20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Barco (USA) in the Security Council meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957.
20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Barco (USA) in the Security Council meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957.
The Security Council began its renewed consideration of the Kashmir problem on 16 January. Since then, we have met eleven times and we have had a very thorough airing of this complicated problem.
The United States has listened with great attention to the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan. The Council, as a whole, has shown an enlightened and constructive attitude towards the solution of the problem in the proper spirit of conciliation.
The Soviet Union, however, apparently does not look at this problem in the same way as the other members of the Council. While it has been our hope that the United Nations, through the draft resolution tabled by Australia, Cuba, The United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787], could assist the parties in taking a forward step, the position of the Soviet representative has been essentially negative.
Let me examine the amendments the representative of the USSR has put forward [S/3789]. First, under the Soviet amendments, all mention of previous resolutions, either of the Security Council or of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, is eliminated. The Council would therefore be asked to ignore the obligations of which both India and Pakistan are committed in the United Nations Commission resolution as well as a large number of Security Council resolutions which are still valid.
Second, under the Soviet Union amendments, all mention of the importance of achieving demilitarization is eliminated. Now, the cease fire is in effect. But it is the failure to reach agreement on the terms of a truce that has prevented further progress toward a plebiscite. The elimination of emphasis on demilitarization would ignore the fact that this is the key point at which progress has been blocked.
Third, under the Soviet Union amendments, all mention of the proposal for a United Nations force is deleted. We continue to believe with the other members of the Council that. This idea deserves consideration and that it should be one of the elements borne in mind by the President of the Security Council in his discussions with the parties, in accordance with the terms of the draft resolution. While the President would have sufficient scope to take this proposal into consideration on the basis of the statement of the representative of Pakistan, we believe a clear reference to it in the draft resolution is desirable.
Fourth, the Soviet Union amendments imply that while the Security Council has heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, it has not considered them. This is an odd reflection on the work of the Council. The United States and, I believe, other members have considered the statements of the parties, and the draft resolution reflects conclusions based on their consideration.
Fifth, under the Soviet Union amendments, the word "dispute" is changed into the word "situation". While the Security Council used the word "situation" in its earliest resolutions, it has subsequently used the word "dispute" consistently. This was the word used in the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] and, in our opinion, reflects the facts.
Finally, under the Soviet Union amendments, the terminal date for the mission of the President is elected. We have no strong views on the exact date, but we do think that we must move forward expeditiously. We would not think that the President should be asked to take on this difficult assignment without a definite terminal date, and we consider 15 April 1957 to be a reasonable date on which to ask him to report.
The draft resolution which has been presented by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States is a carefully balanced whole. The Soviet Union amendments. would destroy that balance. The explanation of the amendments made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 18 February [770th meeting, paras. 134 ff.] revealed that his objectives were contrary to those of other members of the Council. The representative of the Soviet Union does not want to have a plebiscite held under United Nations auspices, nor does he even want to consider the possibility of United Nations forces helping the parties to achieve demilitarization. This is something apparently alien to the instincts of the Soviet Union. He has told us that the serious problem with which the Security Council is faced is, to use his words, an "artificial hue and cry" [Ibid, para. 136], and he premises his willingness to have the President of the Security Council examine the "situation in Kashmir'' [Ibid., para, 143], as he put it, by characterizing that situation as one which has already been settled. In the light of these considerations and his own comments that he wants to interrupt the Council's consideration of the problem for some time, we can not consider his amendments as a serious attempt to further the work of the Council, and we cannot accept them.
With respect to the amendments introduced by the representative of Colombia [S/3791/Rev. 1], I would like to reiterate simply that the we conceive the resolution as an integrated whole. We appreciate the constructive approach which, as always, the representative of Colombia has shown here. How. We have doubts about the desirability of the changes embodied in his amendments, and we think that the terminology in the four-Power draft resolution is more likely to lead to constructive results.
The four-Power draft resolution is designed to assist Pakistan to carry out the obligations they have assumed and which they have reaffirmed before this Council.
The United States and I know the Security Council as a whole want to be helpful in resolving this dispute. The United States values its friendship with India and Pakistan. Reference has been made here to our relationship with Pakistan. The United States is glad to be associated with Pakistan in collective security arrangements and to be assisting it in a co-operative defence effort. We have always attempted to approach the Kashmir problem on its merits, and we do not believe that our collaboration with Pakistan in area defence affects the merits of this case. We seek to assist both India and Pakistan-and I say this with great sincerity-in finding a just and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem. We continue to hope that a settlement can be achieved in a manner satisfactory to both. We again urge them to co-operate to that end. We believe that the four-Power draft resolution will assist them, and we urge its adoption.