20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 722 held on 20 February 1957.
20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 722 held on 20 February 1957.
The Australian delegation is happy to see that the representative of India is well enough to take his place at the Council table this morning and to make further statements on behalf of the Government of India that we were promised.
We have listened with great interest to this statement, and I must say that I personally feel more convinced than ever of the desirability of the Council arranging for its President to visit the area and to report back to the Council as provided in the four-Power draft resolution [S/3787] that is before it.
I feel it desirable to comment briefly on the two sets of amendments submitted to the Council by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Colombia.
As to the Soviet Union amendments [S/3789] I am afraid I see nothing in their favour. Is the representative of the Soviet Union really interested in a sound and rational discussion of this problem of Kashmir ? His own statements seem to contradict his amendments. At the 770th meeting, Mr. Sobolev had this to say:
"...the Kashmir question has in fact already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of the Republic of India". [770th meeting, para. 135.]
If this question of Kashmir has been settled, why does the representative of the Soviet Union support a proposal that the President of the Council should go to the sub-continent to investigate the question ? Surely there would be no point in requesting you to make this long and arduous journey to India and Pakistan if the matter were already settled. One may well ask: What are the real objectives of the Soviet Union in this connexion ?
If we look further into Mr. Sobolev's statement, we find that he has proclaimed that:
"...the Charter does not provide for the use of United Nations forces to impose by forces a plebiscite in any country" [770th meeting, para. 139.]
Of course not. But I suggest to my colleagues that this is a gross distortion of the wording and intention of the draft resolution. If Mr. Sobolev had read the preamble carefully, he would have noted the words:
... in so far as it"-the proposal of the representative of Pakistan concerning the use of a temporary United Nations force-"might contribute towards the achievement. of demilitarization... the use of such a force would deserve consideration". [S/3787.] Nobody has suggested in this Council that troops should be used to force the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.
Of course, it does not come as a surprise that the Soviet Union would be opposed to any suggestion of a plebiscite which would enable the people of Kashmir to express their own views on their future political allegiance. After all, the Soviet Union has often shown a preference for other methods of determining such questions.
Nor, I suppose, should we be surprised that the Soviet Union is opposed to any proposal for the introduction of a temporary United Nations force into Kashmir. We are all familiar with the position of the Soviet Union on the United Nations Emergency Force at present in the Middle East.
And as for Me. Sobolev's suggestion that all would be quiet in Kashmir were it not artificial attempts to create trouble there, these words have so familiar a ring that they can carry little conviction to the Council, particularly in view of the statements we have heard from the parties.
In short, the amendments of the Soviet Union representative seem to me to ignore all that has gone before on this question of Kashmir.
With regard to the amendments proposed by the Colombian delegation [S/3791/Rev.], I would only say that while I fully appreciate its motives in putting them forward, I find them difficult to accept since I feel that the draft resolution as it stands would provide a suitable basis for the mission that we wish to entrust to the President of the Council.
Before concluding these remarks, I wish to correct certain references that the representative of India made last Friday [769th meeting] to my own statement in the Council (768th meeting, paras. 48 to 59]. Mr. Menon complained that I had drawn an analogy between the United Nations Emergency Force now in Egypt and the proposal of the representative of Pakistan which is referred to in the draft resolution before us. Moreover, he said that this analogy "comes from the representative of Australia, who initially refused to have anything to do with this business of sending a force to Egypt in order to implement the purposes of the Charter" [769th meeting, para. 103].
I can only say that Mr. Menon's recollection was at fault when he made this remark. There were three votes in the first emergency special session on the subject of the United Nations Emergency Force. On the first of those resolutions Australia abstained because the preamble recalled earlier resolutions relating to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and French forces which we had not supported. But we made it clear that we supported in principle the establishment of UNEF and we voted for the next two resolutions dealing with arrangements for the Force. So there is no foundation for Mr. Menon's suggestion that Australia's position on UNEF has been such as to make it inappropriate for me to draw an analogy between that Force and the Force proposed for Kashmir, if I had desired to do so. As a matter of fact, my observations on this question were carefully worded to avoid entering into any discussion of that kind.
What I said about the Pakistan proposal for United Nations force is as follows:
"The idea", I said, "is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Without drawing any parallel between the situation that led to the General Assembly's decision to establish that Force and the problem of securing appropriate measures of demilitarization of Kashmir as a preliminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for anybody to deny that the use of such a force, insofar as it might contribute towards demilitarization, would, in the words of the draft resolution 'deserve consideration'." [768th meeting, para. 53.]
I appreciate that Mr. Menon did not have the text of my statement before him when he spoke and that may explain why his own comments somewhat distorted my remarks. I have gone into this partly in order to set the record straight and also, if possible, to reinforce my previous plea to Mr. Menon to recognize our good will in this matter and to accept our draft resolution in the spirit in which it is offered.
I must say that regarding this proposal for the use of a temporary force, the comments of the representative of Pakistan [770th meeting, para, 120 to 128] towards the conclusion of his speech on Monday, indicating his understanding of the functions that a United Nations force might fulfil in this connexion, struck me as being very reasonable. But these are only observations which, along with the other statements made here, would need to be taken into account by our President in his discussion with India and Pakistan.
It is the hope of the Australian delegation that, along with other matters, our President will explore this proposal with the Governments of India and Pakistan and that they will give this, as indeed the other matters studied by the Council on this occasion, their closest consideration.
Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): The Council has before it a series of amendments to the joint draft resolution [S/3787] proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union [S/3789], and it also has before it amendments proposed by the delegation of Colombia [S/3791/Rev. 1].
As regards the latter, I appreciate the sincere desire of the representative of Colombia, shown in his speeches, to be of assistance in suggesting amendments which he has put forward in the hope that they might prove acceptable to both parties. I would only say that these amendments make certain references and omit certain points, with the result that the balance of the original draft is upset. I therefore hope that he will find it possible not to press his amendments.
The Soviet Union amendments have to be read in the light of the Soviet Union representative's statement at the 770th meeting of the Security Council. The amendments by themselves give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise.
However, the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union suggests either that the Soviet Union delegation is ignorant of the facts about Kashmir or that it is making an attempt to create mistrust and exacerbate existing misunderstanding in the sub-continent.
What does he say? He asserts bluntly that:
"The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actual fact already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves." [770th meeting, para. 135]
What does this mean ? And then Mr. Sobolev says:
"We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now, meets with the objections of one of the parties; that it has in fact been rejected by the party." [Ibid., para. 138.]
But it is clear from the speeches of the representative of India that he has not at any stage rejected on behalf of the Government of India the idea of a plebiscite. He referred to the conditions which have to be met before it is possible to have a plebiscite. He has talked about the difficulties in the way of a plebiscite, but he has not suggested that he rejects the idea of a plebiscite. If, however, it is the Soviet Union view that the question of Kashmir has already been settled by the people of Kashmir itself and that the idea of a plebiscite at the present time has been rejected by one of the parties, what then is the purpose of the representative of the Soviet Union in suggesting that the interested parties could use this time, that is to say, the present time, for making new efforts to settle existing differences by means of direct negotiations? Negotiations about what? If, to accept Mr. Sobolev's contention, the question of Kashmir has already been settled and one party rejects the idea of a plebiscite, how-on what basis-could such discussions take place ? With what sincerity does he propose that the President of the Security Council should go out into the field to consider, together with the Governments of India and Pakistan, the existing situation in Kashmir as well as possible methods of setting existing differences ? Yet, despite the strange illogicality in the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union, he did at least agree to that. It is possible to attribute the words of his speech to innocence or ignorance rather than to anything else. I hope, therefore, that he will not make himself responsible for preventing such a visit by our President from taking place.
I said that the Soviet Union amendments give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise; but in my view the effect of those amendments is to emasculate the draft resolution to such an extent that the resulting proposal would not be likely to make a contribution to the settlement of the Kashmir problem. I think I can best explain my reasons-and I shall do it as shortly as I can-by pointing out the significance of the points in the four-Power draft resolution which the Soviet proposal seeks to eliminate or amend.
The proposal of the Soviet Union would omit the whole of the preamble except for one paragraph which would be amended, paragraph to which I shall come later.
Now what does our draft resolution say ? In the first: preambular paragraph it recalls the Security Council resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779], its previous resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In doing this, it is true that it thereby recalls certain parts of the previous resolutions which have only a historical interest. But by recalling all the resolutions, the present draft is designed to avoid arguments about the different weight to be given to previous resolutions. This, I should have thought, would be reassuring to both parties.
It is true that the four-Power draft resolution makes a specific reference to the resolution of 24 January. But, after all, that resolution is a preliminary resolution which says that the Security Council "decides to continue its consideration of the dispute"; it is a resolution passed at the present series of meetings, and it would be anomalous to omit a reference to it. I was asked to say why the resolution of 24 January 1957 had greater significance than that of 17 January 1948. The answer is that it has no greater significance. In fact, I drew attention to the resolution of 17 January 1948 in my intervention at the 768th meeting, by reading out the relevant part of it [768th meeting, para, 17],
Then an amendment is proposed to the clause "Having taken into consideration the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan ''. I find it difficult to understand why. My Government is deeply concerned to find a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem, and I can assure the representative of the Soviet Union that the statements made here have received the closest consideration not only by my delegation, but by my Government too.
Another effect of the Soviet Union amendment is to eliminate the word "dispute" in the draft resolution. I am puzzled that there should be any objection to this word. Not only has it been used in many Security Council resolutions, but it was used in the joint communique issued to the Press in New Delhi on 20 August 1953.
The Soviet Union proposal would eliminate from the draft resolution the clauses referring to "demilitarization". I am glad of this opportunity to clarify the meaning we attach to this important word. Demilitarization in this context means simply the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I repeat, as laid down in these resolutions. Demilitarization in our view is an essential process, to which Pakistan and India both agreed, as the way to the settlement of the problem. It is, moreover, an essential step on which both parties have laid the greatest stress.
Next, the Soviet Union proposal would remove the last preambular paragraph. Certain words in it were criticized, but this paragraph must be read as a whole. This paragraph is an expression of belief, and the sole belief expressed is that the use of a temporary United Nations force would deserve consideration in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarization envisaged in the resolutions-not just demilitarization, but demilitarization as envisaged in the resolutions and towards the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The belief is that expressed in the conditional tense. The belief is that the use of such a force would deserve consideration in so far as "It might contribute".
Now, I am aware of the strong feelings about the idea of a United Nations force. Nothing that has been said on this subject, however, appears very relevant to the paragraph in the draft resolution as it is actually drafted, or to provide a reason for the rejection of the draft resolution. It is surely in accord. with the letter and the spirit of the Charter that the Security Council should tell the parties that it believes in this idea. might conditionally deserve consideration. Is not an idea worth. examining calmly with the President of the Security Council as a possible way of achieving progress ? I assert again that this draft resolution, in our view, in present circumstances, is in the true interest of both parties.
I would here repeat-and I trust my words will go out beyond the confines of this Council-that we approach this question in the simple spirit of wishing to see a just and fair solution. We stand ready, as we have throughout the last nine. years, to consider our attitude to Kashmir on the merits, and on the merits alone, of the cases put forward by the parties, and in examining the cases put forward we are deeply conscious of the vital necessity of making a positive contribution towards peaceful progress in the subcontinent. My Government's attitude is based on no other considerations whatsoever.
In conclusion, I repeat that the draft resolution before us prejudices no position. In the view of my Government it is a balanced draft. In our eyes it has virtue in that it bridges the Indian election period, without halting all the attempts to find a solution during that period.
The time must come soon when the Security Council must face its arduous task again. I trust and hope that it will be in a position to do so with further information about the attitudes of the two Governments before it, which will enable it to consider carefully and wisely its next step.
I therefore appeal once more to both Governments to consider the draft resolution before us, not for what is imputed to it, not for what has been read into it, but for what it is.