20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957.
20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957.
I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for the opportunity which you have given me to intervene again. In the interests of the Government of India. I have to say that if, after the observations which I submit, the representative of Pakistan were to offer observations, I would be entitled to reserve my position to reply to them since this Council has now been convened at the request of Pakistan. I recognize that we can not go on interminably answering but we are in the position where the session has been convened at the request of Pakistan and the draft resolution before the Council is in its support. Therefore, the right of reply rests with us so far as it goes.
There have been a number of statements made, and the position of my Government here, as I have said several times before, is that the Council has kindly invited us under Article 32 of the Charter. Therefore, the Government of India does not propose to take a position on the draft resolution, of support or opposition because it is not required to do so; but it is entitled to offer its observations as to what it would do, what it thinks about the draft resolution, what the consequences would be. In doing that, I have no desire to make another intervention of any length. but merely to deal with what has been said since I intervened this morning [772nd meeting] In doing so, if I may be permitted, I would like to proceed in reverse order, dealing with the last two military allies of Pakistan, the Philippines and Iraq, who have spoken. and come to the main proposals afterwards.
The representative of Iraq, who made a very courteous and gracious reference to me, for which I am grateful, has brought this matter to the forefront. He used the words "a single and continuous process" (para. 4, above).
This arises from the position of Mr. Graham-and again I say that we regret not having heard him at this meeting, so as far as my Government is concerned-and it enables me to Say two things. First of all, the interpretation of a single and continuous process that the representative of Iraq places upon the resolutions is as erroneous as almost every interpretation he has placed on all Security Council decisions; that is to say, it takes the Pakistan view of it, which has not been either accepted by the Commission in the past or is supported by the basic decisions. What is more important and we want to put this into the record-the Government of India is no longer committed by any intermediate discussions that have taken place, by any hypothetical propositions that have been put to them, or by any mathematical calculations made by Mr. Graham at various times. All these things were part of procedures to find a settlement.
If the bargain had been closed, we would be bound by it. We have been bitten so many times (especially when we just heard the representative of the Philippines on whose statement I shall comment in a moment) we have no desire at all for the Security Council to misunderstand our position. It is wrong to say that some advance has been made in regard to demilitarization The only advance that has been made in regard to demilitarization-and it would be useful for Council to know it is the voluntary withdrawal of the Government of India of large numbers of troops from Kashmir since cessation of hostilities for which the Council has not been gracious enough to say one word of appreciation-without any conditions whatsoever.
With regard to these references to a single and continuous process, simultaneous withdrawals, synchronized arrangements, all these things and all these words have been differently interpreted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, by the United Nations representatives afterwards; and whatever discussions may have taken place. either in New York, Geneva, New Delhi, Karachi, Paris or any where, they are all today only part of historical material, they do not commit the Government of India to anything, because there was no closing of any bargains, and it should not be said afterwards that where it is advantageous to one side that is taken as a commitment, and where it is not advantageous, it is pointed out against us.
Therefore, the only engagements from which we can proceed, insofar as we can do so, are the engagements to which we are parties in the context of all the circumstances submitted. Therefore, I would like this particular factor to be written into the record so that in the event of the matter coming up again, or having anyone else intervening, whether it is your distinguished self, Mr. President, it should not be thought that now we have gone back on something else, because unless this attitude is taken, it is impossible to discuss anything, any pro tem proposition, any exploration; any thinking aloud becomes dangerous because at that moment we will be pinned down to it. What is more, the whole surrounding circumstances have to be taken into account.
I prefer to make no further references to the intervention by the representative of Iraq because it will take too long, except to say that the whole analysis is contrary to the facts of the case, contrary to the commitments made by the Commission, contrary to the principles of the Charter, and contrary to the assurances given to us. It is a statement of good advocacy on one side, for which we have respect but for which we can not be grateful.
With regard to the Philippines position, we repudiate, and emphatically repudiate, and will continue to repudiate the position that the United Nations has not at all times been committed to the position of the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, of the competence of the Government of India, of the Union of India, for its external defence and its foreign policy, and for the position that whatever may happen in the final settlement, until that final settlement is reached, it is part of India. That is why the Plebiscite Administrator had to be appointed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government. That is why, as I said this morning, we became responsible for law and order. We could go into all areas of the State, and various other things were provided. That is an essential basis. It was not a contingent proposition. The representative of the Philippines-who, in spite of all the differences, is a good personal friend-is entirely in error in the reading of the facts in this matter, and we would find no impartial legal or juridical support for his position. If that position is taken, there is no basis for talking at all.
Besides, I want to submit to the Council, another pro position. As a former Governor General of India said: "What is Kashmir, no-man's-land ?" My colleague says, in his very labored attempt to establish equality of the two sides, that neither Pakistan or India has sovereignty in this place (para. 46 above). If it is no man's-land, that would be a very peculiar position. On the other hand, if neither of us had sovereignty, it would go back to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir whose son is the President of the Kashmir State at the present moment. There may be some advantage in that, but we are not prepared to take advantage of it.
As regards the idea that the United Nations has some unexplored territory over which it is going to establish its dominion, may I say that the United Nations is not a sovereign body to do all these things. It is merely a conglomeration of Governments, to make recommendations to them, especially under the provisions of the Charter with which we are dealing now, namely Chapter VI, to seek conciliation. I submit that the observations made by the representative of the Philippines are contrary to the basic arrangements, to the basic positions which are enshrined in the relevant resolutions, in the assurances and in all the proceedings that have gone on.
The representative of the Philippines makes a fundamental error, which he could easily rectify if he read the resolutions of the Commission. He says that the resolution places both parties on the same basis. That is exactly what it does not do. It places us on the same basis if by that it means that both of us are involved there. It certainly does not place the parties on the same basis. In fact, it is just the contrary. It is exactly what it does not do. That is the meaning of all that has been argued before the Council of all the assurances given by Mr. Lozano as Chairman of the Commission, and of the words that are written into it, and any documents must be interpreted in their natural meaning. Therefore, the submissions that are made are entirely contrary to facts and to the law that obtains in this case. There has been no achievement of demilitarization except as I said: the voluntary withdrawal of a considerable part of the Indian Army that was there at the time of the fighting. That was not done under the orders of the United Nations, but because we thought that was the best thing to do. That is the demilitarization that we have carried out. It is also part of the general cutting down of our forces.
There is an attempt in the statement made by the representative of the Philippines to establish equality of status. This is what Pakistan has been trying to do for a very long time, but it has not found such obvious advocates in this Council until now. Now therefore, we, as the Government of India, completely disassociate ourselves from and emphatically repudiate these statements in so far as they are contrary to the Charter, contrary to the resolutions, contrary to the assurances, and contrary to good conscience.
That takes us to the two main statements. I will leave aside the statements of the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of Colombia because they are not advocates of the resolution, which is what you are considering. But wherever the United Nations forces appear in this context, my Government has already expressed its position. Therefore, perhaps, before I deal with the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, it would be advantageous to me to make this position clear.
The Secretary-General is not a jurist; he is not a law giver or anything of that kind; but when the Secretary-General submits a report and it is accepted by the United Nations, then it has a different value. And here I refer to document A/3512 dated 24 January 1957 with regard to the use of the United Nations Emergency Force. And this is what the Secretary-General said:
"(b) The use of military force"-there has been no suggestion that it is going to be boy scouts or the Red Cross or the Ladies of the Order of the Golden Cross or anything of that character-"by the United Nations other than under Chapter VII of the Charter requires the consent of the States in which the force is to operate. Moreover, such use must be undertaken and developed in a manner consistent with the principles mentioned under (a) above"-that is, that there should be no change in the status juris.
Sub-paragraph (a), which I do not want to labour in the Council, definitely refers to the fact that there should be no change resulting from military action. It says: "The United Nations cannot condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the provisions of the Charter."
But this is exactly what is being done. Pakistan invaded by military action-it was not welcomed as a liberator-it invaded the territory and by annexation changed the position; and if the points raised by the representative of the Philippines were to be followed, then this would be an attempt to change the status juris as a result of military invasion. Therefore, the Secretary-General's authority, which has gained sanctity because it has been accepted by the General Assembly, is very much a point to be taken into account.
The next passage is even more important from some points of view, where it continues :
"It must, furthermore,"-and I am sorry if the Secretary General feels embarrassed by this-"be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial."
If that sentence is correct, there is not a more inapt context in which the United Nations Force can be brought in.
Now of course it can be argued that no one is trying to send a United Nations force over there to force itself upon us.
The answer is two-fold-and I am sorry that my friend General Romulo who, by his career and by his knowledge of the problems of law and order, and perhaps of disorder, and by his knowledge of these problems, has not taken some note of what I said this morning, when he said that the whole plan as put forward by Pakistan, "deserves consideration"-"deserves", I suppose, is the kind of phrase that usually has some sanctified significance, some holy merit attached to it. When it was put to us, the whole idea was that everybody else should go away the Indian Army should go away, the Kashmir police and militia should go away, and everyone else should go away, and the Pakistanis also, except that of course forty-five battalions of the "Azad'' forces would still be there. And then there would be a very good "banana fight" in the place. That is the position; that is to say, who is going to keep order in this place? When the representative of the Philippines tells us that it is not intended that it should use force, I ask what is it going to do here? Who is going to be responsible for law and order in this area? That is our responsibility.
I have quoted sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 5 of the report of the Secretary-General, and I will now proceed to (c):
"(c) United Nations actions must respectfully the rights of Member Governments recognized in the Charter, and international agreements not contrary to the aims of the Charter, which are concluded in exercise of those rights."
These three sub paragraphs, (a), (b) and (c) are conclusive in regard to the ineptness and the illegality of this; and what I have submitted in regard to the law and order problem does make the whole thing-I will not use any stronger words totally impractical.
But over and above that, the United States and the United Kingdom, who produced this draft resolution which has now been co-sponsored by others, had both private and public knowledge that the Government of India would in no circumstances agree to this. Therefore, to produce a proposition which requires the consent of the parties, in the face of our declaration that we will not agree to it, is either to take the view that what we say does not mean anything or that their persuasive powers would be so great that we would surrender our principles. I think that neither of those conclusions is justified. Therefore, the moment the Head of the Government of India, in a public declaration on its behalf, said that we would not agree to the introduction of this force and, what is more, would view the introduction of this force even into the Pakistan-occupied area-which is our sovereign territory under enemy occupation, if only an enemy for purposes of Kashmir -as constituting a violation. What is more, I said before the Council on behalf of my Government, that any Member State participating in the force, in so far as it acts contrary to the United Nations Charter, would be violating our sovereignty and coming in the way of our bilateral relations.
I refer to the Charter and I ask those who are responsible for the draft resolution to find me one word in Chapter VI, which is concerned with the pacific settlement of disputes, with reference to a United Nations force. There is none. Therefore, it is not possible, it is contrary to the Charter. It is only in regard to this that we want to refer to any amendments such as those of the delegation of Colombia to any part of the draft resolution, although this would be a much milder proposition than that which has been put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom.
I would like next to refer to the observations made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 772nd meeting. I would like to say that the statement made in support of the draft resolution is an attempt, in so far as words can do it, to try and make it palatable to us. Every attempt has been made by the very able representative of the United Kingdom to make this proposition something that we would buy, that the Government of India can tell the people is not too bad. But that does not take away from its character. The leader of our country who created our independence, Mahatma Gandhi, told the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, when he produced a certain form for settlement at that time: "It is no use your giving me names; I must take it, I must weigh it, I must bite it, I must sound it, I must taste it and see what it is like." So we have masticated this during the lunch hour; and I pay my very humble tribute, but a great one, to Sir Pierson Dixon for the great dexterity of language in which this very difficult and un palatable pill has been presented to us in the most agreeable fashion. There is no doubt in my mind that it is his desire and the desire of his Government that we should accept this because they probably believe that it will lead to something that they want. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, there is no antagonism to India, but of course there is a long history whereby the whole of these problems are associated with our two countries.
I would like to refer to a passage of Sir Pierson Dixon's statement. May I say here, without lacking in deference to the Council, that in so far as we have heard them, the debates on the resolution have been largely between the Soviet Union and the rest of the members, so Kashmir does not come in a great deal. But still there is some reference to the draft resolution in this speech. Now this is what Sir Pierson Dixon says:
"...by recalling all the resolutions, the present draft is designed to avoid arguments about the different weight to be given to previous resolutions. This, I should have. thought, would be reassuring to both parties." (772nd meeting, para. 146.)
With the greatest respect, I submit that this is exactly what it is not. There is a difference in the weight of these resolutions. Resolutions which the parties accept and those which they do not accept are in different categories. The resolution of 17 January 1948, and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, the assurances given, these are all resolutions which carry a greater weight that is because we have accepted them, we are parties to them, whether we like them or not. Therefore, to suggest that there is no difference of weight is exactly contrary to the purposes in mind, namely, to create a receptivity in our minds.
One of the main objections to the draft resolution that we would have if we were members of the Security Council is, namely, that these resolutions have been recalled to rub salt in the wounds that already exist. They are things we have rejected over and over again. They deny propositions which have been admitted by the Security Council before and they embody violations of the Charter of the United Nations. That is one point I would like to make.
I am happy to welcome the statement in Sir Pierson Dixon's observation which says:
"I was asked to say why the resolution of 24 January 1957 had greater significance than that of 17 January 1948. My answer is that it has no greater significance." (Ibid., para. 148.)
This is the first time in the whole of this debate that a member of the Security Council has stated in definite terms that the 17 January 1948 resolution is sacrosanct. We welcome this and we hope the Security Council will pursue this matter. If the 17 January resolution is observed you will be in the beginning of a settlement.
I have already dealt with the problems of the United Nations forces so as it is not necessary for me to refer to Sir Pierson Dixon's observation which says:
"It is surely in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Charter that the Security Council should tell the parties that it believes that this idea might, conditionally, deserve consideration." (Ibid., para. 153.)
My distinguished colleague said that it is deserving of consideration. I submit that it is a recommendation of something contrary to the letter and to the spirit of Charter; and what is more, contrary to the very basis on which a solution can be found, namely, the agreement of the two sides. We have definitely said we will not agree to this. It is a Pakistani proposal which has been taken up by others.
We welcome the statement which is a modification of previous positions held by the United Kingdom. The representative of the United Kingdom said:
"Demilitarization in this context means simply the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan." (Ibid., para. 151.)
I want to ask my distinguished colleague, either publicly or privately, if it means that, then why not start with the first part of the resolution of 13 August 1948? That is where it was intended to start because it is only after the first part is completed that the second part comes into operation. And it is only when the first and second parts are completed that the third part comes into operation. If the demilitarization in this context means the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the commission's resolutions, why not do it? The mistake in this matter, for which we are to a certain extent responsible, has been in talking at the wrong end and getting into this higher calculus about quantums and forces and things of that character.
Therefore if "demilitarization in this context means simply the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan'', may I take it that the United Kingdom now subscribes to the immediate operation of parting paragraphs B and E. of the resolution of 13 August 1948. That is not demilitarization, but it is connected with it. I would like to say and I hope it will be conveyed to the Government of the United Kingdom, I have no doubt it will be that we cannot accept the view expressed in the conclusion that the draft resolution before us prejudices no position, because it is merely a request to us for a matter deserving consideration. I ask in all fairness: look into the history of this case. Whenever we have looked at something, we have been told that we have bought it. Now if this idea is introduced in the document which has all the sanctity of a Security Council resolution, we get involved in this matter. Therefore we cannot agree to the position that it prejudices no position, especially in view of the colleagues whom the United Kingdom has been able to obtain in support of the proposition. It has the virtue that it bridges the Indian election, without halting all the attempts to find a solution during that period. We are grateful that it is more or less agreed on all sides that the Government of India would not be able to give consideration to any matters of policy until the elections are over. For that we are very grateful and we express appreciation. The other part, I will come to when I am dealing with the last of these observations, namely, the question of its effect.
That takes us to the statement made by the representative of the United States at the 772nd meeting. We are here in extreme difficulty. We have right through this debate, in view of the sincere attempts we are both making to establish better goodwill in the world as between ourselves and other people, and in spite of the strong differences that exist between their policy and ours in regard to Asia, when the United States became a party to taking under protection all territories south of a particular parallel, we have been very careful not to drag in a great number of matters. Even at this stage we do not propose to lift the whole curtain, because the way of conciliation does not lie in saying everything that can be said; but the duties to one's Government demand that what must be said has to be said.
Now here is part of the statement made by the representative of the United States at the 772nd meeting. I am very sorry my distinguished colleague, Mr. Lodge is not present; that, however, makes no difference because it is a statement of the United States Government. It reads:
"Now, the cease-fire is in effect. But it is the failure to reach agreement on the terms of a truce that has prevented further progress toward a plebiscite." (772nd meeting, para. 112.)
I would say with great respect that this totally ignores. everything that the Government of India had to say this morning. I think it is deserving of courtesy between two friendly nations that at least those arguments should have been entertained and if necessary argued and rejected. Our position is that part I have not observed. Now when the distinguished representative of the United States says, "the cease fire is in effect". if he means thereby there are no hostilities, we agree, But that is not what it says. Part I "Cease-fire order", that is the heading-part I, paragraph B says:
"The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." [S/1100, para. 75].
Now that is what we have been doing for nine years. Therefore our position, as I stated categorically this morning, is: it is a violation of part I, and it is the duty of the Security Council in our humble submission, being parties to this resolution, to take note of it. We have not succeeded so far in getting any expression of opinion from any member of the Security Council which in any way reflects upon the many acts of omission and commission on the part of Pakistan contrary to the Charter, contrary to the agreements and contrary to the resolutions.
Therefore, this is entirely erroneous. We want to enter a caveat against it: that we do not accept the position stated by the United States that the cease-fire, as far as it means part I of the agreement, is in effect. It is not in effect. On the contrary, it stands violated and continues to be violated, as it has been for the last nine years.
We are told that the four-Power draft resolution is designed to assist India and Pakistan to carry out the obligations which they have assumed and which they have reaffirmed before the Council. This would be a good occasion for me to dwell on a similar sentiment expressed by my colleague from the United Kingdom. This draft resolution not only will not promote the process of bettering relations and of finding solutions but will hinder that process. It will impose enormous burdens upon our Government in regard to our public opinion. It will have the effect of fomenting communal feelings in India. It is a draft resolution, I suggest, that is just not of a healing nature, but one that is calculated to create irritation and suspicion and, what is more, to confirm the feeling in the minds of our people that there is no fair approach to this problem in this Council so far as India is concerned. (These are strong words, but I am asked to say them. I am only repeating what the Head of my Government has said.)
Therefore, the view that is stated here that this draft resolution is designed to assist India and Pakistan to carry out obligations is a wish which we appreciate the sentiment-but, as far as facts are concerned, that is not true; it will have the reverse effect.
I come to the last of the observations by the representative of the United States. Before that, I want to express my regret to my colleague from Australia in regard to what I said about the United Nations force in Egypt. I notice now that there is only one resolution on which this country abstained. But my statement was cast in the mould that it was generally not in favour of the action that was taken at that time. In any case, the argument was that the two cases were not parallel. In one case there was the invasion of Egypt, and the purpose of the United Nations Force was to remove the invaders. In this case, the invasion is by Pakistan, and it is the invader that is inviting a United Nations force. Therefore, you are not on the side of the householder, but on the other side, to whom you can give whatever name you like.
The representative of the United States tell us :
"The United States values its friendship with India and Pakistan."-So far as we are concerned, we have no doubt about that. So far as Pakistan is concerned, it is not for us to say-"Reference has been made here to our relationship with Pakistan.``-We have, and I am afraid you will hear of it as time goes on-"The United States is glad to be associated with Pakistan in collective security arrangements and to be assisting it in a co-operative defence effort. We have always attempted to approach the Kashmir problem on its merits, and we do not believe that our collaboration with Pakistan in area defence affects the merits of this case." [772nd meeting, para. 120].
I think it is a legitimate question for a comparatively large country like ours, with our neighbours who are not interested in this area defence and, what is more, have expressly pronounced themselves against it, to ask How can it be a friendly act when the United States intervenes in our area, along with its allies, with one participant in what is called are, defence? How does this differ from the kind of protectorate that was proclaimed by Britain and France over various territories in the past, in which they took these territories under their protection? Therefore, we repudiate this idea of area defence. Area defence-in which area?
If this stood alone, it would not matter. But I would like you to listen to this and read this side by side with the view of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. Then, I think that you, in whatever way you vote-some of you, if not all of you and certainly the peoples of the world will begin to understand that here in regard to Kashmir, while resolutions are being passed without any reference to realities, there is being fomented a situation which can lead to a great catastrophe.
This is an account of what General Ayub said on 15 December:
"In the event of a major war, Pakistan was not likely to send an expeditionary force."
So all this furniture that was sent over is only for domestic purposes. It is not coming to anybody's defence. It is not coming, I say to Sir Pierson Dixon, as the expeditionary force went to the Battle of the Marne in 1914. It is not going, as the Indian Army went, into the desert of Libya. This is a categorical statement. It goes on to say further that it is for the purpose of "the interior lines".
Then, according to the report, General Ayub says:
"Pakistan's potential enemies were a good deal stronger. in potential and superior in number and in equipment. Therefore, we have got to have an army which is standing ready to take the field within a week."
Now where will Pakistan go within a week? It could not be to the Soviet Union. It can only be next door to us. And we have statements of persons, to whom I cannot make reference out of respect to the Secretary-General, who have pointed out that the enemy of Pakistan lies to the South of Pakistan. There you are: "standing ready to take the field within a week".
It does not stop there. I am not going to read the whole of this. General Ayub continues as follows:
"I hope to have an Army which is highly skilled."-and that is the ambition of every general-"It is on that that the future of Pakistan will depend."
That is a very pathetic phrase.
The report goes on say:
"General Ayub said that the American commitment was to give the Pakistan Army means to create certain units that would balance certain divisions. This programme has now been geared in. It is moving splendidly. It is a limited programme.
"A certain number of divisions had been allowed to be balanced But there was enough manpower in the Army balance and double the number of the divisions, though that would perhaps require enormous amounts of money."
Therefore, it is not a small arrangement that is being contemplated.
"A strong Pakistan Army would create an enormous amount of stability in this region.-"tha to its say, the purpose, according to the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief; I do not charge this to the United States-"We could control a number of difficult situations in this region."
We are probably in difficult situations. Are we to assume that the United Nations-and certainly we do not assume that the United States does-has come to the conclusion that the stability in a region is dependent upon its army? Stability in a region is dependent upon the economic well being of the people, upon their contentment, upon the progress of democracy-by conferring, for example, upon the people in "Azad '' Kashmir the power to express themselves instead of suppressing them. And here, we have a strong statement from the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief that "a strong Pakistan Army would create an enormous amount of stability in this region. We could control a number of difficult situations in this region."
I have not come to the best piece of this. It comes now. This is what must worry everybody. The report states:
"General Ayub said that this was the first time that exercises envisaging the use of tactical atomic weapons were being staged in Pakistan." -I did not invent this "Hitherto, Pakistan Army studies have been confined to the studies of atomic warfare in the tactical field.
"To put our observations to the practical test this exercise is being staged. "Conclusions and the technique of fighting in the nuclear battlefields would be evolved from this exercise.
"Exercise is being staged keeping in view the terrain in West Pakistan plains where riverine obstacles' '-there are no rivers on the other side in the way of obstacles, they are on this side. I do not have a copy of a map to circulate, but you know where the riverine obstacles are-" are frequent. The battle has been developing during the past two months. Now the climax is about to be reached." This is about Army manoeuvres. "A riverine obstacle across which the 'enemy' is concentrated is to be crossed so that the 'enemy' concentration. can be attacked from the rear with the tactical atomic weapons."
I ask the Security Council to make its own estimate of whose rear. This is the position which we are facing. This is the position which we are facing in regard to the enormous quantity of war material that has gone there. Now we have, on the admission of General Ayub, the supply of atomic tactical weapons to our area by a country that has pledged itself not to use its advanced atomic knowledge-its considerably advanced atomic knowledge over Pakistan or any other Asian country, for that matter-for military purposes. For our act of self-abnegation not to use atomic power for destructive purposes, we are threatened by the other side with attacks from the rear and, for the first time, exercises are taking place with atomic tactical weapons. Not a needle is given by the United States, with a view to attacking us. But I submit that with all the power that the United States possesses-moral, physical, political, dollar and everything else-it would be impossible for them to control what Pakistan has, any more than a parent can control the use of a pistol or a penknife by a child. That is the position.
This is our reply to the remarks by the United States about the glory of that alliance. After all, there was no point of introducing it into the statement other-wise. My delegation has gone much further into this field than it had intended to go. The initiative was not ours. of the matter. We deeply regret this aspect. I hope that the representative of the United States will not mind my saying this. It is the practice, which we, derive from the father of our nation, to tell the other party what we are going to do. Therefore, in making these statements, we have informed the United States delegation that we propose to use these facts.
The Security Council is the master of its own procedure and its own decisions. It has heard many statements, some of which having no relation to the facts set out in the documents before the Council. The only question to which thought must be given now is: What is the effect of all this? We came here under Chapter VI of the Charter; there has been no suggestion of using Chapter VII. We have not asked for it. It cannot be used against us because we have not invaded anyone's territory unless, of course, you were to accept the view of the representative of the Philippines that we have no business in our own area. To carry out that view would take a lot of doing, even here. Therefore, the only procedures that can be adopted are pacific procedures. The essence of pacific procedures is mutual consent. The Security Council after 20 January 1948 has time after time passed resolutions under the initiative of the United Kingdom, afterwards joined by the United States, and now jointly, which India has not been able to accept. They have been informed publicly and privately that we have been unable to accept them, but the Security Council continued to pass resolutions without any reference to conciliation, without any reference to the possibility of acceptance, and, what is more, in this particular case a draft resolution has been presented which largely embodies the proposals that have been put forward by one side. This is not calculated to bring about a settlement. We hear phrases, even from General Romulo, that the two sides must decide on something themselves. But no one is helping us. The result of this decision and its effect upon the people will be once again that there is no conformity between the resolution and the ethical principles of the Charter and that something has gone wrong somewhere. That will be the result of this kind of procedure where you speak about demilitarization when the invader has made further conquests and has reaped harvests from them, and not a whisper is evoked by the eleven nations gathered round this table. A part of our territory has been forcibly incorporated and over a million of our people are under suppression. What answer will be given to these matters by our people who will go to the polls to record their verdict? You will know by the middle of next month what our people feel about this.
I say in all sincerity that both Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Barco, in speaking for Mr. Lodge, is entirely sincere in thinking that their presentation will assist in getting somewhere. But we are in this problem. How do we convey this to our people? that the proposal which reflects the views of the side which invaded us is a proposal that will bring about conciliation ? It has been said that there is no objection to looking at something even if it is not accepted. But every time we have looked at something we have been told that we have accepted it. We do not want that to be repeated.
I say, therefore, that the Security Council now takes upon itself another dose of serious responsibility. Let not General Romulo say that I was admonishing. I am here to represent the views of the Government of India. What is more, I am happy in the sense that I have no compunctions and no conflict of mind or conscience on this matter. I have read these papers, thousands and thousands of pages of them. I have spent nights and days over them, and I have no doubt that any impartial and competent examination of these documents will lead to one conclusion only, and that is that the nine years of effort that have been spent by Pakistan in consolidating its conquest and invasion have been in violation of the Charter; that the Security Council has been invoked not in order to bring about peace but in order to be used as a sledge hammer to strike another blow against us.
We make no threats. I repeat once again my final words: We shall not do a thing, whatever are our political, moral, ethical, legal or any other rights, which involves the use of force to alter situations. That is our position at present. What will happen in generations to come nobody can ever guarantee. I would like that also to be remembered, because some of us are drawing close to our end and others will come after. This may go on for a long time.
But while we will not do that, I want to repeat again that all the signs which I read out to the Council in the statements by General Ayub, all the information that we have about the massing of these troops, all that goes on in the Hobbies of the United Nations, which members may seen in the Press tomorrow-this is all an indication of a repetition of the processes of 1947. And again we shall be told in this Council that the Indian Army moved in first. I want to be perfectly frank with the Council, as I am sure my Government would want me to be. We have no irregulars, we have no guerrillas, we have no bandits-we have no one except our regular Army and our armed police force to meet aggression. On the other side there are the irregulars, the bandits, the people who have committed rapine and plunder, people who raped and murdered others of the same faith, the people who talk about co-religionists. They are the pioneers and the forerunners of the new invasion. We have to meet them with regular troops, and the regular troops are identifiable. Let it not be said in the Security Council at any time that the Indian Army moved in first.
I pledge the faith of my people that if our territory is attacked, we shall defend it to the last man. All these threats. that have been made in the Council will only create irritation. We deeply regret, as my Prime Minister has said, the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 January in regard to the Constituent Assembly [S/3779], the same Security Council that would not lift a finger when half the territory was incorporated. And here we have done nothing unconstitutional and have made no physical change from the position of 1947. Sir Pierson Dixon, however, believed that we were doing something wrong and he accepted the crisis atmosphere.
I therefore beg of Sir Pierson Dixon to realize that whatever arrangements he may come to so as to push this thing through and to hand over to India what amounts to a non conciliatory effort, what amounts to a Pakistan proposal, will not bring about peace. However, whatever resolution the Security Council may adopt, however hostile it may be to us and however much we may not be able to accept it, at no time has the Government of India said that it would not look at it.
So far as the President of the Security Council is concerned, he is welcome in our country at any time, but his terms of reference have to be examined in a political context. That is why, as the people who are most affected by this, we say to you, before you take another step which may worsen the situation-a situation already bad-which feeds the dogs of war, which encourages the forces of conflict and, what is more, at a time of a great national election when 200 million people are in the process of political awakening, which conveys to them feelings which have relation to communal tensions, to Hindu-Moslem feelings or the intervention of other peoples or the past relations of Britain with India or theories about relations with other countries and with regard to military alliances, that all these things are fraught with great danger.
We have no right except to plead, because we are not members of the Council. We cannot give you counsel. You have asked us to express our opinions, and our opinion is that this is a step fraught with danger.