24091957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 791 held on 24 September 1957.
24091957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 791 held on 24 September 1957.
I am sure that all peace loving nations of the world will share with me a profound disappointment at the failure of yet another United Nations mission to resolve the nine-year old deadlock over the Kashmir dispute.
Mr. Gunnar Jarring, who visited the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in March-April last under the mandate of the Security Council dated 21 February 1957, concludes his brief report by saying that he is unable to report to the Security Council any concrete proposals likely to contribute towards a settlement of the dispute. Thus, all hopes are amicable. settlement of the dispute, which has been pending in the Security Council for the past several years, have once again been shattered. Every effort which has been made by the four mediators appointed by the Security Council from time to time to remove the deadlock and to create appropriate conditions in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the holding of a fair and free plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations has met with failure for the simple and only reason that India is not prepared to carry out its international obligations.
Before I proceed further with any statement, I wish to express my personal thanks and the deep appreciation of my Government to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mr. Gunnar Jarring for his sincere endeavours towards the settlement of the dispute. It is not necessary for me at this stage to repeat the history of this dispute, nor is it essential to recapitulate all the stages through which it has passed since January 1948. I shall, therefore, proceed at once to an examination of Mr. Jarring's report.
Perhaps the most gratifying part of the report is Mr. Jarring's reaffirmation that both India and Pakistan stand committed to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. As these two resolutions constitute a specific agreement that can and must be implemented, it was quite natural that Mr, Jarring should proceed to explore what impedes their implementation.
Making a brief reference in his report to the resolution. on 5 January 1949, which envisages the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, Mr. Jarring has stated that he explored the question of the plebiscite and proposed ways and means by which any difficulties which might arise could be met, or at least substantially mitigated. He records that he made a number of suggestions to this end to both the Governments. His further statement that his suggestions did not prove to be mutually acceptable is likely to cause some ambiguity and misunderstanding and, therefore, would require clarification. It must be granted to Mr. Jarring that most of his conversations with the two Governments were of a confidential nature, and it would be improper to expect him to divulge the exact nature of his talks with either party. But this much we could expect him to say in general terms: that there was nothing which he suggested as a solution which we did not accept. Mr. Jarring will bear me out if I say that Pakistan accepted every suggestion that he made for a peaceful solution of the problem. It can, therefore, be concluded that if Mr. Jarring's suggestions were unacceptable, they were unacceptable to one party alone and that party was India.
Mr. Jarring has not defined the nature of the "grave problems which might arise in connexion with or as a result of a plebiscite" in Kashmir. We maintain that every conceivable A problem that has any bearing on the question of the holding of a plebiscite was discussed and taken care of in the international agreement contained in the two resolutions, adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. When Mr. Jarring refers to grave problems, he is obviously not referring to any problem raised by Pakistan, nor is he referring to anything said by any member of the Security Council or to any mandate of the Security Council, because all the resolutions of the Council are unequivocal in their purport-which is that the original agree. ment contained in the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, should be implemented without any further delay. Mr. Jarring has not said anywhere in his report that he thought that any insuperable obstacles had arisen which made the implementation of the agreement difficult. It is quite evident and this is borne out by the various reports of the different United Nations representatives-that, given goodwill, the agreement can certainly be implemented. All that Mr. Jarring is obviously referring to the changed attitude of the Government of India with regard to the implementation of the agreement.
No change of any kind which should render the holding of plebiscite impracticable has taken place in Kashmir. The basic factors which existed nine years ago exist today. The changes, if any, in occupied Kashmir are the creation of India itself and have been brought about in direct defiance of the directives of the Security Council. India surely cannot plead the length of its aggressive stay in Kashmir as an excuse for not honouring its international agreement.
It is alleged by India that if a plebiscite is held in Kashmir, the Muslims of India would be placed in jeopardy, that they would be murdered by the Hindu majority, and that there would be a general migration of Muslims from India followed by the migration of Hindu from Pakistan. This is a strange argument indeed. In 1953, Mr. Nehru had also hinted at this possibility, I will read out, in part, the reply which our Prime Minister sent to him then : "You refer to the necessity of preventing large-scale migrations that would be an upset of a major character. The decisive factor in preventing any major upset will be the spirit in which our two Governments approach this problem. If in this approach we are able to maintain a spirit of goodwill and friendship between our two countries-an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute will in itself contribute most powerfully to the building and maintenance on such a relationship-there is no reason why the people in the State should have any misgivings as to their future or wish to leave their homes."
The threat that 40 million Muslims residing in India would run the risk of virtual extermination at the hands of Hindi fanatics is nothing short of a confession, not merely of weakness, but of ill-will. It is nothing short of a confession of religious animosity which Hindu still entertain towards the Muslims of India. It is nothing short of an admission that the Muslims of India are hostages for Kashmir. This threat of genocide is political blackmail of the lowest order and dis closes a mentality which makes one shudder. There are proportionately as many Hindus in Pakistan as there are Muslims in India. But we have never indulged in this type of blackmail by threatening that if Kashmir does not come to Pakistan, the Hindu minority in Pakistan will be exterminated. It cannot possibly be believed by those who are aware of the resources of India that if the Prime Minister of India sincerely desired that there should be no genocide of Muslims as an act of vengeance, he would not be able to maintain law and order in his country.
Again, it is absolutely wrong to assert that an appeal to voters would be on religious linas. It is a well-known fact that a number of prominent Hindu leaders of Kashmir, like Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, are in favour of a decision through plebiscite, and are suffering much tribulation at the hands of Mr. Nehru's Government for advocating the accession of the State-their homeland-to Pakistan. It is also a fact that the Vice-President of the Kashmir Political conference, which openly advocates accession to Pakistan and of which more than a dozen leaders are behind the bars without trial, is a Hindu Pandit of the Valley-Mr. Lakhanpal-who is a prominent Hindu leader of India, who has constantly been urging Mr. Nehru to honour his obligations and who has set up a Committee called the "End Kashmir Dispute Committee" for this purpose.
How is it that suddenly, after ten years of comparative calm, following the holocaust which befell the subcontinent. in 1917, it is now being asserted that if the people of Kashmir are allowed to exercise the right of self-determination, it will lead to the general massacre of the 40 million Muslims in India? There is an obvious implication here that the Government of India is certain that the voting in a plebiscite will go in favour of Pakistan. And it is also obvious that this certainty is the real reason why India is avoiding a plebiscite.
India, according to Mr. Jarring, has alleged that two factors stood in the way of implementation of the resolutions. adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan.
The first of the two Indian alleged impediments is that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and particularly paragraphs B and E have not been implemented by the Government of Pakistan. The second Indian alleged impediment is that it is incumbent on the Security Council to express itself on the question of aggression and equally incumbent on Pakistan to vacate the aggression. For the sake of convenience 1 shall deal with the second allegation first.
The Indian allegation of aggression by Pakistan, it will be seen, was summarily dismissed by Mr. Jarring as irrelevant to the task of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute which had been entrusted to him by the Security Council. Throughout the previous discussions in the Security Council, the representatives of all the Power, great or small, who have considered this issue since January 1948, have all regarded the Indian allegation as unworthy of consideration. The scope of the unanimity is clear from a list of the countries in which have participated in the Council's deliberations and none of which is on record as having given even the slightest credence to the Indian allegation. The countries concerned are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Sweden. Turkey, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSP, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.
In fact, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was in possession of the full facts when it framed the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by both India and Pakistan and now constitute a valid international agreement. Nowhere has the Commission or any mediator called Pakistan an aggressor. Sir Owen Dixon himself did not make any "judicial investigation of the issue" [S/1791, para, 21], as he put it, in spite of India's insistence that Pakistan should be declared an aggressor, but only made a certain assumption in order to put a stop to Indian procrastination over the question of the demilitarization of the State.
Mr. Jarring has clinched the issue in these words :
"I explained to the Government of India that the Security Council had properly taken cognizance of the original Indian complaint, and that it was not for me to express myself on the question whether its resolutions on the matter had been adequate or not. I pointed out inat regardless of the merits of the present position taken by the Government of India, it could not be overlooked that India had accepted the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan. [S/3821. para, 141.
I shall now turn to the point of Mr. Jarring's report, which deals with the first Indian allegation, namely the alleged non-implementation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75], and in particular, paragraphs B and E of that part. Paragraph B, as the Security Council will recall, enjoined upon India and Pakistan to refrain from augmenting the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Paragraph B indicated the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of negotiations.
In respect of this Indian allegation, Mr. Jarring records that the Government of Pakistan maintained that part 1 of the first resolution had been implemented in good faith and in full by them and that the time had come to proceed to the implementation of part II. I may remind the Security Council that the Pakistan Government had informed the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan as far back as 30 May 1949 as follows;
"The Pakistan Government has carried out successfully the difficult and delicate operation of ensuring the withdrawal of the tribesmen in advance of the truce agreement, although this obligation arises only after the signing of the truce agreement. No better proof could be afforded of the sincere desire of the Pakistan Government to take all steps possible to promote peace and tranquility in the State and to pave the way, as rapidly as possible, for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite."
When submitting his third report on 22 April 1952 [S/2611 aud Corr. 1]. Dr. Frank Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, made a categorical statement in paragraph 29 of his report that part I of the resolution of 18 August 1948 had been implemented. In paragraph 36 of the same report, he went on to say that even part II of that resolution had to a considerable extent already been implemented. The assumption that part I of the resolution had been implemented was repeated by Dr. Graham in paragraph 44 of his fifth report [S/2967] which was submitted
about a year later on 27 March 1953. I should like to make it quite clear that all negotiations after the conclusion of the cease-fire line agreement were under taken to implement part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It was accepted by both parties that part I of the resolution had been implemented. Dr. Graham has very rightly observed in this behalf that the primary objective of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan during the first stage of its activities was to obtain a suspension of hostilities. The cease-fire was agreed upon between the two parties and made effective on 1 January 1949 and, as a completion of this part of the resolution, the cease-fire line was agreed upon between the two Governments under the auspices of the Commission in the Karachi agreement, of 27 July 1949. The excuse that part I has not been implemented is now being put forward for the first time by India with a view to reopening issues which have long been settled. The obvious object is to obstruct progress in the implementation of part II of the resolution, that is, demilitarization. The negotiations were conducted. by the Commission and the United Nations representatives were all directed towards finding a basis for the implementation of part II. At no stage did India refuse to enter into these negotiations on the plea that Part I had not been implemented by Pakistan. The talks failed mainly because of India's obduracy to reach an agreement on the issue of demilitarization. India also did not raise any such question in the course of direct talks held between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in 1953. The experts committees, including Army representatives, set up by the two Governments, indeed, covered considerable ground of part II of the resolution in their attempt to remove differences arising out of the character and quantum of forces which were to remain on both sides of the cease-fire line-after demilitarization. India could only have re-opened the question if there had been any subsequent violation of the cease-fire agreement. If any such violation had taken place, it was the responsibility of the United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan to report it to the Security Council. Has the Security Council received any such report? If not, the conclusion is inescapable that part I has not only been successfully implemented but that the spirit of the cease-fire agreement has been observed by both the parties. It may be argued, and indeed institutions to this effect are being heard in India, that because Pakistan has entered into certain regional alliances; such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact, and because Pakistan is receiving military aid from the United States, its military potential has increased and therefore, there has been a violation of the resolution of 13 August 1948. I shall refer to Pakistan's defensive alliances later in my statement. All that is necessary here to say is that a bare perusal of this resolution would expose the absurdity of the charge. All that part I, paragraph B of the resolution in question prohibited was the augmentation of the military potential of the forces under the control of the respective Governments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It never could, and did not, contemplate that the two countries concerned would, so long as the dispute remained unsettled, take no step whatever to improve their defence positions otherwise.
Pakistan has not in any manner whatsoever augmented the military potential of her forces stationed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, Dr. Graham definitely stated in paragraph 32 of his third report [S/2611 and Corr. 1], that the present number of armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line was estimated to be less than 50 per cent of the number of armed forces existing on 1 January 1949, when the cease-fire became effective. Moreover, as I have already stated, the United Nations Military Observers are in a position always to watch and report any such increases, and, as far as we are aware, no such objection has ever been raised by them against Pakistan. If India objects to an increase in the defensive power of Pakistan inside Pakistan then it might well be asked: what about the great increase in the defence forces of India inside India ?
To turn now to paragraph E of part I of the resolution. of 13 August 1948: all that this section enjoins upon both parties is that each Government should appeal to its people to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. The fact that further negotiations did take place between the parties thereafter and continued right up to the end of 1953, when Pandit Nehru broke off direct talks, proving that Pakistan had fulfilled its part of the obligation in this respect. Under paragraph E, all that the two Governments agreed to do was to appeal to their peoples. Not only has the Government of Pakistan appealed to the people in this sense, but also the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, entered into a solemn agreement with the Prime Minister of India in 1950 on this subject, which agreement has been fully carried out by Pakistan,
The fact of the matter is that, in all previous negotiations, India never raised the plea of non-implementation of part I of the 1948 resolution. Indeed, the previous United Nations mediators, such as Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Graham, after a thorough examination of the whole problem, have recorded their conclusion that the only impediment to the full implementation of the two resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan was not part I of the 1948 resolution, but the difference of opinion between the two Governments. on the question of demilitarization as a prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite. This position was accepted by the Security Council, which, in the preamble of its resolution of 30 March 1951, says:
"Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were:
"(a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of plebiscite.
"(b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite." [S/2017) Rev. 1].
Subsequently, in paragraph 46 of his third report, Dr. Graham remarked as follows:
"The chief remaining obstacle is the difference over the number and character of the forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization." [S/2611 and Corr. 1, para. 46].
Acting on the assumption that demilitarization was the real issue, the Security Council itself having received Dr. Graham's third report, decided to go forward and to recommend in its resolution of 23 December 1952, that the Governments of India and Pakistan should :
"...enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization...' [S/2883]
It is crystal clear, therefore, that all that India had disputed hitherto was the number of soldiers that should remain on one side or the other and that it had raised no other issue to stall or resist the holding of a plebiscite in the State. The only point in dispute, therefore, that remains to be settled between the two countries is the simple one of how many soldiers should be allowed to remain on each side of the cease-fire line pending the plebiscite.
The sole reason for India's now attempting to restart all controversies which have been set at rest and to re-open all the issues that have already been settled, abandoned or waived during the last ten years, is to create confusion, delay decisions and implementation of decisions, and to cloud the very simple issue of demilitarization. I regret having to tell the Security Council that the mala fides of India are only too apparent.
Mr. Jarring found himself unable to give a clear finding on the supposed deadlock concerning part I of the 1948 resolution. Nowhere in his report, however, did he support the view that part I had not been implemented. In view of India's intransigence, he decided to consult the two Government if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part had been implemented or not to arbitration. He records in the report, in a very significant sentence.
"Being aware of the earlier negative attitude of the Government of India on the question of arbitration with relation to the Kashmir problem as a whole, I made it a point to explain to it that I was not suggesting anything of that nature, and that what I was proposing, while termed arbitration, in all likelihood would be more in the nature of a determination of certain facts which in the Indian view, were incontrovertible." [S/3821, para. 18].
Although the Government of Pakistan was convinced that part I had been implemented, it agreed to the request of Mr. Jarring to refer to arbitration the question whether or not part I had been implemented. This was done merely to demonstrate the anxiety of the Government of Pakistan to agree to any steps which could facilitate a settlement, without prejudice to its contention that the objections of India were untenable and that it had all along been recognized that part I had been fully implemented. The Government of India, however, whose point of view Mr. Jarring made every effort to meet, did not agree that arbitration would be appropriate, saying that the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration. The rejection of this suggestion for arbitration, not on the future of Kashmir, but even on the limited question of the past or present fulfilment of an existing agreement, clearly exposes India's bad faith. Once again, for the twelfth time, Pakistan has accepted and India has rejected a proposal designed to facilitate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
In connexion with this arbitration proposal, there is a point to which I wish to make a brief reference. India's objection is that the acceptance of the proposal might be interpreted as indicating that Pakistan has a locus standi in the matter. This objection is wholly untenable. There can be no manner of doubt that Pakistan is a party to the international agreement embodied in the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The very fact that India accuses Pakistan of not having implemented part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 presupposes Pakistan's locus standi. If Pakistan had no locus standi in the matter, the logical course for India would have been to refuse to become involved in the whole structure of resolutions, commissions, reports and mediators. This India has never done, as indeed in the circumstances it could not do.
It will be seen that Mr. Jarring's mission to the subcontinent of India and Pakistan has not succeeded in getting us any nearer to the solution of the Kashmir problem than was the case before he went to the sub-continent. It is, however, gratifying to note that Mr. Jarring was successful in securing reaffirmation from the Governments of India and Pakistan of their sincere willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute. Further, it was clear to him that both Governments fully realized and accepted the obligations undertaken by them under the terms of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. When I compare these professed adherences to the international agreements with the practical and continued defiance of these agreements by a responsible Government, I am left astounded.
In part III of his report, Mr. Jarring has made the following remarks.
"In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as I have during the period just ended, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connexion with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia.
"The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change". [S/3821, paras. 20 and 21].
In the first of his observations in paragraph 21, Mr. Jarring is clearly referring to what he was told by the Indian Government, since nothing of the kind was ever mentioned by the Government of Pakistan. These extraneous matters have been raised by India for some time now in order to avoid its clear commitments and to bedevil the real issues involved in the Kashmir debate. But, even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that any political, economic or strategic factors have changed the pattern of power relations in West and South Asia, the changes that may have occurred have not even the remotest connexion with the plebiscite pledge to the people of Kashmir. What Pakistan or India may do or abstain from doing in the wider field of international relationships has no relevance at all to Kashmir. The recognized right of the people of Kashmir was to be exercised by them under the auspices of the United Nations, and the Plebiscite Administrator was to ensure that no outside influence would interfere with the free and unfettered exercise of this right. How in these circumstances Pakistan's membership of SEATO or of the Baghdad Pact has altered the situation to the prejudice of the people of Kashmir is beyond one's comprehension.
One of the instances mentioned by India in suggesting a change of conditions is 'that Pakistan has accepted military aid from the United States. We may well ask who is India to question what we do inside our country? We have, however, given categorical assurances that this aid shall not be used for aggressive purposes. The United States has also given assurances to India that if we at any time use the aid aggressively to invade India, the United States will help India to repel that aggression. The acceptance of military aid from the United States has nothing to do with the implementation of the international agreement to which India is a party. The issue raised by India is an extraneous one; and it is obvious that it is a clear attempt on India's part to wriggle out of its international commitments. It is pertinent to observe that India is also receiving aid from the United States and other countries, allegedly economic in nature but actually military in character, that enables it to divert its own resources, which would have been devoted to economic needs, to procurement of armaments, bombers, fighters and naval ships, to organizing and rationalizing its armament factories and to increasing its war potential. The money it spends on defence alone is more than 140 per cent of the total budget of Pakistan. Nevertheless, we have never claimed the right to question what India does insi its own territory, although as a result of this colossal armament programme it is Pakistan which should complain of a threat of Indian aggression.
In paragraph 21, Mr. Jarring obviously wanted to impress upon the Security Council the urgency of a speedy decision when he observed that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which had not been achieved fairly speedily, might become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope had tended to change. This kind of Statement is to imply that the international agreement reached between India and Pakistan on Kashmir had lost its force because India had refused to honour its commitments for so many years. If such were to be the state of affairs, then there can be no sanctity of treaties and contracts; and Mr Jarring is the last person to advance a theory of this nature. On the contrary, he has pointed out that both countries are bound by the international agreement and has warned the Security Council that further delay might create further complications. Consequently, he has urged the Council to expedite the implementation of the previous resolutions. Complications are arising every day which may make the task of the Security Council more and more difficult; for example, the Government of India has admitted the settlement of Hindus in the Kashmir Valley. The sooner this Council insists on the implementations of its decisions, the better for all concerned. The people of Kashmir are being cheated of the fruits of freedom promised to them by the Security Council, through India being continuously allowed to dishonour its agreements.
I may emphasize that the agreement that was referred to in the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 was a solemn international agreement entered into to achieve a permanent result. The agreement remains fully in force. India, in spite of its commitments and assurances that it will stand by the pledge of an internationally organized plebiscite, has nevertheless, after the passing of the two resolutions, deliberately committed acts, some of which I shall detail here. These will make it absolutely clear that the two resolutions are being continuously defied and disobeyed by India.
Firstly, Kashmir has figured as a State of India in the Indian Constitution.
Secondly, efforts were launched by India to secure popular approval of the fraudulent and invalid instrument of accession signed by the Maharaja when he had already forfeited the confidence of the people of Kashmir, as a result of which in October 1950 the Kashmir National Conference was made to pass resolutions supporting the Indian designs.
Thirdly, India set up a bogus Constituent Assembly in 1951. The history of this so-called Constituent Assembly, every single member of which was "elected unopposed", is too
well known to be repeated here.
Fourthly, India took steps in 1952 to bring about the administrative merger of Kashmir with India. An agreement, known as the Delhi Agreement, was signed that year; it covered. such matters as residuary powers; citizenship laws, fundamental rights, powers of the Supreme Court in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the application of emergency provisions embodied in the Constitution and the headship of the State.
Fifthly, India further tightened its grip over occupied Kashmir by the promulgation of a Presidential Order in May 1954, which had the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the Indian Union over the State. The Presidential Order also modified the definition of the term "State subjects" and broadened its basis to include all persons who had acquired immovable property there. This served to reduce the Muslim majority in the State which had already been seriously effected by the 1947 genocide in the Jammu Province.
Sixthly, in April 1954, the customs barriers between the occupied Kashmir and India were abolished.
Seventhly, Indian taxation laws in respect of income tax and customs and excise duties were extended to occupied Kashmir.
Eighthly. Kashmir's financial integration with India, which began the previous year, was completed in 1955; and the Auditor General of India was empowered to exercise the same jurisdiction in Jammu and Kashmir as in other States.
Ninthly, in April 1955, further provisions of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to the State.
Tenthly, in November 1956, India began taking steps unilaterally to integrate the State in the Union of India with effect from 26 January 1957, in complete disregard of India's assurance to the Security Council and in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions. This occasioned the adoption of another resolution by the Security Council, on 24 January 1957, which reaffirmed the Council's resolution of 30 March 1951 and declared that:
" the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and any action that Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the Assembly, would not constitute in support of any such action by the Assembly would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the...principle [enunciated by the Security Council]." [S/3779].
Eleventhly, India went a step further when, on 23 April 1957, it included the Jammu and Kashmir State in the membership of the Northern Zonal Council set up by the Government of India.
The Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decided to merge the State with the Indian Union. This Constituent Assembly, supposed to have been the result of the elections, was brought into being under pressure and in an atmosphere of coercion. The members were selected, and no one dared to oppose. This Constituent Assembly was a creature of Indian might, and the resolutions passed by it were obviously the result of India's commands and behest. India has clearly defied the directives of the Security Council by merging the State with the Indian Union. On the other hand, Pakistan has taken no steps whatsoever to incorporate "Azad" Kashmir territory; and, under section 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the relationship of the whole State to Pakistan is to be decided by the free will of the people of the State.
Recent elections in Indian-held Kashmir were clearly stage-managed. These elections were over before they began, and Mr. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed gained a majority before the voting even started.
Mr. President, I crave permission to ask you: In what language can I describe this calculated and dishonest disobedience of international obligations and this blatant and continuous disregard of solemn assurances repeatedly given to this august body and to its numerous representatives, including Mr. Jarring, who have striven to assist in the settlement of this dispute ?
The specious plea has been advanced that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has become a part of India. If that is so, India has acted in clear defiance of the Security Council directives and is guilty of aggression in that India has annexed that State, thereby breaking its own pledged word to the Security Council. It is also argued by India that, since it has annexed Kashmir, the State is a part of the Indian Union-and that this is final. This unilateral action of India, taken in flagrant disregard of the Security Council resolutions, is clearly invalid. India refuses to carry out the obligations under the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, knowing full well that the people will almost unanimously vote for Pakistan in a plebiscite. We, therefore, have the right to assume that the Indian annexation has taken place to prevent the Jammu and Kashmir State from acceding to Pakistan, and that thereby India has committed aggression a second time, by refusing to vacate the State-the first time being when the Indian army invaded the Jammu and Kashmir State and occupied it by force, as it occupied the Hyderabad. State and the Junagadh State. India is defying not only the will of the people of Kashmir but also world opinion; and it is the duty of the Security Council now to make India vacate this blatant aggression.
The means of solution of the Kashmir dispute are clearly set out in the resolutions adopted by the Commission in 1948 and 1949. This position was indeed, admitted by Mr. Nehru himself when, broadcasting to the nation as early as 2 November 1947, he observed:
"We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it." (The Times of India, Bombay, 3 November, 1947.)
Unfortunately, after accepting the two resolutions of the Commission, India began to raise imaginary difficulties in the matter of the interpretation of the provisions made therein; and, consequently, for the purpose of resolving these difficulties, the Security Council was compelled to appoint, one after another, three mediators-namely, General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Dr. Frank P. Graham. efforts were shattered on the rock of Indian intransigence. But all their
The Security Council will perhaps have noted that of late a somewhat hysterical note has characterized the Indian statements about Kashmir. I refer to such statements as: "Pakistan must vacate aggression"-this, in our opinion, is irrelevant repetition ad nauseam-and "Pakistan must forsake her alliances" "Pakistan must forgo American military aid", "Pakistan must show more goodwill towards India before a plebiscite can be considered", and so forth. I am afraid I find nothing about these matters in the international agreement arrived at between India and ourselves; and, in any case, I cannot see what all this has to do with the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. I must add that I was a little surprised when I read in the Indian Press that Mr. Krishna Menon, speaking a fortnight ago at a public meeting in New Delhi, declared that India would regard as an "unfriendly'' act any vote cast by any nation during the present meetings of the Security Council in favour of sending a United Nations force to Kashmir, or any resolution that condones Pakistan's "aggression" in Kashmir. The Council may wish to ponder deeply over this utterance from one who comes here today before this very same body and, in anticipation of its decision, has proclaimed what he regards as an "unfriendly" act.
Compare with this the attitude of the Government of Pakistan. We made several major concessions in the vain hope of achieving Indian agreement to the implementation of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for Indian and Pakistan. I shall enumerate some of these concessions :
Firstly, we arranged for the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from the State of Jammu and Kashmir in advance of the truce agreement, although this obligation arose only after the signing of the truce agreement.
Secondly, we agreed that demilitarization should take place in a single continuous process, as against what was originally accepted by India and Pakistan in the international. agreement that demilitarization would be in two stages.
Thirdly, we agreed that the United Nations Representative should be permitted to exercise surveillance over the reduced "Azad" Kashmir forces, although the resolution of 13 August 1948, as explained to us by the Commission, envisaged surveillance by the Commission-now the United Nations Representative-only over the "local authorities". The Commission stated categorically that surveillance over the "Azad" Kashmir forces was not contemplated.
Fourthly, although the Commission had sought to maintain a military balance on the two sides of the cease-fire line, we expressed our willingness to negotiate an agreement on the number of forces despite the glaring disparity between the suggested forces on the India and Pakistan side of the cease fire line, as recommended by the Security Council.
Fifthly, we agreed to large-scale disbandment of the "Azad" Kashmir forces even before the Plebiscite Administrator assumed office, although, under the Commission's resolution, reduction and disbandment of the "Azad" Kashmir forces were envisaged only after the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.
Sixthly, we agreed to exclude the Militia in occupied Kashmir from the scope of the demilitarization programme, provided the Gilgit and Baltistan Scouts remained intact, although the resolution contemplated reduction and disbandment of the Militia together with the State Forces and the "Azad" Kashmir Forces.
We even compromised on the basic question of setting up an all-party Government in the State pending a plebiscite on the understanding that the Plebiscite Administrator will have overriding powers, although the Security Council records will show that almost all members had accepted our viewpoint. We then compromised on the stages of demilitarization and then on numbers. We cannot compromise any more because that will knock the bottom out of the agreement and a plebiscite really free and impartial will not be possible.
Now that all efforts to seek a solution of the dispute through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and other usual means of pacific settlement have failed, it is essential that the Security Council squarely face the issue raised by India's persistent refusal to carry out her international obligations with regard to Kashmir. In spite of the continued efforts of the Security Council, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the four United Nations mediators for India and Pakistan and in spite of direct approach and continuous negotiations between the Governments and representatives of the two countries, a deadlock has ensued. And it seems that India, while openly carrying on conversations with Pakistan and the United Nations representatives and declaring before the world that it adhered to the Commission's resolutions, was at the same time quietly proceeding with plans to integrate Kashmir with India.
Part 1 of the resolution adopted by the Commission 13 August 1948 is a closed chapter. Its full implementation. has been accepted not only by all the United Nations mediators and by the Security Council but also by India itself, as evidenced by the reports of Dr. Graham, And, in any event, so far as demilitarization is concerned, the implementation of part II of the resolution of 1948 will automatically. result in the implementation-if any is called for-of part I, paragraph B of the resolution.
It is, therefore, urged that the Security Council now proceed from the stage where it left the dispute on 23 December 1952 and take positive steps to bring about demilitarization so as to ensure that a plebiscite takes place in the State as envisaged in its earlier resolutions.
Owing to India's persistent failure to carry out its international commitments and solemn obligations, this dispute now clearly involves a threat to the peace, and falls under the provisions of Chapter VII. Articles 39 and 41, of the United Nations Charter.
In order to facilitate the task of the Security Council in demilitarizing Jammu and Kashmir as well as to end the long drawn-out arguments about the implementation of the Com mission's resolutions so far as Pakistan is concerned, I would urge that all troops, whether of India or Pakistan, should be withdrawn from the cease-fire line and a United Nations force be stationed on the cease-fire line to prevent any violation of the line. Alternatively, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to remove immediately every Pakistan soldier on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line provided a United Nations force, strong enough to defend these areas and ensure their integrity, is stationed beforehand along the cease-fire line; and provided that India reduces its own troops to the level prescribed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/28 13]. India cannot object to this course being adopted, which safeguards it from any possible attack from the Pakistan side. Nor should India have objection to United Nations forces being posted in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which at present is neither Indian or Pakistan territory, particularly since such a force will be stationed only on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. If India creates conditions favourable for a plebiscite. This unfortunate dispute, which has lasted over a decade and embittered relations between two neighbouring countries, will be peacefully and speedily resolved.
In conclusion, may I say that the issues before the Security Council are clear. The procedure for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute is precisely set out in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949: these resolutions, constituting an international agreement, have been accepted both by India and Pakistan. The specific objectives of the resolutions are the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations to enable the people of the State to determine the future status of their homeland. Let the Security Council proceed to secure these objectives.
On the shoulders of the Security Council rests the great responsibility not only of restoring friendly relations between India and Pakistan, but also of enabling the people of Kashmir to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination. May God give you the strength to discharge your duty with justice and fair play.