before. We have said here that we came here on a complaint of aggression. The answer to that from Pakistan was: "No aggression has been committed, we are not there". Then the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was appointed, and we immediately accepted. Resolutions were passed. All that time, as the Commission has repeatedly stated, the one concern of the Commission and of the Government of India was to bring about a cease-fire. Therefore, we pushed on with all the conciliatory procedures. If Pakistan had not obstructed and had performed part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and withdrawn all its troops and allowed the local authorities to function and had gone home like good boys, then perhaps the resolution could have been worked out in a short time and, as Dr. Jarring said in his report, ad hoc arrangements which are not achieved fairly speedily may become progressively more difficult. We did pursue this. We pursued this in Paris, in Geneva, with Mr. Graham, here and everywhere.

 

Our position with regard to all of these conversations is that they are exploratory, just as the conversations with the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan were before we came here. There were many pieces of correspondence between my Prime Minister and him. The Prime Minister of India wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan saying: "We have done our best to try to get a settlement with you by talking to each of you and in various ways making various suggestions. You have not agreed to any of this. Now, therefore, we will fall back on our rights under the Charter."

 

That is how we came here. So just as the complaint on 1 January 1948 washes out any exploratory conversations that might have taken place earlier, similarly all conversations that have taken place since, whether they be between Prime Ministers, whether they be between Mr. Graham and the permanent representatives are purely of an exploratory character. The only engagements that we have anything to do with are the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 and the two resolutions adopted by the Commission 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 together with the assurances given to us by the Commission. This is not a new position I am taking up on behalf of the Government of India. I stated it the last time.

 

While I am on this point, I might deal with another matter because my Government is very anxiously concerned that no statement of ours or any errors of omission should afterwards be charged to us as a commitment. We have suffered by moderation; we have suffered by the reasonableness in our proceedings before this Council. Every time we have considered a hypothetical proposition and every time we have agreed to embark on an exploration, it has been charged against us as a commitment. Therefore, I want to say here and now that whatever mathematical calculations were made with regard to the figures of 6,000 or 3,000 or 12,000 or 21,000 in the various previous negotiations, they no longer hold true because no offer that is not accepted is a binding contract either in the case of individuals or in the case of nations. Otherwise, you would have a number of floating commitments and no country would know where it stood.

 

Therefore, I want to say here and now that if anyone were to go to India, there would be no use in telling us that we had agreed to that at some time and that now, therefore, we are committed to it. We have agreed to nothing. We have discussed all these proposals. They must all be considered, like any other problem, in the context of the time. We have agreed to the things to which we have been parties. Whatever consideration, whatever provisional sympathies the Government of India might have expressed with certain proposals or explora rations during the last seven or eight years are not binding upon our Government for two reasons First of all, they arose in the course of long discussions, with all the surrounding circumstances that have taken place in different conditions, and whether friends around this table like to accept this view or not, changed conditions have to be taken into account. Therefore, no exploratory, hypothetical or provisional consideration that we might have put forward or entertained or considered with sympathy in the past are binding upon our Government.

 

My Government is most anxious that under no circumstances should we lay ourselves open again to what we regard as the erroneous suggestion that we are departing from commitments. We have therefore been doubly careful in declarations of this kind.

 

It has been repeatedly argued-and it is a good arguing point that Mr. Graham made "X" number of points. I believe it was twelve points, or fourteen points. Fourteen is a sanctified number ever since President Wilson had fourteen points. But, whatever the number of points, we were supposed to have agreed to eight and a half, or nine and three-quarters, or something of that kind, and it is therefore said that all that remains is to agree upon the others. That would be true if the conversations were continuing. But the conversations have been terminated, and since then other things have taken place.

 

If there were a treaty between our two countries which started off by saying "the high contracting parties, in good faith and with a desire to live with each other, come to an agreement", and so on and so forth, and if that paragraph alone were agreed to, and not the remainder, where would be the treaty? Therefore, if at the beginning of this thing, it says that the position in regard to this shall be determined by the democratic method of a plebiscite, or whatever it may be, or that we agree to this or that or the other, it will only be when the document is complete that there is an agreement. You can not pick out one part of it and say that you agree to that. That is our position. We never agree to anything seriatim. We are quite prepared to consider any item for the purpose of convenience or to discuss that alone and say "That seems all right" -but that is in the context of the whole thing.

 

That illustrates how the resolution of 13 August 1948 has been mistakenly regarded. In political decisions and in problems of this kind, you cannot take things out of their sequence or out of their context. If you put the bottom on the top or the top on the bottom, you get a very distorted picture.

 

That is how we look upon this mathematical calculation. in regard to the number of points. We are not judging a boxing match-how many points in our favour and how many. points in their favour. The Graham proposals-or any proposals become binding upon us when we accept the whole of the proposals. If there are various paragraphs and we consider them and say that there seems to be no objection to this particular one, or that we are prepared to consider this one, or that the other one will do, that is good as far as it goes-and if those conversations were still continuing and there had been no breach, and our position were the same, it might have some value.

 

Therefore, we do not go along with any suggestion that you can pick anything out of the Graham report and say that India agrees to this and Pakistan agrees to that. We do not ask Pakistan to stand by any of those individual commitments in that way.

 

All exploratory conversations, in so far as they have not been conclusive, in so far as they do not bind our sovereign character in any way, are not binding on the Government of India. Not only are they not legally binding, but they are not morally binding, because they were merely approached as hypothetical propositions for the purpose of exploration. The very fact that there has been a discussion of so many figures, the very fact that there has been a question as to what arms there should be, and all the arguments about the character and the quantity of them-a question which has never been resolved-indicates that perhaps the unresolved question is not a warranty but a condition that goes to the root of this contract. And, if a condition that goes to the root of a contract is not agreed upon, all other conditions are subsidiary and have no value.

 

Therefore, so far as we are concerned, while we are grateful to Mr. Graham for his nice personality and for the endeavours he has put into the task with which he has been charged, the Government of India is not committed to any of those proposals at this time. We have considered them, and we have considered them seriously and sincerely and to the best of our ability. We tried to take the matter further. In our anxiety to take matters further, we might have been less than cautious. But they are only in the nature of hypothetical propositions and exploratory considerations. So it is no use trying to tell us on how many points we have won and on how many points we have lost.

 

That is the position in regard to the Graham report. And it is for that reason that my delegation has decided not to go into a detailed examination of the various Graham reports, because, if we do that, we go into the merits of this question. So far as we are concerned, that is part of the history, that is not part of any commitment by the Security Council. They are unlike documents of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. These documents and declarations and the resolutions of the Security Council are decisions; they are resolutions, there has been some resolving of a question of one character or another, there has been a meeting of minds on this question where we have committed ourselves to it. Therefore, in category, in content, in their status, these conversations, whether they took place between Mr. and our representatives, representing the United Nations on the one hand, us on the other, or the two Prime Ministers, or officials at different levels, are all exploratory in character.

 

A large number of conversations go on between Pakistan and ourselves, some of which do not come to any conclusion. But we are not going to have a lot of commitments hanging around in the air. That is not the way to do business.

 

That is why my delegation has decided not to argue the merits of the various paragraphs that have been quoted. We could easily quote from them and turn the tables but I do not want to indulge in that exercise because then we would be committing ourselves to some value in regard to those proposals in the present situation. They do not bind us. They were never intended to bind us. They were preparatory discussions, and it is only when the document is complete that they would have some binding value. In every contract, as I have said, you have phrases which say "On account of our friendly relations", or "In order to establish this, we will behave in such and such a way", and so on and so forth. That goes into the preamble or the earlier paragraphs. Then come the hard facts of life-and, if you do not agree on them, that preamble goes by the boards, and that is all there is to it.

 

The status of all these references to determination to do such and such, references that you see in the resolution of 5 January 1949 and at other places, is exactly of the same character. In fact, the Commission recognizes that. So much with regard to the Graham "commitments".

 

That being so, the Security Council has to address itself at the present time-not so much from our point of view as from its own point of view-to the report of Mr. Jarring (S/3821) which is before it and which certainly does not say that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has been carried. out. I have produced sufficient evidence-not out of my head, but out of the documents that are before you. And these documents are not pieces of evidence put in by us; they are the findings of the Commission, and it is my submission that this Council cannot go back upon the findings of fact of the Commision for India and Pakistan and that those facts cannot now be restaged, so to speak.

 

What is more, those commitments go to the basic aspects of our position, namely, the unity or the integrity of India and our right to protect the whole of the State. In the third report of the Commission, this stated :

 

"The Commission did not ignore India's claim to the right to safeguard the security of the State, nor did it put into question the legality of the Jammu and Kashmir Government."

 

There is only one Government in Jammu and Kashmir a State Government-and that is the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

The report goes on :

 

"It had nevertheless to be considered, as a Commission of mediation for the preservation of peace..."

 

Therefore, all these other matters that they propose are, again, conciliatory steps on an exploratory character in order to find some solution. Our legal or political or moral position is not altered by it in any way.

 

Then it is implied that, if the plebiscite had taken place, it would be some joint venture on the part of the Pakistan Government and ourselves. This would be the first time that the Security Council has ever recognized a place for an aggressor in a position of parity with those against whom aggression has been committed. It is quite true that in every action, whether municipal or international, the defendant becomes a party to the action. If a man commits an assault upon another and the person who is assaulted complains to the court, the first man certainly becomes a party to the action. But this does not give him the same status as the other man.

 

Now, aggression has been committed against us. Maybe we were guilty of errors of commission or omission. Maybe we did not push our claims as far as we should have done, because, on the first day, we said that we had no desire to indulge in name-calling. We did not want any branding of anybody. What we wanted was, in effect, the vacating of the aggression. That is still our position-and that situation can only be brought about in two ways.

 

When we came to the Security Council on 1 January 1948, we said that this aggression could be vacated only by military action, only by the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian army. Now, war between two countries like India and Pakistan is unthinkable; it is the last thing which should ever happen. If, however, there is an attempt to push into our territory, we shall defend it to the best of our ability, and no one knows what will happen.

 

We came to the Security Council to prevent such action. We said at that time.

 

"The Government of India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self defence, to enter Pakistan territory, in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is therefore one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace." [S/1100, annex 28, para, 1]

 

It is quite true that we did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter; we did not ask for the operation of Article 39 in order that the aggressor might be branded as such. We did. not do so largely because of our relations with Pakistan, which will, I think-despite these present difficulties-settle down in the course of time to what they should be. For we are two countries, on one mainland, two countries with a common background and with common interests. When certain extraneous circumstances disappear, the character of our people will assert itself and friendship will reign. Meanwhile, however, we have no intention of allowing our territory to be violated.

 

Thus, we came to the Security Council with this request, and the request remains before the Council. That brings me to two aspects with which I must deal, relating to what has happened since the last series of Council meetings at which this problem was considered.

 

When I last spoke to the Council, although I did not plead the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, I pointed out the changed conditions. I also said that pacts must be observed. That has not happened. In the last three or four months, however, there have been many changes in the position vis-a-vis Jammu and Kashmir as far as Pakistan and all its operatives are concerned. It is my intention to place before the Security Council the facts in this regard and seriously to ask the Council whether it will ponder over the implications of those facts. I shall be put to the painful necessity of citing the sources and springs of these actions. A representative of a Government must, in courteous language, deal with facts, however unpleasant they are.

 

This afternoon, therefore, I shall deal with two aspects of the matter. I shall state what has happened with regard to the question since the last series of Council meetings and since Mr. Jarring returned from India-facts which may, although we hope that they write not-have implications concerning what may happen in the coming months. I shall also deal with our own position in regard to Jammu and Kashmir.

 

Several friends of ours, including the United Kingdom representative, often ask us what our position is, what we propose. Well, we have made our proposal several times, and this afternoon I intend to give the contents of the proposal.

 

These events which I shall describe are not matters of hearsay; they will be substantiated by the necessary evidence. We do not ask the Security Council to sit in judgement on this case, because, as I have said, this is not a court of law or a body for deciding territorial questions. But we have come here, with a full sense of responsibility, to put forward facts which cannot be denied and which are substantiated with documentary evidence. We have pointed out, not only that some of these statements which have been made with regard to what obtains on our side are untrue, but that the facts show that quite the contrary is true.

 

I should have said, when I was dealing with the question of conditions in occupied Kashmir, that we have had large numbers of refugees coming from that side. Your predecessor, Mr. President, had a communication addressed to him by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan [S/3860] alleging that the Government of Kashmir had settled in the homes and on the property of those who had gone away Hindus who, presumably, did not belong to the place and that, thereby, that Government had committed a violation of the international agreements.

 

We replied to that almost immediately. We had no difficulty answering them, since the facts are plain. We saw a subsequent communication only two or three days ago, but the facts are entirely to the contrary. We have great difficulty in preventing people from coming over the cease-fire line in search of food or better conditions or, sometimes in the case of the leaders, because they have been driven away by political conditions. But tens of thousands have come over into South Kashmir. This never-ending stream of people who are seeking refuge and food is an endemic problem for India. Millions of them have come from Pakistan, and the Indian Government has spent the equivalent of $630 million in order to house and partly, not entirely, rehabilitate these refugees. It is presenting an enormous problem in the context of India as a whole.

 

With regard to the cease-fire line, we are up against these main difficulties. There is no guarantee that everyone who comes in is a genuine refugee. He may be an infiltrator, but since they are citizens of India we do not want to take harsh measures to find out what they are. There is no doubt that some of them are infiltrators, because we have found some of them are.

 

Large numbers of refugees come in, and these figures will be given this afternoon. The people who have been settled in These areas are people who had gone away from there. It is not a question of settling Hindus or Muslims; they are Kashmiris who had been driven away by invasion or who after the lure of a false propaganda about a theocratic State now find it is better to have food in their stomachs than to proclaim some doctrine of that kind. Thousands and thousands of people I have come across the cease-fire line, and their number grows. It is presenting a very considerable problem, a problem that might quite well become mixed up with the mischief that is going on.

 

The 4.5 million that have come into Eastern India are in addition to those who took part in the mutual exodus that took place at the end of 1947, when millions of people went from what is now India into what is now Pakistan and from what is now Pakistan to India. That was one of the biggest mass migrations in history. We thought that everything had settled down, but since then large numbers of people have come to our country. I should like to give the details of this when the Security Council meets this afternoon, because all this is relevant to the alleged question of genocide and ill-treatment by us.